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Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch Method::init delegates vector length OOB

Method::init indexes ExecutionPlan.delegates[i] using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default Program::Verification::Minimal, loading a malicious .pte and calling Method::load triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at method.cpp:955.

Related: forged BackendDelegate.compile_specs()->size() → PopulateCompileSpecs HBO at method.cpp:179.

Distinct from packaged values/chains/instructions, READY operators/args, READY constant/mutable offsets, MethodMeta sizes, WebGPU, Vela, VGF.

Files

  • poc_method_load_delegates_asan.cpp, asan.log (delegates-oob)
  • related: compile-specs-oob
  • NOTES.md
./poc_method_load_delegates_asan delegates-oob
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