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| # Method | |
| ## The rule | |
| > A number is not a measurement until it has been observed to take different | |
| > values on inputs that are known to differ. | |
| This is a falsifiable requirement, and it is deliberately weak. It does not ask | |
| whether a metric is *good*, *calibrated*, or *measuring the right thing*. It | |
| asks only whether the metric is distinguishable from a constant and from the | |
| neighbouring quantities that happen to be correlated with it. | |
| Anything that fails this is not a weak measurement. It is not a measurement. | |
| ## Three levels | |
| ### 1. Instrument level — `discriminate()` | |
| Feed the callable a set of `ProbePair`s. Each pair holds two inputs known to | |
| differ, tagged with the **dimension** in which they differ. | |
| A pair is *separated* when the two outputs differ by more than `tolerance`. | |
| **Dimension scoping is the load-bearing part.** An instrument that separates | |
| "long text" from "short text" has demonstrated nothing about whether it | |
| measures content. Only separation within the dimension the instrument claims | |
| to measure counts. Concretely: given `claimed_dimensions=["content"]`, an | |
| instrument that returns `1.0` for any non-empty string separates the | |
| existence probe and still fails, because it collapses every pair inside | |
| `content`. | |
| A checker without dimension scoping is itself a decoration. | |
| ### 2. Ledger level — `audit_ledger()` | |
| Run over samples already recorded in production. This is the stronger evidence | |
| of the two, because the inputs were not chosen by whoever wanted the metric to | |
| look good. | |
| | verdict | condition | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | `CONSTANT` | exactly one distinct value across the window | | |
| | `BARE_ZERO` | a modal zero value coincides with `count_field == 0`, and the same zero is returned by samples that examined a non-zero number of items | | |
| | `LIVENESS_BIT` | ≥ 2 distinct values, and the proportion of variance in the value explained by a single boolean is ≥ 0.999 | | |
| | `NO_DATA` | nothing matched the requested field | | |
| `NO_DATA` exists because the obvious default — returning `PASS` when there is | |
| nothing to audit — reproduces the exact failure this package is about. An audit | |
| with no data has not succeeded; it has not happened. | |
| ### 3. Gate level — `audit_gate()` / `audit_gate_counts()` | |
| A guard, assertion or denial path that logs health N times and fires 0 times | |
| across the whole observed window is reported `DEAD_GATE`. | |
| `audit_gate_counts()` takes integers rather than events, so that a guard log can | |
| be audited without the log being published. The counts support the claim; the | |
| raw lines carry whatever the operator's environment contained. | |
| An empty window is **not** reported as death. Zero firings over zero events is | |
| an absence of evidence, and conflating the two is the error the gate audit | |
| exists to catch. | |
| ## Positive controls are part of the procedure | |
| A firing count of zero means one of two things, and the count alone cannot tell | |
| you which: | |
| 1. the gate is dead, or | |
| 2. nothing has ever tried to make it fire. | |
| So the firing count is only interpretable **after** someone has constructed an | |
| input the gate is known to have to block, and shown that it blocks it. | |
| The case study makes this concrete. The same guard reads `DEAD_GATE` for the | |
| 13 days before a positive control was written for it, and `PASS` afterwards. | |
| Nothing about the guard changed at that moment. | |
| This requirement applies to the tool itself: `tools/anonymise.py --self-test` | |
| runs the privacy leak gate against known-positive input and fails the run if | |
| any pattern stays silent. | |
| ## What a `PASS` does not mean | |
| - It does not mean the measured quantity is good. | |
| - It does not mean the claimed dimension is the right one to measure. This | |
| method tests whether an instrument responds to what it is named after, not | |
| whether the name was well chosen. | |
| - It does not transfer across systems. A `PASS` here is a `PASS` for this | |
| instrument on this probe set. | |
| ## Known limits | |
| - **`n = 1` system.** The case study is one agent over roughly two months. The | |
| five signatures recur across instruments within it; cross-system replication | |
| is an open problem. | |
| - **The instruments were authored by the system they measure.** This is the | |
| condition under study, not a defect in the study. It is also the reason the | |
| findings were available at all. | |
| - **Threshold choices are explicit and arbitrary.** `≥ 0.999` for liveness-bit | |
| attribution and `0` for separation are conventions, not derivations. They are | |
| parameters, not hidden constants. | |