Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch MethodMeta memory_planned_buffers vector length OOB
MethodMeta::num_memory_planned_buffers / memory_planned_buffer_size index ExecutionPlan.non_const_buffer_sizes[index+1] using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default Program::Verification::Minimal, loading a malicious .pte and calling memory_planned_buffer_size(0) triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at method_meta.cpp:357.
Distinct from submitted MethodMeta Tensor.sizes, packaged MethodMeta I/O index (inputs/outputs), Program execution_plan / backend_delegate_data, and Method::init values/operators/delegates/list-items.
Files
poc_method_meta_memory_planned_asan.cpp,asan.logmethod_load_stub.cpp(link stub for unusedMethod::load)NOTES.md
./poc_method_meta_memory_planned_asan
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