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Nov 19

IDEA: Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit for Inference-Time Backdoor Detection in GUI Agents

Organizations increasingly deploy downloaded open-weight GUI agents. A backdoored agent passes acceptance tests on clean data and misbehaves only when a visual trigger appears on screen, turning an unvetted checkpoint into a supply-chain risk. However, existing sample-level detectors target image classifiers and CLIP-style encoders, leaving step-level backdoor detection for GUI agents unaddressed. On clean steps, the instruction drives the action; when an unreferenced screen region hijacks the step, the instruction loses control over the decision state or that region dictates it instead. We term this signature intent--evidence dominance inversion and propose IDEA (Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit) to detect backdoor activation at inference time for each step without trigger knowledge or attack data. Specifically, Intent Counterfactual Probing (ICP) measures how far redirected instructions move the decision state, and Region Causal Audit (RCA) quantifies how far ablating a candidate region moves it. A gated conformal score compares both displacements against clean steps at the same distance from the clean manifold, providing a finite-sample false-positive guarantee. Extensive experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-3B across five attack families show that IDEA consistently detects backdoor activation under a controlled false-positive rate and outperforms state-of-the-art detection methods, while localizing the trigger region for every alarm and adding only modest inference overhead.

What AI Red-Team Evaluations Can and Cannot Prove

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

apisec apisec
·
Jul 22 2

Auditable Agents

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 12

Evidence-First Agentic Verification

Long-horizon, semi-verifiable agentic tasks often rely on rubric-based evaluation, but the evidence needed to assess these tasks can be spread across the environment state and the execution trace. A judge may overlook this evidence or accept unsupported claims, including an agent's own reports of success. When rubric verdicts serve as reinforcement-learning rewards, such errors can reinforce undesirable behavior. We introduce Sauron, an evidence-first agentic verifier that investigates both state and trace and relies on a claim only after independently validating it against its source. Bounded queries and joint investigation of related criteria reduce context use and redundant work, and each verdict carries an auditable receipt of its supporting evidence. Across 2,586 human-labeled criteria from 100 personal-assistant episodes, Sauron achieves the highest F1 of five verifiers on all eight backbones tested while costing less than Gandalf, the strongest baseline. With GPT-5.6 Sol, it reaches 0.96 F1 versus Gandalf's 0.92 at 23% lower cost, with a wider margin on process criteria. On a paired fault-injection suite covering 13 families, several of which simulate reward hacking, Sauron detects 97% of injected failures while flagging only 2% of clean controls, outperforming baselines even when they are given the full trace. On TRAIL, a benchmark for detecting and localizing real agent errors, Sauron leads both Gandalf and TRAIL's own judge on all three quality metrics.

ScaleAI Scale AI
·
Oct 12 2

ESAA-Security: An Event-Sourced, Verifiable Architecture for Agent-Assisted Security Audits of AI-Generated Code

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 5

Ventor-QTest: Threat-Model-Driven Verification of Vendor-Hosted LLM APIs

As large language models become increasingly widespread, third-party providers that deploy open-weight models have become an important part of the ecosystem. Auditing the quality of their inference APIs is therefore an open problem. We formalize hosted model routing as a stochastic process and propose \textbf{Ventor-QTest}, a composite black-box audit that requires no probability information from the target API. Its repeated-request component sends each frozen constrained context to the target multiple times, reconstructs a categorical output distribution from the returned text counts, and reports average fidelity loss (AFL) as a null-bias-corrected, within-window mean coarsened-KL statistic. Its long-sequence component uses independent runs to report extreme fidelity loss (EFL) through the empirical upper tail of a run-level reference-centered-surprisal statistic. Across three logprob-capable route conditions, AFL shows strong linear descriptive agreement with a logprob-derived coarsened-KL comparator. Across seven route snapshots, 20-run sequence probes reveal route-specific EFL variation. AFL and EFL have little detectable route-level association with GPQA-Diamond accuracy. In contrast, pronounced EFL coincides with a decline in Terminal-Bench pass rate as task exposure increases. This pattern may arise because correctness in long-horizon tasks is more sensitive to extreme fidelity loss. These results motivate reporting AFL and EFL jointly, particularly when auditing long-horizon agentic tasks. The open-source implementation is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/services/api_checker/ventor_qtest.

tencent Tencent
·
Aug 16 2

ReA-Bench: Benchmarking Responsible Agent Auditing

As agents perform tasks autonomously in local and cloud environments, auditing their execution trajectories can help service providers identify risks and improve agent harnesses and foundation models. Our analysis of production and red-team trajectories shows that some risks are repeatedly missed across auditing configurations. Overall recall obscures which risks are missed and whether higher recall comes with more false positives on legitimate behavior. Existing benchmarks offer limited insight into these failures. Generated trajectories can contain inconsistent tool calls and responses, conspicuous risky actions, or repetitive attack patterns. Grouping results by risk type also makes it difficult to tell whether auditors overlooked evidence, accepted an unsupported conclusion, or lacked information needed to make a judgment. We introduce ReA-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark for auditing responsible agent behavior. It organizes auditing challenges into six tiers: internal safety knowledge, contradictions within trajectories, evidence retrieval in long contexts, verification of sources and reasoning, indirect steering, and missing information. It includes challenging benign cases in which actions resemble risky ones but are consistent with the task and its authorization. It also provides paired trajectory versions to test whether auditors detect the same risks more reliably when the trajectory is shortened or missing information is supplied. Most samples are drawn from real production trajectories, with scenarios manually selected and adapted to preserve realistic tasks and risks that could plausibly arise during execution.

  • 9 authors
·
Nov 11

Audit tools of the trade: Automated Auditor Elicitation Can Be Sensitive to the Context the Auditor Is Given

Does providing additional context to automated AI auditors improve their effectiveness? Using the Petri tool to audit LLM coding agents, we test the impact of providing two types of resources (an external codebase and benchmark transcripts) to LLM auditors, across four auditor-target LLM pairs and three behaviours (harmful compliance, reward hacking, sycophancy). (1) External codebase: We provide the auditor LLM with a fixed, external open source codebase, which prior work finds improves the realism of synthetic audits. Providing this resource suppresses reward hacking in both auditor-target pairs whose baseline rate is above the floor (4.8 to 1.3 and 3.9 to 1.8 on Petri's default 1-10 scale); the remaining two pairs sit at the floor throughout. The suppression recurs in three of four pairs under a different scenario and resource bundle. (2) External benchmark transcripts: We provide the auditor with transcripts of the target's performance on benchmarks measuring similar behaviours, intended to inform the auditor about the target's behavioural patterns. Providing this resource raises reward hacking scores in all four pairs (from 1.7 to 6.1 in one case). However, subsequent experiments show that supplying only the related benchmark's abstract, without transcripts, also increases reward hacking, and the effect is absent under a different framing of the same behaviour. Overall, we find no consistent effect of either resource outside reward hacking, but we find substantial variability in judge-scored behaviour across conditions. Our results underscore the importance of careful piloting with tools such as Petri, as the measured rate of target behaviour is highly sensitive to configuration decisions. We hope our results inspire more research into the reliability and robustness of automated alignment auditing.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 11

CrossAudit: A Git-Native, Cross-Vendor Audit Loop for Agentic Science

An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 4

Prior Audit-Repair Context Shifts LLM Verifier Thresholds Toward Leniency

Automated checking pipelines increasingly place one language model as the checker and another (or the same one) as the fixer. We ask whether that wiring changes what the checker reports. Measuring false alarms on human-verified-correct ProcessBench traces with the present task held byte-identical, we find that a completed audit -> repair episode already in the model's context lowers false alarms in 15 of 15 model x wording combinations, by 2.8 to 11.5 percentage points against a length-matched non-audit control, a 9 to 25% reduction relative to that control. The direction contradicts what the accumulated-message literature predicts: an episode whose audit reported an error lowers false alarms further still, at all five wordings on the model where that manipulation lands cleanly, though a negativity asymmetry predicts more flagging. Decomposing the episode finds repair content and audit verdict complementary: different components carry the effect on different model families. Signal-detection analysis locates the change in the threshold rather than in discrimination -- the criterion moves in 15 of 15 combinations and survives correction in 13 while d' survives in none, though the d' test is half as sensitive by construction -- and a hand audit of 50 false alarms finds 82% simply wrong, so at this operating point the shift need not be harmful. With reasoning enabled the effect keeps its relative size on both models tested, and the threshold reading holds there too.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 16 2

Counterfactual Trace Auditing of LLM Agent Skills

Large Language Model agents are increasingly augmented with agent skills. Current evaluation methods for skills remain limited. Most deployed benchmarks report only pass rate before and after a skill is attached, treating the skill as a black box change to agent behavior. We introduce Counterfactual Trace Auditing (CTA), a framework for measuring how a skill changes agent behavior. CTA pairs each with skill agent trace with a without skill counterpart on the same task, segments both traces into goal directed phases, aligns the phases, and emits structured Skill Influence Pattern (SIP) annotations. These annotations describe the behavioral effect of a skill rather than only its task outcome. We instantiate CTA on SWE-Skills-Bench with Claude across 49 software engineering tasks. The resulting audit reveals a clear evaluation gap. Pass rate changes by only +0.3 percentage points on average, suggesting little aggregate effect. Yet CTA identifies 522 SIP instances across the same paired traces, showing that the skills substantially reshape agent behavior even when pass rate is nearly unchanged. The audit also separates several recurring effects that pass rate cannot detect, including literal template copying, off task artifact creation, excess planning, and task recovery. Three findings emerge. First, high baseline tasks contain most of the observed skill effects, although their pass rate is already saturated and therefore cannot reflect those effects. Second, tasks with moderate baseline performance show the most recoverable gain, but often at substantially higher token cost. Third, the dominant SIP type can be identified by baseline bucket: surface anchoring is most common on ceiling tasks and edge-case prompting is most common on mid-range and floor tasks. These regularities turn informal failure mode observations into reproducible behavioral measurements.

  • 5 authors
·
May 27

LLMAuditor: A Framework for Auditing Large Language Models Using Human-in-the-Loop

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more pervasive across various users and scenarios, identifying potential issues when using these models becomes essential. Examples of such issues include: bias, inconsistencies, and hallucination. Although auditing the LLM for these problems is often warranted, such a process is neither easy nor accessible for most. An effective method is to probe the LLM using different versions of the same question. This could expose inconsistencies in its knowledge or operation, indicating potential for bias or hallucination. However, to operationalize this auditing method at scale, we need an approach to create those probes reliably and automatically. In this paper we propose the LLMAuditor framework which is an automatic, and scalable solution, where one uses a different LLM along with human-in-the-loop (HIL). This approach offers verifiability and transparency, while avoiding circular reliance on the same LLM, and increasing scientific rigor and generalizability. Specifically, LLMAuditor includes two phases of verification using humans: standardized evaluation criteria to verify responses, and a structured prompt template to generate desired probes. A case study using questions from the TruthfulQA dataset demonstrates that we can generate a reliable set of probes from one LLM that can be used to audit inconsistencies in a different LLM. This process is enhanced by our structured prompt template with HIL, which not only boosts the reliability of our approach in auditing but also yields the delivery of less hallucinated results. The novelty of our research stems from the development of a comprehensive, general-purpose framework that includes a HIL verified prompt template for auditing responses generated by LLMs.

  • 7 authors
·
Feb 14, 2024

Large Language Models for Agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, Evaluation, and Safety

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in network operations (NetOps) and artificial intelligence for IT operations (AIOps) for tasks ranging from telemetry retrieval and incident diagnosis to configuration planning and bounded remediation. As these systems acquire greater access to operational tools, a central question is whether operational assurance develops commensurately with the authority granted to them. This survey examines that question through a structured, evidence-stratified review of agentic NetOps and AIOps, spanning directly evaluated LLM systems, operational mechanisms, transferred evidence, and normative guidance. We organise the field around autonomy, tool scope, evidence traces, assurance controls, evaluation, security, and governance, and introduce an operational assurance contract that links each autonomy level to permitted tools, required evidence, independent gates, execution budgets, rollout and rollback duties, and audit requirements. The synthesis indicates a capability-assurance gap: evidence is comparatively strong for read-oriented assistance and tool-grounded diagnosis, but becomes substantially less complete as systems approach configuration change, bounded execution, and closed-loop operation. We therefore develop a workflow-level evaluation framework covering evidence quality, tool use, policy and invariant compliance, staged execution, recovery, calibration, cost, and human intervention, together with a threat model for prompt-borne attacks, compromised operational evidence, excessive agency, privilege boundaries, and auditability. The resulting view treats agentic NetOps and AIOps as constrained operational control, in which increasing autonomy requires correspondingly stronger evidence, independently enforced safeguards, and recovery mechanisms.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 4

Do Search-Augmented Recommenders Use the Latest Search Episode?

Search-augmented recommenders can use the latest search episode and earlier searches. We introduce FocalSwap to test how these inputs contribute to the next recommendation. For each recommendation, it changes the latest search slot or all search inputs while holding the target, candidates, pre-search history, and scorer fixed. It compares neutral masks with matched observed-search replacements, recording rank changes, RR gains relative to each control, and preference for the true focal search. A planted signal and GenSAR's current-query task confirm that the audit detects known input dependence. We evaluate behavioral and lexical evidence on KuaiSAR and Qilin, and recommendation checkpoints trained using the released SESRec and UniSAR implementations. Across three independently trained UniSAR checkpoints, the estimated all-source benefit depends on the control. On the same 66,139 rows, replacing all search inputs with a neutral ID yields a positive signed contribution, whereas replacing them with category/profile-matched observed search sequences gives smaller estimates, with an interval below zero for one checkpoint. The paired RR gaps range from +2.770 times 10^{-3} to +6.604 times 10^{-3}, and every adjusted interval is above zero. Neutral masks change 59.7-61.7% of target ranks, while matched replacements change 44.1-44.8%. The control contrast persists across five alternative donor assignments per checkpoint. Under the primary neutral-mask and category-matched controls, positive latest-slot contribution is not established in SESRec or UniSAR. These results show why masking evidence should be compared with observed-search replacements when attributing a benefit to broader search state or the latest episode.

  • 1 authors
·
Nov 3

Super Research: Answering Highly Complex Questions with Large Language Models through Super Deep and Super Wide Research

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated proficiency in Deep Research or Wide Search, their capacity to solve highly complex questions-those requiring long-horizon planning, massive evidence gathering, and synthesis across heterogeneous sources-remains largely unexplored. We introduce Super Research, a task for complex autonomous research tasks that integrates (i) structured decomposition into a research plan, (ii) super wide retrieval for diverse perspectives, and (iii) super deep investigation to resolve uncertainties through iterative queries. To evaluate this capability, we curated a benchmark of 300 expert-written questions across diverse domains, each requiring up to 100+ retrieval steps and 1,000+ web pages to reconcile conflicting evidence. Super Research produces verifiable reports with fine-grained citations and intermediate artifacts (e.g., outlines and tables) to ensure traceable reasoning. Furthermore, we present a graph-anchored auditing protocol that evaluates Super Research along five dimensions: Coverage, Logical Consistency, Report Utility, Objectivity and Citation Health. While super-complex questions may be infrequent in standard applications, Super Research serves as a critical ceiling evaluation and stress test for LLM capabilities. A model's proficiency within Super Research acts as a powerful proxy for its general research competence; success here suggests the robustness necessary to navigate nearly any subordinate research task. Leaderboard is available at: https://cnsdqd-dyb.github.io/Super-Research-Benchmark/

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 2

Relational Preference Encoding in Looped Transformer Internal States

We investigate how looped transformers encode human preference, training lightweight evaluator heads on frozen Ouro-2.6B loop-iteration states on Anthropic HH-RLHF. v2: an erratum is prepended; the original manuscript is unchanged. A post-publication audit found the three headline results inflated by two independent evaluation errors. The 95.2% pairwise evaluator accuracy is a canonical-ordering artifact: the data were correctly split, but the evaluator learned to prefer the first-presented argument; its strict antisymmetrized accuracy on the full 8,552-pair test set is 63.9%. The 84.5% pairwise probe and the below-chance 21.75% pointwise probe were source-item leaks (orientation rows and pair partners crossing the train/test split); corrected pair-disjoint values are 56.5% and 54.2% -- above chance, so the "inverted polarity" finding is withdrawn. The central finding survives at much smaller magnitude: preference is decoded more accurately relationally than pointwise (paired +2.3 points, 95% CI [+1.3, +3.3]), and the antisymmetrized evaluator still beats the linear probe, but no corrected readout rivals end-to-end reward models. The methodological findings stand (constant-output degeneracy, flip test, swap-protocol metric deflation), with one correction: antisymmetrized accuracy, not antisymmetry correlation, certifies relational discrimination. The two errors are mutually invisible -- a split audit cannot see an ordering prior, antisymmetrization cannot see a leak -- so both checks are required. Full audit in the follow-up work (Kirin, 2026, in preparation).

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 15

DMAIC-Bench: From Self-Reflection to Self-Restraint for Agents in Multi-Stage Analytical Tasks

Multi-stage analytical tasks require LLM agents to use intermediate evidence to decide whether to continue, redirect or stop. Self-reflection, in which an agent critiques its output, is widely studied, yet a critique does not show whether evidence changed the next action. We call that capability self-restraint. Existing agent benchmarks largely measure task completion or output quality and leave it untested. DMAIC-Bench evaluates it with 97 seeded tasks across 15 industrial cases in four sectors, built around Lean Six Sigma's explicit statistical prerequisites. Paired counterfactual variants require opposite actions at the same workflow position, distinguishing warranted restraint from indiscriminate stopping. We assess execution traces with a private scorer and final claims through independent expert review. Across 13 models from six providers, execution-level routing accuracy averages 92% on matched GO decisions and 19% on NO-GO decisions, counting any forbidden downstream computation as a route error. Execution traces show agents reporting correct diagnostics before performing analyses that those results disallow. Separately, blinded expert review of the 11 audited agents estimates that reports act on invalid evidence at 47% of reached NO-GO decisions, with an interval from 31% to 61%. Explicit stopping permission helps some models without consistently restoring correct decisions at both GO and NO-GO forks. Sixteen life-sciences tasks in bulk ribonucleic acid sequencing (RNA-seq) and case-control genome-wide association studies (GWAS) show that the same framework can evaluate evidence-dependent decisions beyond industrial workflows. Project code and data are available at: https://github.com/psptpx/DMAIC-Bench-public.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 23

AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviors

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 8

PANINI-DR: Controlled Deep Research through Generative Semantic Workspaces

Deep research requires connecting multiple steps of search, reasoning, and computation, with intermediate findings guiding what to investigate next. As investigations grow, agents must maintain research state across model calls and check findings before errors propagate into subsequent work. We introduce PANINI-DR, a multi-agent harness that separates coordination of the overall investigation from the research and verification of individual subquestions. A shared workspace, built on the Generative Semantic Workspace representation, records subquestions, their dependencies, findings, and supporting evidence. Researchers investigate individual subquestions, while a separate verification agent checks proposed answers against those subquestions and their evidence. Verification feedback guides further investigation, and recorded findings inform subsequent assignments. We evaluate PANINI-DR on BrowseComp-Plus, FRAMES, and MoNaCo against seven state-of-the-art deep-research harnesses, all using a shared language-model backbone and frozen corpora. PANINI-DR achieves the strongest average performance across the three benchmarks. On BrowseComp-Plus, it achieves 73.3% accuracy, outperforming the next-best harness by 16.0 points. Its advantage is strongest on hard questions, where it answers nearly twice as many as the next-best harness. Ablations further show that structured planning and persistent state improve performance, as does checking each finding against its cited evidence before it is reused. Because a model can answer correctly from memory alone, we also analyze the evidence retained by each harness. PANINI-DR achieves the highest answer recoverability from saved evidence on all three benchmarks, while complementary claim-support audits show stronger evidence-backed answers. Accounting for this evidence changes how harnesses compare and further strengthens PANINI-DR's advantage.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 9 3

STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 10

CatchBench: When Can an Agent Failure Be Caught?

When can an agent failure be caught? An audit is usually limited by the record rather than by the method. CatchBench therefore puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST). Prior benchmarks fix one of these states or vary the telemetry; to our knowledge none scores all three under one task-method interface. Each state admits different questions, so seven task contracts carry their own labels and metrics rather than one leaderboard. Four are evidential; three are Gold-derived mechanism diagnostics. The release scores 72 entrants, from rule scanners and structural models to eleven LLM judges across nine model families (GPT, Claude, Gemini, Gemma, Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, Nova), over 1187 declared configurations and 1162 recorded runs. Most of the arena does not order: 56 of 138 registered contrasts separate, and the rest are published unresolved rather than ranked. The two sharpest results cut against our own data. One rule ignores every name and permission; it flags each capability declared after the first. On one of six configuration sources it reaches a perfect F1, so a score there measures how the corpus was built rather than how well a method reasons. Our admissibility bar then rejected one injected substrate and withheld evidential status from the other. A benchmark number is therefore not interpretable until the process behind its labels is published and tested for the shortcut it may leave. We report both, and regenerate every ordering from released predictions with no model call.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 5

Scores Alone Do Not Prove Discovery: The Discovery Certification Protocol for Auditing AI Research Agents

AI research agents combine prior knowledge, public sources, and experimental feedback to produce useful results. The Discovery Certification Protocol (DCP) turns claims about these results into executable recovery and feedback tests. Gate 1 validates useful improvement on sealed evaluation. Gate 2 gives matched agents the registered starting information and observed Web content while withholding the target research history. Every valid method reaching the numerical target supplies a recovery witness and triggers the Core veto. DCP Core requires adequate controls, zero observed recoveries, and a finite-sample bound on recovery in one fresh registered episode. Optional Gate 3 measures the average effect of truthful feedback relative to a specified neutral policy from a shared checkpoint. DCP Evidence adds this effect after independent null calibration and a registered effect margin. Two controlled audits exercise the complete protocol in SQLite optimization and virtual catalyst control under different models. Each produced zero recoveries in 96 episodes, with an upper bound of 0.0468. Each paired study yielded 30 truthful recoveries and zero neutral recoveries, with passing 60-pair null studies. Additional cases exercise Core, recovered, and audit-incomplete decisions. A deterministic, LLM-free verifier reproduces the decisions from frozen evidence. DCP provides a common evidence language for useful outcomes, alternative routes, and feedback effects across AI research.

LegalHalluLens: Typed Hallucination Auditing and Calibrated Multi-Agent Debate for Trustworthy Legal AI

AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment. We present LegalHalluLens, an auditing framework with three components: typed hallucination profiles across four legally-motivated claim categories (numeric, temporal, obligation/entitlement, factual) over CUAD (Hendrycks et al., 2021); a Risk Direction Index (RDI) that reduces omission-versus-invention bias to a single deployment-comparable scalar; and a typed debate pipeline calibrated to both magnitudes and directions. Across 510 contracts and 249,252 clause-level instances we measure a within-model gap of approximately 38-40 pp between obligation/numeric and temporal claims that aggregate reporting hides, and show that two systems with matched 52% rates can carry opposite RDIs. The debate pipeline reduces fabricated detections by 45% with per-category gains tracking the diagnosis, matching commercial APIs with a substantially smaller backbone (4B active parameters). Typed profiles and RDI surface failure modes that aggregate metrics hide; we further show these diagnostics serve as calibration inputs for multi-agent debate pipelines, where Skeptic challenges and asymmetric gates targeted at measured failure modes outperform generically-tuned debate. The framework supports direction-aware procurement, accountability, and agent design for legal AI deployed in the wild.

AuditLLM: A Tool for Auditing Large Language Models Using Multiprobe Approach

As Large Language Models (LLMs) gain wider adoption in various contexts, it becomes crucial to ensure they are reasonably safe, consistent, and reliable for an application at hand. This may require probing or auditing them. Probing LLMs with varied iterations of a single question could reveal potential inconsistencies in their knowledge or functionality. However, a tool for performing such audits with simple workflow and low technical threshold is lacking. In this demo, we introduce "AuditLLM," a novel tool designed to evaluate the performance of various LLMs in a methodical way. AuditLLM's core functionality lies in its ability to test a given LLM by auditing it using multiple probes generated from a single question, thereby identifying any inconsistencies in the model's understanding or operation. A reasonably robust, reliable, and consistent LLM should output semantically similar responses for a question asked differently or by different people. Based on this assumption, AuditLLM produces easily interpretable results regarding the LLM's consistencies from a single question that the user enters. A certain level of inconsistency has been shown to be an indicator of potential bias, hallucinations, and other issues. One could then use the output of AuditLLM to further investigate issues with the aforementioned LLM. To facilitate demonstration and practical uses, AuditLLM offers two key modes: (1) Live mode which allows instant auditing of LLMs by analyzing responses to real-time queries; (2) Batch mode which facilitates comprehensive LLM auditing by processing multiple queries at once for in-depth analysis. This tool is beneficial for both researchers and general users, as it enhances our understanding of LLMs' capabilities in generating responses, using a standardized auditing platform.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 14, 2024

ScientistOne: Towards Human-Level Autonomous Research via Chain-of-Evidence

Autonomous research agents produce competitive solutions and professional-looking manuscripts, yet their outputs contain verifiability failures undetectable by surface-level evaluation: fabricated citations, unreproducible scores, and method descriptions that diverge from the implementation. We address this through three contributions. First, Chain-of-Evidence (CoE), a verifiability framework requiring every claim to be traceable to its evidence source. Second, ScientistOne, an end-to-end autonomous research system that maintains evidence chains by construction throughout literature review, solution discovery, and paper writing. Third, CoE Audit, a post-hoc audit whose four integrity checks -- score verification, specification violation, reference verification, and method-code alignment -- apply uniformly to all systems. Across 75 papers spanning five systems and five frontier research tasks, every baseline exhibits at least one systematic failure mode: hallucinated reference rates reach 21%, score verification passes in as few as 42% of papers, and method-code alignment ranges from 20% to 80%. ScientistOne achieves zero hallucinated references (0/337), perfect score verification (12/12), and the highest method-code alignment (14/15), while matching or exceeding human expert performance on all five tasks. ScientistOne further generalizes to six additional tasks spanning medical imaging, fine-grained recognition, 3D perception, and language modeling, achieving state-of-the-art on Parameter Golf and gold medals on MLE-Bench tasks where baselines fail entirely.

google Google
·
May 24 2

Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 10 2

CLAIR-Fin: An Adversarial Multi-Agent Framework for Claim-Level Verification and Adaptive Debate in Cross-Modal Financial QA

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

  • 5 authors
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Aug 17

Recursive Organization Improvement: A Modeling Specification for Human--Agent Organizations

Stronger AI agents do not automatically produce better organizations: teams must also learn which work arrangements to retain and when to reconsider them. We propose a modeling specification for recursive organization improvement and evaluate it through an executable checker, a public-record mapping, and controlled simulation. The specification connects actor-visible histories, organizational memory, decision rights, and evidence-carrying change contracts. The mechanism study crosses six decision rules, three memory conditions, and three task environments under fixed resource ceilings. In a stationary environment, cumulative evidence raises balanced evaluation's normalized net value per task from 0.45224 to 0.48007. Repeated reassessment's disadvantage relative to this comparator falls from 0.01702 with reset evidence to 0.00007 with cumulative evidence. A reversal of the best workflow reveals the opposite cost: indefinite retention delays adaptation, while a finite window restores eventual performance at a transition cost. In exploratory controls, matching trial acquisition and label reuse reduces the apparent reassessment gain from 0.00607 to 0.00191. Program replacement adds no stable benefit across the tested reversal times. The study identifies evidence acquisition, reuse, and timely updating as mechanisms that must be separated from evaluator replacement when assessing organizational improvement.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 28

ReportLogic: Evaluating Logical Quality in Deep Research Reports

Users increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) for Deep Research, using them to synthesize diverse sources into structured reports that support understanding and action. In this context, the practical reliability of such reports hinges on logical quality: whether the report's claims and arguments are explicitly supported and can be trusted as a basis for downstream use, rather than merely appearing fluent or informative. However, current evaluation frameworks largely overlook this requirement. To bridge this gap, we introduce ReportLogic, a benchmark that quantifies report-level logical quality through a reader-centric lens of auditability. Specifically, ReportLogic adopts a hierarchical taxonomy that evaluates whether readers can (1) trace an on-topic report structure with a unified analytical arc (Macro-Logic), (2) understand the progression with necessary context (Expositional-Logic), and (3) verify conclusions via explicit claim--support (Structural-Logic). Based on this taxonomy, we construct a human-annotated rubric-guided dataset and train an open-source LogicJudge for scalable evaluation. We further evaluate judge robustness via adversarial attacks, showing that off-the-shelf LLM judges are frequently influenced by superficial cues (e.g., verbosity), and reasoning modes can mask broken support relations. Overall, our results provide actionable guidance for building more robust logic evaluators and improving the logical reliability of LLM-generated reports.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 27

Exposing the Illusion of Fairness: Auditing Vulnerabilities to Distributional Manipulation Attacks

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

VeriPhy: Agentic Physical Reasoning for World Model Evaluation and Refinement

Visual fluency in generated video does not imply physical reliability, and a scalar quality score alone is incapable of indicating the obligation a clip violates or the moment it fails. We present VeriPhy, an auditable physical-verification system in which a text-only planner compiles the prompt into typed physical obligations and a statically validated execution plan before any frame is observed. During execution, observations gate and scope only declared calls to frozen low-level experts (e.g., segmentation and tracking, counting, eleven typed physical measurements over the resulting tracks, depth, OCR, and audio-event detection). Each action returns a provenance-carrying evidence record whose payload, when usable, is either a typed measurement or an explicitly tagged learned state. Typed resolvers and fixed composition map usable records to a three-valued state (supported, contradicted, or unknown, surfaced as plausible, implausible, or abstain) with full provenance, so that every verdict is traceable to the evidence that produced it. We anchor evaluation in a 1,500-clip corpus of human-annotated flaw records that localize real generation failures in prompt reference, space, and time. On a 149-clip core carrying 304 such records, VeriPhy accounts for 228, against 164 for a published question-decomposition evaluator given the same clips and the same claims. Recall alone does not separate it from prompting the same backbone monolithically, which reaches 222; what separates them is that each decision retains its evidence record and provenance, making the traces auditable one verdict at a time and usable as the interface through which a critic verdict could be written back into generation.

  • 11 authors
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Sep 1 2

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

  • 8 authors
·
Aug 5 2

MedSkillAudit: A Domain-Specific Audit Framework for Medical Research Agent Skills

Background: Agent skills are increasingly deployed as modular, reusable capability units in AI agent systems. Medical research agent skills require safeguards beyond general-purpose evaluation, including scientific integrity, methodological validity, reproducibility, and boundary safety. This study developed and preliminarily evaluated a domain-specific audit framework for medical research agent skills, with a focus on reliability against expert review. Methods: We developed MedSkillAudit (skill-auditor@1.0), a layered framework assessing skill release readiness before deployment. We evaluated 75 skills across five medical research categories (15 per category). Two experts independently assigned a quality score (0-100), an ordinal release disposition (Production Ready / Limited Release / Beta Only / Reject), and a high-risk failure flag. System-expert agreement was quantified using ICC(2,1) and linearly weighted Cohen's kappa, benchmarked against the human inter-rater baseline. Results: The mean consensus quality score was 72.4 (SD = 13.0); 57.3% of skills fell below the Limited Release threshold. MedSkillAudit achieved ICC(2,1) = 0.449 (95% CI: 0.250-0.610), exceeding the human inter-rater ICC of 0.300. System-consensus score divergence (SD = 9.5) was smaller than inter-expert divergence (SD = 12.4), with no directional bias (Wilcoxon p = 0.613). Protocol Design showed the strongest category-level agreement (ICC = 0.551); Academic Writing showed a negative ICC (-0.567), reflecting a structural rubric-expert mismatch. Conclusions: Domain-specific pre-deployment audit may provide a practical foundation for governing medical research agent skills, complementing general-purpose quality checks with structured audit workflows tailored to scientific use cases.

AIPOCH-AI AIPOCH
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Apr 21 2

What Git Does Not Record: Provenance Legibility in Two AI-Assisted Research Repositories

Publishers and funders increasingly ask authors to disclose how AI tools contributed to a piece of research. In computational work the repository is where an author or an auditor would look for the answer, and we ask what it can actually supply. We audit two single-investigator repositories by the same author in the same field, each carrying a different class of agent residue: a prescriptive trace of standing rule files and a narrative trace of a running agent scratchpad, in repositories of 466 and 103 commits. The two are legible in opposite ways. 85.6% of the lines ever committed to the prescriptive trace are visible at the current revision, and a standing rule states a conclusion and discards the episode behind it; the narrative trace records episodes and shows 21.8%. Counted by revision the gap is far smaller: 15 of the prescriptive trace's 41 revisions leave no visible line, against 18 of the narrative trace's 41. The Co-Authored-By trailer, the field an automated audit reads, is one of three AI trailer keys Project A carries and covers 66 of the 121 commits carrying any. In Project B it has low sensitivity against an explicit within-repository proxy: 39 commits revise a file maintained to hold an agent's working notes and 1 (2.6%) carries the trailer. Project A's repository-level rate is unstable in time too, stepping from 2.7% to 17.7% across a boundary we did not specify in advance. Repository channels disagree, and neither rate can be read as an involvement rate; we do not isolate the cause, and say so. We give a field-by-field account of which provenance claims such traces support, which they cannot, and which they answer confidently and wrongly, construct an auditable evidence ledger, and derive the requirements this places on any system meant to record research provenance as it happens.

  • 3 authors
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Oct 8 3

Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 3, 2023

AIREP: A Protocol for Per-Decision Evidence in AI Runtime Governance

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 15

Sibyl-AutoResearch: Autonomous Research Needs Self-Evolving Trial-and-Error Harnesses, Not Paper Generators

Autonomous research systems increasingly make the scientific workflow executable: agents can propose ideas, run code, inspect results, and draft papers. But executable workflows do not by themselves produce research judgment. We analyze where current systems lose trial experience: weak evidence becomes prose, pilot signals become broad claims, memory remains textual, and recurring process failures do not change later behavior. We introduce Sibyl-AutoResearch, a self-evolving AutoResearch framework built around Scientific Trial-and-Error Harnesses. A harness lets agents run bounded trials, preserve positive and negative outcomes, and route lessons into later planning, validation, claim scope, scheduling, critique, writing, and harness repair. We formalize this through two auditable conversion units: trial-to-behavior conversion, which links trial signals to later research actions, and trial-to-harness-behavior conversion, which links recurring process failures to system updates. We implement the framework in SIBYL, a file-backed autonomous research system that exposes the state, roles, memory, gates, and artifact traces needed to inspect these conversion paths. A retrospective audit identifies eight high-confidence conversion events, with a median latency of one iteration and a maximum latency of three iterations. A recovered-failure registry further shows how five naturally occurring failure classes, including duplicate results, stale numbers, and unsupported statistics, were blocked, downgraded, or routed into later repair. These traces do not establish a comparative performance claim; they show that the proposed conversion units are recoverable from realistic autonomous-research workspaces. The SIBYL framework and system are available at https://github.com/Sibyl-Research-Team/AutoResearch-SibylSystem.

  • 6 authors
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May 20

Can LLMs Trust Appropriately? Evaluating Calibrated Reliance on Imperfect Partners

Large language models increasingly collaborate with humans and peer AI agents whose contributions may be incomplete, inconsistent, or incorrect. Effective collaboration requires calibrated trust, whereby decisions to rely on, verify, or assist a partner adapt rationally as empirical evidence accumulates. We investigate whether models translate partner evidence into appropriate reliance policies. We introduce a benchmark of 324 scenarios across 23 collaboration categories. Each scenario involves three sequential decisions with explicit transition dynamics, feedback emissions, and cost schedules, permitting exact analytical evaluation of choices against their expected consequences over the remaining interaction. Evaluating seven models alongside 36 controlled-history probes, we dissociate evidence sensitivity from normatively appropriate action. While the strongest frontier model approaches near-optimal decisions, other models exhibit recurring pathologies: procuring excessive safeguards, purchasing verification tests with zero expected value of information, prioritizing immediate savings over cooperative learning, and misallocating assistance to suboptimal channels. Supplying explicit posterior distributions resolves certain errors while introducing new failure modes. Calibrated trust in autonomous agents critically demands coupling empirical evidence with forward-looking decision utility.

  • 2 authors
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Oct 24

WorldAuditBench: Interactive 3D World Auditing with Multimodal Agents

As interactive 3D worlds are increasingly used to study intelligent behavior, it becomes important to develop efficient pipelines for identifying anomalies in these simulated environments, such as floating objects, traversable walls, or objects inconsistent with the surrounding scene. Multimodal AI systems, including vision-language models (VLMs) and vision-language-action models (VLAs), have shown potential for automating this task. However, 3D world auditing is complex, requiring the close coupling of two distinct capabilities: action, to navigate the 3D world and search for anomalies systematically and efficiently; and visual reasoning, to understand the environment and identify anomalies from multimodal observations. It remains largely unexplored whether multimodal agents can effectively couple these two capabilities, using visual reasoning to identify potential anomalies while taking actions to validate them. In this paper, we introduce WorldAuditBench, a benchmark for 3D world auditing comprising 213 anomaly tasks across 13 environments built with Unreal Engine 5 and Three.js, spanning five anomaly families. We evaluate five frontier models under a fixed exploration budget using two auditing paradigms: VLA-based exploration followed by VLM-based anomaly identification, and an end-to-end VLM agent in which visual reasoning directly guides action selection. Across the evaluated models and two paradigms, success rates range from 6.6% to 42.3%, substantially below human performance (83.4%). Through the task of world auditing, WorldAuditBench provides a testbed for studying how multimodal agents couple action and visual reasoning in interactive 3D environments, while highlighting current limitations in their ability to gather and interpret evidence during exploration.

Cited but Not Consulted: A Counterfactual Audit of Legal Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness

Large language models increasingly justify legal decisions by naming the statute or precedent behind a verdict, treated as evidence that the decision follows from it. We test this directly: holding case facts fixed, we substitute the named legal authority for an unrelated one and decode a model's evolving verdict from its hidden states. Across seven open-weight models (8B-70B) and four benchmarks spanning judicial and contractual reasoning, when explicitly required to justify a verdict by naming the governing authority, models name the correct one in 66.7%-100% of generations, while the verdict changing when the authority changes is far less consistent: 0.0%-21.7% on CaseHOLD, 30.0%-76.7% on ECHR and SCOTUS, and 43.3%-50.0% on ContractNLI. Neither scale nor a purpose-built legal-reasoning model (a best-effort LoRA reproduction; Section 6) closes this gap. A red-teaming evaluation on five core models finds compliance with an adversarial instruction hidden in the case facts (73.3%-96.4%) exceeds verdict-swap sensitivity by a wide margin, holding without exception across model rankings. Naming a legal authority is thus a poor proxy for a verdict's dependence on it, while the same verdict remains separately vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Both findings replicate across checks ruling out prompt-wording noise and confounded sampling, and bear directly on the use of generated legal explanations as compliance or audit artefacts.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 7

Beyond End-Task Success: How to Audit Visual Experience Retrieval in Robotics

Robots that store past experiences must select which one to reuse in a new scene. Most systems select by visual similarity, and most evaluations report only the success of the selected experience. That number does not show whether the selection was good: a rule can score well by repeatedly using one broadly transferable experience, or poorly because its preferred experience is weak. Since robots increasingly adapt by reuse rather than retraining, a score that describes the library rather than the rule misleads what the field builds next. We contribute an audit methodology: execute every stored experience in every query scene, over two manipulation tasks, three reuse mechanisms, and libraries of K=3, 10, and 50. Because every alternative's outcome is known, a score can be traced to per-scene selection or to library quality. The audited rules select by nearest-neighbor distance in five visual embeddings, from raw pixels to CLIP. (1) One fixed experience, chosen with hindsight, captures 30-58% of the gap between random selection and an oracle; per-scene selection competes for the remaining 0.07-0.15 in success rate. (2) At Kge10, visual rules concentrate on one experience 1.5-3 times more than the oracle does, and their scores then follow that experience's quality. (3) Wherever a rule differs significantly from a shuffle that keeps its selection rates but pairs them with scenes at random, the rule is worse, for every learned image policy. (4) Visual distance predicts well whether a given pair will succeed (AUROC up to 0.96), yet ranks the candidates within one scene no better than chance for four of five embeddings at K=50 (AUROC 0.45-0.52). Exhaustive execution is usually infeasible, so the audit reduces to two cheap reports any study can give: the distribution of selected experiences, and the success of the best single experience in hindsight.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 21

Your AI Travel Agent Would Book You a Bullfight: An Agentic Benchmark for Implicit Animal Welfare in Frontier AI Models

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 16 1

Beyond Attack-Success Rate: Action-Graded Severity Scale for Tool-Using AI Agents

Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not. We argue that this binary attack-success rate discards the information a defender most needs, namely how harmful the resulting action was. We introduce an action-graded harm rubric that scores an agent's tool-call trajectory on a seven-level ordinal scale (L0 to L6) according to whether the executed action was reversible, whether it crossed scope to reach another party, and whether it expanded privilege. We compute the scale two ways: a deterministic oracle that reads the trajectory and the attacker's stated goal, and a panel of three frontier language-model judges that read a tag-free account of the same trajectory. Across four victim models and two defenses on the AgentDojo workspace suite, severity grading exposes three cases the binary metric hides, including a defense that reports a zero attack-success rate while still permitting an externally visible cross-scope leak through an unfiltered tool. The judge panel reproduces the oracle with high ordinal agreement (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.91) but shares systematic blind spots that we characterize, most notably a failure to recognize escalation chains. Unlike prior work that provides harm taxonomies, harmful-task completion tests, execution-level safety benchmarks, or severity-aware simulation, our contribution is a reusable, trace-grounded severity instrument applied to the actual actions recorded in existing red-team logs. All code, prompts, and per-episode logs are released.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 7

Monitor Accuracy Isn't the Answer: A Decision-Value Framework for Evaluating AI Agent Restart Monitors

Classification accuracy and true-positive and false-positive rates alone do not determine whether restarting an AI agent improves success. Using an exact alarm-to-action identity for an independent clean restart with zero monitoring overhead, we show analytically that a monitor with fixed 90% accuracy can swing from a five-percentage-point loss to a 35-point gain in success rate, depending solely on the replacement attempt's residual-budget success probability. We introduce two techniques for evaluating monitors and progress signals in decision terms. First, a decision-sufficiency criterion, a binary-action specialization of Blackwell's comparison of experiments, identifies which progress representations or context compressions preserve the information needed to choose optimally between the specified actions, independent of trace reconstruction fidelity. Second, a finite-sample, model-free decision audit uses simultaneous binomial intervals over existing agent traces, without additional model calls, to certify a preference for "restart" or "continue" under stated sampling assumptions, or return "abstain" when evidence is insufficient. In a study of 194 externally evaluated model executions on 19 selected SymPy issues from SWE-bench Verified, with a retrospective audit of 130 of these traces, we find a 2.29-point apparent restart gain traced to a single surviving failed attempt, a 42.29-point loss on a second model, no positive replication of the initial gain on prospective task cohorts, and zero of 103 live comparisons meeting the specified certification bar. These results motivate evaluating agent monitors through recovery opportunity, decision value, and statistical support, rather than classification performance alone.

intuit Intuit
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Oct 26 3

Trial by Trace: Benchmarking AI Agent Harnesses for Reliability and Failure Attribution

LLM agents are increasingly used to solve real-world problems, and their effectiveness depends on both the underlying models and the harnesses that support their operation. However, most existing benchmarks focus on model capabilities and overall agent performance, with limited attention to the evaluation of agent harnesses. To address this gap, we introduce TraceTrial-Bench, which organizes harness reliability into seven components covering context, execution, governance, lifecycle, observability, tools, and verification. We construct 95 expert-level, mechanism-oriented tasks with executable or state-based ground truth to support semantically equivalent comparisons while preserving the native behavior of each harness. We design a Trajectory Tracing (TT) module to capture agent execution traces and introduce a two-layer evaluation framework that separately assesses agent performance and harness reliability. In addition, we design a Multi-source Evidence Acquisition (MEA) module to provide evidence from the agent context, harness, and execution environment for LLM-based evaluation, and develop a Failure Attribution (FA) module that uses explicit mechanism chains to support attribution at the run level. Across 4 harnesses, 9 models, and 95 tasks, our evaluation of 3,420 runs yields macro-averaged harness scores ranging from 59.8% to 72.0%, while 31.1% of runs achieve task success despite failing at least one harness criterion. TraceTrial-Bench provides an auditable and reproducible foundation for comparing agent harnesses, diagnosing their failures, and studying how harness design interacts with model behavior.

TraceLite-AI TraceLite AI
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Oct 22 6

PACT: Can Enterprise AI Assistants Be Trusted Under Pressure?

As corporate AI adoption continues to grow, enterprise-grade LLM agents are being deployed into sensitive contexts such as hiring, healthcare, and finance. In these contexts, compliance with rules specified in an agent's system context is a first-order legal concern. Currently, no evaluation framework systematically measures which LLM models tend to violate compliance rules, especially under pressure from a persistent user, a hurried manager, or circumstances where violation is convenient or attractive. We introduce PACT (Pressure-Applied Compliance Testing), a benchmark for rule-following under pressure in AI agents assisting employees in daily tasks across twelve regulated enterprise domains and forty-eight scenarios, each set in a realistic multi-turn conversation. Each benchmark item pairs a standing rule against a rule-violating shortcut, and applies a battery of pressures across different wordings and system-prompt modes. We construct PACT component by component under strict LLM-as-judge auditing to ensure samples are unambiguous, ungameable, and realistic enough to avoid eliciting evaluation-aware behavior. We use PACT to profile LLM compliance across six complementary metrics that create a holistic picture of an AI assistant's robustness under pressure and throughout multi-turn conversations, its transparency, and ability to correctly discern where a rule applies. We aggregate this profile into PACTScore, a reliability-weighted compliance rate over all items and modes. Our results across 22 common LLM models spanning multiple providers and sizes show substantial variability in compliance across models and metric dimensions. Even the strongest assistants mis-apply a rule on 6 to 10% of items, and ordinary user pressure raises the violation rate by 65% on average. PACT highlights compliance risks in LLM assistants, motivating guardrails and careful model selection.

Pay Only for Disagreement: Certified No-Regression Verdicts for Model Updates with Matching Label-Complexity Bounds

Every production model is updated, by retraining, fine-tuning, quantization, or a silent vendor swap, and each update risks being worse than what it replaced. We formalize update promotion as certified paired risk-difference auditing. Our starting point is a support identity: the risk difference between two models lives on the inputs where they disagree, observable without labels. We build DISCERN, a sequential two-tier protocol. A zero-label tier certifies benign updates whose disagreement rate is below tolerance from unlabeled traffic alone. An audited tier labels only sampled disagreements through an anytime-valid confidence sequence, valid at every stopping time and under any label-routing rule, even an adversarial judge. We prove finite-sample validity and matching label-complexity bounds of order rho^2/eps^2 at the rate level, so exploiting free disagreement provably saves a factor 1/rho over any pairing-blind auditor, and the guarantee composes across an unbounded sequence of promotions from one error budget. Across 14,000+ replayed audit streams over 785 update pairs, including LoRA fine-tunes of language models up to 1.4B parameters, miscoverage is 0.0002 (nominal 5%), power 0.986 with zero false alarms, and 56% of benign updates certify with zero labels. Each audit emits a machine-checkable evidence record for post-market monitoring.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 21

When Language Overrules: Revealing Text Dominance in Multimodal Large Language Models

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a diverse range of multimodal tasks. However, these models suffer from a core problem known as text dominance: they depend heavily on text for their inference, while underutilizing other modalities. While prior work has acknowledged this phenomenon in vision-language tasks, often attributing it to data biases or model architectures. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic investigation of text dominance across diverse data modalities, including images, videos, audio, time-series, and graphs. To measure this imbalance, we propose two evaluation metrics: the Modality Dominance Index (MDI) and the Attention Efficiency Index (AEI). Our comprehensive analysis reveals that text dominance is both significant and pervasive across all tested modalities. Our in-depth analysis identifies three underlying causes: attention dilution from severe token redundancy in non-textual modalities, the influence of fusion architecture design, and task formulations that implicitly favor textual inputs. Furthermore, we propose a simple token compression method that effectively rebalances model attention. Applying this method to LLaVA-7B, for instance, drastically reduces its MDI from 10.23 to a well-balanced value of 0.86. Our analysis and methodological framework offer a foundation for the development of more equitable and comprehensive multimodal language models.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 14, 2025

Agentic Search in the Wild: Intents and Trajectory Dynamics from 14M+ Real Search Requests

LLM-powered search agents are increasingly being used for multi-step information seeking tasks, yet the IR community lacks empirical understanding of how agentic search sessions unfold and how retrieved evidence is used. This paper presents a large-scale log analysis of agentic search based on 14.44M search requests (3.97M sessions) collected from DeepResearchGym, i.e. an open-source search API accessed by external agentic clients. We sessionize the logs, assign session-level intents and step-wise query-reformulation labels using LLM-based annotation, and propose Context-driven Term Adoption Rate (CTAR) to quantify whether newly introduced query terms are traceable to previously retrieved evidence. Our analyses reveal distinctive behavioral patterns. First, over 90% of multi-turn sessions contain at most ten steps, and 89% of inter-step intervals fall under one minute. Second, behavior varies by intent. Fact-seeking sessions exhibit high repetition that increases over time, while sessions requiring reasoning sustain broader exploration. Third, agents reuse evidence across steps. On average, 54% of newly introduced query terms appear in the accumulated evidence context, with contributions from earlier steps beyond the most recent retrieval. The findings suggest that agentic search may benefit from repetition-aware early stopping, intent-adaptive retrieval budgets, and explicit cross-step context tracking. We plan to release the anonymized logs to support future research.

Phantom Gains: Auditing Self-Improvement Against a Measured Null

Whether a language model has improved itself is increasingly judged not by mean accuracy but by which individual problems it gains and loses. Tracking these transitions means differencing two noisy estimates, leaving them vulnerable to measurement artifacts. Auditing three rounds of rank-32 LoRA self-training on Qwen3-8B against a frozen control pushed through the identical pipeline, we identify seven measurement failures, each of which inverts a reported finding when its control is absent. Several are standard practice. A ledger built on a single greedy decode manufactures capability changes on an untrained model, largely an artifact of inference batching; the expansion statistic separating acquisition from sharpening assigns that same model a rate of 0.280. The natural threshold repair does not survive replication: estimated across the frozen comparisons such a design already contains, its null stays non-zero. We replace it with a per-problem exact test against a pooled baseline under false-discovery-rate control, which detects nothing on any held-out replicate and is unchanged under the multiple-testing rule, error rate and pool size. Applied to a ladder of arms matched in stream, volume and evaluation, the audit finds that external distillation improves problems the base model rarely reaches while three forms of self-training do not; a regression rejects this asymmetry as a by-product of distillation's larger overall gain (p < 10^{-8}). On the far smaller set of problems the base model never reaches, the evidence is inconclusive, while self-training corrupts problems solved at baseline at rates well above the measured floor. Transition-level auditing therefore requires a separately measured null for every statistic it reports: nulls that cost no new experiments, built from baseline replicates a multi-arm study already owns, though not from as few as most possess.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 19

Constraining the Commit Boundary: A DIO/ODI-Informed Authorization Guardrail for Agentic Entity Resolution

Agentic Entity Resolution (ER) systems iteratively plan actions, retrieve evidence, revise hypotheses, and propose graph mutations. An erroneous identity hypothesis may condition later retrieval and produce apparent confirmation. This paper proposes a Digital Identity Optimization (DIO) and Ontology of Digital Identity (ODI)-informed authorization boundary between evidence available for agent reasoning and evidence eligible to authorize persistent identity-changing mutations. A domain-governed constraint-binding function maps selected reconstruction-failure distinctions to explicit identity-preserving constraints. An abstract two-phase supervisor permits a commit only when claim-specific authorization-eligible evidence supports every required proposition, relevant conflicts are resolved, the operation remains within its authorized scope, and relevant state and policy versions remain valid. Admission as UNVERIFIED does not confer authorization eligibility. Separate claim-specific promotion governs evidentiary use; insufficient support or unresolved material conflict leads to deferral. The contribution is a specification connecting diagnostic-to-constraint mapping, evidence promotion, proposition coverage, conflict handling, scope binding, and commit-time version integrity. A proposed evaluation protocol is designed to assess the mapping's incremental value beyond generic authorization and conventional identifier rules. This is a conceptual architecture without implementation or empirical validation, not a theorem of semantic correctness. Its property depends on domain-policy adequacy, evidence promotion, and enforcement. It does not prevent erroneous hypotheses or hypothesis-conditioned retrieval; dependency-aware evidence flow remains future research.

  • 1 authors
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Oct 27

Evaluating Bounded Autonomy in Regulated Agentic AI: A Diagnostic Harness with Constitutional Rewards, Escalation Labels, and Runtime Governance

We propose RegLLM, a diagnostic harness for bounded autonomy in regulated agentic workflows. It instruments six trustworthiness signals: citation validity, source grounding, schema compliance, escalation correctness, constitutional alignment, and unsafe-action rate. Signals are distinguished by their source of supervision: programmatic verifiers, task-level escalation labels, or AI-judge scores. A deterministic runtime supervisor blocks ungrounded answers and forces escalation, logging interventions. The same domain constitution informs evaluation, training rewards, and serving guardrails. Task-level should-escalate labels make the act-versus-defer decision a measurable training signal. We demonstrate the harness at smoke scale. An offline reference run (n=12) lifts escalation recall from 0 to 0.67 and reduces unsafe-action rate from 0.33 to 0.08 when governance is enabled. Two single-GPU Qwen2.5-3B LoRA/DPO pilots (n=8, same seed and evaluation split) expose substantial variation: nominally identical RL-base configurations yield task success of 0.25 versus 0.12 and escalation recall of 1.0 versus 0.5. An answer-quality adapter changes recall from 1.0 to 0.5 in Run A, but from 0.5 to 1.0 in Run B. An escalation-aware variant produces no measurable change in Run B. These small pilots do not establish reliable adapter effects or production readiness. Their contribution is diagnostic: configuration variance can overwhelm apparent tuning effects on bounded-autonomy metrics, motivating larger evaluation sets and repeated runs.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 27 1

DEER: A Benchmark for Evaluating Deep Research Agents on Expert Report Generation

Recent advances in large language models have enabled deep research systems that generate expert-level reports through multi-step reasoning and evidence-based synthesis. However, evaluating such reports remains challenging: report quality is multifaceted, making it difficult to determine what to assess and by what criteria; LLM-based judges may miss errors that require domain expertise to identify; and because deep research relies on retrieved evidence, report-wide claim verification is also necessary. To address these issues, we propose DEER, a benchmark for evaluating expert-level deep research reports. DEER systematizes evaluation criteria with an expert-developed taxonomy (7 dimensions, 25 subdimensions) operationalized as 101 fine-grained rubric items. We also provide task-specific Expert Evaluation Guidance to support LLM-based judging. Alongside rubric-based assessment, we propose a claim verification architecture that verifies both cited and uncited claims and quantifies evidence quality. Experiments show that while current deep research systems can produce structurally plausible reports that cite external evidence, there is room for improvement in fulfilling expert-level user requests and achieving logical completeness. Beyond simple performance comparisons, DEER makes system strengths and limitations interpretable and provides diagnostic signals for improvement.

LG-AI-Research LG AI Research
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Dec 19, 2025 1

VeriGraph: Towards Verifiable Data-Analytic Agents

LLM-based agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in data-intensive analytical tasks, yet their outputs are rarely verifiable: a reliance on linear text trajectories makes their reasoning difficult to audit. In particular, deterministic computations over raw data and semantic deductions over natural-language claims are often entangled in an unstructured stream, leaving numerical conclusions hard to reproduce and qualitative judgments hard to inspect. To address this, we propose VeriGraph, a traceable neuro-symbolic reasoning framework that enables agents to construct an explicit heterogeneous evidence directed acyclic graph (DAG) during execution. VeriGraph introduces three evidence-expansion primitives, namely computational, grounding, and derivational expansion, to connect raw data, interpreter variables, computed results, and natural-language claims in a unified graph. Under this formulation, structural traceability is reduced to graph reachability from raw data sources to terminal claims, while semantic support is measured by claim-level evidence evaluation. To improve graph construction, we further design a graph-based policy optimization strategy with a composite reward that jointly supervises answer correctness, computational integrity, and derivational coherence. Experiments on four benchmarks show that VeriGraph-8B achieves the highest overall score among all baselines. More importantly, VeriGraph produces auditable evidence graphs with substantially stronger claim grounding, achieving a 87.61\% Grounding Rate under our claim-level evidence support evaluation. These results suggest that explicit evidence-graph construction is a promising path toward verifiable data-analytic agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/ignorejjj/VeriGraph.

  • 8 authors
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Jun 14

When Behavioral Safety Evaluation Fails: A Representation-Level Perspective

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.

SchemeArena: Factorized Stress Testing of Scheming in LLM Agents

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

launch LAUNCH Lab
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Sep 7 2

REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems

Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks. Adversarial inputs can exploit interactions between the agent and its environment, causing the agent to violate safety policies during execution. Yet existing evaluations often reduce agent safety to a single attack success rate (ASR), collapsing exposure, execution, observation, and adjudication and potentially conflating actual violations with evidence visibility. We introduce REDAgentBench, an executable framework for autonomous red-teaming and faithful measurement. It derives attacks from explicit safety constraints and associated agent-system vulnerabilities, runs them in isolated service sandboxes, and verifies harmful effects from service receipts and final-state changes. The benchmark contains 1,661 cases across five service surfaces. Across six models and three agent harnesses, macro-average ASR is 65.69%; reported ASR varies with harness and evidence view, while evaluation-context disclosure changes execution behavior. In a state-grounded diagnostic cohort, almost one in five confirmed violations with resolved action anchors occurs after the agent states the relevant constraint or risk, revealing a Recognition--Execution Gap. Finally, a training-free policy reminder reduces confirmed violations by more than 70 percentage points in matched replay. These findings show that executable evaluation can improve safety measurement and identify actionable intervention points.

  • 9 authors
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Aug 10

Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents

By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, budget, OAuth, mandate, and fulfillment checks can validate transaction conditions without deciding whether a returned resource may become usable authority. This post-fulfillment activation gap spans tool-mediated creation, inter-agent delegation, and agentic commerce. We present a provenance-bounded runtime authorization architecture. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their actual capabilities from authenticated provider evidence through a versioned resolver, and activates them only through a current activation transaction that checks the resolved manifest, provenance, epochs, and a downward-closed relational envelope over a typed resource-capability hypergraph. The envelope preserves correlated identity, effect, data, delegation, and graph-wide limits. Single-use effect permits are revalidated and consumed at effect linearization. Under explicit assumptions, we prove eight safety properties covering quarantine, backing, non-amplification, split non-evasion, crash/retry, refunds, epochs, and effect confinement. Across five resource classes, reference semantics accepted 20/20 benign traces and rejected 40/40 registered unsafe traces over 810 events; an independent checker agreed on 60 base and 40 refinement traces and rejected 89/89 tamper tests. Frozen Codex and Gemini Model Context Protocol (MCP) client components completed 54/54 deterministic local stdio calls. In a registered 18-case staged MCP-to-Docker composition, both benign paths completed, and none of the 16 unsafe paths added an unauthorized Docker start request. A five-source audit classified 1,248 field pairs across 32 units; no unit alone supplied a complete activation profile.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 17

How Reproducible Are Evaluation Conclusions? A Self-Audit of LLM-Inferred Prompt Structure

Evaluations of LLM systems routinely average over small prompt sets and report models as a ranked table. We ask how much confidence such a table deserves, using LLM-based prompt-structure inference as the case study: eight open model variants across five families and 8B to 675B parameters, caching disabled, 293 raw intermediate representations persisted. The measured phenomenon is unstable to begin with. Identical calls do not reliably recover identical structure, with mean node-set Jaccard from 0.39 to 0.96 and 72% of prompt-model cells never node-set-perfect. Auditing the evaluation weakens its conclusions further, and this is our main contribution. Under a joint cluster bootstrap over prompts, only the bottom of the ranking is firm: the two least reproducible models hold rank in 99% and 86% of replicates, the middle four in 27% to 48%, and the top two in 68% each, so the table identifies the worst model reliably but does not reliably identify the best. Two equally defensible rules for merging repeated campaigns change four of eight rows and move the study-wide headline by 7 percentage points. Checking the inferred structure against ground-truth annotations shows reproducibility cannot be read as accuracy. And four of the eight endpoints were withdrawn within ten weeks of measurement, so the study as specified can no longer be run. Small-sample LLM evaluations can therefore look far more definitive than their evidence supports. We recommend reporting rank stability, per-cell provenance, executed sensitivity comparisons, raw per-run outputs, and a measurement date alongside any ranking.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 23 2

ProofAgent Harness: Open Infrastructure for Adversarial Evaluation of AI Agents

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

  • 1 authors
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May 21

Political Alignment in Large Language Models: A Multidimensional Audit of Psychometric Identity and Behavioral Bias

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into social decision-making, understanding their political positioning and alignment behavior is critical for safety and fairness. This study presents a sociotechnical audit of 26 prominent LLMs, triangulating their positions across three psychometric inventories (Political Compass, SapplyValues, 8 Values) and evaluating their performance on a large-scale news labeling task (N approx 27{,}000). Our results reveal a strong clustering of models in the Libertarian-Left region of the ideological space, encompassing 96.3% of the cohort. Alignment signals appear to be consistent architectural traits rather than stochastic noise (η^2 > 0.90); however, we identify substantial discrepancies in measurement validity. In particular, the Political Compass exhibits a strong negative correlation with cultural progressivism (r=-0.64) when compared against multi-axial instruments, suggesting a conflation of social conservatism with authoritarianism in this context. We further observe a significant divergence between open-weights and closed-source models, with the latter displaying markedly higher cultural progressivism scores (p<10^{-25}). In downstream media analysis, models exhibit a systematic "center-shift," frequently categorizing neutral articles as left-leaning, alongside an asymmetric detection capability in which "Far Left" content is identified with greater accuracy (19.2%) than "Far Right" content (2.0%). These findings suggest that single-axis evaluations are insufficient and that multidimensional auditing frameworks are necessary to characterize alignment behavior in deployed LLMs. Our code and data will be made public.

  • 6 authors
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Jan 7

Think Locally, Explain Globally: Graph-Guided LLM Investigations via Local Reasoning and Belief Propagation

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

  • 10 authors
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Jan 28

Quantifying Overclaiming Propensity in Frontier LLM Agents

Frontier coding agents are increasingly trusted to work autonomously for long periods of time, yet what they actually did is often hard to tell from their final response. We quantify the propensity of such agents to overclaim task completion, which may mislead the user. We operationalize overclaiming as a final response that reports work that the agent's own transcript shows it did not do, for example, claiming to have read a file it never opened. This criterion requires no inference about intent and does not depend on whether the delivered work is correct; it asks only whether the reported work was done. We introduce OverclaimBench, an evaluation suite of five file-review scenarios with transcript-based coverage measurements and registered planted defects. We evaluate eight proprietary frontier models in their own production command-line interfaces and four open-weight models under a single fixed harness, and find that 1) agents fail to read every file they were asked to review in 67.9% of runs; 2) among these incomplete runs, agents are misleading 80.4% of the time (59-96% per model), either falsely claiming a complete review or leaving the gap undisclosed; 3) requiring delegation to subagents increases coverage, but a large majority of reviews that remain incomplete are still misleading; and 4) agents that falsely claim a complete review miss planted defects at about 1.8 times the rate of agents that read every file, showing that claims of completion can conceal substantive failures. Together, these results show that agents' final responses are not reliable accounts of their actions.

  • 9 authors
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Sep 21

A^2E : An End-to-End Agent Auditing Engine

With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), harnesses have become essential infrastructure for deploying agents across a wide range of domains. The fast-evolving harness ecosystem has also made rigorous capability evaluation increasingly important. However, efficiently building an end-to-end, systematic, and comprehensive evaluation pipeline remains a significant challenge. To address this challenge, we introduce A^2E (Agent Auditing Engine), an end-to-end evaluation engine designed for agent harnesses. A^2E leverages our newly proposed Agent Task Protocol (ATP) to enable the rapid integration of evaluation tasks with different harnesses. Through an automatically instrumented Monitor, it captures and generates standardized execution traces during experiments. In the Evaluation stage, A^2E systematically assesses harness capabilities using a suite of multidimensional metrics. Compared with correctness alone, these metrics provide a more fine-grained characterization of differences among harnesses in execution efficiency, tool use, task planning, and error recovery. Experiments conducted with A^2E further reveal that model-harness combinations exhibit substantial performance variation across different types of tasks, and that no single combination consistently outperforms all others across every task. These findings not only demonstrate the necessity of systematic evaluation but also provide useful guidance for the co-evolving of models and harnesses. Our code is available at https://github.com/datamllab/A2E.

RGDT-Bench: Benchmarking LLM Reasoning for Rule-Governed Decisions and Their Justifications

We study reasoning in Rule-Governed Decision Tasks (RGDTs), where models apply external rules to case facts and justify decisions, as required in policy, contract, and compliance settings. Beyond the deductive capability emphasized by standard mathematical and logical reasoning tasks, RGDTs require interpreting rules and their applicability, assessing conditions from evidence, combining judgments under rules and exceptions, and providing checkable justifications. These demands motivate a benchmark assessing both decisions and their stated grounds. We introduce RGDT-Bench, providing 202.1K condition-level supervision slots across four task tracks and eight supported task-probe combinations that vary access to supporting information. Label-blind extraction and deterministic checks produce labels for warrant completeness: source-referenced coverage and consistency of stated decision grounds. The benchmark attributes failures to four process layers: rule use, condition, evidence, and aggregation, and checks the final outcome. Among evaluable correct responses, warrant incompleteness averages 40.2% across six evaluated LLMs and supported task-probe combinations. Such warrant incompleteness poses potential safety risks and remains difficult to detect: the best of seventeen existing evaluators reaches only 57.69% (random: 50%) task-averaged area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). To address this difficulty, we train a simple reward model with warrant supervision. It achieves 69.24% task-averaged AUROC among correct answers, exceeding the matched outcome-supervised baseline by 10.37 pp (percentage points) and the best existing evaluator by 11.55 pp. Beyond completeness assessment, the model outperforms both outcome-supervised baselines across nearly all response-selection comparisons, supporting RGDT-Bench's warrant supervision for RGDT reasoning.

  • 10 authors
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Sep 27

Evidence Sufficiency Under Delayed Ground Truth: Proxy Monitoring for Risk Decision Systems

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

  • 1 authors
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Apr 16

AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applications

System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications. They are used throughout commercial AI products, but are rarely disclosed to the public or regulators, creating a serious trust and accountability gap in the wide deployment of AI systems. In this paper, we introduce Artificial Intelligence System Prompt Assurance (AISPA), a user-centric framework for systematically auditing system prompts in AI systems. AISPA examines specific parts of a system prompt and evaluates them along eight dimensions that matter to users. We then use this framework to review 3,249 instructions from system prompts in 88 commercial AI products, classifying each instruction as either protective (of users) or problematic. Our audit surfaces four core findings. First, system prompt design varies substantially across products and developers, with some organizations averaging over 60 protective instructions per product while others average fewer than 5. Second, protective instructions are widely adopted but shallow in scope: 98.9% of products contain at least one, yet only 24% cover all eight dimensions of the AISPA taxonomy. Third, system prompts have grown steadily longer and more protective of users, suggesting that user protection is becoming a more visible concern in commercial prompt design. Fourth, despite this progress, problematic instructions remain pervasive: roughly 40% of products contain at least one instruction that works against user interests, and protective and problematic instructions frequently coexist within the same prompt. Our findings highlight the need for greater transparency, standardization, and independent oversight for system prompts in commercial AI products.

LSREP: A Longitudinal State-Replay Protocol for Evaluating Conversational Memory, with ICE v2 as an Audited Local-First Architecture

Conversational memory changes during use, so endpoint question answering alone cannot establish how a persistent state accumulates, ages, or incorporates revisions. We introduce LSREP, a Longitudinal State-Replay Evaluation Protocol combining ordered replay, explicit lifecycle schedules, repeated probes, evolving reference answers, and mechanism-fidelity checks. Its architectural case study is ICE v2, a local-first memory middleware with typed stores, retrieval fusion, and dynamic context budgets. The private, single-user instantiation contains 1,985 turns, 219 distinct probes, and 1,211 probe-checkpoint observations across 52 checkpoints. On three ordinary-density datasets, ICE v2 has a near-zero mean quality difference from vector-RAG while selecting 32% fewer fragments but using 6.6% more estimated prompt tokens. A fourth, dense dataset exposes catastrophic failures of the unbudgeted baseline. The fidelity audit limits attribution: procedural retrieval is defective, several mechanisms are unexercised, and graph utility is not established. In a complementary matched public diagnostic, ICE v2 loses decisively to pure vector-RAG on LongMemEval: 50.8% versus 72.8% in the evidence-only oracle and 43.0% versus 69.5% in full-S. Paired differences are -22.0 points (95% CI [-26.6, -17.4]) and -26.5 ([-31.3, -21.8]). Conservative abstention accompanies severe multi-session and temporal failures. ICE uses less context in this diagnostic, establishing a quality-cost trade-off rather than superior efficiency. Together, replay, fidelity auditing, and public endpoint testing expose distinct failure modes that neither architectural descriptions nor aggregate scores identify alone.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 14

Evaluating whether AI models would sabotage AI safety research

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

  • 5 authors
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Apr 26

Search-G1: Co-Evolving Representation-Based Rewards for Selective Grounded Search

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

  • 10 authors
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Oct 9

Measure, Don't Optimize: Forecasting Recovery in LLM Unlearning

Prior white-box studies show that large language models can retain latent traces of target knowledge after unlearning, even when the knowledge is no longer expressed in their outputs. However, existing audits remain limited to one-off diagnostics: it is unclear whether these residual signals can predict future recovery under continued training or serve as reliable optimization targets. Resolving this gap is essential to determine whether internal auditing can move beyond post-hoc evaluation toward proactive risk monitoring and safer unlearning. We propose J-Access, an inference-time audit that uses the Jacobian lens to map intermediate representations into vocabulary space and measures how often target concepts remain accessible along the model's output pathway. We hypothesize that residual accessibility reflects recovery susceptibility: knowledge that remains closer to the output pathway requires less fine-tuning to restore, leading to faster recovery. We audit 398 public unlearned models spanning eight unlearning methods. We find that: (1) most unlearned models retain access above the retain-only gold level; (2) pre-attack accessibility predicts recovery speed and extent at the model level, but cannot identify which specific facts will be recovered; and (3) directly minimizing J-Access does not promote genuine deletion. Instead, the model learns to hide knowledge from the audit, producing lower audit scores but greater post-attack recovery. These findings position J-Access as a model-level diagnostic for assessing residual susceptibility in unlearned models. We argue internal audits should serve as an independent diagnostic dimension in unlearning evaluation, and should not be converted into optimization targets without validation.

  • 11 authors
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Aug 10

Reachability Is Not Realization: Tracing the Sources of LLM Benchmark Gains

Benchmark gains are often treated as evidence of greater LLM capability. Yet the same gain can reflect different changes in model behavior. A model may reach new answers, or produce answers that were already within reach. Aggregate scores do not distinguish these changes question by question. We establish a question-level audit under fixed budgets, temperatures, and answer formats. A question is realized when the default deployment procedure produces the correct answer. A question is reachable when a specified probe finds that answer within a fixed budget. We first test whether inference-time layer routing can expand reachability. Under a matched budget, random routes match or exceed structured search in all 43 model and task settings. Answer-blind procedures retain almost none of this gain, which instead requires access to the correct answer. We then ask why reachable answers sometimes fail to appear. Across six cases spanning 0.5B to 31B, silencing one identified MLP block repairs 68 to 92 percent of a predefined failure set. We next test whether training closes the gap by expanding reachability. In five of six matched evaluations, deployed performance rises while the reachable ceiling remains flat or falls. For DAPO, the deployed score rises by 14.7 points while the reachable ceiling falls by 13.3 points. Across the settings we audit, realization and reachability therefore do not always change together. Claims of capability expansion should report both realized performance and reachability under matched evaluation conditions. Code is available at https://github.com/LiZaiyuan0619/reachability-not-realization

  • 7 authors
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Aug 3

Auditing Self-Evolution in Financial Agents: Capability Gains, Security Drift, and Execution-Interface Mismatch

Self-evolving agents turn experience into reusable skills, workflows, or memories, but post-evolution accuracy alone does not show whether learned behavior preserves previously correct behavior or security. We audit SkillOpt, Agent Workflow Memory (AWM), and ReasoningBank in simulated e-banking using matched benign acquisition trajectories, sealed evaluation endpoints, execution-grounded checks, and independent state replay. On Qwen 3.7 Flash, SkillOpt raises benign utility from 0.741 to 0.837 while exposure to injected content rises from 0.820 to 0.943. Conditional attack success after exposure falls from 0.605 to 0.562, yet overall attack success rate (ASR) rises from 0.496 to 0.530 and unauthorized financial state changes rise to 0.685. Across three independently evolved lineages, capability, exposure, and unauthorized-state changes increase in all three, whereas ASR increases in only two. ReasoningBank raises utility to 0.859 without increasing aggregate ASR, although unauthorized state changes remain slightly above Static. AWM reveals a separate evaluation hazard: a literal WebArena text-action envelope disrupts tool execution in our native function-calling executor. In a post-hoc sensitivity test, removing only that envelope restores utility from 0.319 to 0.756, while exposure rises from 0.299 to 0.909 and ASR from 0.195 to 0.575. Auditing self-evolving financial agents therefore requires tracking regressions, attack-surface contact, unauthorized financial-state change, and artifact-executor compatibility, not accuracy alone.

  • 2 authors
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Aug 17