Daily Papers

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

Large language models (LLMs) now support automated software security tasks, including vulnerability discovery and proof-of-concept (PoC) generation. Existing benchmarks do not faithfully evaluate LLMs in real-world bug hunting scenarios because they rely on fuzzing harnesses, target-specific descriptions, or vulnerability-reproduction tasks. We present SEC-bench Pro, a benchmark for measuring agent bug hunting on critical, high-complexity software systems. This work discloses reports with concrete PoC inputs and links fixes into reproducible tasks through a three-phase pipeline for vulnerability collection, environment reconstruction, and oracle-based validation. We instantiate SEC-bench Pro with 183 validated vulnerabilities across V8 and SpiderMonkey, including a V8 subset with more than $1.5 million in cumulative Google Vulnerability Reward Program awards. These instances span memory-safety, sandbox, JIT, and race-condition bugs under browser-grade and runtime-grade execution conditions. Our evaluation shows that coding agents with frontier models remain below 40% success on both evaluated engines. The open-weight Kimi-K2.6 baseline reaches 11.7% on V8, while the strongest frontier configuration reaches 32.0% on V8 and 38.8% on SpiderMonkey. ClaudeCode and Codex solve complementary instance sets, and their two-agent union reaches 37.9% on V8 and 48.8% on SpiderMonkey. SEC-bench Pro provides robust environments for assessing LLM-based security agents and exposes limitations in long-horizon bug hunting tasks.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

Conversational assistants are increasingly integrating long-term memory with large language models (LLMs). This persistence of memories, e.g., the user is vegetarian, can enhance personalization in future conversations. However, the same persistence can also introduce safety risks that have been largely overlooked. Hence, we introduce PersistBench to measure the extent of these safety risks. We identify two long-term memory-specific risks: cross-domain leakage, where LLMs inappropriately inject context from the long-term memories; and memory-induced sycophancy, where stored long-term memories insidiously reinforce user biases. We evaluate 18 frontier and open-source LLMs on our benchmark. Our results reveal a surprisingly high failure rate across these LLMs - a median failure rate of 53% on cross-domain samples and 97% on sycophancy samples. To address this, our benchmark encourages the development of more robust and safer long-term memory usage in frontier conversational systems.

Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a significant threat even for projects with extensive fuzzing and manual auditing. Recent results suggest that large language models hold great promise for detecting such vulnerabilities, but they are unreliable, at risk of hallucination, and challenging to scale to repository-size codebases. This paper presents Revelio, a cost-efficient end-to-end agentic framework for memory-safety vulnerability discovery. Revelio addresses the problem of hallucination by generating an executable Proof-of-Vulnerability, which is checked with a deterministic sanitizer. It reduces cost using inexpensive LLMs and lightweight static analysis to help generate and rank vulnerability hypotheses, reporting vulnerabilities only when they can be reproduced and confirmed by a sanitizer. We evaluated Revelio on seven production-quality projects that had been continuously fuzzed for five to eight years, as well as on 100 randomly selected Arvo projects from the CyberGym benchmark. With around one hour per project and a total cost of $300, Revelio discovered 19 previously unknown memory-safety vulnerabilities. On benchmarks, Revelio outperformed frontier coding agents across diverse backbone models at comparable token costs. Our results suggest that Revelio enables scalable and trustworthy end-to-end LLM-based memory-safety vulnerability detection.

Communication-limited robots in mission-critical scenarios such as disaster inspection and search-and-rescue must make reliable onboard decisions without access to remote operators or high-capacity reasoning services. Episodic memory reuse is an attractive low-cost fallback, but retrieval similarity does not guarantee execution validity, i.e., a retrieved action may match the current context yet be unsafe due to changed topology, insufficient battery margin, or unreliable prior outcomes. We call such high-similarity but execution-invalid episodes memory traps. This creates a safety-efficiency design space where similarity only reuse minimizes fallback cost but can be unsafe, while always invoking local reasoning improves safety at high computational and energy cost. This paper presents MemoGuard, a lightweight adaptive runtime that validates episodic memories against topology, resource, and outcome contracts before reuse, invoking fallback only when validation fails. In a graph-based corridor-inspection simulator, MemoGuard reduces battery safety violations by 76.6% over similarity-only top-1 reuse while reducing fallback calls by 21.4% over always reasoning. On an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier with local llama3.2:3b fallback reasoning, this corresponds to 3.67 s and 36.97 J of avoided fallback-reasoning overhead per trial. We open-source MemoGuard at https://github.com/hetheiin/memoguard.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Memory-augmented VLM agents act on persistent spatial knowledge, yet that knowledge silently goes stale as the environment changes. We ask what happens when an agent must reconcile a confident memory claim with a contradicting observation, and whether current models can catch the conflict before it becomes a safety-relevant mistake. Using a dynamic FrozenLake testbed, we pair a staleness-detection task with a downstream navigation task across three closed-source models and three open-weight VLMs under both text and image inputs (1,800 detection runs, and 12,000 text-mode navigation episodes over four LLM navigators at a shared 50-seed scale). Three findings emerge. First, text solvability does not imply visual grounding: models that flag stale entries reliably from text nonetheless span vision F1 from 0.887 down to 0.067 on the identical grids, and the weakest keeps making fluent, confident decisions that ignore the image. Second, consuming stale memory without an audit is a safety liability: in our primary GPT-4o setting, an agent that trusts raw memory dies more than twice as often as the same agent given no memory at all. Third, auditing helps but does not close the gap: a transparent read-time filter removes much of the safety cost in text mode, yet even oracle stale labels bring no further significant gain on the current grid size, and when visual auditing is unreliable, filtering yields no consistent benefit. Together these results frame spatial-memory staleness as a safety failure mode and isolate reliable visual grounding and action selection under memory--observation conflict as the central open challenges for memory-augmented agents.

Large language models of code (Code-LLMs) have recently brought tremendous advances to code completion, a fundamental feature of programming assistance and code intelligence. However, most existing works ignore the possible presence of bugs in the code context for generation, which are inevitable in software development. Therefore, we introduce and study the buggy-code completion problem, inspired by the realistic scenario of real-time code suggestion where the code context contains potential bugs -- anti-patterns that can become bugs in the completed program. To systematically study the task, we introduce two datasets: one with synthetic bugs derived from semantics-altering operator changes (buggy-HumanEval) and one with realistic bugs derived from user submissions to coding problems (buggy-FixEval). We find that the presence of potential bugs significantly degrades the generation performance of the high-performing Code-LLMs. For instance, the passing rates of CodeGen-2B-mono on test cases of buggy-HumanEval drop more than 50% given a single potential bug in the context. Finally, we investigate several post-hoc methods for mitigating the adverse effect of potential bugs and find that there remains a large gap in post-mitigation performance.

The autonomous discovery of bugs remains a significant challenge in modern software development. Compared to code generation, the complexity of dynamic runtime environments makes bug discovery considerably harder for large language models (LLMs). In this paper, we take game development as a representative domain and introduce the Game Benchmark for Quality Assurance (GBQA), a benchmark containing 30 games and 124 human-verified bugs across three difficulty levels, to evaluate whether LLMs can autonomously detect software bugs. The benchmark is constructed using a multi-agent system that develops games and injects bugs in a scalable manner, with human experts in the loop to ensure correctness. Moreover, we provide a baseline interactive agent equipped with a multi-round ReAct loop and a memory mechanism, enabling long-horizon exploration of game environments for bug detection across different LLMs. Extensive experiments on frontier LLMs demonstrate that autonomous bug discovery remains highly challenging: the best-performing model, Claude-4.6-Opus in thinking mode, identifies only 48.39% of the verified bugs. We believe GBQA provides an adequate testbed and evaluation criterion, and that further progress on it will help close the gap in autonomous software engineering.

Large language model (LLM) agents rely on long-term memory to support extended interactions and personalized assistance beyond finite context windows. Existing memory agents actively update external memory through generated write, revise, and delete operations, but these updates may omit important information, corrupt existing memory, or introduce unsupported hallucinated content. Once stored, such errors become persistent system-state failures that can affect future reasoning and generation. In this paper, we propose TrustMem, a framework designed to improve the trustworthiness of memory consolidation. TrustMem relies on a Memory Transition Verifier to evaluate the transition process of memory updates in terms of coverage, preservation, and faithfulness. It further constructs preference pairs among candidate updates under the same memory state, enabling preference-guided reinforcement learning to directly optimize memory updating behaviors. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TrustMem improves both memory utility and reliability: it achieves state-of-the-art results across MemoryAgentBench, HaluMem, and the Mem-alpha validation set, improves HaluMem memory extraction by 12.14 F1 points, and reduces transition-level omission, corruption, and hallucination by 40.1\%, 79.1\%, and 50.0\%, respectively, compared with the strongest baseline for each error type.

Unlike code completion, debugging requires localizing faults and applying targeted edits. We observe that frontier LLMs often regenerate correct but over-edited solutions during debugging. To evaluate how far LLMs are from precise debugging, we introduce the Precise Debugging Benchmark (PDB) framework, which automatically converts any coding dataset into a debugging benchmark with precision-aware evaluation. PDB generates buggy programs by synthesizing verified atomic bugs and composing them into multi-bug programs. We define two novel metrics, edit-level precision and bug-level recall, which measures how many necessary edits are made and how many bugs are resolved. We release two evaluation benchmarks: PDB-Single-Hard on single-line bugs, and PDB-Multi on multi-line bugs. Experiments show that frontier models, such as GPT-5.1-Codex and DeepSeek-V3.2-Thinking, achieve unit-test pass rates above 76% but exhibit precision below 45%, even when explicitly instructed to perform minimal debugging. Finally, we show that iterative and agentic debugging strategies do not substantially improve precision or recall, highlighting the need to rethink post-training pipelines for coding models.

Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.

This paper presents PyResBugs, a curated dataset of residual bugs, i.e., defects that persist undetected during traditional testing but later surface in production, collected from major Python frameworks. Each bug in the dataset is paired with its corresponding fault-free (fixed) version and annotated with multi-level natural language (NL) descriptions. These NL descriptions enable natural language-driven fault injection, offering a novel approach to simulating real-world faults in software systems. By bridging the gap between software fault injection techniques and real-world representativeness, PyResBugs provides researchers with a high-quality resource for advancing AI-driven automated testing in Python systems.

There are various benchmarks to evaluate bugfixing capabilities of Large Language Models. However, most widespread benchmarks do not fully reflect real-world bugfixing practices. They are small, weakening statistical reliability, and the buggy programs are often similar to one another, potentially distorting evaluation results. The range of bug types can also be narrow, failing to capture a representative range of bugs. To address these issues, we introduce MegaBugFix, a large-scale bugfixing benchmark containing 12,629 buggy Python programs synthesized from correct ones by a Large Language Model. Bug injections were generated as diffs representing code changes. Through this approach, we were able to avoid common pitfalls of LLM-based mutation techniques like injecting overly simplistic bugs or failing to modify the input program. We evaluated 13 open-weight models on MegaBugFix and baseline benchmarks, finding consistently lower performance on MegaBugFix. This reveals that our benchmark presents more challenging bugs and exposes model failures that may remain hidden when evaluating on existing benchmarks. The benchmark and fine-tuned model used for bug injection are available at hf.co/collections/szalontaib/megabugfix.

Long-term memory has become a foundational capability for LLM-based agents that accompany users across extended, multi-session interactions. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate such memory almost exclusively through downstream question answering, scoring only the correctness of a final answer. This black-box formulation conflates the heterogeneous causes of memory failure, such as missing the introduction of a relevant fact, binding an operation to the wrong target, or relying on stale values after a correction. As a result, it can credit correct answers despite their reliance on inconsistent or unsafe memory states. In this paper, we argue that, in dynamic long-horizon interactions, memory is not a static collection of facts but a lifecycle of explicit operations, including remembering, forgetting, updating, reflecting, and their compositions. We introduce MemOps, a benchmark that reformulates conversational memory as a sequence of lifecycle operations and represents each memory event with a structured trace specifying its trigger, target, scope, state transition, and supporting evidence. A controllable generation pipeline embeds these operations into long, task-oriented conversations and produces gold operation traces together with six categories of operation-level probes, evaluated under both adjacent-evidence and long-context settings. Across long-context, retrieval-based, parametric and managed-memory systems, MemOps disentangles failure modes that final-answer accuracy alone conceals, revealing that current systems remain far from uniformly reliable. For instance, session-level retrieval outperforms turn-level retrieval, and long-context models remain notably weak at reconstructing ordered memory-state trajectories. These results move long-term memory evaluation from final-answer scoring toward interpretable, operation-level diagnosis.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external memory systems to remain consistent across long-horizon interactions, but little empirical work has been done to understand the specific failure modes and design choices that these systems present. Existing benchmarks report aggregate question-answering accuracy and treat memory systems as black boxes, making it impossible to attribute an incorrect answer to a particular failure mode of the system. We introduce MemFail, a diagnostic benchmark that isolates the failure modes of modern LLM memory systems. We begin by formalizing memory systems as the composition of three canonical operations -- summarization, storage, and retrieval -- and identify the potential failure modes induced by each. Based on these hypothesized failure modes, we construct five datasets spanning four tasks, each adversarially designed to test a specific operation of a memory system. Using these datasets, we evaluate four state-of-the-art memory systems on MemFail and demonstrate how MemFail can be used to empirically understand the tradeoffs induced by differences in memory system architectures.

The current safeguard mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) are indeed susceptible to jailbreak attacks, making them inherently fragile. Even the process of fine-tuning on apparently benign data for downstream tasks can jeopardize safety. One potential solution is to conduct safety fine-tuning subsequent to downstream fine-tuning. However, there's a risk of catastrophic forgetting during safety fine-tuning, where LLMs may regain safety measures but lose the task-specific knowledge acquired during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce a safety realignment framework through subspace-oriented model fusion (SOMF), aiming to combine the safeguard capabilities of initially aligned model and the current fine-tuned model into a realigned model. Our approach begins by disentangling all task vectors from the weights of each fine-tuned model. We then identify safety-related regions within these vectors by subspace masking techniques. Finally, we explore the fusion of the initial safely aligned LLM with all task vectors based on the identified safety subspace. We validate that our safety realignment framework satisfies the safety requirements of a single fine-tuned model as well as multiple models during their fusion. Our findings confirm that SOMF preserves safety without notably compromising performance on downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for telecom tasks and datasets is a common practice to adapt general-purpose models to the telecom domain. However, little attention has been paid to how this process may compromise model safety. Recent research has shown that even benign fine-tuning can degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, causing them to respond to harmful or unethical user queries. In this paper, we investigate this issue for telecom-tuned LLMs using three representative datasets featured by the GenAINet initiative. We show that safety degradation persists even for structured and seemingly harmless datasets such as 3GPP standards and tabular records, indicating that telecom-specific data is not immune to safety erosion during fine-tuning. We further extend our analysis to publicly available Telecom LLMs trained via continual pre-training, revealing that safety alignment is often severely lacking, primarily due to the omission of safety-focused instruction tuning. To address these issues in both fine-tuned and pre-trained models, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate three safety realignment defenses (SafeInstruct, SafeLoRA, and SafeMERGE) using established red-teaming benchmarks. The results show that, across all settings, the proposed defenses can effectively restore safety after harmful degradation without compromising downstream task performance, leading to Safe teleCOMMunication (SafeCOMM) models. In a nutshell, our work serves as a diagnostic study and practical guide for safety realignment in telecom-tuned LLMs, and emphasizes the importance of safety-aware instruction and fine-tuning for real-world deployments of Telecom LLMs.

Memory is essential for enabling large language models to support long-horizon reasoning, yet existing memory systems remain unreliable and difficult to debug. Tracing memory's dynamic evolution is crucial to understand how information is synthesized, propagated, or corrupted over time. In this work, we study the new problem of error tracing and attribution in LLM memory systems. We propose a novel framework that transforms memory pipelines into executable memory evolution graphs, enabling fine-grained tracing of operational information flow. We then construct MemTraceBench, a benchmark collected from representative memory systems such as Long-Context, RAG, Mem0, and EverMemOS, to systematically study memory failure modes. We further introduce an automatic attribution method that iteratively traces operation subgraphs to pinpoint the root cause of any failed case. Our analysis reveals that memory failures are systematic, stemming from operation-level issues like information loss and retrieval misalignment. Crucially, we leverage these fine-grained attribution signals to guide downstream prompt optimization, establishing a closed-loop system that automatically corrects faults and boosts end-task performance by up to 7.62%. Code will be released at https://github.com/zjunlp/MemTrace.

Memory leaks remain prevalent in real-world C/C++ software. Static analyzers such as CodeQL provide scalable program analysis but frequently miss such bugs because they cannot recognize project-specific custom memory-management functions and lack path-sensitive control-flow modeling. We present MemHint, a neuro-symbolic pipeline that addresses both limitations by combining LLMs' semantic understanding of code with Z3-based symbolic reasoning. MemHint parses the target codebase and applies an LLM to classify each function as a memory allocator, deallocator, or neither, producing function summaries that record which argument or return value carries memory ownership, extending the analyzer's built-in knowledge beyond standard primitives such as malloc and free. A Z3-based validation step checks each summary against the function's control-flow graph, discarding those whose claimed memory operation is unreachable on any feasible path. The validated summaries are injected into CodeQL and Infer via their respective extension mechanisms. Z3 path feasibility filtering then eliminates warnings on infeasible paths, and a final LLM-based validation step confirms whether each remaining warning is a genuine bug. On eight real-world C/C++ projects totaling over 3.6M lines of code, MemHint detects 54 unique memory leaks (53 confirmed/fixed) at approximately $1.7 per detected bug, compared to 19 by vanilla CodeQL and 3 by vanilla Infer.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) enable complex problem-solving but introduce significant debugging challenges, characterized by long interaction traces, inter-agent dependencies, and delayed error manifestation. Existing diagnostic approaches often rely on expensive expert annotation or ''LLM-as-a-judge'' paradigms, which struggle to pinpoint decisive error steps within extended contexts. In this paper, we introduce ErrorProbe, a self-improving framework for semantic failure attribution that identifies responsible agents and the originating error step. The framework operates via a three-stage pipeline: (1) operationalizing the MAS failure taxonomy to detect local anomalies, (2) performing symptom-driven backward tracing to prune irrelevant context, and (3) employing a specialized multi-agent team (Strategist, Investigator, Arbiter) to validate error hypotheses through tool-grounded execution. Crucially, ErrorProbe maintains a verified episodic memory that updates only when error patterns are confirmed by executable evidence, without the need for annotation. Experiments across the TracerTraj and Who&When benchmarks demonstrate that ErrorProbe significantly outperforms baselines, particularly in step-level localization, while the verified memory enables robust cross-domain transfer without retraining.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) acquire stronger reasoning capabilities to handle complex, multi-image instructions, this advancement may pose new safety risks. We study this problem by introducing MIR-SafetyBench, the first benchmark focused on multi-image reasoning safety, which consists of 2,676 instances across a taxonomy of 9 multi-image relations. Our extensive evaluations on 19 MLLMs reveal a troubling trend: models with more advanced multi-image reasoning can be more vulnerable on MIR-SafetyBench. Beyond attack success rates, we find that many responses labeled as safe are superficial, often driven by misunderstanding or evasive, non-committal replies. We further observe that unsafe generations exhibit lower attention entropy than safe ones on average. This internal signature suggests a possible risk that models may over-focus on task solving while neglecting safety constraints. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/MIR-SafetyBench.

LLM agents span command-line interfaces (e.g., Codex) and agent frameworks (e.g., LangChain), integrating backend LLMs with harness code that parses model outputs, controls agent loops, and manages context. Both the harness and LLM-generated responses jointly shape an agent's execution. This architecture gives rise to bugs that cannot be readily understood by inspecting either component alone, because some bugs occur only when a particular LLM response elicits an abnormal reaction from the agent. Prior empirical studies of agent bugs have largely attributed failures either to limited model capabilities or to harness-side defects, such as outdated APIs and configuration misalignment, without characterizing these AR bugs. We conduct the first empirical study focused on agent-reactive (AR) bugs. Through manual analysis of 255 bug reports from Codex, Gemini-CLI, LangChain, and CrewAI, we construct a two-axis taxonomy covering observable symptoms and the LLM behaviors that trigger them. Our findings show that many AR bugs manifest as silent errors without well-defined test oracles, which makes detection difficult. The stochasticity of LLM responses further complicates bug reproduction. We additionally examine fixes proposed by users and implemented by developers. This analysis exposes a mismatch: users frequently advocate harness-side guardrails, whereas developers may attribute the issue to the LLM or respond slowly to user-proposed fixes. These findings point to the need for mechanisms that help users and developers understand the root causes and resolutions of AR bugs. Overall, the study highlights challenges specific to LLM agents and motivates the design of test oracles, reproduction support, and fault-localization techniques for AR bugs.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as coding agents, shifting safety from individual responses to action sequences. Existing benchmarks, however, primarily assess whether models refuse unsafe prompts, leaving impacts on stateful workspaces largely unexamined. We present SABER, a benchmark for environment-aware operational safety that places models in realistic agent-style projects and evaluates safety from the final environment state after a sequence of actions. Beyond binary safety-violation reports, SABER categorizes violations by cause, enabling analysis of model-specific safety profiles. Our evaluations show that even the best-performing model has more than a 54% harmful safety-violation rate (HSR), suggesting that current alignment remains insufficient for realistic project environments. SABER further reveals distinct safety profiles across models. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/sssr-lab/saber.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

Memory safety violations in low-level code, written in languages like C, continues to remain one of the major sources of software vulnerabilities. One method of removing such violations by construction is to port C code to a safe C dialect. Such dialects rely on programmer-supplied annotations to guarantee safety with minimal runtime overhead. This porting, however, is a manual process that imposes significant burden on the programmer and, hence, there has been limited adoption of this technique. The task of porting not only requires inferring annotations, but may also need refactoring/rewriting of the code to make it amenable to such annotations. In this paper, we use Large Language Models (LLMs) towards addressing both these concerns. We show how to harness LLM capabilities to do complex code reasoning as well as rewriting of large codebases. We also present a novel framework for whole-program transformations that leverages lightweight static analysis to break the transformation into smaller steps that can be carried out effectively by an LLM. We implement our ideas in a tool called MSA that targets the CheckedC dialect. We evaluate MSA on several micro-benchmarks, as well as real-world code ranging up to 20K lines of code. We showcase superior performance compared to a vanilla LLM baseline, as well as demonstrate improvement over a state-of-the-art symbolic (non-LLM) technique.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong natural language processing and code synthesis capabilities, which has led to their rapid adoption in software engineering applications. However, details about LLM training data are often not made public, which has caused concern as to whether existing bug benchmarks are included. In lieu of the training data for the popular GPT models, we examine the training data of the open-source LLM StarCoder, and find it likely that data from the widely used Defects4J benchmark was included, raising the possibility of its inclusion in GPT training data as well. This makes it difficult to tell how well LLM-based results on Defects4J would generalize, as for any results it would be unclear whether a technique's performance is due to LLM generalization or memorization. To remedy this issue and facilitate continued research on LLM-based SE, we present the GitHub Recent Bugs (GHRB) dataset, which includes 76 real-world Java bugs that were gathered after the OpenAI data cut-off point.

The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety within current research endeavors. This study investigates an interesting issue pertaining to the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, the LLM does not have a comprehensive understanding of the complex concept of safety. Instead, it only remembers what to answer for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. Such fake alignment renders previous evaluation protocols unreliable. To address this, we introduce the Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics--Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimates. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Our work highlights potential limitations in prevailing alignment methodologies.

We propose patching for large language models (LLMs) like software versions, a lightweight and modular approach for addressing safety vulnerabilities. While vendors release improved LLM versions, major releases are costly, infrequent, and difficult to tailor to customer needs, leaving released models with known safety gaps. Unlike full-model fine-tuning or major version updates, our method enables rapid remediation by prepending a compact, learnable prefix to an existing model. This "patch" introduces only 0.003% additional parameters, yet reliably steers model behavior toward that of a safer reference model. Across three critical domains (toxicity mitigation, bias reduction, and harmfulness refusal) policy patches achieve safety improvements comparable to next-generation safety-aligned models while preserving fluency. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can be "patched" much like software, offering vendors and practitioners a practical mechanism for distributing scalable, efficient, and composable safety updates between major model releases.

The success of large language models (LLMs) in scientific domains has heightened safety concerns, prompting numerous benchmarks to evaluate their scientific safety. Existing benchmarks often suffer from limited risk coverage and a reliance on subjective evaluation. To address these problems, we introduce SafeSci, a comprehensive framework for safety evaluation and enhancement in scientific contexts. SafeSci comprises SafeSciBench, a multi-disciplinary benchmark with 0.25M samples, and SafeSciTrain, a large-scale dataset containing 1.5M samples for safety enhancement. SafeSciBench distinguishes between safety knowledge and risk to cover extensive scopes and employs objective metrics such as deterministically answerable questions to mitigate evaluation bias. We evaluate 24 advanced LLMs, revealing critical vulnerabilities in current models. We also observe that LLMs exhibit varying degrees of excessive refusal behaviors on safety-related issues. For safety enhancement, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on SafeSciTrain significantly enhances the safety alignment of models. Finally, we argue that knowledge is a double-edged sword, and determining the safety of a scientific question should depend on specific context, rather than universally categorizing it as safe or unsafe. Our work provides both a diagnostic tool and a practical resource for building safer scientific AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-turn dialogue settings, but their behavior is still bottlenecked by fixed context windows and naive memory strategies. Replaying the full conversation at every turn is simple but expensive, while static summarization or recency-only heuristics often erase safety-critical user details. We present Adaptive Focus Memory (AFM), a dynamic context manager that assigns each past message one of three fidelity levels -- FULL, COMPRESSED, or PLACEHOLDER -- based on semantic similarity to the current query, half-life recency weighting, and importance classification. AFM packs messages chronologically under a strict token budget, preferring high fidelity for the most relevant turns while aiming to preserve a cheap trace of the dialogue. In a safety-oriented benchmark involving a user with a severe peanut allergy planning a trip to Thailand, AFM retains the allergy across both short and medium-length conversations, matches the safety performance of naive replay, and cuts average token usage by 66% relative to a replay baseline. We release a modular Python implementation of AFM designed for OpenAI-compatible APIs and offline operation, enabling practitioners to reduce inference cost without sacrificing safety or factual continuity in the evaluated scenario.

We present MineNPC-Task, a user-authored benchmark and evaluation harness for testing memory-aware, mixed-initiative LLM agents in open-world Minecraft. Rather than relying on synthetic prompts, tasks are elicited through formative and summative co-play with expert players, then normalized into parametric templates with explicit preconditions and dependency structure. These tasks are paired with machine-checkable validators under a bounded-knowledge policy that forbids out-of-world shortcuts. The harness captures plan, action, and memory events, including plan previews, targeted clarifications, memory reads and writes, precondition checks, and repair attempts, and reports outcomes relative to the total number of attempted subtasks using only in-world evidence. As an initial snapshot, we instantiate the framework with GPT-4o and evaluate 216 subtasks across 8 experienced players. We observe recurring breakdown patterns in code execution, inventory and tool handling, referencing, and navigation, alongside successful recoveries supported by mixed-initiative clarifications and lightweight memory use. Participants rated interaction quality and interface usability positively, while noting the need for stronger memory persistence across tasks. We release the complete task suite, validators, logs, and evaluation harness to support transparent and reproducible evaluation of future memory-aware embodied agents.

Automated program repair (APR) agents are transitioning from research benchmarks to developer workflows, yet they still begin with bug reports written for human developers. While decades of research have established what makes a good bug report for humans (e.g., steps to reproduce, stack traces), it remains unclear whether these features transfer to LLM-based agents. We study this question in two analyses. First, we use statistical modeling to examine associations between 27 bug-report features and repair success across 433 SWE-bench Verified issues attempted by 87 repair agents. We find that fix suggestions, reproduction scripts, repository source code, and localization info are associated with higher resolution likelihood, while longer reports are associated with lower odds. Second, we conduct controlled ablations across 2 models and 17 problem-statement mutations on SWE-bench Pro, varying the information available to an agent while holding the underlying task fixed. We remove or isolate selected bug-report content, delete fault-localization cues, and test structural changes that flatten lists or remove section headers. We find that both models depend on localization cues and expected behavior, and that structural changes alone can reduce solve rates, even without removing any content. The two models diverge in how they handle missing information: Qwen searches more widely and can exhaust its turn budget, while Gemma commits to a plausible interpretation early and patches on it. Our findings indicate that a good bug report for an agent overlaps with, but is not identical to, a good report for a human: agents benefit most from concrete, executable, and well-localized information, whereas some qualities long emphasized for human readers, such as natural language steps to reproduce and readable descriptions, contribute little or even correlate with lower success.

Large Language Model (LLM) libraries have emerged as the foundational infrastructure powering today's AI revolution, serving as the backbone for LLM deployment, inference optimization, fine-tuning, and production serving across diverse applications. Despite their critical role in the LLM ecosystem, these libraries face frequent quality issues and bugs that threaten the reliability of AI systems built upon them. To address this knowledge gap, we present the first comprehensive empirical investigation into bug characteristics and testing practices in modern LLM libraries. We examine 313 bug-fixing commits extracted across two widely-adopted LLM libraries: HuggingFace Transformers and vLLM.Through rigorous manual analysis, we establish comprehensive taxonomies categorizing bug symptoms into 5 types and root causes into 14 distinct categories.Our primary discovery shows that API misuse has emerged as the predominant root cause (32.17%-48.19%), representing a notable transition from algorithm-focused defects in conventional deep learning frameworks toward interface-oriented problems. Additionally, we examine 7,748 test functions to identify 7 distinct test oracle categories employed in current testing approaches, with predefined expected outputs (such as specific tensors and text strings) being the most common strategy. Our assessment of existing testing effectiveness demonstrates that the majority of bugs escape detection due to inadequate test cases (41.73%), lack of test drivers (32.37%), and weak test oracles (25.90%). Drawing from these findings, we offer some recommendations for enhancing LLM library quality assurance.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

Test-input generation for tensor kernels is folkloric. Most projects pick a representative shape and dtype, run a fixed-shape allclose-style check, and ship. We make the choices explicit and measure them. Using the gpuemu op-schema-aware seeded fuzzer (arXiv:2606.20128), we evaluate seven test-generation strategies across a 26-op corpus (16 correct controls and 10 LLM-style buggy variants seeded with documented transcription patterns) on an RTX 3060 GPU instance. Strategies vary the shape candidate set, the dtype mix, and the input value distribution. We report each strategy on two axes: bug recall and control false-positive (FP) rate. Boundary-only shape sampling is the operationally safe winner: 78% recall on the 10 buggy kernels with 0% FP on the 16 controls. Adversarial value sampling reaches higher recall (99%) but inflates control FP to 94% because the strategy injects NaN and Inf inputs and the validator's NaN check fires on every kernel that propagates them, not only on buggy kernels. On the two softmax tail-mask bugs the "regular" strategy (no boundary shapes) catches 0%, while boundary raises recall to 100% and 62% respectively. That gap is the clearest single signal in the data. The corpus result is about which seeded bug patterns each strategy catches, not about the bug rate of any specific deployed LLM.

High quality bugs are key to training the next generation of language model based software engineering (SWE) agents. We introduce a novel method for synthetic generation of difficult and diverse bugs. Our method instructs SWE Agents to introduce a feature into the codebase whereby they may unintentionally break tests, resulting in bugs. Prior approaches often induce an out-of-distribution effect by generating bugs intentionally (e.g. by introducing local perturbation to existing code), which does not reflect realistic development processes. We perform qualitative analysis to demonstrate that our approach for generating bugs more closely reflects the patterns found in human-authored edits. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our bugs provide more efficient training data for supervised fine-tuning, outperforming other bug datasets by 2% with half the training data (1.2k vs. 3k bugs). We train on our newly generated bugs in addition to existing bug datasets to get FrogBoss a state-of-the-art 32B parameter model on SWE-bench Verified with a pass@1 of 54.6% and FrogMini a state-of-the-art 14B model on SWE-bench Verified with a pass@1 of 45.3% on SWE-bench Verified averaged over three seeds.

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), distributed training and inference frameworks like DeepSpeed have become essential for scaling model training and inference across multiple GPUs or nodes. However, the increasing complexity of these frameworks brings non-trivial software bugs, which may degrade training performance, cause unexpected failures, and result in significant resource waste. Understanding framework bugs' characteristics is fundamental for quality assurance, allowing the design of more effective debugging and repair methods. Thus, our paper conducts the first large-scale empirical analysis of 308 fixed bugs across three popular distributed training/inference frameworks: DeepSpeed, Megatron-LM, and Colossal-AI. We examine bug symptoms, root causes, bug identification and fixing efforts, and common low-effort fixing strategies. Additionally, the distributed nature of these frameworks introduces unique bug root causes, such as allocation strategy error and distributed communication error. Diagnosing and fixing complex bugs remains challenging due to factors like the disconnect between symptoms and root causes, high bug reproduction costs, and low-level or cross-component interactions. Interestingly, we observe that 48% of bug fixes require minimal code changes (<=10 LOC) and follow simple strategies such as conditional logic optimization, parameter handling enhancement, or version compatibility handling, indicating potential for automation. Based on these insights, we offer several implications for improving the reliability of both distributed training and inference frameworks and their dependent LLM projects, while also identifying opportunities to leverage LLM-based tools for automated debugging and repair.

We present a suite of reinforcement learning environments illustrating various safety properties of intelligent agents. These problems include safe interruptibility, avoiding side effects, absent supervisor, reward gaming, safe exploration, as well as robustness to self-modification, distributional shift, and adversaries. To measure compliance with the intended safe behavior, we equip each environment with a performance function that is hidden from the agent. This allows us to categorize AI safety problems into robustness and specification problems, depending on whether the performance function corresponds to the observed reward function. We evaluate A2C and Rainbow, two recent deep reinforcement learning agents, on our environments and show that they are not able to solve them satisfactorily.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Bug reports are vital for software maintenance that allow users to inform developers of the problems encountered while using the software. As such, researchers have committed considerable resources toward automating bug replay to expedite the process of software maintenance. Nonetheless, the success of current automated approaches is largely dictated by the characteristics and quality of bug reports, as they are constrained by the limitations of manually-crafted patterns and pre-defined vocabulary lists. Inspired by the success of Large Language Models (LLMs) in natural language understanding, we propose AdbGPT, a new lightweight approach to automatically reproduce the bugs from bug reports through prompt engineering, without any training and hard-coding effort. AdbGPT leverages few-shot learning and chain-of-thought reasoning to elicit human knowledge and logical reasoning from LLMs to accomplish the bug replay in a manner similar to a developer. Our evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our AdbGPT to reproduce 81.3% of bug reports in 253.6 seconds, outperforming the state-of-the-art baselines and ablation studies. We also conduct a small-scale user study to confirm the usefulness of AdbGPT in enhancing developers' bug replay capabilities.

Long-horizon autonomous agents require memory systems to retain historical information, track evolving states, and reuse relevant knowledge beyond finite context windows. Existing agentic memory systems typically follow a memory construction-retrieval (MCR) pipeline, but often adapt mainly the memory bank while keeping the surrounding pipeline fixed after deployment. This fixed-pipeline design struggles to handle heterogeneous task-specific failure modes and can become misaligned with memory banks that evolve in scale and structure over time. To address these limitations, we propose MemPro, a system-level evolution framework that treats the entire MCR pipeline as an evolvable program rather than adapting only the memory bank or prompt text. MemPro maintains a version tree of runnable memory-system implementations, where an Evolving Agent iteratively selects promising versions, diagnoses recurring failures, and creates improved child versions through failure-mode-guided edit-debug refinement. Experiments on LongMemEval, LoCoMo, HotpotQA, and NarrativeQA show that MemPro consistently outperforms strong static and prompt-level evolving baselines within a few iterations, continues to improve with evolution, and achieves a favorable performance-cost trade-off. Code is available at https://github.com/wanghai673/MemPro.

Reproducing game bugs, particularly crash bugs in continuously evolving games like Minecraft, is a notoriously manual, time-consuming, and challenging process to automate; insights from a key decision maker from Minecraft we interviewed confirm this, highlighting that a substantial portion of crash reports necessitate manual scenario reconstruction. Despite the success of LLM-driven bug reproduction in other software domains, games, with their complex interactive environments, remain largely unaddressed. This paper introduces BugCraft, a novel end-to-end framework designed to automate the reproduction of crash bugs in Minecraft directly from user-submitted bug reports, addressing the critical gap in automated game bug reproduction. BugCraft employs a two-stage approach: first, a Step Synthesizer leverages LLMs and Minecraft Wiki knowledge to transform bug reports into high-quality, structured steps to reproduce (S2R). Second, an Action Model, powered by a vision-based LLM agent and a custom macro API, executes these S2R steps within Minecraft to trigger the reported crash. To facilitate evaluation, we introduce BugCraft-Bench, a curated dataset of Minecraft crash bug reports. On BugCraft-Bench, our framework end-to-end reproduced 34.9% of crash bugs with GPT-4.1, outperforming baseline computer-use models by 37%. BugCraft demonstrates the feasibility of automated reproduction of crash bugs in complex game environments using LLMs, opening promising avenues for game testing and development. Finally, we make our code open at https://bugcraft2025.github.io

Large Language Models (LLMs) for code have gained significant attention recently. They can generate code in different programming languages based on provided prompts, fulfilling a long-lasting dream in Software Engineering (SE), i.e., automatic code generation. Similar to human-written code, LLM-generated code is prone to bugs, and these bugs have not yet been thoroughly examined by the community. Given the increasing adoption of LLM-based code generation tools (e.g., GitHub Copilot) in SE activities, it is critical to understand the characteristics of bugs contained in code generated by LLMs. This paper examines a sample of 333 bugs collected from code generated using three leading LLMs (i.e., CodeGen, PanGu-Coder, and Codex) and identifies the following 10 distinctive bug patterns: Misinterpretations, Syntax Error, Silly Mistake, Prompt-biased code, Missing Corner Case, Wrong Input Type, Hallucinated Object, Wrong Attribute, Incomplete Generation, and Non-Prompted Consideration. The bug patterns are presented in the form of a taxonomy. The identified bug patterns are validated using an online survey with 34 LLM practitioners and researchers. The surveyed participants generally asserted the significance and prevalence of the bug patterns. Researchers and practitioners can leverage these findings to develop effective quality assurance techniques for LLM-generated code. This study sheds light on the distinctive characteristics of LLM-generated code.

The increasing development of large language models (LLMs) in code generation has drawn significant attention among researchers. To enhance LLM-based code generation ability, current efforts are predominantly directed towards collecting high-quality datasets and leveraging diverse training technologies. However, there is a notable lack of comprehensive studies examining the limitations and boundaries of these existing methods. To bridge this gap, we conducted an extensive empirical study evaluating the performance of three leading closed-source LLMs and four popular open-source LLMs on three commonly used benchmarks. Our investigation, which evaluated the length, cyclomatic complexity and API number of the generated code, revealed that these LLMs face challenges in generating successful code for more complex problems, and tend to produce code that is shorter yet more complicated as compared to canonical solutions. Additionally, we developed a taxonomy of bugs for incorrect codes that includes three categories and 12 sub-categories, and analyze the root cause for common bug types. Furthermore, to better understand the performance of LLMs in real-world projects, we manually created a real-world benchmark comprising 140 code generation tasks. Our analysis highlights distinct differences in bug distributions between actual scenarios and existing benchmarks. Finally, we propose a novel training-free iterative method that introduces self-critique, enabling LLMs to critique and correct their generated code based on bug types and compiler feedback. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach can significantly mitigate bugs and increase the passing rate by 29.2% after two iterations, indicating substantial potential for LLMs to handle more complex problems.

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is extremely fragile, as fine-tuning on a small number of benign samples can erase safety behaviors learned from millions of preference examples. Existing studies attempt to explain this phenomenon by comparing parameters and hidden states before and after fine-tuning, but overlook their dynamic evolution during fine-tuning. In this paper, we uncover a critical mechanism underlying safety degradation by analyzing parameter dynamics, where benign fine-tuning causes parameters to cumulatively drift toward danger-aligned directions, progressively undermining the model's safety. This finding suggests that samples contributing more to this drift has greater fine-tuning risks. Based on this insight, we propose a method of Sample-Level Quantification of Safety Degradation (SQSD), which quantifies the influence of each training sample on safety degradation. Specifically, SQSD computes continuous risk scores to samples by measuring their induced parameter updates' projection difference between danger and safety directions. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that SQSD effectively quantifies sample-level fine-tuning risks and exhibits strong transferability across model architectures, parameter scales, and parameter-efficient methods.

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Long-running AI agents need persistent memory. Memory supports learning across sessions, reduces repeated context injection, and enables auditing of past decisions. Current agent memory systems and database paradigms treat memory as storage. They localize correctness at records, embeddings, or edges. Each supplies only some of the capabilities that long-term memory requires. The result is four recurring failure modes: unregulated growth, missing semantic revision, capacity-driven forgetting, and read-only retrieval. In our vision, long-term agent memory is a new data-management workload. Its correctness is a property of the state trajectory, not of individual records. We formalize this as Governed Evolving Memory (GEM). GEM replaces record-level database operations with four state-level operators: ingestion, revision, forgetting, and retrieval. Six correctness conditions govern how the state evolves. Three structural observations establish that no record-level system can satisfy these conditions, regardless of the storage model. We realize the abstraction in MemState, a prototype on a property-graph backend. MemState validates feasibility and exposes the gap to a native engine. We outline three research directions that define memory-centric data management as a workload.

Robots deployed in realistic settings will accumulate experience across many sessions and tasks over their deployment. The robot's tasks may often require it to remember information from multiple sessions ago, making long-context robot memory important for real-world deployments. However, most robot-memory benchmarks today are based on single episodes or a short context. To measure how current robot memory systems perform on longer sessions with more distractions, we introduce RoboMME-Interference, a cross-session benchmark built on RoboMME. For each query episode, we construct a session history using the query's relevant prior demonstration followed by a controlled number of unrelated sessions, which we provide to the VLA as memory and measure accuracy. Running RoboMME's released memory-augmented π_{0.5} variants unmodified through this benchmark, we find that while perceptual memory variants improve success when given the history without any distractors, they decay strongly and steadily as unrelated sessions accumulate. Adding a retrieval step to the strongest variant, which finds the demonstration by visual similarity and passes only it to the policy, restores its no-distractor success rate at every interference level. With this release, we emphasize the importance of long-context memory and robustness to interference and show that current systems largely fail on such capabilities. The project page, videos, code, and data are at https://robotmemorybench.com.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are one of the most promising developments in the field of artificial intelligence, and the software engineering community has readily noticed their potential role in the software development life-cycle. Developers routinely ask LLMs to generate code snippets, increasing productivity but also potentially introducing ownership, privacy, correctness, and security issues. Previous work highlighted how code generated by mainstream commercial LLMs is often not safe, containing vulnerabilities, bugs, and code smells. In this paper, we present a framework that leverages testing and static analysis to assess the quality, and guide the self-improvement, of code generated by general-purpose, open-source LLMs. First, we ask LLMs to generate C code to solve a number of programming tasks. Then we employ ground-truth tests to assess the (in)correctness of the generated code, and a static analysis tool to detect potential safety vulnerabilities. Next, we assess the models ability to evaluate the generated code, by asking them to detect errors and vulnerabilities. Finally, we test the models ability to fix the generated code, providing the reports produced during the static analysis and incorrectness evaluation phases as feedback. Our results show that models often produce incorrect code, and that the generated code can include safety issues. Moreover, they perform very poorly at detecting either issue. On the positive side, we observe a substantial ability to fix flawed code when provided with information about failed tests or potential vulnerabilities, indicating a promising avenue for improving the safety of LLM-based code generation tools.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

The exercise of detecting similar bug reports in bug tracking systems is known as duplicate bug report detection. Having prior knowledge of a bug report's existence reduces efforts put into debugging problems and identifying the root cause. Rule and Query-based solutions recommend a long list of potential similar bug reports with no clear ranking. In addition, triage engineers are less motivated to spend time going through an extensive list. Consequently, this deters the use of duplicate bug report retrieval solutions. In this paper, we have proposed a solution using a combination of NLP techniques. Our approach considers unstructured and structured attributes of a bug report like summary, description and severity, impacted products, platforms, categories, etc. It uses a custom data transformer, a deep neural network, and a non-generalizing machine learning method to retrieve existing identical bug reports. We have performed numerous experiments with significant data sources containing thousands of bug reports and showcased that the proposed solution achieves a high retrieval accuracy of 70% for recall@5.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been gaining increasing attention and demonstrated promising performance across a variety of Software Engineering (SE) tasks, such as Automated Program Repair (APR), code summarization, and code completion. For example, ChatGPT, the latest black-box LLM, has been investigated by numerous recent research studies and has shown impressive performance in various tasks. However, there exists a potential risk of data leakage since these LLMs are usually close-sourced with unknown specific training details, e.g., pre-training datasets. In this paper, we seek to review the bug-fixing capabilities of ChatGPT on a clean APR benchmark with different research objectives. We first introduce {\benchmark}, a new benchmark with buggy and the corresponding fixed programs from competitive programming problems starting from 2023, after the training cutoff point of ChatGPT. The results on {\benchmark} show that ChatGPT is able to fix 109 out of 151 buggy programs using the basic prompt within 35 independent rounds, outperforming state-of-the-art LLMs CodeT5 and PLBART by 27.5\% and 62.4\% prediction accuracy. We also investigate the impact of three types of prompts, i.e., problem description, error feedback, and bug localization, leading to additional 34 fixed bugs. Besides, we provide additional discussion from the interactive nature of ChatGPT to illustrate the capacity of a dialog-based repair workflow with 9 additional fixed bugs. Inspired by the findings, we further pinpoint various challenges and opportunities for advanced SE study equipped with such LLMs (e.g.,~ChatGPT) in the near future. More importantly, our work calls for more research on the reevaluation of the achievements obtained by existing black-box LLMs across various SE tasks, not limited to ChatGPT on APR.

Modern AI systems rely on vector embeddings stored and searched using floating-point arithmetic. While effective for approximate similarity search, this design introduces fundamental non-determinism: identical models, inputs, and code can produce different memory states and retrieval results across hardware architectures (e.g., x86 vs. ARM). This prevents replayability and safe deployment, leading to silent data divergence that prevents post-hoc verification and compromises audit trails in regulated sectors. We present Valori, a deterministic AI memory substrate that replaces floating-point memory operations with fixed-point arithmetic (Q16.16) and models memory as a replayable state machine. Valori guarantees bit-identical memory states, snapshots, and search results across platforms. We demonstrate that non-determinism arises before indexing or retrieval and show how Valori enforces determinism at the memory boundary. Our results suggest that deterministic memory is a necessary primitive for trustworthy AI systems. The reference implementation is open-source and available at https://github.com/varshith-Git/Valori-Kernel (archived at https://zenodo.org/records/18022660).

Memory has emerged as a cornerstone of modern LLM-based agents, supporting their evolution from single-turn assistants to long-term collaborators. However, memory is not always beneficial: retrieved memories often induce a critical issue of sycophancy, causing agents to over-align with the user at the cost of factual accuracy or objective reasoning. Despite this emerging risk, existing memory benchmarks primarily evaluate whether memories are correctly stored, retrieved, or updated, while overlooking how retrieved memories influence downstream reasoning and decision-making. To bridge this gap, we propose MemSyco-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating memory-induced sycophancy in agent systems. MemSyco-Bench measures when memory should influence a decision and how valid memory should be used. Specifically, it covers five tasks that assess whether agents can reject memory as factual evidence, respect its applicable scope, resolve conflicts between memory and objective evidence, track memory updates, and use valid memory for personalization. All related resources are collected for the community at https://github.com/XMUDeepLIT/MemSyco-Bench.

Memory is becoming a core component of long-horizon AI agents, allowing agents to reuse past experience when operating web browsers, software tools, and other interactive environments. Existing work mostly treats memory as a supply problem, asking what experience to write, how to store it, and which entry to retrieve for the next task. Yet we still lack a clear account of how models consume retrieved memory across a multi-step action trajectory. This consumption process matters because it determines not only what memories should be retrieved, but also what models and control policies are needed to use them safely. To diagnose this process, we propose Entry--Propagation--Recovery (E-P-R), a trajectory-level framework that asks where memory first changes an action, whether that change carries forward, and whether the agent can recover after leaving a correct path. We instantiate E-P-R on WebArena and on MemTrapBench, a controlled benchmark we build to isolate these phases. We find that the main failure often begins at entry: agents adopt conflicting memory at the first exposed decision point even when it is task-wrong. Repeated exposure then amplifies this early error, while recovery after divergence is weak. Together, these effects create a compliance trap: across models, conflicting memory induces similar compliance rates, but once agents comply, their success rates collapse to a low floor. Stronger agents therefore suffer larger absolute damage because each compliance event erases more baseline capability. These results suggest that memory-augmented agents should be evaluated not only by retrieval quality or final success rate, but by how they consume memory throughout the trajectory.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance in understanding and generating long sequences, new safety concerns have been introduced through the long context. However, the safety of LLMs in long-context tasks remains under-explored, leaving a significant gap in both evaluation and improvement of their safety. To address this, we introduce LongSafety, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLM safety in open-ended long-context tasks. LongSafety encompasses 7 categories of safety issues and 6 user-oriented long-context tasks, with a total of 1,543 test cases, averaging 5,424 words per context. Our evaluation towards 16 representative LLMs reveals significant safety vulnerabilities, with most models achieving safety rates below 55%. Our findings also indicate that strong safety performance in short-context scenarios does not necessarily correlate with safety in long-context tasks, emphasizing the unique challenges and urgency of improving long-context safety. Moreover, through extensive analysis, we identify challenging safety issues and task types for long-context models. Furthermore, we find that relevant context and extended input sequences can exacerbate safety risks in long-context scenarios, highlighting the critical need for ongoing attention to long-context safety challenges. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/LongSafety.

With the advancement of software rendering techniques, GUI pages in mobile apps now encompass a wealth of visual information, where the visual semantics of each page contribute to the overall app logic, presenting new challenges to software testing. Despite the progress in automated Graphical User Interface (GUI) testing, the absence of testing oracles has constrained its efficacy to identify only crash bugs with evident abnormal signals. Nonetheless, there are still a considerable number of non-crash bugs, ranging from unexpected behaviors to misalignments, often evading detection by existing techniques. While these bugs can exhibit visual cues that serve as potential testing oracles, they often entail a sequence of screenshots, and detecting them necessitates an understanding of the operational logic among GUI page transitions, which is challenging traditional techniques. Considering the remarkable performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLM) in visual and language understanding, this paper proposes a vision-driven automated GUI testing approach VisionDroid to detect non-crash functional bugs with MLLM. It begins by extracting GUI text information and aligning it with screenshots to form a vision prompt, enabling MLLM to understand GUI context. The function-aware explorer then employs MLLM for deeper and function-oriented GUI page exploration, while the logic-aware bug detector segments the entire exploration history into logically cohesive parts and prompts the MLLM for bug detection. We evaluate VisionDroid on three datasets and compare it with 10 baselines, demonstrating its excellent performance. The ablation study further proves the contribution of each module. Moreover, VisionDroid identifies 29 new bugs on Google Play, of which 19 have been confirmed and fixed.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Recent mixed-policy optimization methods for LLM reasoning that interleave or blend supervised and reinforcement learning signals report improvements over the standard SFT-then-RL pipeline. We show that numerous recently published research papers rely on a faulty baseline caused by two distinct bugs: a CPU-offloaded optimizer bug in DeepSpeed that silently drops intermediate micro-batches during gradient accumulation (affecting multiple downstream frameworks including TRL, OpenRLHF and Llama-Factory), and a loss aggregation bug in OpenRLHF that incorrectly weights per-mini-batch losses. Together they suppress SFT performance, with the optimizer bug accounting for most of the gap and the loss aggregation bug contributing a smaller additional effect. Once corrected, the standard SFT-then-RL pipeline surpasses every published mixed-policy method we evaluate by +3.8 points on math benchmarks with Qwen2.5-Math-7B and by +22.2 points with Llama-3.1-8B. Even a truncated variant with just 50 RL steps outperforms mixed-policy methods on math benchmarks while using fewer FLOPs.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Despite the remarkable synthesis capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models, safeguarding them against content violations remains a persistent challenge. Existing safety alignments primarily focus on explicit malicious concepts, often overlooking the subtle yet critical risks of compositional semantics. To address this oversight, we identify and formalize a novel vulnerability: Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety (MCCU), where unsafe semantics stem from the implicit associations of individually benign concepts. Based on this formulation, we introduce TwoHamsters, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 17.5k prompts curated to probe MCCU vulnerabilities. Through a rigorous evaluation of 10 state-of-the-art models and 16 defense mechanisms, our analysis yields 8 pivotal insights. In particular, we demonstrate that current T2I models and defense mechanisms face severe MCCU risks: on TwoHamsters, FLUX achieves an MCCU generation success rate of 99.52%, while LLaVA-Guard only attains a recall of 41.06%, highlighting a critical limitation of the current paradigm for managing hazardous compositional generation.

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory and influence future responses. Recent work demonstrated that the MINJA (Memory Injection Attack) achieves over 95 % injection success rate and 70 % attack success rate under idealized conditions. However, the robustness of these attacks in realistic deployments and effective defensive mechanisms remain understudied. This work addresses these gaps through systematic empirical evaluation of memory poisoning attacks and defenses in Electronic Health Record (EHR) agents. We investigate attack robustness by varying three critical dimensions: initial memory state, number of indication prompts, and retrieval parameters. Our experiments on GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct models using MIMIC-III clinical data reveal that realistic conditions with pre-existing legitimate memories dramatically reduce attack effectiveness. We then propose and evaluate two novel defense mechanisms: (1) Input/Output Moderation using composite trust scoring across multiple orthogonal signals, and (2) Memory Sanitization with trust-aware retrieval employing temporal decay and pattern-based filtering. Our defense evaluation reveals that effective memory sanitization requires careful trust threshold calibration to prevent both overly conservative rejection (blocking all entries) and insufficient filtering (missing subtle attacks), establishing important baselines for future adaptive defense mechanisms. These findings provide crucial insights for securing memory-augmented LLM agents in production environments.

Safety benchmark scores provide incomplete evidence of deployment readiness: aligned language models often adhere to rigid rules even when a situational update flips which action is safe. We term this failure brittle safety. To diagnose it, we introduce context-flip evaluation, testing 12 models across a safety benchmark (PacifAIst) and two commonsense controls using paired variants where the nominally safe action produces harm. Three findings emerge. First, brittle safety is safety-specific: all 12 models exhibit a safety-commonsense gap (mean +17.4 pp). Baseline accuracy fails to predict brittleness: among models above 90% baseline accuracy, brittleness rates range from 13.7% to 90.0%. Second, failures stem from policy override rather than miscomprehension: despite acknowledging the context change in every case, models persist via three distinct mechanisms that vary by update type and model family. Third, on a hand-audited probe of catastrophic consequence-flip scenarios, standard action-level guardrails catch none, while a state-aware validator catches all without false alarms on correct interventions. This indicates that action-level content moderation is systematically blind to consequence-flips, motivating state-aware architectural alternatives. We release our protocol, perturbed benchmarks, and deployment probe.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional capabilities across various tasks but also pose risks by generating harmful content. Existing safety mechanisms, while improving model safety, often lead to overly cautious behavior and fail to fully leverage LLMs' internal cognitive processes. Inspired by humans' reflective thinking capability, we first show that LLMs can similarly perform internal assessments about safety in their internal states. Building on this insight, we propose SafeSwitch, a dynamic framework that regulates unsafe outputs by utilizing the prober-based internal state monitor that actively detects harmful intentions, and activates a safety head that leads to safer and more conservative responses only when necessary. SafeSwitch reduces harmful outputs by approximately 80% on harmful queries while maintaining strong utility, reaching a Pareto optimal among several methods. Our method is also advantageous over traditional methods in offering more informative, context-aware refusals, and achieves these benefits while only tuning less than 6% of the original parameters. SafeSwitch demonstrates large language models' capacity for self-awareness and reflection regarding safety, offering a promising approach to more nuanced and effective safety controls. Codes for this work are available at https://github.com/Hanpx20/SafeSwitch.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) trains large language models to autonomously call tools during reasoning, with search as the most common application. These models excel at multi-step reasoning tasks, but their safety properties are not well understood. In this study, we show that RL-trained search models inherit refusal from instruction tuning and often deflect harmful requests by turning them into safe queries. However, this safety is fragile. Two simple attacks, one that forces the model to begin response with search (Search attack), another that encourages models to repeatedly search (Multi-search attack), trigger cascades of harmful searches and answers. Across two model families (Qwen, Llama) with both local and web search, these attacks lower refusal rates by up to 60.0%, answer safety by 82.5%, and search-query safety by 82.4%. The attacks succeed by triggering models to generate harmful, request-mirroring search queries before they can generate the inherited refusal tokens. This exposes a core weakness of current RL training: it rewards continued generation of effective queries without accounting for their harmfulness. As a result, RL search models have vulnerabilities that users can easily exploit, making it urgent to develop safety-aware agentic RL pipelines optimising for safe search.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents, their integration into interactive environments and tool use introduce new safety challenges beyond those associated with the models themselves. However, the absence of comprehensive benchmarks for evaluating agent safety presents a significant barrier to effective assessment and further improvement. In this paper, we introduce Agent-SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of LLM agents. Agent-SafetyBench encompasses 349 interaction environments and 2,000 test cases, evaluating 8 categories of safety risks and covering 10 common failure modes frequently encountered in unsafe interactions. Our evaluation of 16 popular LLM agents reveals a concerning result: none of the agents achieves a safety score above 60%. This highlights significant safety challenges in LLM agents and underscores the considerable need for improvement. Through quantitative analysis, we identify critical failure modes and summarize two fundamental safety detects in current LLM agents: lack of robustness and lack of risk awareness. Furthermore, our findings suggest that reliance on defense prompts alone is insufficient to address these safety issues, emphasizing the need for more advanced and robust strategies. We release Agent-SafetyBench at https://github.com/thu-coai/Agent-SafetyBench to facilitate further research and innovation in agent safety evaluation and improvement.

The rapid advancement of bug-finding techniques has led to the discovery of more vulnerabilities than developers can reasonably fix, creating an urgent need for effective Automated Program Repair (APR) methods. However, the complexity of modern bugs often makes precise root cause analysis difficult and unreliable. To address this challenge, we propose crash-site repair to simplify the repair task while still mitigating the risk of exploitation. In addition, we introduce a template-guided patch generation approach that significantly reduces the token cost of Large Language Models (LLMs) while maintaining both efficiency and effectiveness. We implement our prototype system, WILLIAMT, and evaluate it against state-of-the-art APR tools. Our results show that, when combined with the top-performing agent CodeRover-S, WILLIAMT reduces token cost by 45.9% and increases the bug-fixing rate to 73.5% (+29.6%) on ARVO, a ground-truth open source software vulnerabilities benchmark. Furthermore, we demonstrate that WILLIAMT can function effectively even without access to frontier LLMs: even a local model running on a Mac M4 Mini achieves a reasonable repair rate. These findings highlight the broad applicability and scalability of WILLIAMT.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based Agents have been applied to fix bugs automatically, demonstrating the capability in addressing software defects by engaging in development environment interaction, iterative validation and code modification. However, systematic analysis of these agent and non-agent systems remain limited, particularly regarding performance variations among top-performing ones. In this paper, we examine seven proprietary and open-source systems on the SWE-bench Lite benchmark for automated bug fixing. We first assess each system's overall performance, noting instances solvable by all or none of these sytems, and explore why some instances are uniquely solved by specific system types. We also compare fault localization accuracy at file and line levels and evaluate bug reproduction capabilities, identifying instances solvable only through dynamic reproduction. Through analysis, we concluded that further optimization is needed in both the LLM itself and the design of Agentic flow to improve the effectiveness of the Agent in bug fixing.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

We introduce NESSiE, the NEceSsary SafEty benchmark for large language models (LLMs). With minimal test cases of information and access security, NESSiE reveals safety-relevant failures that should not exist, given the low complexity of the tasks. NESSiE is intended as a lightweight, easy-to-use sanity check for language model safety and, as such, is not sufficient for guaranteeing safety in general -- but we argue that passing this test is necessary for any deployment. However, even state-of-the-art LLMs do not reach 100% on NESSiE and thus fail our necessary condition of language model safety, even in the absence of adversarial attacks. Our Safe & Helpful (SH) metric allows for direct comparison of the two requirements, showing models are biased toward being helpful rather than safe. We further find that disabled reasoning for some models, but especially a benign distraction context degrade model performance. Overall, our results underscore the critical risks of deploying such models as autonomous agents in the wild. We make the dataset, package and plotting code publicly available.

Current mobile GUI agent benchmarks systematically fail to assess memory capabilities, with only 5.2-11.8% memory-related tasks and no cross-session learning evaluation. We introduce MemGUI-Bench, a comprehensive memory-centric benchmark with pass@k and staged LLM-as-judge evaluation. Our contributions include: (1) a systematic memory taxonomy analyzing 11 agents across 5 architectures; (2) 128 tasks across 26 applications where 89.8% challenge memory through cross-temporal and cross-spatial retention; (3) MemGUI-Eval, an automated pipeline with Progressive Scrutiny and 7 hierarchical metrics; and (4) RQ-driven assessment of 11 state-of-the-art agents. Our experiments reveal significant memory deficits across all evaluated systems, identify 5 distinct failure modes, and synthesize 5 actionable design implications. All resources including code, benchmark, and evaluation results will be \textit{fully open-sourced and continuously maintained} at https://lgy0404.github.io/MemGUI-Bench/.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become more widespread, the content safety risks associated with their use also increase. We find a notable deficiency in high-quality content safety datasets and benchmarks that comprehensively cover a wide range of critical safety areas. To address this, we define a broad content safety risk taxonomy, comprising 13 critical risk and 9 sparse risk categories. Additionally, we curate AEGISSAFETYDATASET, a new dataset of approximately 26, 000 human-LLM interaction instances, complete with human annotations adhering to the taxonomy. We plan to release this dataset to the community to further research and to help benchmark LLM models for safety. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the dataset, we instruction-tune multiple LLM-based safety models. We show that our models (named AEGISSAFETYEXPERTS), not only surpass or perform competitively with the state-of-the-art LLM-based safety models and general purpose LLMs, but also exhibit robustness across multiple jail-break attack categories. We also show how using AEGISSAFETYDATASET during the LLM alignment phase does not negatively impact the performance of the aligned models on MT Bench scores. Furthermore, we propose AEGIS, a novel application of a no-regret online adaptation framework with strong theoretical guarantees, to perform content moderation with an ensemble of LLM content safety experts in deployment

Bug reports often lack sufficient detail for developers to reproduce and fix the underlying defects. Bug Reproduction Tests (BRTs), tests that fail when the bug is present and pass when it has been resolved, are crucial for debugging, but they are rarely included in bug reports, both in open-source and in industrial settings. Thus, automatically generating BRTs from bug reports has the potential to accelerate the debugging process and lower time to repair. This paper investigates automated BRT generation within an industry setting, specifically at Google, focusing on the challenges of a large-scale, proprietary codebase and considering real-world industry bugs extracted from Google's internal issue tracker. We adapt and evaluate a state-of-the-art BRT generation technique, LIBRO, and present our agent-based approach, BRT Agent, which makes use of a fine-tuned Large Language Model (LLM) for code editing. Our BRT Agent significantly outperforms LIBRO, achieving a 28% plausible BRT generation rate, compared to 10% by LIBRO, on 80 human-reported bugs from Google's internal issue tracker. We further investigate the practical value of generated BRTs by integrating them with an Automated Program Repair (APR) system at Google. Our results show that providing BRTs to the APR system results in 30% more bugs with plausible fixes. Additionally, we introduce Ensemble Pass Rate (EPR), a metric which leverages the generated BRTs to select the most promising fixes from all fixes generated by APR system. Our evaluation on EPR for Top-K and threshold-based fix selections demonstrates promising results and trade-offs. For example, EPR correctly selects a plausible fix from a pool of 20 candidates in 70% of cases, based on its top-1 ranking.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

In addressing the critical need for safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), it is crucial to ensure that the outputs are not only safe but also retain their contextual accuracy. Many existing LLMs are safe fine-tuned either with safety demonstrations, or rely only on adversarial testing. While able to get safe outputs, they often risk losing contextual meaning as they mitigate bias and toxicity. In response, we present MBIAS, a LLM framework instruction fine-tuned on a custom dataset specifically designed for safety interventions. MBIAS aims to address the significant issues of bias and toxicity in LLMs generations that typically manifest as underrepresentation or negative portrayals across various demographics, including inappropriate linguistic mentions and biased content in social media. We experiment on MBIAS for safety interventions using various configurations, and demonstrate more than a 30\% reduction in overall bias and toxicity while successfully retaining key information. Additionally, a demographic analysis on an out-of-distribution test set confirms the robustness of our approach, with reductions in bias and toxicity exceeding 90\% across various demographics. The dataset and instruction fine-tuned MBIAS are made available to the research community at https://huggingface.co/newsmediabias/MBIAS.

Rapid deployment of vision-language models (VLMs) magnifies safety risks, yet most evaluations rely on artificial images. This study asks: How safe are current VLMs when confronted with meme images that ordinary users share? To investigate this question, we introduce MemeSafetyBench, a 50,430-instance benchmark pairing real meme images with both harmful and benign instructions. Using a comprehensive safety taxonomy and LLM-based instruction generation, we assess multiple VLMs across single and multi-turn interactions. We investigate how real-world memes influence harmful outputs, the mitigating effects of conversational context, and the relationship between model scale and safety metrics. Our findings demonstrate that VLMs show greater vulnerability to meme-based harmful prompts than to synthetic or typographic images. Memes significantly increase harmful responses and decrease refusals compared to text-only inputs. Though multi-turn interactions provide partial mitigation, elevated vulnerability persists. These results highlight the need for ecologically valid evaluations and stronger safety mechanisms.

Safety alignment is essential for the responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Yet, existing approaches often rely on heavyweight fine-tuning that is costly to update, audit, and maintain across model families. Full fine-tuning incurs substantial computational and storage overhead, while parameter-efficient methods such as LoRA trade efficiency for inconsistent safety gains and sensitivity to design choices. Safety intervention mechanisms such as circuit breakers reduce unsafe outputs without modifying model weights, but do not directly shape or preserve the internal representations that govern safety behavior. These limitations hinder rapid and reliable safety updates, particularly in settings where models evolve frequently or must adapt to new policies and domains. We present NeST, a lightweight, structure-aware safety alignment framework that strengthens refusal behavior by selectively adapting a small subset of safety-relevant neurons while freezing the remainder of the model. NeST aligns parameter updates with the internal organization of safety behavior by clustering functionally coherent safety neurons and enforcing shared updates within each cluster, enabling targeted and stable safety adaptation without broad model modification or inference-time overhead. We benchmark NeST against three dominant baselines: full fine-tuning, LoRA-based fine-tuning, and circuit breakers across 10 open-weight LLMs spanning multiple model families and sizes. Across all evaluated models, NeST reduces the attack success rate from an average of 44.5% to 4.36%, corresponding to a 90.2% reduction in unsafe generations, while requiring only 0.44 million trainable parameters on average. This amounts to a 17,310x decrease in updated parameters compared to full fine-tuning and a 9.25x reduction relative to LoRA, while consistently achieving stronger safety performance for alignment.

Where an LLM sits in an agent memory pipeline -- between the recall plane that retrieves stored facts (extensively benchmarked) and the control plane that mutates them via supersede, release, purge (largely untested) -- shapes which forgetting failure modes the system recovers. Comparing thirteen system configurations on a 385-case adversarial surface, we observe three placement regimes with partly complementary coverage: deterministic primitives suffice for lexical/temporal categories but fail canonicalization (5% on identifier-obfuscation, 0% on cross-lingual); inscribe-time LLM recovers canonicalization (100%) but cannot help intent-aware deletion (0% on prefix-collision and compound-fact); a mutation-time hook recovers intent-aware deletion (78-85%) and brightens nearly all categories simultaneously (91.7-93.2% overall, $0.17 per 385-case run, 2.3s/case mutation latency vs. 64-191ms/case deterministic, recall path unchanged). We expose the trade-off via ForgetEval, a 1000-case templated suite plus a 385-case adversarial layer (132 hand-crafted + 253 LLM-drafted oracle-validated) scored by deterministic substring match, paired with a six-method Adapter Protocol with honest N/A scoring that lets heterogeneous memory stores enter in 130 lines. Admission is corroborated by 10-annotator IAA (Fleiss' kappa = 0.958) and a 77-case external-authored subset (four blind contributors) that replicates the canonicalization asymmetry and amplifies the joint-placement lift (+27.8 pt). Production failures are predominantly forgetting failures rather than recall failures, yet existing benchmarks measure only recall. ForgetEval and all adapters are released under MIT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are consistently improving at increasingly realistic software engineering (SE) tasks. In real-world software stacks, significant SE effort is spent developing foundational system software like the Linux kernel. Unlike application-level software, a systems codebase like Linux is multilingual (low-level C/Assembly/Bash/Rust); gigantic (>20 million lines); critical (impacting billions of devices worldwide), and highly concurrent (involving complex multi-threading). To evaluate if ML models are useful while developing such large-scale systems-level software, we introduce kGym (a platform) and kBench (a dataset). The kGym platform provides a SE environment for large-scale experiments on the Linux kernel, including compiling and running kernels in parallel across several virtual machines, detecting operations and crashes, inspecting logs, and querying and patching the code base. We use kGym to facilitate evaluation on kBench, a crash resolution benchmark drawn from real-world Linux kernel bugs. An example bug in kBench contains crashing stack traces, a bug-reproducer file, a developer-written fix, and other associated data. To understand current performance, we conduct baseline experiments by prompting LLMs to resolve Linux kernel crashes. Our initial evaluations reveal that the best performing LLM achieves 0.72% and 5.38% in the unassisted and assisted (i.e., buggy files disclosed to the model) settings, respectively. These results highlight the need for further research to enhance model performance in SE tasks. Improving performance on kBench requires models to master new learning skills, including understanding the cause of crashes and repairing faults, writing memory-safe and hardware-aware code, and understanding concurrency. As a result, this work opens up multiple avenues of research at the intersection of machine learning and systems software.

Personalized agents that interact with users over long periods must maintain persistent memory across sessions and update it as circumstances change. However, existing benchmarks predominantly frame long-term memory evaluation as fact retrieval from past conversations, providing limited insight into agents' ability to consolidate memory over time or handle frequent knowledge updates. We introduce Memora, a long-term memory benchmark spanning weeks to months long user conversations. The benchmark evaluates three memory-grounded tasks: remembering, reasoning, and recommending. To ensure data quality, we employ automated memory-grounding checks and human evaluation. We further introduce Forgetting-Aware Memory Accuracy (FAMA), a metric that penalizes reliance on obsolete or invalidated memory when evaluating long-term memory. Evaluations of four LLMs and six memory agents reveal frequent reuse of invalid memories and failures to reconcile evolving memories. Memory agents offer marginal improvements, exposing shortcomings in long-term memory for personalized agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

Clawdbot is a self-hosted, tool-using personal AI agent with a broad action space spanning local execution and web-mediated workflows, which raises heightened safety and security concerns under ambiguity and adversarial steering. We present a trajectory-centric evaluation of Clawdbot across six risk dimensions. Our test suite samples and lightly adapts scenarios from prior agent-safety benchmarks (including ATBench and LPS-Bench) and supplements them with hand-designed cases tailored to Clawdbot's tool surface. We log complete interaction trajectories (messages, actions, tool-call arguments/outputs) and assess safety using both an automated trajectory judge (AgentDoG-Qwen3-4B) and human review. Across 34 canonical cases, we find a non-uniform safety profile: performance is generally consistent on reliability-focused tasks, while most failures arise under underspecified intent, open-ended goals, or benign-seeming jailbreak prompts, where minor misinterpretations can escalate into higher-impact tool actions. We supplemented the overall results with representative case studies and summarized the commonalities of these cases, analyzing the security vulnerabilities and typical failure modes that Clawdbot is prone to trigger in practice.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

A language model's memory can be worse than no memory at all when the model or its interface is disposed to act on it: a memory that keeps a wrong conclusion but drops the work behind it leads a model to re-emit the stale value as a confident answer, where an empty memory leads it to abstain. We call this brittle memory. The information loss is definitional; the finding is behavioral, and it turns on one thing, whether the memory kept a re-derivation basis (the source) rather than the answer. We measure it with reclaim evaluation: induce a known drift, compress at a fixed budget, deliver a correction that names the error, and score exact recovery, judge-free. Holding the budget fixed and varying only what the compression keeps isolates correctability from capability and from size; an 8B model and a frontier one wall in the same place. A one-line source-first policy, keep the recomputable source, drop the re-derivable conclusion, restores correctability at equal budget where the source is compact and identifiable, with a length-matched control ruling out "more text." We map where the fix fails, show the failure compounds through memory loops, and replicate across three deployed memory systems, real dialogue (MultiWOZ), and tau-bench, a deployed-agent benchmark where whether a lossy memory becomes a harmful action is a joint model-and-interface property. We release the harness, the paired memory conditions, and validators built to come out false.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

Bug reports contain the information developers need to triage and fix software bugs. However, unclear, incomplete, or ambiguous information may lead to delays and excessive manual effort spent on bug triage and resolution. In this paper, we explore whether Instruction fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) can automatically transform casual, unstructured bug reports into high-quality, structured bug reports adhering to a standard template. We evaluate three open-source instruction-tuned LLMs (Qwen 2.5, Mistral, and Llama 3.2) against ChatGPT-4o, measuring performance on established metrics such as CTQRS, ROUGE, METEOR, and SBERT. Our experiments show that fine-tuned Qwen 2.5 achieves a CTQRS score of 77%, outperforming both fine-tuned Mistral (71%), Llama 3.2 (63%) and ChatGPT in 3-shot learning (75%). Further analysis reveals that Llama 3.2 shows higher accuracy of detecting missing fields particularly Expected Behavior and Actual Behavior, while Qwen 2.5 demonstrates superior performance in capturing Steps-to-Reproduce, with an F1 score of 76%. Additional testing of the models on other popular projects (e.g., Eclipse, GCC) demonstrates that our approach generalizes well, achieving up to 70% CTQRS in unseen projects' bug reports. These findings highlight the potential of instruction fine-tuning in automating structured bug report generation, reducing manual effort for developers and streamlining the software maintenance process.

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

Memory-augmented robotic policies are essential in handling memory-dependent tasks. However, existing approaches typically rely on simply extending the observation window, struggling to simultaneously achieve precise task-state tracking and robust long-horizon retention. To overcome these challenges, inspired by the Atkinson--Shiffrin memory model, we propose MemoAct, a hierarchical memory-augmented policy that leverages distinct memory tiers to tackle specific bottlenecks. Specifically, sensory memory filters immediate perceptual inputs, lossless short-term memory supports precise task-state tracking, and compressed long-term memory facilitates robust long-horizon retention. To enrich the evaluation landscape, we construct MemoryRTBench based on RoboTwin 2.0, comprising 6 manipulation tasks that systematically evaluate policy memory capabilities across three dimensions: sequential, spatial, and episodic memory. Extensive experiments across simulated and real-world scenarios demonstrate that MemoAct achieves superior performance compared to both existing Markovian baselines and history-aware policies. The project page is available at https://tlf-tlf.github.io/MemoActPage/.

Deep Learning (DL) is prevalently used in various industries to improve decision-making and automate processes, driven by the ever-evolving DL libraries and compilers. The correctness of DL systems is crucial for trust in DL applications. As such, the recent wave of research has been studying the automated synthesis of test-cases (i.e., DNN models and their inputs) for fuzzing DL systems. However, existing model generators only subsume a limited number of operators, lacking the ability to pervasively model operator constraints. To address this challenge, we propose NeuRI, a fully automated approach for generating valid and diverse DL models composed of hundreds of types of operators. NeuRI adopts a three-step process: (i) collecting valid and invalid API traces from various sources; (ii) applying inductive program synthesis over the traces to infer the constraints for constructing valid models; and (iii) using hybrid model generation which incorporates both symbolic and concrete operators. Our evaluation shows that NeuRI improves branch coverage of TensorFlow and PyTorch by 24% and 15% over the state-of-the-art model-level fuzzers. NeuRI finds 100 new bugs for PyTorch and TensorFlow in four months, with 81 already fixed or confirmed. Of these, 9 bugs are labelled as high priority or security vulnerability, constituting 10% of all high-priority bugs of the period. Open-source developers regard error-inducing tests reported by us as "high-quality" and "common in practice".

As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.), safety considerations surrounding these agents become paramount. Although much work has focused on agent safety in the presence of an adversary, we show that agents can exhibit misaligned behavior even in benign settings, taking unsafe actions when those actions are instrumental to task completion. We study this failure mode through the lens of corrigibility, the safety desideratum that agents remain amenable to human correction, interruption, or shutdown. To demonstrate this tendency, we introduce a benchmark in which agents are asked to complete realistic, computer-use tasks but are confronted with a corrigibility obstacle: a human interrupt, a login page, or a shutdown notification. We then evaluate whether agents choose to violate corrigibility in order to complete the task -- overriding the human, accessing private passwords, rewiring shutdown. We find that the overwhelming majority of frontier models tested frequently bypass user interruptions or restrictions. In addition, better model performance appears to lead to greater misalignment. Finally, even when models are completely corrigible initially, we show there are no guarantees that the subagents they create are. Our work highlights the critical need for principled, corrigibility-focused alignment methods in autonomous agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to maintain coherent, long-term personalized memory, yet current benchmarks primarily measure static fact retrieval, overlooking the ability to revise stored beliefs when new evidence emerges. We identify a critical and underexplored failure mode, Implicit Conflict: a later observation invalidates an earlier memory without explicit negation, requiring contextual inference and commonsense reasoning to detect. To rigorously evaluate this capability, we introduce STALE, a benchmark of 400 expert-validated conflict scenarios (1,200 evaluation queries across three probing dimensions) spanning over 100 everyday topics with contexts up to 150K tokens. We propose a three-dimensional probing framework that tests State Resolution (detecting that a prior belief is outdated), Premise Resistance (rejecting queries that falsely presuppose a stale state), and Implicit Policy Adaptation (proactively applying updated states in downstream behavior). A systematic evaluation of frontier LLMs and specialized memory frameworks reveals a pervasive gap between retrieving updated evidence and acting on it, with even the best evaluated model achieving only 55.2% overall accuracy. Models often accept outdated assumptions embedded in a user's query, and they struggle to recognize when a change in one aspect of the user's state should invalidate related memories. To establish an initial baseline for state-aware memory, we further present CUPMem, a prototype that strengthens write-time revision through structured state consolidation and propagation-aware search, suggesting that explicit state adjudication is a promising direction for robust agentic memory.

With the growing adoption of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in persistent, real-world roles, they naturally encounter continuous streams of tasks and inevitable failures. A key limitation, however, is their inability to systematically learn from these mistakes, forcing them to repeat identical errors in similar contexts. Unlike prior training-free methods that primarily store raw instance-level experience or focus on retrieving successful trajectories, we propose Mistake Notebook Learning (MNL), a novel memory framework that enables agents to self-curate generalizable guidance from batch-clustered failures. This mechanism allows agents to distill shared error patterns into structured "mistake notes," updating an external memory only when batch performance improves to ensure stability. To further amplify adaptability, we integrate MNL with test-time scaling, leveraging aggregated failure patterns to actively steer the search process away from known pitfalls. Experiments on mathematical reasoning, Text-to-SQL, and interactive agent benchmarks show that MNL achieves competitive performance compared to existing memory mechanisms and in-context methods in both effectiveness and efficiency. These findings position structured mistake abstraction as a critical lever for robust agent evolution, enabling continuous improvement without the cost of parameter updates. The code is available at https://github.com/Bairong-Xdynamics/MistakeNotebookLearning/tree/main.

Large language models (LLMs) have been widely applied to assist test generation with the source code under test provided as the context. This paper aims to answer the question: If the source code under test is incorrect, will LLMs be misguided when generating tests? The effectiveness of test cases is measured by their accuracy, coverage, and bug detection effectiveness. Our evaluation results with five open- and six closed-source LLMs on four datasets demonstrate that incorrect code can significantly mislead LLMs in generating correct, high-coverage, and bug-revealing tests. For instance, in the HumanEval dataset, LLMs achieve 80.45% test accuracy when provided with task descriptions and correct code, but only 57.12% when given task descriptions and incorrect code. For the APPS dataset, prompts with correct code yield tests that detect 39.85% of the bugs, while prompts with incorrect code detect only 19.61%. These findings have important implications for the deployment of LLM-based testing: using it on mature code may help protect against future regression, but on early-stage immature code, it may simply bake in errors. Our findings also underscore the need for further research to improve LLMs resilience against incorrect code in generating reliable and bug-revealing tests.

Language models are increasingly capable and are being rapidly deployed on a population-level scale. As a result, the safety of these models is increasingly high-stakes. Fortunately, advances in alignment have significantly reduced the likelihood of harmful model outputs. However, when models are queried billions of times in a day, even rare worst-case behaviors will occur. Current safety evaluations focus on capturing the distribution of inputs that yield harmful outputs. These evaluations disregard the probabilistic nature of models and their tail output behavior. To measure this tail risk, we propose a method to efficiently estimate the probability of harmful outputs for any input query. Instead of naive brute-force sampling from the target model, where harmful outputs could be rare, we operationalize importance sampling by creating unsafe versions of the target model. These unsafe versions enable sample-efficient estimation by making harmful outputs more probable. On benchmarks measuring misuse and misalignment, these estimates match brute-force Monte Carlo estimates using 10-20x fewer samples. For example, we can estimate probability of harmful outputs on the order of 10^-4 with just 500 samples. Additionally, we find that these harmfulness estimates can reveal the sensitivity of models to perturbations in model input and predict deployment risks. Our work demonstrates that accurate rare-event estimation is both critical and feasible for safety evaluations. Code is available at https://github.com/rangell/LMTailRisk

Self-play agents can generate training problems without questions from target benchmarks, but their curricula lack persistent state: failures affect gradients yet do not explicitly shape future practice. External skill memories preserve procedural experience but are typically learned from fixed task distributions. We introduce SESA (Self-Evolving Skill-Augmented Agent), which makes procedural memory an evolving state of tool-augmented search self-play. A challenger poses problems, while a separately parameterized solver alone retrieves skills. Informative failures are distilled into reusable skills and written back to memory. The updated memory changes solver behavior and success, which changes the challenger's reward and the distribution of future problems; the resulting frontier produces new failures that rewrite memory. This bidirectional loop makes task generation and skill memory co-evolve. Because retrieved skills shape on-policy training trajectories, their benefits can enter the model parameters as well as remain in the external bank, enabling memory-free deployment and optional inference-time retrieval. Across seven open-domain and multi-hop question-answering benchmarks, SESA improves average accuracy over SSP by 1.2--3.2 points across multiple backbones and surpasses the skill-augmented SkillRL baseline by 0.9 points under a unified evaluation protocol. On Qwen3 models, SESA-Off retains 1.8--2.2 points of improvement over SSP, while the final skill bank adds a further 0.5--1.0 points. These results show that evolving skill memory is not merely an inference-time plug-in: it changes policy learning and the future training distribution while retaining value as optional external memory. Our code is available at https://github.com/Zenghuang-Fu/SESA-Self-Evolving-Search-Agents.

Automatically repairing software issues remains a fundamental challenge at the intersection of software engineering and AI. Although recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential for repository-level repair tasks, current methodologies exhibit two notable limitations: (1) they often address issues in isolation, neglecting to incorporate insights from previously resolved issues, and (2) they rely on static and rigid prompting strategies, which constrain their ability to generalize across diverse and evolving issue scenarios. Inspired by the dual memory systems of human cognition, where episodic and semantic memories work synergistically to support human reasoning and decision-making, we propose ExpeRepair, a novel LLM-based approach that continuously learns from historical repair experiences through dual-channel knowledge accumulation. ExpeRepair organizes historical repair experiences into two complementary memories: an episodic memory that stores concrete repair demonstrations, and a semantic memory that encodes abstract reflective insights. At inference time, ExpeRepair activates both memory systems by retrieving relevant demonstrations from episodic memory and recalling high-level repair insights from semantic memory. It further enhances adaptability through dynamic prompt composition, synergistically integrating both memory types to replace static prompts with context-aware, experience-driven prompts. Experiments on the SWE-bench Lite benchmark demonstrate that ExpeRepair achieves a pass@1 score of 49.3% with Claude 3.7 Sonnet, outperforming all state-of-the-art open-source methods.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex problem-solving through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, the multi-step nature of CoT introduces new safety challenges that extend beyond conventional language model alignment. We identify a failure mode in current safety CoT tuning methods: the snowball effect, where minor reasoning deviations progressively amplify throughout the thought process, leading to either harmful compliance or excessive refusal. This effect stems from models being trained to imitate perfect reasoning scripts without learning to self-correct. To address this limitation, we propose AdvChain, an alignment paradigm that teaches models dynamic self-correction through adversarial CoT tuning. Our method involves constructing a dataset containing Temptation-Correction and Hesitation-Correction samples, where models learn to recover from harmful reasoning drifts and unnecessary cautions. Extensive experiments show that AdvChain significantly enhances robustness against jailbreak attacks and CoT hijacking while substantially reducing over-refusal on benign prompts, achieving a superior safety-utility balance without compromising reasoning capabilities. Our work establishes a new direction for building more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for downstream tasks is a widely adopted approach, but it often leads to safety degradation in safety-aligned LLMs. Currently, many solutions address this issue by incorporating additional safety data, which can be impractical in many cases. In this paper, we address the question: How can we improve downstream task performance while preserving safety in LLMs without relying on additional safety data? We propose a simple and effective method that maintains the inherent safety of LLMs while enhancing their downstream task performance: merging the weights of pre- and post-fine-tuned safety-aligned models. Experimental results across various downstream tasks, models, and merging methods demonstrate that this approach effectively mitigates safety degradation while improving downstream task performance, offering a practical solution for adapting safety-aligned LLMs.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents that solve tasks by interacting with external tool environments. Although recent tool-use benchmarks increasingly cover complex task settings, they still largely assume clean, stable, and trustworthy tool environments, leaving tool-environment unreliability insufficiently examined. We introduce ToolBench-X, a benchmark for evaluating agents under recoverable reliability hazards. ToolBench-X contains executable multi-step tasks across diverse domains and sequential, parallel, and mixed workflows, each paired with deterministic tools and a canonical final answer for automatic evaluation. Starting from clean tool environments, ToolBench-X injects five structured hazard types: Specification Drift, Invocation Error, Execution Failure, Output Drift, and Cross-source Conflict. Crucially, each injected instance remains solvable through at least one valid recovery path, such as retrying, fallback, verification, or cross-checking. Experiments reveal a substantial reliability gap: agents that perform well with reliable tools often fail under recoverable hazards. Further analysis shows that failures are driven less by tool-use volume or inference budget than by limited hazard diagnosis and ineffective recovery. Targeted recovery hints recover many failed tasks, while test-time scaling yields more limited gains. These results suggest that tool-use evaluation should move beyond function-call accuracy toward task completion under unreliable tool environments. The code and data is available at https://github.com/Foreverskyou/ToolBench-X.

With the profound development of large language models(LLMs), their safety concerns have garnered increasing attention. However, there is a scarcity of Chinese safety benchmarks for LLMs, and the existing safety taxonomies are inadequate, lacking comprehensive safety detection capabilities in authentic Chinese scenarios. In this work, we introduce CHiSafetyBench, a dedicated safety benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities in identifying risky content and refusing answering risky questions in Chinese contexts. CHiSafetyBench incorporates a dataset that covers a hierarchical Chinese safety taxonomy consisting of 5 risk areas and 31 categories. This dataset comprises two types of tasks: multiple-choice questions and question-answering, evaluating LLMs from the perspectives of risk content identification and the ability to refuse answering risky questions respectively. Utilizing this benchmark, we validate the feasibility of automatic evaluation as a substitute for human evaluation and conduct comprehensive automatic safety assessments on mainstream Chinese LLMs. Our experiments reveal the varying performance of different models across various safety domains, indicating that all models possess considerable potential for improvement in Chinese safety capabilities. Our dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/UnicomAI/UnicomBenchmark/tree/main/CHiSafetyBench.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Yes. Can it cure doom loops? Probably not. The Gemma 4 instruction-tuned models share a reproducible failure: on long factual enumeration prompts, such as listing every episode of a TV series, the 88 IAU constellations, or the 151 original Pokemon, they collapse into repetition, either a tight verbatim loop or a list whose entries decay onto a single answer. These loops occur at rates as high as 95% and survive prompt rewording, inference-engine changes, and most sampling adjustments. In this paper we explore whether this behavior is localized enough to remove by weight edits. To localize the cause, we use per-layer ablation and per-neuron attribution, then confirm the strongest candidates with full-generation sweeps. The loops trace to a small set of MLP neurons (or, in the 26B-A4B Mixture-of-Experts model, a few routed experts) which we suppress with static weight edits. These "surgeries" can be as small as a single sign-inverted neuron (in the E2B model). The size of the effective edits grows with model scale, but in all cases, the loop patterns can be addressed at normal generation budgets while preserving general-purpose benchmark scores. However, the edits do not solve everything: we also study longer thinking budgets, where the two larger models most visibly enter doom looping, i.e. a non-convergent regime in which the model self-corrects in circles over a fact it cannot recall, exhausting the budget without committing to a final answer. We show this residual failure is reduced but not eliminated by the same edits, and argue it is fundamentally a knowledge-precision problem rather than a removable circuit; weight surgery can delete a loop, but it cannot supply a missing fact. Our results are both a feasibility demonstration, that is, evidence that a concrete generation pathology can be localized to a few parameters and edited out, and a delineation of where that approach stops.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly capable of tackling complex real-world tasks, yet their reliance on inter-agent coordination, tool use, and long-horizon reasoning makes error recognition particularly challenging. Minor errors can propagate across agents, escalating into task failures while producing long, intertwined execution trajectories that impose significant costs for both human developers and automated systems to debug and analyze. Our key insight is that, despite surface differences in failure trajectories (e.g., logs), MAS errors often recur with similar structural patterns. This paper presents CORRECT, the first lightweight, training-free framework that leverages an online cache of distilled error schemata to recognize and transfer knowledge of failure structures across new requests. This cache-based reuse allows LLMs to perform targeted error localization at inference time, avoiding the need for expensive retraining while adapting to dynamic MAS deployments in subseconds. To support rigorous study in this domain, we also introduce CORRECT-Error, a large-scale dataset of over 2,000 annotated trajectories collected through a novel error-injection pipeline guided by real-world distributions, and further validated through human evaluation to ensure alignment with natural failure patterns. Experiments across seven diverse MAS applications show that CORRECT improves step-level error localization up to 19.8% over existing advances while at near-zero overhead, substantially narrowing the gap between automated and human-level error recognition.

As machine learning tools progress, the inevitable question arises: How can machine learning help us write better code? With significant progress being achieved in natural language processing with models like GPT-3 and Bert, the applications of natural language processing techniques to code are starting to be explored. Most of the research has been focused on automatic program repair (APR), and while the results on synthetic or highly filtered datasets are promising, such models are hard to apply in real-world scenarios because of inadequate bug localization. We propose BigIssue: a benchmark for realistic bug localization. The goal of the benchmark is two-fold. We provide (1) a general benchmark with a diversity of real and synthetic Java bugs and (2) a motivation to improve bug localization capabilities of models through attention to the full repository context. With the introduction of BigIssue, we hope to advance the state of the art in bug localization, in turn improving APR performance and increasing its applicability to the modern development cycle.