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2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | We will hear argument next in Case 09-400, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Mr. Schnapper. | 3.88 | 0 | 3.88 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -8.518681 | 4.247814 | WE WILL HEAR ARGUMENT NEXT IN CASE NINE FOUR HUNDRED STAUB V PROCTOR HOSPITAL MISTER SCHNAPPER | 08-1438:0.0 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Actually, it's Mr. Russell. | 1.72 | 3.7 | 5.42 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -7.731526 | 2.701456 | ACTUALLY IT'S MISTER RUSSELL | 08-1438:3.7 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Oh, I'm sorry. I'm looking ahead. And, oh, I've got the argument wrong, too. We will hear argument in 08-1438, Sossamon v. Texas. You don't look like Mr. Schnapper. Mr. Russell. | 5.6 | 5.6 | 11.2 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -9.274369 | 6.35831 | OH I'M SORRY I'M LOOKING AHEAD AND OH I'VE GOT THE ARGUMENT WRONG TOO WE WILL HEAR ARGUMENT IN EIGHT FOURTEEN THIRTY EIGHT SOSSAMON V TEXAS YOU DON'T LOOK LIKE MISTER SCHNAPPER MISTER RUSSELL | 08-1438:5.6 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | By accepting Federal funds for its prisons, Texas consented to suit for appropriate relief for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The question in this case is whether that appropriate relief encompasses damages. If you simply asked what kind of relief is generally appropriate agains... | 22.48 | 11.06 | 33.54 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.17252 | 0.345139 | BY ACCEPTING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR ITS PRISONS TEXAS CONSENTED TO SUIT FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT THE QUESTION IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER THAT APPROPRIATE RELIEF ENCOMPASSES DAMAGES IF YOU SIMPLY ASKED WHAT KIND OF RELIEF IS GENERALLY APPROPRIATE AGAINST A... | 08-1438:11.06 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And so RLUIPA necessarily asks a more precise question, and that is what relief is appropriate against a State that has consented to be sued for violations of this sort. Damages, for example, are perfectly appropriate against a State that has consented to be sued for breach of contract. | 15.48 | 33.86 | 49.34 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.034892 | 0.023075 | AND SO RLUIPA NECESSARILY ASKS A MORE PRECISE QUESTION AND THAT IS WHAT RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE AGAINST A STATE THAT HAS CONSENTED TO BE SUED FOR VIOLATIONS OF THIS SORT DAMAGES FOR EXAMPLE ARE PERFECTLY APPROPRIATE AGAINST A STATE THAT HAS CONSENTED TO BE SUED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT | 08-1438:33.86 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Now, what would it be, Mr. Russell, if there were a suit under RFRA | 6.32 | 49.24 | 55.56 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.214727 | 0.114383 | NOW WHAT WOULD IT BE MISTER RUSSELL IF THERE WERE A SUIT UNDER RFRA | 08-1438:49.24 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | because a Federal penal institution was not allowing for the religious practices that the act protects? | 12.02 | 57.58 | 69.6 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.015255 | 0.033021 | BECAUSE A FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTION WAS NOT ALLOWING FOR THE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES THAT THE ACT PROTECTS | 08-1438:57.58 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In -- | 0.28 | 71.7 | 71.98 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.215582 | 0.09375 | IN | 08-1438:71.7 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In a suit under RFRA, could there be -- would damages be an appropriate remedy? | 8.02 | 71.88 | 79.9 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.445238 | 0.114393 | IN A SUIT UNDER RFRA COULD THERE BE WOULD DAMAGES BE AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY | 08-1438:71.88 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In our view they are, although it's a different context, and we recognize that the government disagrees with us on that. We can't point to the Spending Clause-contract analogy that applies with respect to Spending Clause legislation as RFRA applies to the Federal Government. But there are other indications, including f... | 21.24 | 80.46 | 101.7 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.223151 | 0.066631 | IN OUR VIEW THEY ARE ALTHOUGH IT'S A DIFFERENT CONTEXT AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DISAGREES WITH US ON THAT WE CAN'T POINT TO THE SPENDING CLAUSE CONTRACT ANALOGY THAT APPLIES WITH RESPECT TO SPENDING CLAUSE LEGISLATION AS RFRA APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUT THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS INCLUDING FOR EX... | 08-1438:80.46 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, could we back up. You are saying you could get them against the Federal Government too, but the government doesn't think so? | 7.84 | 101.52 | 109.36 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.920764 | 0.338823 | WELL COULD WE BACK UP YOU ARE SAYING YOU COULD GET THEM AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TOO BUT THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T THINK SO | 08-1438:101.52 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That is our view, although we recognize that RLUIPA is different in this respect, in that it's a Spending Clause statute under which -- and this Court's decision in Barnes v. Gorman makes clear that damages are traditionally appropriate relief for the violation of any Spending Clause statute. Of course, there is also a... | 20.44 | 109.92 | 130.36 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.104855 | 0.193817 | THAT IS OUR VIEW ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT RLUIPA IS DIFFERENT IN THIS RESPECT IN THAT IT'S A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE UNDER WHICH AND THIS COURT'S DECISION IN BARNES VERSUS GORMAN MAKES CLEAR THAT DAMAGES ARE TRADITIONALLY APPROPRIATE RELIEF FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE OF COURSE THERE IS ALSO A TR... | 08-1438:109.92 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Take statutes like Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, section 504 of the ADA, the list goes on and on, where Congress has created damages as the quintessential remedy to enforce civil rights, and when Congress has subjected States to suits under such statutes, it has always put them on equal footing with other defendants a... | 21.82 | 130.88 | 152.7 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.432402 | 0.062101 | TAKE STATUTES LIKE TITLE SIX TITLE SEVEN TITLE NINE SECTION FIVE OH FOUR OF THE ADA THE LIST GOES ON AND ON WHERE CONGRESS HAS CREATED DAMAGES AS THE QUINTESSENTIAL REMEDY TO ENFORCE CIVIL RIGHTS AND WHEN CONGRESS HAS SUBJECTED STATES TO SUITS UNDER SUCH STATUTES IT HAS ALWAYS PUT THEM ON EQUAL FOOTING WITH OTHER DEFEN... | 08-1438:130.88 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But did it use such language as "appropriate relief"? | 2.98 | 152.6 | 155.58 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -0.037805 | 0.070418 | BUT DID IT USE SUCH LANGUAGE AS APPROPRIATE RELIEF | 08-1438:152.6 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, for example -- | 0.74 | 155.52 | 156.26 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.52293 | 0.681369 | WELL FOR EXAMPLE | 08-1438:155.52 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | I mean, that's the question. Our cases say it has to be clear to the State when they go into one of these schemes, it has to be clear what liability they are subjecting themselves to. And in these other cases I think it was clear. I don't think it's clear with simply the word "appropriate relief." | 17.44 | 156.08 | 173.52 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -0.162983 | 0.089767 | I MEAN THAT'S THE QUESTION OUR CASES SAY IT HAS TO BE CLEAR TO THE STATE WHEN THEY GO INTO ONE OF THESE SCHEMES IT HAS TO BE CLEAR WHAT LIABILITY THEY ARE SUBJECTING THEMSELVES TO AND IN THESE OTHER CASES I THINK IT WAS CLEAR I DON'T THINK IT'S CLEAR WITH SIMPLY THE WORD APPROPRIATE RELIEF | 08-1438:156.08 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | No, we are not saying that the word "appropriate relief" in itself supplies the clarity. It's looking at that language and the way the court interprets statutes generally, among other things, looking at the tradition of what constitutes appropriate relief for a violation of this sort. | 13.84 | 173.58 | 187.42 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.234636 | 0.124126 | NO WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT THE WORD APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN ITSELF SUPPLIES THE CLARITY IT'S LOOKING AT THAT LANGUAGE AND THE WAY THE COURT INTERPRETS STATUTES GENERALLY AMONG OTHER THINGS LOOKING AT THE TRADITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES APPROPRIATE RELIEF FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS SORT | 08-1438:173.58 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | We do think that Barnes v. Gorman is appropriate precedent in telling the court -- in telling Texas what kind of relief is generally thought appropriate to satisfy Congress's desire to remedy violations of a Spending Clause statute. We recognize, of course, that Barnes didn't involve sovereign defendants, but the local... | 22.32 | 187.54 | 209.86 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.068856 | 0.030555 | WE DO THINK THAT BARNES VERSUS GORMAN IS APPROPRIATE PRECEDENT IN TELLING THE COURT IN TELLING TEXAS WHAT KIND OF RELIEF IS GENERALLY THOUGHT APPROPRIATE TO SATISFY CONGRESS'S DESIRE TO REMEDY VIOLATIONS OF A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE WE RECOGNIZE OF COURSE THAT BARNES DIDN'T INVOLVE SOVEREIGN DEFENDANTS BUT THE LOCAL GO... | 08-1438:187.54 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | It just comes out of the Spending Clause rather than the Eleventh Amendment. That is, both constitutional provisions prohibit Congress from subjecting defendants to damages suits under Spending Clause legislation without their consent. And this Court has enforced that identical constitutional right with the same clear ... | 20.04 | 209.72 | 229.76 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.046414 | 0.021775 | IT JUST COMES OUT OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE RATHER THAN THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT THAT IS BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PROHIBIT CONGRESS FROM SUBJECTING DEFENDANTS TO DAMAGES SUITS UNDER SPENDING CLAUSE LEGISLATION WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT AND THIS COURT HAS ENFORCED THAT IDENTICAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WITH THE SAME CLEAR STA... | 08-1438:209.72 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Even more, the contract analogy the Court relied on in Barnes is no less apt simply because one of the recipients is a State. | 7.38 | 230.5 | 237.88 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.041938 | 0.069267 | EVEN MORE THE CONTRACT ANALOGY THE COURT RELIED ON IN BARNES IS NO LESS APT SIMPLY BECAUSE ONE OF THE RECIPIENTS IS A STATE | 08-1438:230.5 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | The contract analogy, I suppose, would provide that the meaning of the contract is interpreted against the drafter. Right? | 9.88 | 238.06 | 247.94 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -0.00252 | 0.02133 | THE CONTRACT ANALOGY I SUPPOSE WOULD PROVIDE THAT THE MEANING OF THE CONTRACT IS INTERPRETED AGAINST THE DRAFTER RIGHT | 08-1438:238.06 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That would have been true in Barnes as well. | 1.72 | 248.44 | 250.16 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.030944 | 0.114522 | THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN TRUE IN BARNES AS WELL | 08-1438:248.44 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Yes. So to the extent the State is arguing for a restrictive interpretation, it gets at least a little help from the fact that the Federal Government wrote the statute. | 9.2 | 250.06 | 259.26 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -0.07973 | 0.06056 | YES SO TO THE EXTENT THE STATE IS ARGUING FOR A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION IT GETS AT LEAST A LITTLE HELP FROM THE FACT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WROTE THE STATUTE | 08-1438:250.06 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, it gets the same amount of help that the local governments got in Barnes, which wasn't enough. And Not only does the analogy, I think, apply; so does the remedy. Damages are a quintessential appropriate remedy for breach of contract by a State so long as the State has agreed to be sued for violation of a contract... | 17.3 | 259.16 | 276.46 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.308436 | 0.08306 | WELL IT GETS THE SAME AMOUNT OF HELP THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS GOT IN BARNES WHICH WASN'T ENOUGH AND NOT ONLY DOES THE ANALOGY I THINK APPLY SO DOES THE REMEDY DAMAGES ARE A QUINTESSENTIAL APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY A STATE SO LONG AS THE STATE HAS AGREED TO BE SUED FOR VIOLATION OF A CONTRACT | 08-1438:259.16 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Mr. Russell, the State looks at this statute and says, oh, this statute preserves | 11.62 | 276.36 | 287.98 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.147406 | 0.043902 | MISTER RUSSELL THE STATE LOOKS AT THIS STATUTE AND SAYS OH THIS STATUTE PRESERVES | 08-1438:276.36 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | the PLRA, and under the PLRA there are no damages | 8.46 | 289.86 | 298.32 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.023498 | 0.069341 | THE PLRA AND UNDER THE PLRA THERE ARE NO DAMAGES | 08-1438:289.86 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | without having a physical injury. So putting the PLRA together with "appropriate relief," PLRA is telling us it's not appropriate relief when there is no physical injury. | 15.16 | 300.28 | 315.44 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.081807 | 0.058449 | WITHOUT HAVING A PHYSICAL INJURY SO PUTTING THE PLRA TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE RELIEF PLRA IS TELLING US IT'S NOT APPROPRIATE RELIEF WHEN THERE IS NO PHYSICAL INJURY | 08-1438:300.28 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, I would say two things about that. One, keep in mind that the PLRA limitations only apply to incarcerated individuals. It doesn't apply to the people RLUIPA protects in State-run nursing homes or mental health facilities. So Congress wouldn't have been thinking that appropriate relief is defined in some sense by ... | 17.38 | 315.66 | 333.04 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.184356 | 0.121331 | WELL I WOULD SAY TWO THINGS ABOUT THAT ONE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE PLRA LIMITATIONS ONLY APPLY TO INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS IT DOESN'T APPLY TO THE PEOPLE RLUIPA PROTECTS IN STATE RUN NURSING HOMES OR MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES SO CONGRESS WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN THINKING THAT APPROPRIATE RELIEF IS DEFINED IN SOME SENSE BY THE S... | 08-1438:315.66 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In addition, we think that the fact that Congress expressly said that the PLRA applies to limit the relief that's otherwise available under RLUIPA shows that Congress didn't think that the PLRA itself made the relief inappropriate. It's simply that there is some relief that is otherwise appropriate that will be limited... | 20.32 | 333.26 | 353.58 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.314558 | 0.154944 | IN ADDITION WE THINK THAT THE FACT THAT CONGRESS EXPRESSLY SAID THAT THE PLRA APPLIES TO LIMIT THE RELIEF THAT'S OTHERWISE AVAILABLE UNDER RLUIPA SHOWS THAT CONGRESS DIDN'T THINK THAT THE PLRA ITSELF MADE THE RELIEF INAPPROPRIATE IT'S SIMPLY THAT THERE IS SOME RELIEF THAT IS OTHERWISE APPROPRIATE THAT WILL BE LIMITED I... | 08-1438:333.26 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But in the prison setting, then, isn't it an academic question, because there are not going to be damages anyway? | 7.32 | 353.4 | 360.72 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.305214 | 0.102154 | BUT IN THE PRISON SETTING THEN ISN'T IT AN ACADEMIC QUESTION BECAUSE THERE ARE NOT GOING TO BE DAMAGES ANYWAY | 08-1438:353.4 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | No, that's not true, for a couple of reasons. One, there are many cases involving pecuniary damages. There is destruction of religious items that won't be subject to the PLRA limitation. There are -- there are cases that give rise to pecuniary claims. So there is destruction of a religious item, a Bible or something li... | 21.52 | 360.76 | 382.28 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.160973 | 0.094611 | NO THAT'S NOT TRUE FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS ONE THERE ARE MANY CASES INVOLVING PECUNIARY DAMAGES THERE IS DESTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS ITEMS THAT WON'T BE SUBJECT TO THE PLRA LIMITATION THERE ARE THERE ARE CASES THAT GIVE RISE TO PECUNIARY CLAIMS SO THERE IS DESTRUCTION OF A RELIGIOUS ITEM A BIBLE OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT THE... | 08-1438:360.76 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | There are cases where people are deprived of food for long periods of time. There is a case where a prison refused to transport an inmate for medical treatment outside the facility because he wouldn't take off his yarmulke. Congress, I don't think would have thought that the PLRA limitations rendered a damages remedy u... | 19.52 | 382.16 | 401.68 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.093982 | 0.047096 | THERE ARE CASES WHERE PEOPLE ARE DEPRIVED OF FOOD FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME THERE IS A CASE WHERE A PRISON REFUSED TO TRANSPORT AN INMATE FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT OUTSIDE THE FACILITY BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T TAKE OFF HIS YARMULKE CONGRESS I DON'T THINK WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE PLRA LIMITATIONS RENDERED A DAMAGES REMEDY UNIM... | 08-1438:382.16 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Does it include punitive damages? | 2.56 | 401.5 | 404.06 | scotus:JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR | -11.97966 | 2.069174 | DOES IT INCLUDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES | 08-1438:401.5 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Excuse me? | 0.32 | 403.88 | 404.2 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -10.300065 | 5.980928 | EXCUSE ME | 08-1438:403.88 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Does it include punitive damages? | 2.1 | 404 | 406.1 | scotus:JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR | -0.014862 | 0.097093 | DOES IT INCLUDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES | 08-1438:404.0 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | The statute, I think, does not in light of Barnes, because Barnes said that you get traditional contract remedies and punitive damages are not a traditional contract remedy. Beyond that tradition, though, there's also textual cues in the statue itself. There are three of them that I would like to focus on. I'll list th... | 24.28 | 407.04 | 431.32 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.31851 | 0.139208 | THE STATUTE I THINK DOES NOT IN LIGHT OF BARNES BECAUSE BARNES SAID THAT YOU GET TRADITIONAL CONTRACT REMEDIES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT A TRADITIONAL CONTRACT REMEDY BEYOND THAT TRADITION THOUGH THERE'S ALSO TEXTUAL CUES IN THE STATUE ITSELF THERE ARE THREE OF THEM THAT I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON I'LL LIST THEM AND T... | 08-1438:407.04 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | The second is the Federal enforcement provision, which specifically allows suits by the United States, but only for the equitable and declaratory relief that the State says is the only thing that's available under appropriate relief. And finally is the fact that the statute separately already authorizes suits for injun... | 24.66 | 431.32 | 455.98 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.020885 | 0.026938 | THE SECOND IS THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT PROVISION WHICH SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS SUITS BY THE UNITED STATES BUT ONLY FOR THE EQUITABLE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF THAT THE STATE SAYS IS THE ONLY THING THAT'S AVAILABLE UNDER APPROPRIATE RELIEF AND FINALLY IS THE FACT THAT THE STATUTE SEPARATELY ALREADY AUTHORIZES SUITS FOR INJUNCTI... | 08-1438:431.32 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Beginning with the definitions section, this Court recognized in the United States v. Nordic Village that where Congress, in the Bankruptcy Act, defined "governmental unit" to include both the United States and a State, that Congress was making clear, quote, that "States and Federal sovereigns are to be treated the sam... | 18.06 | 456.8 | 474.86 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.078767 | 0.031367 | BEGINNING WITH THE DEFINITIONS SECTION THIS COURT RECOGNIZED IN THE UNITED STATES VERSUS NORDIC VILLAGE THAT WHERE CONGRESS IN THE BANKRUPTCY ACT DEFINED GOVERNMENTAL UNIT TO INCLUDE BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND A STATE THAT CONGRESS WAS MAKING CLEAR QUOTE THAT STATES AND FEDERAL SOVEREIGNS ARE TO BE TREATED THE SAME FOR... | 08-1438:456.8 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | I think the same lesson comes out of the fact that RLUIPA defines "governments" to include not only States, but local governments, and subjects all governments to the same cause of action for the same appropriate relief. Congress was expressing there as clear as it could that there was a definitional equivalence betwee... | 17.64 | 475.12 | 492.76 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.042222 | 0.072376 | I THINK THE SAME LESSON COMES OUT OF THE FACT THAT RLUIPA DEFINES GOVERNMENTS TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY STATES BUT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND SUBJECTS ALL GOVERNMENTS TO THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE SAME APPROPRIATE RELIEF CONGRESS WAS EXPRESSING THERE AS CLEAR AS IT COULD THAT THERE WAS A DEFINITIONAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN STA... | 08-1438:475.12 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Yeah, but -- but, I mean, that means either that the Federal Government -- that the State government is liable for damages just as municipalities are, or that municipalities are immune to suit for damages just as the States are. I mean, that -- you don't know which way that cuts, do you? | 18.52 | 492.66 | 511.18 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -0.516274 | 0.199743 | YEAH BUT BUT I MEAN THAT MEANS EITHER THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES JUST AS MUNICIPALITIES ARE OR THAT MUNICIPALITIES ARE IMMUNE TO SUIT FOR DAMAGES JUST AS THE STATES ARE I MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHICH WAY THAT CUTS DO YOU | 08-1438:492.66 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, I will point you to other provisions of the statute. | 2.76 | 511 | 513.76 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.816215 | 0.447921 | WELL I WILL POINT YOU TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE | 08-1438:511.0 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, maybe let's talk about them, then. | 1.98 | 513.58 | 515.56 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -1.649715 | 0.543489 | WELL MAYBE LET'S TALK ABOUT THEM THEN | 08-1438:513.58 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Okay. One is the fact that, as I mentioned before, the statute -- and I think the State agrees -- already allows suits for injunctive relief against State officials in their official capacity. The only thing that adding States as defendant would accomplish in light of that would simply be a change in the caption of the... | 23.9 | 515.46 | 539.36 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.103656 | 0.032742 | OKAY ONE IS THE FACT THAT AS I MENTIONED BEFORE THE STATUTE AND I THINK THE STATE AGREES ALREADY ALLOWS SUITS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY THE ONLY THING THAT ADDING STATES AS DEFENDANT WOULD ACCOMPLISH IN LIGHT OF THAT WOULD SIMPLY BE A CHANGE IN THE CAPTION OF THE LAWSUIT U... | 08-1438:515.46 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, except this would be a violation of a statute, not a violation of a constitutional right. So under Ex parte Young they couldn't necessarily get an injunction. | 12.2 | 540.06 | 552.26 | scotus:JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR | -0.031298 | 0.023848 | WELL EXCEPT THIS WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF A STATUTE NOT A VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT SO UNDER EX PARTE YOUNG THEY COULDN'T NECESSARILY GET AN INJUNCTION | 08-1438:540.06 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, I would set aside the question of whether Ex parte Young applies of its own force. I think by defining "officials" as a form of government and authorizing suits for appropriate relief against officials, I think everybody agrees that that authorizes suits against the officials for at least injunctive relief. And t... | 21.46 | 553.5 | 574.96 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.048428 | 0.019506 | WELL I WOULD SET ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER EX PARTE YOUNG APPLIES OF ITS OWN FORCE I THINK BY DEFINING OFFICIALS AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND AUTHORIZING SUITS FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF AGAINST OFFICIALS I THINK EVERYBODY AGREES THAT THAT AUTHORIZES SUITS AGAINST THE OFFICIALS FOR AT LEAST INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THEN TH... | 08-1438:553.5 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And I think the obvious answer is it authorizes a damages claim against the State. And even in light of Barnes, the State seems to acknowledge that damages are appropriate relief against local governments under this statute. | 14.46 | 575.26 | 589.72 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.656707 | 0.195183 | AND I THINK THE OBVIOUS ANSWER IS IT AUTHORIZES A DAMAGES CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE AND EVEN IN LIGHT OF BARNES THE STATE SEEMS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE RELIEF AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THIS STATUTE | 08-1438:575.26 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, I can conceive of a case where -- where the State's violation of RLUIPA consists of a State statute that simply deprives the individual of his rights under RLUIPA. What State official would you -- would you sue? | 17.84 | 589.62 | 607.46 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -0.383376 | 0.170947 | WELL I CAN CONCEIVE OF A CASE WHERE WHERE THE STATE'S VIOLATION OF RLUIPA CONSISTS OF A STATE STATUTE THAT SIMPLY DEPRIVES THE INDIVIDUAL OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER RLUIPA WHAT STATE OFFICIAL WOULD YOU WOULD YOU SUE | 08-1438:589.62 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | It seems to me you couldn't sue the State legislature, so it would make sense to have an injunction against the State. | 8.56 | 607.98 | 616.54 | scotus:JUSTICE SCALIA | -0.010489 | 0.02556 | IT SEEMS TO ME YOU COULDN'T SUE THE STATE LEGISLATURE SO IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO HAVE AN INJUNCTION AGAINST THE STATE | 08-1438:607.98 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | I think it's common in that circumstance to sue the State attorney general for Ex parte Young relief, for example, if you have a constitutional claim against the statute, as may very well have happened in the California case, or the governor, I guess. So I don't think that naming -- having a State as a defendant is nec... | 18.2 | 616.5 | 634.7 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.444418 | 0.095153 | I THINK IT'S COMMON IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE TO SUE THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR EX PARTE YOUNG RELIEF FOR EXAMPLE IF YOU HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM AGAINST THE STATUTE AS MAY VERY WELL HAVE HAPPENED IN THE CALIFORNIA CASE OR THE GOVERNOR I GUESS SO I DON'T THINK THAT NAMING HAVING A STATE AS A DEFENDANT IS NECESSARY FO... | 08-1438:616.5 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In addition, as I mentioned before, I think even the State acknowledges that damages are appropriate relief against local governments, but Congress made clear that when it intended the identity of a party to result in a dramatically different scope of relief, it did so expressly, and you can see that in the U.S. enforc... | 18.36 | 635.12 | 653.48 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.109745 | 0.016079 | IN ADDITION AS I MENTIONED BEFORE I THINK EVEN THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE RELIEF AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BUT CONGRESS MADE CLEAR THAT WHEN IT INTENDED THE IDENTITY OF A PARTY TO RESULT IN A DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT SCOPE OF RELIEF IT DID SO EXPRESSLY AND YOU CAN SEE THAT IN THE U S ENFORCEMENT ... | 08-1438:635.12 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | There, Congress specially authorized suits by the United States and had its own remedial provision which provides only for declaratory and injunctive relief. And that shows both that Congress didn't expect courts to simply figure out that different kinds of defendants would be subject to different appropriate relief, b... | 19 | 653.36 | 672.36 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.025963 | 0.01274 | THERE CONGRESS SPECIALLY AUTHORIZED SUITS BY THE UNITED STATES AND HAD ITS OWN REMEDIAL PROVISION WHICH PROVIDES ONLY FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THAT SHOWS BOTH THAT CONGRESS DIDN'T EXPECT COURTS TO SIMPLY FIGURE OUT THAT DIFFERENT KINDS OF DEFENDANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT APPROPRIATE RELIEF BUT ... | 08-1438:653.36 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Isn't it argued that a possible purpose of that was to make it clear that the Federal Government couldn't sue a State to recover money that had been given to it? | 9.94 | 672.26 | 682.2 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.01616 | 0.021729 | ISN'T IT ARGUED THAT A POSSIBLE PURPOSE OF THAT WAS TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULDN'T SUE A STATE TO RECOVER MONEY THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO IT | 08-1438:672.26 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, the fact -- I would say two things about that. One is Congress didn't limit that provision to suits against States. It's anybody who gets sued by the United States is limited to equitable injunctive relief. And that's, again, an example of Congress treating States the same as everybody else. Whether they are sued... | 22.52 | 682.16 | 704.68 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.178714 | 0.100392 | WELL THE FACT I WOULD SAY TWO THINGS ABOUT THAT ONE IS CONGRESS DIDN'T LIMIT THAT PROVISION TO SUITS AGAINST STATES IT'S ANYBODY WHO GETS SUED BY THE UNITED STATES IS LIMITED TO EQUITABLE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THAT'S AGAIN AN EXAMPLE OF CONGRESS TREATING STATES THE SAME AS EVERYBODY ELSE WHETHER THEY ARE SUED BY THE UN... | 08-1438:682.16 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That provision also kind of -- the language of that provision, "injunctive or declaratory relief," stands in pretty stark contrast to the facially broader phrase "appropriate relief" in the general provision. | 10.78 | 705.44 | 716.22 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.098427 | 0.035044 | THAT PROVISION ALSO KIND OF THE LANGUAGE OF THAT PROVISION INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF STANDS IN PRETTY STARK CONTRAST TO THE FACIALLY BROADER PHRASE APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN THE GENERAL PROVISION | 08-1438:705.44 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In addition to RLUIPA itself, I think it's also worth pointing out that the State had independent notice under section 2000(d)(7) -- this is the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, where Congress made clear to Texas that it would be subject to suit for damages under any statute that -- under a section of any statute... | 22.04 | 718.22 | 740.26 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.167748 | 0.057469 | IN ADDITION TO RLUIPA ITSELF I THINK IT'S ALSO WORTH POINTING OUT THAT THE STATE HAD INDEPENDENT NOTICE UNDER SECTION TWO THOUSAND D SEVEN THIS IS THE REHABILITATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF NINETEEN EIGHTY SIX WHERE CONGRESS MADE CLEAR TO TEXAS THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SUIT FOR DAMAGES UNDER ANY STATUTE THAT UNDER A SECTI... | 08-1438:718.22 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And I think the question here boils down to whether RLUIPA is materially distinguishable from section 504, which is listed in section 2000(d)(7) as an example of a statute prohibiting discrimination. And if -- I think that means that the catch-all has to at least be broad enough to encompass section 504, and in our vie... | 22.98 | 740.12 | 763.1 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.112364 | 0.054893 | AND I THINK THE QUESTION HERE BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER RLUIPA IS MATERIALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM SECTION FIVE OH FOUR WHICH IS LISTED IN SECTION TWO THOUSAND D SEVEN AS AN EXAMPLE OF A STATUTE PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AND IF I THINK THAT MEANS THAT THE CATCH ALL HAS TO AT LEAST BE BROAD ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS SECTION FIVE ... | 08-1438:740.12 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Both prohibit both the kind of disparate treatment of similarly-situated individuals that the State acknowledges constitutes discrimination and requires accommodations in some circumstances. | 11.34 | 763 | 774.34 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.13835 | 0.025963 | BOTH PROHIBIT BOTH THE KIND OF DISPARATE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS THAT THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES CONSTITUTES DISCRIMINATION AND REQUIRES ACCOMMODATIONS IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES | 08-1438:763.0 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | You addressed the -- the effect of the issue here on | 5.64 | 774.34 | 779.98 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.139494 | 0.173536 | YOU ADDRESSED THE THE EFFECT OF THE ISSUE HERE ON | 08-1438:774.34 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | persons who are in State institutions other than penal institutions. What would be -- what's the effect of the issue here on land use restrictions? Are there many cases in which issues involving land use restrictions are -- are raised in litigation against the State as opposed to a municipality? | 20.78 | 781.76 | 802.54 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.218319 | 0.065497 | PERSONS WHO ARE IN STATE INSTITUTIONS OTHER THAN PENAL INSTITUTIONS WHAT WOULD BE WHAT'S THE EFFECT OF THE ISSUE HERE ON LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE MANY CASES IN WHICH ISSUES INVOLVING LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ARE ARE RAISED IN LITIGATION AGAINST THE STATE AS OPPOSED TO A MUNICIPALITY | 08-1438:781.76 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | It's quite rare. I am aware of one pending case in Vermont where there is a challenge to a -- a State environmental regulation, but for the most part it isn't. But if this Court were to, you know, section -- the provision that we are talking about here applies to land use as well as to institutionalized persons, and on... | 24.08 | 802.44 | 826.52 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.209492 | 0.076205 | IT'S QUITE RARE I AM AWARE OF ONE PENDING CASE IN VERMONT WHERE THERE IS A CHALLENGE TO A A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION BUT FOR THE MOST PART IT ISN'T BUT IF THIS COURT WERE TO YOU KNOW SECTION THE PROVISION THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE APPLIES TO LAND USE AS WELL AS TO INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS AND ONE WOULD ORDI... | 08-1438:802.44 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | I recognize that the State's basic argument is that the meaning changes depending on who the defendant is, and I suppose if you accept that it could also depend on -- on what provision is being applied. But that's not normally how statutes work. | 13.76 | 826.48 | 840.24 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.089007 | 0.023966 | I RECOGNIZE THAT THE STATE'S BASIC ARGUMENT IS THAT THE MEANING CHANGES DEPENDING ON WHO THE DEFENDANT IS AND I SUPPOSE IF YOU ACCEPT THAT IT COULD ALSO DEPEND ON ON WHAT PROVISION IS BEING APPLIED BUT THAT'S NOT NORMALLY HOW STATUTES WORK | 08-1438:826.48 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But the answer to Justice Alito's question is that in the land use area, zoning for example, those are mostly cases against municipalities or counties? | 13.1 | 840.22 | 853.32 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.289335 | 0.051791 | BUT THE ANSWER TO JUSTICE ALITO'S QUESTION IS THAT IN THE LAND USE AREA ZONING FOR EXAMPLE THOSE ARE MOSTLY CASES AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES OR COUNTIES | 08-1438:840.22 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That is correct. | 0.66 | 853.22 | 853.88 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -2.75527 | 0.626138 | THAT IS CORRECT | 08-1438:853.22 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Not against the State. | 1.2 | 853.7 | 854.9 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.93433 | 0.609805 | NOT AGAINST THE STATE | 08-1438:853.7 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That is correct. | 1 | 854.84 | 855.84 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.035376 | 1.299214 | THAT IS CORRECT | 08-1438:854.84 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | The government is going to tell us that the standard for waiver with respect to the Federal Government is different from the standard with respect to the State. Do you -- I think that's what they are going to tell us. Do you agree with that? | 13.16 | 857.24 | 870.4 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.604668 | 0.144928 | THE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO TELL US THAT THE STANDARD FOR WAIVER WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE STANDARD WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE DO YOU I THINK THAT'S WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO TELL US DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT | 08-1438:857.24 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | No. I actually don't understand them to be making that argument, either. But I know for sure that that's not our position. And the Court's decision in Barnes I think, for example, is entirely consistent with the Court's recent decisions, including for example in Richlin, where it's made clear that when you are consider... | 24.38 | 870.58 | 894.96 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.234985 | 0.025981 | NO I ACTUALLY DON'T UNDERSTAND THEM TO BE MAKING THAT ARGUMENT EITHER BUT I KNOW FOR SURE THAT THAT'S NOT OUR POSITION AND THE COURT'S DECISION IN BARNES I THINK FOR EXAMPLE IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE IN RICHLIN WHERE IT'S MADE CLEAR THAT WHEN YOU ARE CONSIDERING THE ... | 08-1438:870.58 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | If at the end of that interpretation the statute remains unclear, you know, certainly the sovereign wins. But -- | 6.28 | 894.86 | 901.14 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.53185 | 0.229523 | IF AT THE END OF THAT INTERPRETATION THE STATUTE REMAINS UNCLEAR YOU KNOW CERTAINLY THE SOVEREIGN WINS BUT | 08-1438:894.86 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But it seems to me that the States are in need of special protection. With -- with the Congress, if it's a Federal immunity, the Congress can always -- always change its law. | 11.46 | 901.62 | 913.08 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.078037 | 0.039957 | BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE STATES ARE IN NEED OF SPECIAL PROTECTION WITH WITH THE CONGRESS IF IT'S A FEDERAL IMMUNITY THE CONGRESS CAN ALWAYS ALWAYS CHANGE ITS LAW | 08-1438:901.62 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well -- | 0.56 | 913.36 | 913.92 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.000742 | 0.279369 | WELL | 08-1438:913.36 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That just can't happen with the State. | 1.88 | 914.08 | 915.96 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.492073 | 0.146505 | THAT JUST CAN'T HAPPEN WITH THE STATE | 08-1438:914.08 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | I don't know that this Court's cases support the idea that -- that heightened clear statement rule for States versus the Federal Government. If anything, I think they suggest the opposite, but so long as the statute is clear. | 11.2 | 916.26 | 927.46 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.095116 | 0.074159 | I DON'T KNOW THAT THIS COURT'S CASES SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT THAT HEIGHTENED CLEAR STATEMENT RULE FOR STATES VERSUS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IF ANYTHING I THINK THEY SUGGEST THE OPPOSITE BUT SO LONG AS THE STATUTE IS CLEAR | 08-1438:916.26 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | It's the suggestion of the opposite that -- that I am trying -- I am trying to explore. You have your white light on. | 7.2 | 927.32 | 934.52 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.426326 | 0.275769 | IT'S THE SUGGESTION OF THE OPPOSITE THAT THAT I AM TRYING I AM TRYING TO EXPLORE YOU HAVE YOUR WHITE LIGHT ON | 08-1438:927.32 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Thank you. | 0.46 | 935.52 | 935.98 | scotus:adv:KEVIN RUSSELL | -0.012049 | 1.635928 | THANK YOU | 08-1438:935.52 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Thank you, Mr. Russell. | 0.94 | 935.78 | 936.72 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -0.012454 | 4.903701 | THANK YOU MISTER RUSSELL | 08-1438:935.78 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Ms. Harrington. | 0.96 | 944.48 | 945.44 | scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS | -0.250009 | 0.200382 | MISS HARRINGTON | 08-1438:944.48 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Respondent in this case agrees that when it accepts Federal funds for its correctional system it voluntarily waives its sovereign immunity to private suits in Federal court to enforce RLUIPA, and it is clear under this Court's decisions in cases such as Franklin and B... | 20.9 | 945.76 | 966.66 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.088198 | 0.036686 | MISTER CHIEF JUSTICE AND MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT THE RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE AGREES THAT WHEN IT ACCEPTS FEDERAL FUNDS FOR ITS CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM IT VOLUNTARILY WAIVES ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO PRIVATE SUITS IN FEDERAL COURT TO ENFORCE RLUIPA AND IT IS CLEAR UNDER THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN CASES SUCH AS FRANKLIN AND B... | 08-1438:945.76 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Suppose Congress passes a statute that creates a private right of action against both the Federal Government and against the States and in both instances authorizes all appropriate relief. Are damages available in the action against the Federal Government as well as the State government? | 17.5 | 966.56 | 984.06 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.004213 | 0.012398 | SUPPOSE CONGRESS PASSES A STATUTE THAT CREATES A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST BOTH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND AGAINST THE STATES AND IN BOTH INSTANCES AUTHORIZES ALL APPROPRIATE RELIEF ARE DAMAGES AVAILABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS THE STATE GOVERNMENT | 08-1438:966.56 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, it would depend on the context to answer both questions. | 4.04 | 984.14 | 988.18 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.009168 | 0.052103 | WELL IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTEXT TO ANSWER BOTH QUESTIONS | 08-1438:984.14 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, the State -- the State provision is a Spending Clause provision. | 3.48 | 988.84 | 992.32 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.212625 | 0.361239 | WELL THE STATE THE STATE PROVISION IS A SPENDING CLAUSE PROVISION | 08-1438:988.84 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Then the answer would be yes as to the States. This Court has been clear in cases such as Franklin and Barnes that in the Spending Clause context, unless Congress indicates an intent to rebut the presumption somehow -- | 10.78 | 992.24 | 1,003.02 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.063853 | 0.044726 | THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE YES AS TO THE STATES THIS COURT HAS BEEN CLEAR IN CASES SUCH AS FRANKLIN AND BARNES THAT IN THE SPENDING CLAUSE CONTEXT UNLESS CONGRESS INDICATES AN INTENT TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION SOMEHOW | 08-1438:992.24 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And what about the Federal Government? | 1.64 | 1,002.92 | 1,004.56 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -1.155472 | 0.447748 | AND WHAT ABOUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT | 08-1438:1002.92 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | In the Federal Government probably not, although this Court has looked to background principles in interpreting words such as "appropriate." | 7.1 | 1,004.46 | 1,011.56 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.039481 | 0.056023 | IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROBABLY NOT ALTHOUGH THIS COURT HAS LOOKED TO BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETING WORDS SUCH AS APPROPRIATE | 08-1438:1004.46 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | What sense does it make? Other than -- I know you are representing a client and so special pleading for your client is -- is to be expected, but I find that very difficult to accept. If "all appropriate relief" includes damages as against the State that accepts Federal money, then you know, what's good for the State sh... | 20.78 | 1,011.54 | 1,032.32 | scotus:JUSTICE ALITO | -0.124351 | 0.086419 | WHAT SENSE DOES IT MAKE OTHER THAN I KNOW YOU ARE REPRESENTING A CLIENT AND SO SPECIAL PLEADING FOR YOUR CLIENT IS IS TO BE EXPECTED BUT I FIND THAT VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT IF ALL APPROPRIATE RELIEF INCLUDES DAMAGES AS AGAINST THE STATE THAT ACCEPTS FEDERAL MONEY THEN YOU KNOW WHAT'S GOOD FOR THE STATE SHOULD BE GOOD ... | 08-1438:1011.54 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Well, I would say two things. First, in both cases what you want is a clear statement of an intent to waive the sovereign's immunity, either by the Federal Government or the State government. And also that it's important to keep in mind that in cases such as Franklin and Barnes, this Court was construing statutes that ... | 19.14 | 1,032.22 | 1,051.36 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.218807 | 0.153028 | WELL I WOULD SAY TWO THINGS FIRST IN BOTH CASES WHAT YOU WANT IS A CLEAR STATEMENT OF AN INTENT TO WAIVE THE SOVEREIGN'S IMMUNITY EITHER BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND ALSO THAT IT'S IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT IN CASES SUCH AS FRANKLIN AND BARNES THIS COURT WAS CONSTRUING STATUTES THAT DID NO... | 08-1438:1032.22 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And so we don't rely so much on RLUIPA's use of the phrase "appropriate relief" as we do on the Spending Clause context. | 6.66 | 1,051.76 | 1,058.42 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.123824 | 0.067433 | AND SO WE DON'T RELY SO MUCH ON RLUIPA'S USE OF THE PHRASE APPROPRIATE RELIEF AS WE DO ON THE SPENDING CLAUSE CONTEXT | 08-1438:1051.76 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But those cases did not involve States, right? | 3.44 | 1,058.32 | 1,061.76 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.477921 | 0.096925 | BUT THOSE CASES DID NOT INVOLVE STATES RIGHT | 08-1438:1058.32 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | Those cases did not involve States, that's true. But -- | 2.66 | 1,061.92 | 1,064.58 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -1.135683 | 0.308198 | THOSE CASES DID NOT INVOLVE STATES THAT'S TRUE BUT | 08-1438:1061.92 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And I think that the -- the core question here is the State -- and Justice Alito just posed it: the State is being treated with less dignity than the Federal Government, because your position is that the Federal Government is shielded by its sovereign immunity, and | 24.62 | 1,064.48 | 1,089.1 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.268589 | 0.045415 | AND I THINK THAT THE THE CORE QUESTION HERE IS THE STATE AND JUSTICE ALITO JUST POSED IT THE STATE IS BEING TREATED WITH LESS DIGNITY THAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BECAUSE YOUR POSITION IS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS SHIELDED BY ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND | 08-1438:1064.48 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | you say the State is not. | 2.68 | 1,089 | 1,091.68 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.004168 | 0.07554 | YOU SAY THE STATE IS NOT | 08-1438:1089.0 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | On the contrary, as to the dignity point, Your Honor, if -- the State voluntarily waives its immunity when it accepts Federal funds that clearly condition the acceptance of the funds on the waiver of its immunity. The State in this case doesn't contest that it has waived its sovereign immunity voluntarily to some unive... | 17.82 | 1,092.62 | 1,110.44 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.269407 | 0.085124 | ON THE CONTRARY AS TO THE DIGNITY POINT YOUR HONOR IF THE STATE VOLUNTARILY WAIVES ITS IMMUNITY WHEN IT ACCEPTS FEDERAL FUNDS THAT CLEARLY CONDITION THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE FUNDS ON THE WAIVER OF ITS IMMUNITY THE STATE IN THIS CASE DOESN'T CONTEST THAT IT HAS WAIVED ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY VOLUNTARILY TO SOME UNIVERSE OF ... | 08-1438:1092.62 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But we are talking about general principles of interpretation and the proposition that we are suggesting is that the State surely should be entitled to the same dignity, the same protection against suits as the Federal Government, and you suggest just the opposite. | 17.22 | 1,110.26 | 1,127.48 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.301653 | 0.066697 | BUT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND THE PROPOSITION THAT WE ARE SUGGESTING IS THAT THE STATE SURELY SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE SAME DIGNITY THE SAME PROTECTION AGAINST SUITS AS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND YOU SUGGEST JUST THE OPPOSITE | 08-1438:1110.26 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | No, Your Honor. | 0.6 | 1,127.4 | 1,128 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.65954 | 0.877492 | NO YOUR HONOR | 08-1438:1127.4 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | And it seems to me that's contrary to standard principles of the Federal -- of protecting the Federal balance. | 7.58 | 1,127.86 | 1,135.44 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.0397 | 0.039693 | AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT'S CONTRARY TO STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL OF PROTECTING THE FEDERAL BALANCE | 08-1438:1127.86 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | If you were construing a State statute that voluntarily waived its own immunity, then you might -- we might say the use of appropriate relief in that statute should be construed the same as the use of appropriate relief in RFRA. But in this case you are not talking about a State's waiver of its immunity through its -- ... | 15.08 | 1,135.46 | 1,150.54 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.197398 | 0.095182 | IF YOU WERE CONSTRUING A STATE STATUTE THAT VOLUNTARILY WAIVED ITS OWN IMMUNITY THEN YOU MIGHT WE MIGHT SAY THE USE OF APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN THAT STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED THE SAME AS THE USE OF APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN RFRA BUT IN THIS CASE YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A STATE'S WAIVER OF ITS IMMUNITY THROUGH ITS THROUGH ... | 08-1438:1135.46 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | The Court said in College Savings Bank that when a -- when a State takes Federal funds that are conditioned on a waiver of immunity, it is the act of accepting the funds that is the waiver and it waives its immunity to suits to the extent that it has noticed that it is doing so. | 13.4 | 1,150.56 | 1,163.96 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.501362 | 0.176782 | THE COURT SAID IN COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK THAT WHEN A WHEN A STATE TAKES FEDERAL FUNDS THAT ARE CONDITIONED ON A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IT IS THE ACT OF ACCEPTING THE FUNDS THAT IS THE WAIVER AND IT WAIVES ITS IMMUNITY TO SUITS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAS NOTICED THAT IT IS DOING SO | 08-1438:1150.56 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But it's -- but it's only because they accept the funds at all that the Spending -- that the Spending Clause is even operative. | 7.06 | 1,163.78 | 1,170.84 | scotus:JUSTICE KENNEDY | -0.31834 | 0.290416 | BUT IT'S BUT IT'S ONLY BECAUSE THEY ACCEPT THE FUNDS AT ALL THAT THE SPENDING THAT THE SPENDING CLAUSE IS EVEN OPERATIVE | 08-1438:1163.78 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | That's right. But again, it's -- it's the act of accepting the funds that are clearly conditioned that constitutes the waiver. So that the waiver -- | 7 | 1,171.18 | 1,178.18 | scotus:adv:SARAH HARRINGTON | -0.36327 | 0.136951 | THAT'S RIGHT BUT AGAIN IT'S IT'S THE ACT OF ACCEPTING THE FUNDS THAT ARE CLEARLY CONDITIONED THAT CONSTITUTES THE WAIVER SO THAT THE WAIVER | 08-1438:1171.18 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | But the waiver -- I mean, on the State side they can say it says "appropriate relief." All right; we accept that we are going to be | 6.86 | 1,178.08 | 1,184.94 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -2.063032 | 0.91668 | BUT THE WAIVER I MEAN ON THE STATE SIDE THEY CAN SAY IT SAYS APPROPRIATE RELIEF ALL RIGHT WE ACCEPT THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE | 08-1438:1178.08 | |
2,010 | 08-1438 | Sossamon v. Texas | 2010-11-02 | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/08-1438.pdf | https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/08-1438 | vulnerable to an injunction suit. But we're the State and it's our treasury, and it is not appropriate relief. We didn't waive it. It's not -- doesn't say | 12.7 | 1,186.66 | 1,199.36 | scotus:JUSTICE GINSBURG | -0.262844 | 0.122275 | VULNERABLE TO AN INJUNCTION SUIT BUT WE'RE THE STATE AND IT'S OUR TREASURY AND IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE RELIEF WE DIDN'T WAIVE IT IT'S NOT DOESN'T SAY | 08-1438:1186.66 |
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Larry SCOTUS Oral Argument Aligned Segments
Built from thelarryproject/scotus-unaligned.
U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments, October Terms 2010–2025, cut into short single-speaker clips with matching transcript text. Each argument's transcript was aligned to its audio, then split at speaker changes, long pauses, and sentence ends into clips of at most 25 seconds. Contains 395,983 clips (~1,191 hours) from all 1,050 argument sessions, un-pruned.
Fields
docket,term,case_name,date_argued,pdf_url,page_url: copied from the argument the clip came fromaudio: Arrow audio typed column of (bytes, path); 16 kHz mono FLAC, path is emptytext_original: the transcript text for the clip, as written by the court reportertext_normalized: the same text spelled out as spoken, in uppercase letters, apostrophes, and spaces (e.g. "Mr." ->MISTER, "09-400" ->NINE FOUR HUNDRED)speaker_id: a consistent speaker id across arguments, e.g.scotus:JUSTICE KAGAN,scotus:CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS,scotus:adv:PAUL CLEMENTstart_s,end_s: where the clip sits in the original argument audio, in secondsduration_s: clip length in secondsavg_word_score: how confidently the clip's words were aligned (closer to 0 is better)ctc_mismatch: how poorly the clip's audio matches its text when scored on its own (lower is better); empty when the clip is too short to score
Construction
Aligned with facebook/wav2vec2-large-960h-lv60-self. See provenance.json for the producing commit, timestamp, and
ancestry.
Known corrections
From the manifest
13-7120rearg: the court's page links the original argument's transcript and date; this has been manually corrected to the reargument transcript and 2015-04-20
From the unaligned dataset
- Minor misplacements of speaker labels in the original transcripts
From this dataset
- Speaker labels are mapped to one id per person: justices are matched against the bench sitting on the argument date, and advocates against each transcript's list of appearances
- Reporter typos in names are corrected, e.g. "ERICJ FEIGIN" -> ERIC FEIGIN, "JEFFERY FISHER" -> JEFFREY FISHER, "IRV GORNSTEIN" -> IRVING GORNSTEIN, "STUART DUNCAN" -> KYLE DUNCAN; a justice mislabeled as an advocate (e.g. "MR. KAGAN") is attributed to the justice
- Stage directions such as "(Laughter.)" and "(Pause.)" are removed from the text
- Where text can be spoken more than one way (numbers, years, "v." as "V" or "VERSUS"), the reading that best matches the audio is used
Known gaps
- Clips under ~2 seconds are mostly quick interruptions where speakers overlap; many have high
ctc_mismatchand may contain parts of the other speaker - Neighboring clips can overlap by up to 0.2 seconds, so a clip's end can include the first sound of the next one
- 9 clips have
speaker_idscotus:unknown, mostly the Chief Justice's opening and closing lines in a few 2013–2014 arguments - No quality, duration, or
ctc_mismatchfiltering is applied here; that is left to downstream consumers
The audio and transcripts are Public Domain, but this redistribution is CC-BY-4.0 under the larry project.
Preprocessing pipeline code is at https://github.com/Mekadrom/larry, and this dataset is fully reproducible with a single command in that repo:
uv run preprocessing --config_file configs/preprocessing/other/voice/aligned/thelarryproject_scotus-aligned.yaml --output_dir ~/.cache/larry/datasets/other/voice/aligned/thelarryproject_scotus-aligned --clean
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