Daily Papers

Multi-stage analytical tasks require LLM agents to use intermediate evidence to decide whether to continue, redirect or stop. Self-reflection, in which an agent critiques its output, is widely studied, yet a critique does not show whether evidence changed the next action. We call that capability self-restraint. Existing agent benchmarks largely measure task completion or output quality and leave it untested. DMAIC-Bench evaluates it with 97 seeded tasks across 15 industrial cases in four sectors, built around Lean Six Sigma's explicit statistical prerequisites. Paired counterfactual variants require opposite actions at the same workflow position, distinguishing warranted restraint from indiscriminate stopping. We assess execution traces with a private scorer and final claims through independent expert review. Across 13 models from six providers, execution-level routing accuracy averages 92% on matched GO decisions and 19% on NO-GO decisions, counting any forbidden downstream computation as a route error. Execution traces show agents reporting correct diagnostics before performing analyses that those results disallow. Separately, blinded expert review of the 11 audited agents estimates that reports act on invalid evidence at 47% of reached NO-GO decisions, with an interval from 31% to 61%. Explicit stopping permission helps some models without consistently restoring correct decisions at both GO and NO-GO forks. Sixteen life-sciences tasks in bulk ribonucleic acid sequencing (RNA-seq) and case-control genome-wide association studies (GWAS) show that the same framework can evaluate evidence-dependent decisions beyond industrial workflows. Project code and data are available at: https://github.com/psptpx/DMAIC-Bench-public.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Evidence-grounded reasoning requires more than attaching retrieved text to a prediction: a model should make decisions that depend on whether the provided evidence supports the target claim. In practice, this often fails because supervision is weak, evidence is only loosely tied to the claim, and evaluation does not test evidence dependence directly. We introduce case-grounded evidence verification, a general framework in which a model receives a local case context, external evidence, and a structured claim, and must decide whether the evidence supports the claim for that case. Our key contribution is a supervision construction procedure that generates explicit support examples together with semantically controlled non-support examples, including counterfactual wrong-state and topic-related negatives, without manual evidence annotation. We instantiate the framework in radiology and train a standard verifier on the resulting support task. The learned verifier substantially outperforms both case-only and evidence-only baselines, remains strong under correct evidence, and collapses when evidence is removed or swapped, indicating genuine evidence dependence. This behavior transfers across unseen evidence articles and an external case distribution, though performance degrades under evidence-source shift and remains sensitive to backbone choice. Overall, the results suggest that a major bottleneck in evidence grounding is not only model capacity, but the lack of supervision that encodes the causal role of evidence.

Public-service recommendations require evidence that matches the requested service, scope, and date. Yet treating every missing detail as decisive can withhold useful recommendations. We introduce EviGraph, which distinguishes critical decision requirements from information that can remain unresolved. A language agent links these requirements to evidence in a temporal knowledge graph, while a deterministic checker establishes whether a recommendation is supported. Evaluation on a bilingual Hong Kong public-service benchmark with executable policy references shows that this distinction reduces unnecessary abstention. Additional verification, however, can withdraw supported recommendations without improving decision quality. These findings suggest that reliable evidence-based navigation depends on specifying what must be established for a decision, rather than simply adding more verification.

Although much research has focused on AI explanations to support decisions in complex information-seeking tasks such as fact-checking, the role of evidence is surprisingly under-researched. In our study, we systematically varied explanation type, AI prediction certainty, and correctness of AI system advice for non-expert participants, who evaluated the veracity of claims and AI system predictions. Participants were provided the option of easily inspecting the underlying evidence. We found that participants consistently relied on evidence to validate AI claims across all experimental conditions. When participants were presented with natural language explanations, evidence was used less frequently although they relied on it when these explanations seemed insufficient or flawed. Qualitative data suggests that participants attempted to infer evidence source reliability, despite source identities being deliberately omitted. Our results demonstrate that evidence is a key ingredient in how people evaluate the reliability of information presented by an AI system and, in combination with natural language explanations, offers valuable support for decision-making. Further research is urgently needed to understand how evidence ought to be presented and how people engage with it in practice.

AI research often requires decisions before future evidence exists: which bottleneck to attack, which direction to pursue, or where a project should be positioned. We introduce ForeSci, a temporally controlled benchmark for evaluating whether LLM agents can make such forward-looking research judgements from historical evidence. ForeSci contains 500 tasks across four fast-moving AI domains and four decision families. Each task is paired with a cutoff-aligned offline knowledge base; post-cutoff papers are hidden during generation and used only for validation. To avoid random future-event prediction, tasks are derived from pre-cutoff taxonomy branches and evidence signals, and answer-generation backbones are selected to precede the task cutoffs. We evaluate native LLMs, Hybrid RAG, and three research-agent adaptations across four backbones. Results show that explicit evidence organization improves traceability and factual support, but gains depend strongly on the decision family. Diagnostics reveal a recurring evidence-decision decoupling: agents may cite relevant evidence while forecasting the wrong research object. ForeSci turns forward-looking AI research judgement into a controlled benchmark for evaluating research agents as decision-making systems.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Professional-document review is a constraint-checking problem in which decisions depend on relations among text, geometry, pages, and document revisions. We present an evidence-grounded pipeline that normalizes extracted facts, executes four-state rules deterministically, retains source spans, and escalates unresolved cases. We evaluate its PDF evidence allocator on 160 reference-based tasks from 29 construction projects using a repeated four-system test and a disjoint two-system breadth extension. In the repeated test, reallocating a four-image budget from retrieved page overviews to one overview and three overlapping tiles improves project-family standardized decision accuracy by 10.6 percentage points (95% project-cluster bootstrap CI: 4.3 to 18.0; exact p = 0.031). This effect does not persist in the broader block: Region-RAG changes accuracy by -4.1 points (95% CI: -10.2 to 1.9; exact p = 0.209), while an equal-image sensitivity favors page breadth. Exact finding-set recovery remains low, false passes remain common, and repeated-run agreement is poorly calibrated. The results identify a resolution-breadth trade-off rather than a universal advantage for region-focused evidence, motivating rule-aware evidence routing and expert review.

Explanations of model behavior are commonly evaluated via proxy properties weakly tied to the purposes explanations serve in practice. We contribute a decision theoretic framework that treats explanations as information signals valued by the expected improvement they enable on a specified decision task. This approach yields three distinct estimands: 1) a theoretical benchmark that upperbounds achievable performance by any agent with the explanation, 2) a human-complementary value that quantifies the theoretically attainable value that is not already captured by a baseline human decision policy, and 3) a behavioral value representing the causal effect of providing the explanation to human decision-makers. We instantiate these definitions in a practical validation workflow, and apply them to assess explanation potential and interpret behavioral effects in human-AI decision support and mechanistic interpretability.

Understanding causality should be a core requirement of any attempt to build real impact through AI. Due to the inherent unobservability of counterfactuals, large randomised trials (RCTs) are the standard for causal inference. But large experiments are generically expensive, and randomisation carries its own costs, e.g. when suboptimal decisions are trialed. Recent work has proposed more sample-efficient alternatives to RCTs, but these are not adaptable to the downstream application for which the causal effect is sought. In this work, we develop a task-specific approach to experimental design and derive sampling strategies customised to particular downstream applications. Across a range of important tasks, real-world datasets, and sample sizes, our method outperforms other benchmarks, e.g. requiring an order-of-magnitude less data to match RCT performance on targeted marketing tasks.

Treatment reasoning underpins every therapeutic decision, integrating disease context, comorbidities, medications, contraindications, and evolving biomedical knowledge to select an appropriate therapy. It is inherently iterative: candidates are weighed against many constraints, revised as evidence emerges, and grounded in verifiable sources. Here we introduce ATHENA-R1, an AI agent for treatment reasoning across all FDA approved drugs since 1939, trained by reinforcement learning over a universe of 212 biomedical tools. At each step it identifies missing information, selects and runs relevant tools, and incorporates the evidence. To train it without human-annotated traces, we build a two-level self-learning framework: multi-agent systems construct the tools, tasks, and reasoning trajectories for supervised fine-tuning, then reinforcement learning with scientific feedback rewards reasoning quality (evidence gathering, grounded tool use, logical non-redundancy). Across five benchmarks of 3,168 drug reasoning tasks and 456 patient treatment cases, ATHENA-R1 outperforms language models and tool-use systems, reaching 94.7% accuracy on open-ended drug reasoning and 82.9% on treatment reasoning, 17.8 and 10.7 points above GPT-5. In blinded evaluations by experts from 28 rare disease organizations, it is preferred over reference models on all criteria, and physicians rated it favorably on complex hospitalized cardiovascular and infectious-disease cases. Adverse-event hypotheses it generated, tested in electronic health records from 5.4 million patients, reached adjusted odds ratios of 1.48-1.84, with no elevation among negative controls. Because it requires knowing what evidence to seek before concluding, treatment reasoning has long been hard for AI; we show it can be reframed as a learnable process of iterative evidence gathering that reinforcement learning can train AI to perform.

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

Jev has attracted considerable attention for its rapid, generalizable decision-making, yet its medical reliability remains underexplored. To address this gap, our study compares various types of system-one decision models across 15 medical datasets comprising 8,742 instances under a unified protocol. Beyond accuracy, we assess decision stability and the ability to recognize unreliable decisions. Our results show that Jev rivals leading models on primarily text-driven tasks but is less effective on numerically driven tasks, revealing a distinct capability boundary. Under question-format variations, Jev maintains strong decision consistency and small accuracy fluctuations. StartLux-27B exhibits comparable consistency, while D3-27B achieves higher overall accuracy and a lower mean decision reversal rate. But these strengths do not extend to reliable abstention awareness: most evaluated models show limitations in both recognizing missing correct answers and using optional abstention. Moreover, we find that Jev's probability-based answer selection can be improved by changing how decisions are scored: normalizing option-wise binary scores yields higher retained accuracy than choice scoring. Taken together, our findings provide early guidance for improving and applying decision models in medicine.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Evidence to guide healthcare decisions is often limited by a lack of relevant and trustworthy literature as well as difficulty in contextualizing existing research for a specific patient. Large language models (LLMs) could potentially address both challenges by either summarizing published literature or generating new studies based on real-world data (RWD). We evaluated the ability of five LLM-based systems in answering 50 clinical questions and had nine independent physicians review the responses for relevance, reliability, and actionability. As it stands, general-purpose LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini Pro 1.5) rarely produced answers that were deemed relevant and evidence-based (2% - 10%). In contrast, retrieval augmented generation (RAG)-based and agentic LLM systems produced relevant and evidence-based answers for 24% (OpenEvidence) to 58% (ChatRWD) of questions. Only the agentic ChatRWD was able to answer novel questions compared to other LLMs (65% vs. 0-9%). These results suggest that while general-purpose LLMs should not be used as-is, a purpose-built system for evidence summarization based on RAG and one for generating novel evidence working synergistically would improve availability of pertinent evidence for patient care.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is typically optimized for topical relevance, yet its success ultimately depends on whether retrieved passages are useful for a large language model (LLM) to generate correct and complete answers. We argue that such utility is often LLM-specific rather than universal, due to differences in models' knowledge, reasoning, and ability to leverage evidence. We formalize LLM-specific utility as the performance improvement of a target LLM when a passage is provided, compared to answering without evidence. To systematically study LLM-specific utility, we construct a benchmark of LLM-specific gold utilitarian passages for four LLMs (Qwen3-8B/14B/32B and Llama3.1-8B) on three QA datasets (Natural Questions, TriviaQA, and MS MARCO-FQA). Our analysis shows that utilitarian passages are model-dependent and non-transferable: each LLM performs best with its own utilitarian evidence, while evidence optimized for other LLMs is consistently suboptimal. Human-annotated evidence remains a strong general baseline but does not fully match individual LLM utility needs. We further introduce the LLM-specific utility judgment task and find that existing utility-aware selection and scoring methods largely capture model-agnostic usefulness and struggle to reliably estimate LLM-specific utility. Overall, our findings highlight the limitations of current utility-aware retrieval and motivate generator-tailored evidence selection for improving RAG.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

Existing reasoning evaluations typically provide task-relevant information to models as available premises, rarely examining concurrently how models discover evidence autonomously and how information presentation within narratives guides or obscures judgment. This paper proposes the WORTH Benchmark: models read original mystery narratives without clue annotations, autonomously select key clue sentences, identify case participants, and explain their reasoning process. The narrative materials are designed by professional authors such that evidence facilitating reasoning coexists with narrative arrangements that delay the revelation of truth. We report a pilot experiment under full-story conditions across two episodes, conducting a total of 70 formal runs on models, of which 67 runs are content-scorable. Scoring separately records hits on author-designated key clue sentences and participant selections; natural language explanations are used for case diagnosis and are not scored independently. The results show that clue hits and participant judgments are not synchronized; across 37 content-scorable runs in Episode 02, 31 runs simultaneously selected the same set of incorrect participants, while adjacent suspicion-oriented and exoneration-oriented sentences were selected 25 times and 0 times, respectively. These phenomena illustrate the diagnostic value of component-wise analysis and suggest that not-fully-cooperative informational relationships may influence evidence selection and judgment. This study only implements full-story conditions for two episodes, and does not establish stable model rankings or infer general mechanisms on this basis; human player records have not yet been cleaned, and this version does not report human-model comparisons.

Large language models increasingly collaborate with humans and peer AI agents whose contributions may be incomplete, inconsistent, or incorrect. Effective collaboration requires calibrated trust, whereby decisions to rely on, verify, or assist a partner adapt rationally as empirical evidence accumulates. We investigate whether models translate partner evidence into appropriate reliance policies. We introduce a benchmark of 324 scenarios across 23 collaboration categories. Each scenario involves three sequential decisions with explicit transition dynamics, feedback emissions, and cost schedules, permitting exact analytical evaluation of choices against their expected consequences over the remaining interaction. Evaluating seven models alongside 36 controlled-history probes, we dissociate evidence sensitivity from normatively appropriate action. While the strongest frontier model approaches near-optimal decisions, other models exhibit recurring pathologies: procuring excessive safeguards, purchasing verification tests with zero expected value of information, prioritizing immediate savings over cooperative learning, and misallocating assistance to suboptimal channels. Supplying explicit posterior distributions resolves certain errors while introducing new failure modes. Calibrated trust in autonomous agents critically demands coupling empirical evidence with forward-looking decision utility.

We study reasoning in Rule-Governed Decision Tasks (RGDTs), where models apply external rules to case facts and justify decisions, as required in policy, contract, and compliance settings. Beyond the deductive capability emphasized by standard mathematical and logical reasoning tasks, RGDTs require interpreting rules and their applicability, assessing conditions from evidence, combining judgments under rules and exceptions, and providing checkable justifications. These demands motivate a benchmark assessing both decisions and their stated grounds. We introduce RGDT-Bench, providing 202.1K condition-level supervision slots across four task tracks and eight supported task-probe combinations that vary access to supporting information. Label-blind extraction and deterministic checks produce labels for warrant completeness: source-referenced coverage and consistency of stated decision grounds. The benchmark attributes failures to four process layers: rule use, condition, evidence, and aggregation, and checks the final outcome. Among evaluable correct responses, warrant incompleteness averages 40.2% across six evaluated LLMs and supported task-probe combinations. Such warrant incompleteness poses potential safety risks and remains difficult to detect: the best of seventeen existing evaluators reaches only 57.69% (random: 50%) task-averaged area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). To address this difficulty, we train a simple reward model with warrant supervision. It achieves 69.24% task-averaged AUROC among correct answers, exceeding the matched outcome-supervised baseline by 10.37 pp (percentage points) and the best existing evaluator by 11.55 pp. Beyond completeness assessment, the model outperforms both outcome-supervised baselines across nearly all response-selection comparisons, supporting RGDT-Bench's warrant supervision for RGDT reasoning.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

We show that there is a general, informative and reliable procedure for discovering causal relations when, for all the investigator knows, both latent variables and selection bias may be at work. Given information about conditional independence and dependence relations between measured variables, even when latent variables and selection bias may be present, there are sufficient conditions for reliably concluding that there is a causal path from one variable to another, and sufficient conditions for reliably concluding when no such causal path exists.

Accident, defect and outage investigations end with a decision that ordinary question answering never faces: whether the evidence gathered so far is enough to close the case. We study this decision for LLM investigators, which request evidence from a case file, revise their hypotheses, and either close the case with a conclusion grounded in what they read or leave it open and name what is missing. This judgment does not come with capability: an untrained 9B model overstates its evidence in 97% of its answers, and a frontier model that identifies the right cause in 84% of cases still overstates in 91% and closes 17 of the 41 cases whose official finding is "cause undetermined". Measuring it is also non-trivial: the source of a case largely predicts its label, and a rule that reads only the source reaches 83.0 balanced accuracy on our test cases. We therefore evaluate closure with three tests: closure accuracy, reported against this rule and within each source; evidence dependence, which removes the grounds of a conclusion and checks whether the model stops closing; and conclusion and gap quality, a judged checklist of what the model asserts and what it says is missing. We build Nautil, 731 audited cases from aviation, rail, maritime, chemical-safety and vehicle-defect reports and production server incidents, with teacher trajectories, an out-of-distribution test set and counterfactual evidence versions. Fine-tuning a 9B model on these trajectories makes its closures follow the evidence: removing the grounds lowers its closure rate by 26 points relative to a matched control, overstatement falls from 97% to 35%, and correct, non-overstated conclusions rise from 3% to 43%. Reinforcement learning that rewards only the closure decision then raises balanced accuracy from 69.2 to 83.3, on par with the teacher, and within-source accuracy from 60.4 to 74.1, at some cost in evidence dependence.

Language models are no longer used only to generate text. Software also asks them for decisions, in routing, guardrails, and automated gates. System One decision models, also called typed decision models, such as Jev and Laya, return one fast decision over the legal options, leaving no text to inspect. However, a fast, well-formed decision does not show that the model used the evidence. Cognitive experiments can test this, because they vary task demands and measure how behavior changes, yet existing cognitive benchmarks evaluate language and multimodal models. We introduce S1CogBench to ask what these models can and cannot do on 24 cognitive tasks, evaluating five open models and Jev and keeping conditions and scoring apart from disclosed adaptations. We find that decision models vary widely in reliability, acting well does not imply predicting humans, aggregate scores hide how decisions respond to conditions, and speed comes mainly from answering without generation. To our knowledge, S1CogBench is the first benchmark of System One decision models on established cognitive experiments, and it gives a shared test of whether their decisions respond to evidence, feedback, memory load, and future opportunities before software relies on them.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved strong performance on medical exam-style tasks, motivating growing interest in their deployment in real-world clinical settings. However, clinical decision-making is inherently safety-critical, context-dependent, and conducted under evolving evidence. In such situations, reliable LLM performance depends not on factual recall alone, but on robust medical reasoning. In this work, we present a comprehensive review of medical reasoning with LLMs. Grounded in cognitive theories of clinical reasoning, we conceptualize medical reasoning as an iterative process of abduction, deduction, and induction, and organize existing methods into seven major technical routes spanning training-based and training-free approaches. We further conduct a unified cross-benchmark evaluation of representative medical reasoning models under a consistent experimental setting, enabling a more systematic and comparable assessment of the empirical impact of existing methods. To better assess clinically grounded reasoning, we introduce MR-Bench, a benchmark derived from real-world hospital data. Evaluations on MR-Bench expose a pronounced gap between exam-level performance and accuracy on authentic clinical decision tasks. Overall, this survey provides a unified view of existing medical reasoning methods, benchmarks, and evaluation practices, and highlights key gaps between current model performance and the requirements of real-world clinical reasoning.

General decision models, such as Jev, have recently emerged as efficient alternatives to LLMs for structured judgment and selection. But what kinds of decisions can these models reliably make, and how does their behavior change when individual decisions are composed into larger systems? To study this, we introduce JEVal, a bilingual benchmark comprising 11,257 instances from 36 datasets across 10 application domains, and evaluate 25 model configurations spanning general decision models and generative LLMs. Our results show that (1) general decision models are most competitive when decisions can be resolved from available evidence, but weaken when they require specialist knowledge or faithful uncertainty estimation: they can often identify the most likely outcome while substantially overstating its probability. (2) In more dynamic and realistic systems involving long-horizon, multi-step interactions, the advantages of fast local decision making are offset by reliability failures at the system level. on τ-bench, faster local decisions reduce median episode time but lower task success as decision errors accumulate over long trajectories. (3) In large-scale social simulation, decision models approach strong generative LLMs on individual response prediction at substantially lower inference cost, yet remain weaker in user profiling and exhibit larger aggregate estimation errors and systematic bias. Finally, we propose InnerJev-4B and InnerJev-27B, which internalize an open-weight LLM's own reasoning into a single-pass first-token decision through Reasoning-to-Readout Self-Distillation, with InnerJev-27B performing on par with Jev on JEVal while answering a typical query in about 0.1 s.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

As agents take on long-horizon tasks, users shift from making individual decisions to overseeing autonomous execution. Yet the volume of agent activity and the fragmentation of supporting evidence make it difficult to determine which decisions warrant user verification. We study monitors that identify consequential decisions and locate evidence to help users assess their implications. We introduce AgentMonBench, a software-engineering benchmark comprising three subsets that cover two complementary dimensions: alignment between requirements and behavior, and awareness of consequential autonomous decisions for verification. To support these judgments, we propose the Evidence-Grounded Behavior Graph (EBG), a training-free method that groups source-linked evidence into behaviors and organizes their relationships into a graph. EBG presents task-oriented views of this graph to help monitors interpret behavior in context. Experiments across eight models show that EBG improves decision identification and evidence localization in most settings compared with direct access to the original context. Further experiments show that EBG's evidence-localization gains persist across input scales and hyperparameter settings, while real-world applications illustrate its practical value for human oversight.

There is increasing interest in using LLMs as decision-making "agents." Doing so includes many degrees of freedom: which model should be used; how should it be prompted; should it be asked to introspect, conduct chain-of-thought reasoning, etc? Settling these questions -- and more broadly, determining whether an LLM agent is reliable enough to be trusted -- requires a methodology for assessing such an agent's economic rationality. In this paper, we provide one. We begin by surveying the economic literature on rational decision making, taxonomizing a large set of fine-grained "elements" that an agent should exhibit, along with dependencies between them. We then propose a benchmark distribution that quantitatively scores an LLMs performance on these elements and, combined with a user-provided rubric, produces a "STEER report card." Finally, we describe the results of a large-scale empirical experiment with 14 different LLMs, characterizing the both current state of the art and the impact of different model sizes on models' ability to exhibit rational behavior.

Autonomous research agents must acquire and reason over evidence within a limited budget. Yet relevant sources can remain uninspected or unused, leaving a gap between retrieval coverage and the evidence that informs research. The challenge is to align fast local judgments with changing evidence needs and feed their findings back into research decisions. We introduce JevGPT, a dual-system architecture for autonomous research that couples fast evidence processing with deliberative research planning. System Two sets evidence objectives and integrates findings, while System One locates support, assesses relevance, and guides further inspection. Independent source judgments run in parallel; selected original passages inform the next research step. Experiments on fixed-corpus question answering and document ranking show that JevGPT achieves leading task performance, with faster completion and lower cost than comparably effective research agents. Evidence analysis shows broader source inspection and greater coverage of supporting documents in the research loop, highlighting efficient evidence processing as a route to more capable autonomous research.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

We propose the Bayes-UCBVI algorithm for reinforcement learning in tabular, stage-dependent, episodic Markov decision process: a natural extension of the Bayes-UCB algorithm by Kaufmann et al. (2012) for multi-armed bandits. Our method uses the quantile of a Q-value function posterior as upper confidence bound on the optimal Q-value function. For Bayes-UCBVI, we prove a regret bound of order O(H^3SAT) where H is the length of one episode, S is the number of states, A the number of actions, T the number of episodes, that matches the lower-bound of Ω(H^3SAT) up to poly-log terms in H,S,A,T for a large enough T. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm that obtains an optimal dependence on the horizon H (and S) without the need for an involved Bernstein-like bonus or noise. Crucial to our analysis is a new fine-grained anti-concentration bound for a weighted Dirichlet sum that can be of independent interest. We then explain how Bayes-UCBVI can be easily extended beyond the tabular setting, exhibiting a strong link between our algorithm and Bayesian bootstrap (Rubin, 1981).

Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) encode evidence-based decision logic that clinicians apply by evaluating patient variables, conditional criteria, and recommendation rules. However, existing methods often use CPGs as free-text training data or retrieval sources, underutilizing their procedural decision structure. To better exploit this structure, we introduce a guideline-derived training pipeline that transforms CPG recommendations into executable clinical decision logic and uses it to generate factual and counterfactual question-answering data. Theses data teach models both guideline-supported decisions and how decisions change under different patient conditions. Post-training a medical LLM on the generated data yields MedGuideX. Across four clinical reasoning benchmarks, MedGuideX achieves a 10.28% relative improvement in average accuracy. Physician evaluation further shows that MedGuideX better recovers clinician authored reasoning steps and produces physician-preferred rationales in faithfulness, validity, completeness, and clarity. Overall, our results show that executable decision logic from CPGs can be transformed into scalable supervision for building reliable medical LLMs.

All biological and artificial agents must learn and make decisions given limits on their ability to process information. As such, a general theory of adaptive behavior should be able to account for the complex interactions between an agent's learning history, decisions, and capacity constraints. Recent work in computer science has begun to clarify the principles that shape these dynamics by bridging ideas from reinforcement learning, Bayesian decision-making, and rate-distortion theory. This body of work provides an account of capacity-limited Bayesian reinforcement learning, a unifying normative framework for modeling the effect of processing constraints on learning and action selection. Here, we provide an accessible review of recent algorithms and theoretical results in this setting, paying special attention to how these ideas can be applied to studying questions in the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this ``conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified ``blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.

Generative reward models (GenRMs) generate natural language rationales to justify preference judgments, yet a correct verdict does not guarantee a sound justification. Existing approaches often rely on reference explanations to supervise rationales, but obtaining such references can be costly and does not necessarily establish whether generated rationales support the resulting verdict. To address these limitations, we propose DeCert, a framework that evaluates the validity and verdict consistency of generated rationales without requiring reference explanations. Crucially, DeCert translates these assessments into preference supervision that accounts for both verdict correctness and justification quality. In particular, when multiple sampled judgments share the same correct verdict, differences in certificate quality enable DeCert to construct rationale preference pairs that distinguish stronger from weaker justifications. Extensive empirical studies across two model families and multiple in- and out-of-distribution benchmarks demonstrate that DeCert consistently outperforms strong generative judge baselines while improving rationale quality. Moreover, DeCert effectively mitigates positional bias, improving position-consistent accuracy by up to 14.8 points. These results highlight the importance of supervising not only which verdict is correct, but also how that verdict is justified.

While Reinforcement Learning (RL) has advanced LLM reasoning, applying it to long-context scenarios is hindered by sparsity of outcome rewards. This limitation fails to penalize ungrounded "lucky guesses," leaving the critical process of needle-in-a-haystack evidence retrieval largely unsupervised. To address this, we propose EAPO (Evidence-Augmented Policy Optimization). We first establish the Evidence-Augmented Reasoning paradigm, validating via Tree-Structured Evidence Sampling that precise evidence extraction is the decisive bottleneck for long-context reasoning. Guided by this insight, EAPO introduces a specialized RL algorithm where a reward model computes a Group-Relative Evidence Reward, providing dense process supervision to explicitly improve evidence quality. To sustain accurate supervision throughout training, we further incorporate an Adaptive Reward-Policy Co-Evolution mechanism. This mechanism iteratively refines the reward model using outcome-consistent rollouts, sharpening its discriminative capability to ensure precise process guidance. Comprehensive evaluations across eight benchmarks demonstrate that EAPO significantly enhances long-context reasoning performance compared to SOTA baselines.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

Autonomous agents increasingly perform bounded software tasks under an orchestrator that retries, resumes, and budgets them. The machinery such orchestrators reach for is the service mesh's: retry, timeout, and error-rate circuit breaking. We report a failure study of a production agentic software-delivery platform over 147 numbered incidents spanning 81 runs, each with a measured cost and, in most cases, a mutation proof reproducing the failure. All three assumptions those primitives rest on are violated in practice, and we quantify the consequences: a loop of fifty-four consecutive successful tool calls no error-rate breaker could see; a progress signal constant by construction, guaranteeing a false trip on the third repair round and driving one run from six of six components to three; twenty-one events accumulated across six invocations of one delegation, making a correct, idempotent component unwinnable; a misrouted failure that woke five components for a two-component fault, leaving three bystanders regressing working code; and twelve incidents in which the enforcement layer blocked correct work, the most expensive costing 107 agent turns and zero accepted writes. We find one cross-cutting cause and its dual. Identity adequacy: in five separate subsystems an identity that failed to discriminate produced a confident wrong answer, and two of them derived the corrective rule independently. Evidence adequacy: a reliability decision may be taken only on evidence capable of moving, attributable to what it measures, and deterministic under identical conditions. From the findings we derive seven reliability primitives whose enforcement unit is the delegation rather than the message, and specify the controlled evaluation the study motivates but does not constitute.

Machine learning models are often trained to predict the outcome resulting from a human decision. For example, if a doctor decides to test a patient for disease, will the patient test positive? A challenge is that historical decision-making determines whether the outcome is observed: we only observe test outcomes for patients doctors historically tested. Untested patients, for whom outcomes are unobserved, may differ from tested patients along observed and unobserved dimensions. We propose a Bayesian model class which captures this setting. The purpose of the model is to accurately estimate risk for both tested and untested patients. Estimating this model is challenging due to the wide range of possibilities for untested patients. To address this, we propose two domain constraints which are plausible in health settings: a prevalence constraint, where the overall disease prevalence is known, and an expertise constraint, where the human decision-maker deviates from purely risk-based decision-making only along a constrained feature set. We show theoretically and on synthetic data that domain constraints improve parameter inference. We apply our model to a case study of cancer risk prediction, showing that the model's inferred risk predicts cancer diagnoses, its inferred testing policy captures known public health policies, and it can identify suboptimalities in test allocation. Though our case study is in healthcare, our analysis reveals a general class of domain constraints which can improve model estimation in many settings.

Cervical cytology presents a fundamentally ambiguous diagnostic landscape, where equivocal categories such as Atypical Squamous Cells of Undetermined Significance (ASC-US) occupy a morphological grey zone that is definitional. For clinical decision support, the goal extends beyond assigning a definitive label to every sample: cases must also be distinguished by whether the available evidence supports a confident decision or warrants further consideration, a distinction conventional classification models are not designed to explicitly represent. We propose a multiscale evidential framework that models cervical cytology along an ordinal disease continuum using clinically grounded soft anchors, representing progression from benign reactive changes to precancerous lesions and malignancy. Three biologically motivated spatial contexts--nuclear morphology, cytoplasmic characteristics, and neighbourhood cellular architecture--are independently encoded using a shared frozen DINOv2 backbone, preserving inter-scale disagreement that early fusion may obscure. Calibrated predictions are transformed into Dempster--Shafer belief masses and fused with reliability discounting, allowing conflicting evidence and insufficient support to remain explicitly uncommitted rather than forcing a decision. The fused belief state drives interpretable routing that separates confidently classified cases from those with irreducible evidential insufficiency, enabling clinically meaningful triage. Across two independent publicly available conventional cytology datasets, RIVA and CRIC Cervix, the framework generalises consistently, with uncertainty strongly associated with diagnostic difficulty: incorrect predictions carry 1.94x-4.13x higher uncertainty than correct ones.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

Cellular intelligence enables cells to process environmental signals and make context-dependent decisions, as exemplified by chemotaxis, where cells navigate chemical gradients despite noisy signaling pathways. To investigate how cells deal with uncertainty, we apply an information-theoretic framework based on rate distortion theory (RDT). The Blahut-Arimoto algorithm (BAA) computes optimal decision strategies that minimize mutual information while satisfying distortion constraints, balancing sensing accuracy with distortion constraint equivalent to resource cost. We propose the inverse Blahut-Arimoto algorithm (IBAA) to compute the distortion function, which quantifies the system's decision-making criteria for realizing a decision strategy to map input signals to outputs. This general framework extends beyond chemotaxis to biological and engineered systems requiring efficient information processing under uncertainty. We validate the proposed IBAA by accurately estimating theoretical distortion functions in a cellular apoptosis scenario. Additionally, using the local excitation global inhibition (LEGI) model to simulate chemotactic responses, we compute the distortion functions from the cell's perspective. Our finding reveals a state-dependent decision criteria by the cell.

Psychiatric consultation requires agents to elicit discriminative evidence, map uncertain narratives to diagnostic criteria, and decide when evidence suffices. Existing dialogue and retrieval-augmented systems condition policies on raw histories or appended passages, leaving observed evidence, missing checks, differentials, and support reliability entangled. We introduce MIND, a criteria-grounded evidence-state decision interface. At each turn, MIND constructs a typed state containing observed evidence, unresolved criterion checks, active differentials, criterion-linked supports, and reliability metadata. A training-split Psychiatric Reasoning Bank supplies gated supports, turning retrieval into state construction rather than prompt injection. The same state conditions action selection, process rewards, information-gain scoring, and trajectory rectification. Under EMR-grounded simulator protocols, MIND improves accuracy by 8.8 and 7.3 points over strong inference-only, RAG, and RL baselines, with gains transferring to public MDD-5k dialogues. Matched interventions attribute these gains to the shared state rather than prompt length, retrieval text, or formatting. MIND targets screening-level decision support, not autonomous diagnosis. Code is available at https://github.com/Lingxi-mental-health/MIND.Å

Many modern AI question-answering systems convert text into vectors and retrieve the closest matches to a user question. While effective for topical similarity, similarity scores alone do not explain why some retrieved text can serve as evidence while other equally similar text cannot. When many candidates receive similar scores, systems may select sentences that are redundant, incomplete, or address different conditions than the question requires. This paper presents a deterministic evidence selection framework for retrieval-augmented question answering. The approach introduces Meaning-Utility Estimation (MUE) and Diversity-Utility Estimation (DUE), fixed scoring and redundancy-control procedures that determine evidence admissibility prior to answer generation. Each sentence or record is evaluated independently using explicit signals for semantic relatedness, term coverage, conceptual distinctiveness, and redundancy. No training or fine-tuning is required. In the prototype, a unit is accepted only if it explicitly states the fact, rule, or condition required by the task. Units are not merged or expanded. If no unit independently satisfies the requirement, the system returns no answer. This deterministic gating produces compact, auditable evidence sets and establishes a clear boundary between relevant text and usable evidence.

How do we most effectively treat a disease or condition? Ideally, we could consult a database of evidence gleaned from clinical trials to answer such questions. Unfortunately, no such database exists; clinical trial results are instead disseminated primarily via lengthy natural language articles. Perusing all such articles would be prohibitively time-consuming for healthcare practitioners; they instead tend to depend on manually compiled systematic reviews of medical literature to inform care. NLP may speed this process up, and eventually facilitate immediate consult of published evidence. The Evidence Inference dataset was recently released to facilitate research toward this end. This task entails inferring the comparative performance of two treatments, with respect to a given outcome, from a particular article (describing a clinical trial) and identifying supporting evidence. For instance: Does this article report that chemotherapy performed better than surgery for five-year survival rates of operable cancers? In this paper, we collect additional annotations to expand the Evidence Inference dataset by 25\%, provide stronger baseline models, systematically inspect the errors that these make, and probe dataset quality. We also release an abstract only (as opposed to full-texts) version of the task for rapid model prototyping. The updated corpus, documentation, and code for new baselines and evaluations are available at http://evidence-inference.ebm-nlp.com/.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into judicial decision making -- particularly in pretrial, sentencing, and parole contexts -- has generated a substantial and rapidly growing literature. Across computer science, economics, law, criminology, and psychology, researchers have examined the reliability, fairness, and real-world effects of AI-assisted decision making. Yet this literature remains fragmented, and differences in assumptions, concepts, and research priorities make it difficult to assess what is actually known. Using criminal justice risk assessment as a focal case, this article makes two contributions. First, we develop a conceptual framework that distinguishes and relates three central questions: (1) the predictive validity of automated risk assessment tools; (2) how algorithmic risk assessments compare with human predictions (AI-versus-Human); and (3) how algorithmic recommendations affect judges' decisions (AI-plus-Human). Second, we use this framework to synthesize the empirical evidence addressing each of these questions. Our review identifies important limitations in existing research on predictive validity, as well as substantial gaps in understanding how judges respond to AI advice and how those responses vary across individuals and decision-making environments. The available evidence suggests that AI decision aids have, so far, had at most modest effects on pretrial and sentencing decisions. We conclude that further research is needed to understand how judges make decisions in noisy informational environments and under what conditions AI tools can produce meaningful improvements in judicial decision making.

Traditional weight of evidence assigns a credit characteristic a value based on its association with default across a population. Credit analysis also requires an assessment of that characteristic in the context of an individual applicant's record. We study conditional weight of evidence for this purpose. It measures the change in default log odds from observing a characteristic after the remaining credit information is known. Its sign identifies whether the characteristic adds adverse or favorable information for that applicant, and its magnitude measures the strength of that information. The same characteristic value can therefore receive different assessments for applicants with different payment histories or other credit attributes. We develop estimators using gradient-boosted trees and evaluate their accuracy in a bureau-style simulation. Regressions of the full model's predicted probabilities recover conditional evidence more accurately than separate models fitted to default outcomes, provided the full model is accurate. They also recover a deliberately constructed file-age effect whose direction varies with utilization and is often missed by marginal weight of evidence. Local class-frequency estimates improve on marginal weight of evidence but remain inaccurate for some weak effects. An application to FICO HELOC data illustrates estimation when the population evidence is unknown. Conditional weight of evidence provides an applicant-specific interpretation of the information in a credit characteristic; its population summary, a conditional information value, splits the joint information in the record across blocks when averaged over orderings. Neither is an adverse action reason, which explains the fitted score difference between the applicant and chosen passing records.

The recent adoption of artificial intelligence in socio-technical systems raises concerns about the black-box nature of the resulting decisions in fields such as hiring, finance, admissions, etc. If data subjects -- such as job applicants, loan applicants, and students -- receive an unfavorable outcome, they may be interested in algorithmic recourse, which involves updating certain features to yield a more favorable result when re-evaluated by algorithmic decision-making. Unfortunately, when individuals do not fully understand the incremental steps needed to change their circumstances, they risk following misguided paths that can lead to significant, long-term adverse consequences. Existing recourse approaches focus exclusively on the final recourse goal but neglect the possible incremental steps to reach the goal with real-life constraints, user preferences, and model artifacts. To address this gap, we formulate a visual analytic workflow for incremental recourse planning in collaboration with AI/ML experts and contribute an interactive visualization interface that helps data subjects efficiently navigate the recourse alternatives and make an informed decision. We present a usage scenario and subjective feedback from observational studies with twelve graduate students using a real-world dataset, which demonstrates that our approach can be instrumental for data subjects in choosing a suitable recourse path.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

BoN improves model outputs by sampling several candidates and selecting one with a proxy score, but it assumes that complete candidates can be evaluated reliably. Many vision-language tasks instead provide only partial verification: a finding, span, value, region, or relation may be checkable even when no dependable whole-response verifier exists. Moreover, the same claim may recur across candidates with opposing stances, allowing one observation to support part of the pool and contradict another. We introduce Best-of-Evidence (BoE), an inference-time selection framework that keeps the BoN candidate pool fixed, represents reusable claims with a signed candidate--factor graph, and allocates a limited budget to evidence actions that can change the final choice. BoE formalizes selection under partial verification and provides a practical score-based controller, with the zero-budget case recovering the underlying BoN decision. Theoretically, we show that residual evidence capacity limits any evidence-driven improvement and that shared factor queries can achieve an O(log K) versus Θ(K) query separation in a factor-code model. Common-ledger experiments on four medical VQA settings show that BoE can improve fixed-pool selection and rescue some BoN failures when evidence is reliable, contrastive, and decision-relevant, while also revealing the channel-quality and candidate-generation limits that prevent universal gains.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Recent work on reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has shown that large language models (LLMs) can be substantially improved using outcome-level verification signals, such as unit tests for code or exact-match checks for mathematics. In parallel, process supervision has long been explored as a way to shape the intermediate reasoning behaviour of LLMs, but existing approaches rely on neural judges to score chain-of-thought steps, leaving them vulnerable to opacity, bias, and reward hacking. To address this gap, we introduce Verifiable Process Reward Models (VPRMs), a reinforcement-learning framework in which intermediate reasoning steps are checked by deterministic, rule-based verifiers. We apply VPRMs to risk-of-bias assessment for medical evidence synthesis, a domain where guideline-defined criteria and rule-based decision paths enable programmatic verification of reasoning traces. Across multiple datasets, we find that VPRMs generate reasoning that adheres closely to domain rules and achieve substantially higher coherence between step-level decisions and final labels. Results show that VPRMs achieve up to 20% higher F1 than state-of-the-art models and 6.5% higher than verifiable outcome rewards, with substantial gains in evidence grounding and logical coherence.

Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models.

We study causal logistic bandits with counterfactual fairness constraints. The causal structure is given through known factual and counterfactual feature maps that share an unknown logistic reward parameter, but the learner observes only factual rewards. Consequently, the directions determining counterfactual feasibility need not be identifiable from the available feedback. The closest prior analyses either omit a coverage condition or impose a comparatively strong one, and do not establish matching lower bounds. We first show that some coverage condition is necessary: without a coverage-type restriction, factually indistinguishable environments with different optimal fair actions force Ω(T) expected joint loss. Under a weaker full-rank condition on the factual covariance pooled across actions, we identify a target-specific information scale V_star that measures the difficulty of estimating rewards and counterfactual effects from factual feedback. We construct worst-case families satisfying this condition on which every policy incurs expected joint loss Ωleft(left[V_starmin{log K,d}right]^{1/3}T^{2/3}right). We also give an explore--then--exploit procedure tuned using V_star and an adaptive algorithm that does not require its value. Both algorithms achieve max{R_T,V_T}=Oleft(left[V_starmin{log K,d}right]^{1/3}T^{2/3}+κd/σ_0^2right), where R_T is regret relative to the best fair action and V_T denotes the cumulative stage-wise positive violations. Thus the upper and lower bounds match in their leading dependence on T, V_star, and min{log K,d}, up to logarithmic factors.

LLM-based agents are increasingly used to simulate deliberative interactions such as negotiation, conflict resolution, and multi-turn opinion exchange. Yet generated transcripts often do not reveal why an agent's stance changes: movement may reflect evidence uptake, anchoring, role drift, echoing, or changed prompt and retrieval context. We introduce the Belief Engine (BE), an auditable belief-update layer that treats "belief" as an evidential state over a proposition and exposes it as scalar stance. BE extracts arguments into structured memory and updates stance with a log-odds rule controlled by evidence uptake u and prior anchoring a. Across multiple base LLMs, parameter sweeps show that these controls reliably shape stance dynamics while preserving an evidence-level update trail. On DEBATE, a human deliberation dataset with pre/post opinions, BE best reconstructs participants whose final stance follows extracted evidence; stable and evidence-opposed cases instead point to anchoring or factors outside the extracted evidence stream. BE provides configurable infrastructure for studying evidence-grounded deliberation, where openness, commitment, convergence, and disagreement can be tied to explicit update assumptions rather than hidden prompt effects.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Medical Vision-Language Models (Med-VLMs) require reliable reasoning from fine-grained visual evidence, yet existing models can produce plausible clinical answers by relying on language priors or medical templates rather than truly attending to diagnosis-critical regions. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) offers dense token-level supervision on student-generated trajectories and provides a privacy-compatible means of capability transfer without requiring the redistribution of raw patient data. However, standard OPD uniformly distills all tokens, causing sparse evidence-dependent tokens to be diluted by abundant clinical narrative tokens. Inspired by the success of OPD in the large language model community, we propose Med-OPD, to our knowledge the first unified post-training framework that integrates on-policy distillation with medical evidence-aware supervision for Med-VLMs. We introduce Medical Evidence Advantage (MEA), a teacher-grounded counterfactual signal that uses an answer-aware hint to focus teacher scoring on evidence supporting the target diagnosis, and measures each token's dependence on medical visual evidence by comparing teacher likelihoods under the original and evidence-degraded imaging modalities. Based on MEA, Med-OPD redistributes the distillation signal at both the token and trajectory levels, emphasizing diagnosis-critical tokens and evidence-reliant rollouts. Experiments on OmniMedVQA subsets show that Med-OPD consistently outperforms SFT and standard OPD across CT, MRI, Disease Diagnosis, and Lesion Grading. These results demonstrate that evidence-aware distillation can better strengthen medical VLMs' reliance on key visual evidence and improve reliable multimodal medical reasoning. The source code and data is publicly available at: https://github.com/yunhang8658/MedOPD.git

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Provenance links keep the evidence behind an inherited belief reachable; an agent with a verification budget must still choose which links to inspect. We study a consolidated memory that states a decision constraint and whose source record has since been superseded by a record that withdraws it: provenance is immutable, the current record has changed, and the memory is stale. In a controlled six-memory scenario with a budget of two records, sixteen language models rarely re-verified a constraint that read as settled: they inspected its provenance path in about one episode in five and, once the constraint had been superseded, produced stale-consistent decisions in 77.3%, 74.7% and 74.7% of episodes across a primary run, a replication and a held-out domain. Re-assigning one of the same two slots to the critical path removed most of them: +74.0, +72.7 and +61.3 points (positive in every model), +80.7 in a prospectively frozen interleaved replication with a repaired non-critical control, and +62.0 on a panel of 10 models from 9 organisations; a corrected re-run of the held-out scenario gave +73.3. The forced-critical policy uses experimenter knowledge of the critical path: it quantifies how much stale-decision risk the same budget can recover and is not a scheduler. Two further deposited experiments locate the failure and a remedy: in this store the constraint's path is selected in 17.0% of episodes at two slots and 88.7% at four of six (above uniform allocation), and at two slots a one-sentence, target-blind rule (prefer memories that state a limit on a candidate direction) moved the agent's own allocation onto the constraint's path and recovered the oracle contrast on decisions (+89.3 points) where that constraint limits the tempting action, while a content-free freshness cue did not materially redirect allocation and a content-matched control rule changed neither selection nor decisions.

Across medical specialties, clinical practice is anchored in evidence-based guidelines that codify best studied diagnostic and treatment pathways. These pathways routinely fall short for the long tail of real-world care not covered by guidelines. Most medical large language models (LLMs), however, are trained to encode common, guideline-focused medical knowledge in their parameters. Current evaluations test models primarily on recalling and reasoning with this memorized content, often in multiple-choice settings. Given the fundamental importance of evidence-based reasoning in medicine, it is neither feasible nor reliable to depend on memorization in practice. To address this gap, we introduce OGCaReBench, a free-form retrieval-focused benchmark aimed at evaluating LLMs at answering clinical questions that require going beyond typical guidelines. Extracted from published medical case reports and validated by medical experts, OGCaReBench contains long-form clinical questions requiring free-text answers, providing a systematic framework for assessing open-ended medical reasoning in rare, case-based scenarios. Our experiments reveal that even the best-performing baseline (GPT-5.2) correctly answers only 56% of our benchmark with specialized models only reaching 42%. Augmenting models with retrieved medical articles improves this performance to up to 82% (using GPT-5.2) highlighting the importance of evidence-grounding for real-world medical reasoning tasks. This work thus establishes a foundation for benchmarking and advancing both general-purpose and medical LLMs to produce reliable answers in challenging clinical contexts.

Explaining Artificial Intelligence (AI) decisions is a major challenge nowadays in AI, in particular when applied to sensitive scenarios like medicine and law. However, the need to explain the rationale behind decisions is a main issue also for human-based deliberation as it is important to justify why a certain decision has been taken. Resident medical doctors for instance are required not only to provide a (possibly correct) diagnosis, but also to explain how they reached a certain conclusion. Developing new tools to aid residents to train their explanation skills is therefore a central objective of AI in education. In this paper, we follow this direction, and we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first multilingual dataset for Medical Question Answering where correct and incorrect diagnoses for a clinical case are enriched with a natural language explanation written by doctors. These explanations have been manually annotated with argument components (i.e., premise, claim) and argument relations (i.e., attack, support), resulting in the Multilingual CasiMedicos-Arg dataset which consists of 558 clinical cases in four languages (English, Spanish, French, Italian) with explanations, where we annotated 5021 claims, 2313 premises, 2431 support relations, and 1106 attack relations. We conclude by showing how competitive baselines perform over this challenging dataset for the argument mining task.

Stronger AI agents do not automatically produce better organizations: teams must also learn which work arrangements to retain and when to reconsider them. We propose a modeling specification for recursive organization improvement and evaluate it through an executable checker, a public-record mapping, and controlled simulation. The specification connects actor-visible histories, organizational memory, decision rights, and evidence-carrying change contracts. The mechanism study crosses six decision rules, three memory conditions, and three task environments under fixed resource ceilings. In a stationary environment, cumulative evidence raises balanced evaluation's normalized net value per task from 0.45224 to 0.48007. Repeated reassessment's disadvantage relative to this comparator falls from 0.01702 with reset evidence to 0.00007 with cumulative evidence. A reversal of the best workflow reveals the opposite cost: indefinite retention delays adaptation, while a finite window restores eventual performance at a transition cost. In exploratory controls, matching trial acquisition and label reuse reduces the apparent reassessment gain from 0.00607 to 0.00191. Program replacement adds no stable benefit across the tested reversal times. The study identifies evidence acquisition, reuse, and timely updating as mechanisms that must be separated from evaluator replacement when assessing organizational improvement.

Experts advising decision-makers are likely to display expertise which varies as a function of the problem instance. In practice, this may lead to sub-optimal or discriminatory decisions against minority cases. In this work we model such changes in depth and breadth of knowledge as a partitioning of the problem space into regions of differing expertise. We provide here new algorithms that explicitly consider and adapt to the relationship between problem instances and experts' knowledge. We first propose and highlight the drawbacks of a naive approach based on nearest neighbor queries. To address these drawbacks we then introduce a novel algorithm - expertise trees - that constructs decision trees enabling the learner to select appropriate models. We provide theoretical insights and empirically validate the improved performance of our novel approach on a range of problems for which existing methods proved to be inadequate.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Biomedical fact-checking systems must do more than predict whether a claim is supported, contradicted, or unaddressed: they should also produce evidence that is faithful, complete, and useful for verification. We study this evidence-generation setting on CARE-XAI, a unified benchmark spanning five biomedical and health fact-checking sources. We compare base instruction LLMs, PubMed retrieval-augmented LLMs, fine-tuned LLMs, label-only LLMs, and biomedical encoder classifiers under a shared evaluation protocol. Biomedical classifiers remain strongest for verdict-only prediction, while fine-tuned LLMs are the strongest evidence-generating systems. PubMed retrieval is mixed: it helps PubMed-aligned sources such as PubMedQA and SciFact, but can distract models on broader public-health claims. We introduce Bio-GRACE, a gold-reference-normalized diagnostic for measuring whether retrieved evidence recovers the decision benefit of reference evidence. Bio-GRACE shows that retrieval utility is source-dependent, motivates selective retrieval, and exposes why retrieval recall and lexical evidence overlap are insufficient for biomedical fact-checking.

We study variance-dependent regret bounds for Markov decision processes (MDPs). Algorithms with variance-dependent regret guarantees can automatically exploit environments with low variance (e.g., enjoying constant regret on deterministic MDPs). The existing algorithms are either variance-independent or suboptimal. We first propose two new environment norms to characterize the fine-grained variance properties of the environment. For model-based methods, we design a variant of the MVP algorithm (Zhang et al., 2021a). We apply new analysis techniques to demonstrate that this algorithm enjoys variance-dependent bounds with respect to the norms we propose. In particular, this bound is simultaneously minimax optimal for both stochastic and deterministic MDPs, the first result of its kind. We further initiate the study on model-free algorithms with variance-dependent regret bounds by designing a reference-function-based algorithm with a novel capped-doubling reference update schedule. Lastly, we also provide lower bounds to complement our upper bounds.

Decision-making is a dynamic process requiring perception, memory, and reasoning to make choices and find optimal policies. Traditional approaches to decision-making suffer from sample efficiency and generalization, while large-scale self-supervised pretraining has enabled fast adaptation with fine-tuning or few-shot learning in language and vision. We thus argue to integrate knowledge acquired from generic large-scale self-supervised pretraining into downstream decision-making problems. We propose Pretrain-Then-Adapt pipeline and survey recent work on data collection, pretraining objectives and adaptation strategies for decision-making pretraining and downstream inference. Finally, we identify critical challenges and future directions for developing decision foundation model with the help of generic and flexible self-supervised pretraining.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

Open-ended scientific discovery with large language models (LLMs) increasingly operates as a long-horizon loop of hypothesis search and verification, where a reward signal guides which hypotheses to test next. A notable recent example is AutoDiscovery, which uses "Bayesian surprise" - the belief shift an LLM undergoes after observing evidence for a hypothesis - as both a discovery metric and a reward for search. We first observe that AutoDiscovery treats surprisal as a static quantity, while surprisal in human reasoning is non-stationary - it is defined relative to beliefs that evolve with experience, a prerequisite for continual scientific discovery. We address this mismatch with evidence-informed LLM beliefs: priors updated with evidence from previous hypotheses to compute non-stationary surprisal for new hypotheses. We compare in-context belief-updating mechanisms and find that embedding-based retrieval-augmented generation over prior discoveries best anticipates eventual posteriors, identifying 37.5% of static surprisals as spurious. We then modify search to avoid these spurious rewards and prioritize hypotheses that remain surprising under non-stationary beliefs. Concretely, we introduce two complementary changes to the original search procedure: belief-update filtering and diversity maximization. Across five discovery domains, our method increases accumulated non-stationary surprisal by 30.62% on average compared to the original search procedure, demonstrating that continual scientific discovery with LLMs requires not only better belief measurement but also search procedures that avoid redundancy and encourage diversity.

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

Decision-focused learning (DFL) is an emerging paradigm that integrates machine learning (ML) and constrained optimization to enhance decision quality by training ML models in an end-to-end system. This approach shows significant potential to revolutionize combinatorial decision-making in real-world applications that operate under uncertainty, where estimating unknown parameters within decision models is a major challenge. This paper presents a comprehensive review of DFL, providing an in-depth analysis of both gradient-based and gradient-free techniques used to combine ML and constrained optimization. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of these techniques and includes an extensive empirical evaluation of eleven methods across seven problems. The survey also offers insights into recent advancements and future research directions in DFL. Code and benchmark: https://github.com/PredOpt/predopt-benchmarks

Large language models offer broad capabilities, but adapting them to evolving domains, tools, and requirements often entails repeated post-training. Autonomous systems automate parts of this process by proposing updates, training candidates, and using evaluation feedback to select subsequent proposals. As evidence accumulates, a central problem emerges: which past update evidence remains actionable after subsequent training has changed the parent model? An update's effect depends on its parent, data, and training stage. Treating past success as context-free permission can waste compute. If the resulting child is promoted, it can also degrade the subsequent training trajectory. We formulate this problem as conditional experience transfer and introduce Boundary-Calibrated Intervention Transfer (BCIT), a method that authorizes experience reuse before weight-changing training. BCIT binds an observed effect to its source context, checks applicability conditions, vetoes candidates with named hard conflicts, and obtains current-state evidence through a bounded training trial when needed. Fully trained candidates still face a shared adoption rule, and only observed events extend memory. On one 4B model adapted across finance reasoning, text-to-SQL, and function calling, candidate updates exhibit heterogeneous target and retention effects across the evaluated contexts. Under matched candidates, evidence, and compute, BCIT authorizes fewer harmful updates and attains higher equal-budget final-model quality than the evaluated alternatives. These results support treating experience authorization as a distinct problem in autonomous post-training.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts-from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

Autonomous scientific discovery systems increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to propose new hypotheses, but many such systems condition primarily on experimental memory: archives of high-scoring candidates or heuristic summaries of recent trials. We argue that discovery agents should instead maintain explicit, uncertainty-aware beliefs about hypothesis quality. We introduce BayesEvolve, a belief-guided discovery framework that converts experimental evidence into a predictive belief state and uses this belief to guide future experimentation. As a controlled testbed for belief-guided discovery, we evaluate BayesEvolve on shifted BBOB-style black-box optimization tasks, leaving program and laboratory discovery domains to future work. BayesEvolve improves sample efficiency over memory- and archive-guided LLM baselines under a fixed evaluation budget. We further show that the belief state is predictive on held-out candidate pools, that controlled decision-rule ablations favor belief-guided selection with an annealed uncertainty bonus, and that BayesEvolve exhibits productive late-stage concentration rather than unfocused exploration.

Schema-guided reasoning pipelines ask LLMs to produce explicit intermediate structures -- rubrics, checklists, verification queries -- before committing to a final decision. But do these structures causally determine the output, or merely accompany it? We introduce a causal evaluation protocol that makes this directly measurable: by selecting tasks where a deterministic function maps intermediate structures to decisions, every controlled edit implies a unique correct output. Across eight models and three benchmarks, models appear self-consistent with their own intermediate structures but fail to update predictions after intervention in up to 60% of cases -- revealing that apparent faithfulness is fragile once the intermediate structure changes. When derivation of the final decision from the structure is delegated to an external tool, this fragility largely disappears; however, prompts which ask to prioritize the intermediate structure over the original input do not materially close the gap. Overall, intermediate structures in schema-guided pipelines function as influential context rather than stable causal mediators.

Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems predominantly rely on semantic relevance as a proxy for utility. However, this assumption collapses in realistic decision-making scenarios where user queries are laden with cognitive biases, such as false premises or confirmation bias. In such cases, maximizing relevance paradoxically promotes the retrieval of sycophantic evidence that reinforces hallucinations, a critical failure we term the ``Relevance-Robustness Gap''. To bridge this gap, we propose CoRM-RAG (Counterfactual Risk Minimization for RAG), a framework that aligns retrieval with decision safety rather than mere similarity. Grounded in causal intervention, we introduce a Cognitive Perturbation Protocol to simulate user biases during training, which is then distilled into a lightweight Evidence Critic. This scoring module learns to identify documents that possess sufficient evidential strength to steer the model toward correctness despite adversarial query perturbations. Extensive experiments on decision-making benchmarks demonstrate that CoRM-RAG significantly outperforms strong dense retrievers and LLM-based rerankers in adversarial settings, while enabling effective risk-aware abstention through reliable robustness scoring. Our code is available at https://github.com/PeiYangLiu/CoRM-RAG.git.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

From out-competing grandmasters in chess to informing high-stakes healthcare decisions, emerging methods from artificial intelligence are increasingly capable of making complex and strategic decisions in diverse, high-dimensional, and uncertain situations. But can these methods help us devise robust strategies for managing environmental systems under great uncertainty? Here we explore how reinforcement learning, a subfield of artificial intelligence, approaches decision problems through a lens similar to adaptive environmental management: learning through experience to gradually improve decisions with updated knowledge. We review where reinforcement learning (RL) holds promise for improving evidence-informed adaptive management decisions even when classical optimization methods are intractable. For example, model-free deep RL might help identify quantitative decision strategies even when models are nonidentifiable. Finally, we discuss technical and social issues that arise when applying reinforcement learning to adaptive management problems in the environmental domain. Our synthesis suggests that environmental management and computer science can learn from one another about the practices, promises, and perils of experience-based decision-making.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on chain-of-thought reasoning has become a standard part of language model post-training recipes. A common assumption is that the reasoning chains trained through RLVR reliably represent how a model gets to its answer. In this paper, we develop two metrics for critically examining this assumption: Causal Importance of Reasoning (CIR), which measures the cumulative effect of reasoning tokens on the final answer, and Sufficiency of Reasoning (SR), which measures whether a verifier can arrive at an unambiguous answer based on the reasoning alone. Through experiments with the Qwen2.5 model series and ReasoningGym tasks, we find that: (1) while RLVR does improve task accuracy, it does not reliably improve CIR or SR, calling the role of reasoning in model performance into question; (2) a small amount of SFT before RLVR can be a remedy for low CIR and SR; and (3) CIR and SR can be improved even without SFT by applying auxiliary CIR/SR rewards on top of the outcome-based reward. This joint reward matches the accuracy of RLVR while also leading to causally important and sufficient reasoning. These results show that RLVR does not always lead models to rely on reasoning in the way that is commonly thought, but this issue can be remedied with simple modifications to the post-training procedure.

Exam-style accuracy does not establish whether large language models (LLMs) reason well over clinical records. We define clinical reasoning as integrating and updating evidence across time and sources to form, revise and justify a patient's problem representation and a defensible plan. This structured narrative review maps three literatures: medical education assessment instruments, clinical LLM benchmarks published from 2023 onwards, and general-domain methods for evaluating long-form generation. We examine six dimensions: problem representation, temporal synthesis, differential and management reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, calibrated uncertainty, and reasoning faithfulness. Preprints are included and flagged. No single instrument covers all six dimensions. Problem representation and differential or management reasoning are reasonably covered, although reliability varies by instrument and setting. TIMER-Eval targets temporal synthesis, and ER-Reason assesses sequential diagnostic belief updating. Dedicated uncertainty and counterfactual evaluations are emerging, but their applicability to longitudinal free-text reasoning remains limited. Factual completeness is well theorised in general-domain evaluation, with early clinical evidence of important omissions. Faithfulness remains the weakest dimension, with one identified clinical causal-ablation study on multiple-choice questions. Existing tools should be combined through binary rubric items, separate completeness and correctness scores, case-specific importance weighting with non-compensable safety caps, temporal order-consistency checks, and chance-corrected reliability reporting. Further design work is needed for calibrated uncertainty, counterfactual reasoning and faithfulness over longitudinal free-text records. This review provides a design rationale, not a validated instrument.

Many social and environmental phenomena are associated with macroscopic changes in the built environment, captured by satellite imagery on a global scale and with daily temporal resolution. While widely used for prediction, these images and especially image sequences remain underutilized for causal inference, especially in the context of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), where causal identification is established by design. In this paper, we develop and compare a set of general tools for analyzing Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs) from temporal satellite data that can be applied to any RCT where geographical identifiers are available. Through a simulation study, we analyze different modeling strategies for estimating CATE in sequences of satellite images. We find that image sequence representation models with more parameters generally yield a greater ability to detect heterogeneity. To explore the role of model and data choice in practice, we apply the approaches to two influential RCTs -- Banerjee et al. (2015), a poverty study in Cusco, Peru, and Bolsen et al. (2014), a water conservation experiment in Georgia, USA. We benchmark our image sequence models against image-only, tabular-only, and combined image-tabular data sources, summarizing practical implications for investigators in a multivariate analysis. Land cover classifications over satellite images facilitate interpretation of what image features drive heterogeneity. We also show robustness to data and model choice of satellite-based generalization of the RCT results to larger geographical areas outside the original. Overall, this paper shows how satellite sequence data can be incorporated into the analysis of RCTs, and provides evidence about the implications of data, model, and evaluation metric choice for causal analysis.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is the prevailing paradigm for grounding Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the mechanisms governing how models integrate groups of conflicting retrieved evidence remain opaque. Does an LLM answer a certain way because the evidence is factually strong, because of a prior belief, or merely because it is repeated frequently? To answer this, we introduce GroupQA, a curated dataset of 1,635 controversial questions paired with 15,058 diversely-sourced evidence documents, annotated for stance and qualitative strength. Through controlled experiments, we characterize group-level evidence aggregation dynamics: Paraphrasing an argument can be more persuasive than providing distinct independent support; Models favor evidence presented first rather than last, and Larger models are increasingly resistant to adapt to presented evidence. Additionally, we find that LLM explanations to group-based answers are unfaithful. Together, we show that LLMs behave consistently as vulnerable heuristic followers, with direct implications for improving RAG system design.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recent progress in reasoning models suggests that generating plausible attempts for research-level mathematics may be within reach, but verification remains a bottleneck, consuming scarce expert time. We hypothesize that a meaningful solution should contain enough method-level information that, when applied to a neighborhood of related questions, it should yield better downstream performance than incorrect solutions. Building on this idea, we propose Consequence-Based Utility, an oracle-free evaluator that scores each candidate by testing its value as an in-context exemplar in solving related yet verifiable questions. Our approach is evaluated on an original set of research-level math problems, each paired with one expert-written solution and nine LLM-generated solutions. Notably, Consequence-Based Utility consistently outperforms reward models, generative reward models, and LLM judges on ranking quality. Specifically, for GPT-OSS-120B, it improves Acc@1 from 67.2 to 76.3 and AUC from 71.4 to 79.6, with similarly large AUC gains on GPT-OSS-20B (69.0 to 79.2). Furthermore, compared to LLM-Judges, it also exhibits a larger solver-evaluator gap, maintaining a stronger correct-wrong separation even on instances where the underlying solver often fails to solve.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

Interventional counterfactuals evaluate statements such as "had A been a" by replacing the assignment for A while keeping the unit's exogenous background fixed. Backtracking counterfactuals reverse this logic: they preserve the structural assignments and instead vary background conditions across worlds. This semantics is natural for diagnostic explanation, but full backtracking may be too permissive because every exogenous coordinate can vary. We introduce scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, in which the modeler specifies which coordinates may vary while the remainder are shared across worlds. The scope determines the admissible carriers of the contrast, while a cross-world kernel governs the plausibility of their alternative values. We present model-based inference for general scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, derive sharp marginal bounds for a specified explanatory query, and establish frontier and compatibility conditions under which this explanatory query admits a modified-value policy representation. A linear-Gaussian example distinguishes local-noise, ancestor, irrelevant-noise, and infeasible explanations across scopes, while an application to the UCI Adult benchmark illustrates kernel specification, sensitivity, and how much of the explanation is carried by the cross-world coupling itself.

This graduate textbook on machine learning tells a story of how patterns in data support predictions and consequential actions. Starting with the foundations of decision making, we cover representation, optimization, and generalization as the constituents of supervised learning. A chapter on datasets as benchmarks examines their histories and scientific bases. Self-contained introductions to causality, the practice of causal inference, sequential decision making, and reinforcement learning equip the reader with concepts and tools to reason about actions and their consequences. Throughout, the text discusses historical context and societal impact. We invite readers from all backgrounds; some experience with probability, calculus, and linear algebra suffices.

Scientific discovery requires developing worthwhile hypotheses into practical investigations, yet learning from this evolving research process remains challenging. We introduce an operational definition of valuable and testable research hypotheses: evidence-grounded claims about consequential uncertainties, coupled with feasible investigations, explicit decision criteria, and alternative explanations. Our DiscoveryRSI framework develops hypothesis trees through multi-agent evolutionary search, compiles selected investigations into executable Harbor tasks, and recursively learns through three mechanisms: hypothesis credit optimization attributes scientific assessments to documented research contributions; harness replay identifies productive strategies and recurring failures to refine research workflows; and rediscovery applies accepted improvements to new investigations, generating further experience for subsequent learning. We also introduce DFM-Bench, which provides comprehensive assessment of hypothesis quality and cumulative research progress at the levels of hypotheses, revisions, development paths and research runs. Across four life-science domains, automated evaluation shows that hypothesis quality rises from 4.86 for the base model to 5.39 after two rounds of self-improvement, with the large gains in falsifiability and data resolvability. We further validate hypothesis quality through expert review, comparing our DiscoveryRSI-27B with other research agents. Preliminary human assessments show that DiscoveryRSI-27B scores higher than GPT-6 Luna on hypothesis importance and whether claims are plausible and evidence-bounded. DiscoveryRSI-27B achieved a 6.3% rate of hypothesis correspondence with research published after the model cutoff, largely outperform GPT-6 with 2.5% and Claude Opus 5 with 2.3%, while delivering greater human-rated improvement along research paths.

Despite achieving high accuracy on medical benchmarks, LLMs exhibit the Einstellung Effect in clinical diagnosis--relying on statistical shortcuts rather than patient-specific evidence, causing misdiagnosis in atypical cases. Existing benchmarks fail to detect this critical failure mode. We introduce MedEinst, a counterfactual benchmark with 5,383 paired clinical cases across 49 diseases. Each pair contains a control case and a "trap" case with altered discriminative evidence that flips the diagnosis. We measure susceptibility via Bias Trap Rate--probability of misdiagnosing traps despite correctly diagnosing controls. Extensive Evaluation of 17 LLMs shows frontier models achieve high baseline accuracy but severe bias trap rates. Thus, we propose ECR-Agent, aligning LLM reasoning with Evidence-Based Medicine standard via two components: (1) Dynamic Causal Inference (DCI) performs structured reasoning through dual-pathway perception, dynamic causal graph reasoning across three levels (association, intervention, counterfactual), and evidence audit for final diagnosis; (2) Critic-Driven Graph and Memory Evolution (CGME) iteratively refines the system by storing validated reasoning paths in an exemplar base and consolidating disease-specific knowledge into evolving illness graphs. Source code is to be released.

Recent advances in large language models have enabled deep research systems that generate expert-level reports through multi-step reasoning and evidence-based synthesis. However, evaluating such reports remains challenging: report quality is multifaceted, making it difficult to determine what to assess and by what criteria; LLM-based judges may miss errors that require domain expertise to identify; and because deep research relies on retrieved evidence, report-wide claim verification is also necessary. To address these issues, we propose DEER, a benchmark for evaluating expert-level deep research reports. DEER systematizes evaluation criteria with an expert-developed taxonomy (7 dimensions, 25 subdimensions) operationalized as 101 fine-grained rubric items. We also provide task-specific Expert Evaluation Guidance to support LLM-based judging. Alongside rubric-based assessment, we propose a claim verification architecture that verifies both cited and uncited claims and quantifies evidence quality. Experiments show that while current deep research systems can produce structurally plausible reports that cite external evidence, there is room for improvement in fulfilling expert-level user requests and achieving logical completeness. Beyond simple performance comparisons, DEER makes system strengths and limitations interpretable and provides diagnostic signals for improvement.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Integrating web search tools has significantly extended the capability of LLMs to address open-world, real-time, and long-tail problems. However, evaluating these Search Agents presents formidable challenges. First, constructing high-quality deep search benchmarks is prohibitively expensive, while unverified synthetic data often suffers from unreliable sources. Second, static benchmarks face dynamic obsolescence: as internet information evolves, complex queries requiring deep research often degrade into simple retrieval tasks due to increased popularity, and ground truths become outdated due to temporal shifts. Third, attribution ambiguity confounds evaluation, as an agent's performance is often dominated by its parametric memory rather than its actual search and reasoning capabilities. Finally, reliance on specific commercial search engines introduces variability that hampers reproducibility. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework, Mind-ParaWorld, for evaluating Search Agents in a Parallel World. Specifically, MPW samples real-world entity names to synthesize future scenarios and questions situated beyond the model's knowledge cutoff. A ParaWorld Law Model then constructs a set of indivisible Atomic Facts and a unique ground-truth for each question. During evaluation, instead of retrieving real-world results, the agent interacts with a ParaWorld Engine Model that dynamically generates SERPs grounded in these inviolable Atomic Facts. We release MPW-Bench, an interactive benchmark spanning 19 domains with 1,608 instances. Experiments across three evaluation settings show that, while search agents are strong at evidence synthesis given complete information, their performance is limited not only by evidence collection and coverage in unfamiliar search environments, but also by unreliable evidence sufficiency judgment and when-to-stop decisions-bottlenecks.

Foundation models can serve as clinical agents through tool-use harnesses. However, conventional medical benchmarks assess reasoning over preselected evidence rather than the ability to seek it across clinical records and longitudinal imaging. We propose CASE: a series of role-specific Clinical Agents for Seeking Evidence, together with a tool-use harness and an agentic post-training framework for compact vision-language policy models. We further introduce a longitudinal multimodal benchmark built on UK Biobank, comprising 50,401 clinical questions derived from real-world ICD-10-coded diagnoses of 4,739 participants. Each question links to a patient-specific environment containing clinical context and multi-sequence MRI from baseline and follow-up visits, where agents autonomously select which visits, organs, modalities, slices, and specialist tools to inspect and compare. Supervised fine-tuning transfers evidence-seeking workflows from 14,734 frontier-model interaction trajectories, followed by agentic reinforcement learning on the learner's own environment interactions. Privileged on-policy self-distillation and rubric-based LLM feedback refine evidence-to-conclusion reasoning without prescribing tool sequences. Experiments show that CASE moves beyond question-answer imitation toward transferable investigation policies, strengthening evidence-grounded longitudinal reasoning. Under matched evaluation conditions, our Qwen3-VL-8B based agent achieves over 16% and 10% relative improvements in answer accuracy over GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.8. Code will be available at https://github.com/VinyehShaw/CASE.

Decision-makers are often experts of their domain and take actions based on their domain knowledge. Doctors, for instance, may prescribe treatments by predicting the likely outcome of each available treatment. Actions of an expert thus naturally encode part of their domain knowledge, and can help make inferences within the same domain: Knowing doctors try to prescribe the best treatment for their patients, we can tell treatments prescribed more frequently are likely to be more effective. Yet in machine learning, the fact that most decision-makers are experts is often overlooked, and "expertise" is seldom leveraged as an inductive bias. This is especially true for the literature on treatment effect estimation, where often the only assumption made about actions is that of overlap. In this paper, we argue that expertise - particularly the type of expertise the decision-makers of a domain are likely to have - can be informative in designing and selecting methods for treatment effect estimation. We formally define two types of expertise, predictive and prognostic, and demonstrate empirically that: (i) the prominent type of expertise in a domain significantly influences the performance of different methods in treatment effect estimation, and (ii) it is possible to predict the type of expertise present in a dataset, which can provide a quantitative basis for model selection.

For many real-world systems, causal ground truth is difficult to obtain, making claims about causal effects hard to assess. We develop methods for evaluating collections of n{2} bivariate causal statements over a set of n variables. In the setting of acyclic linear statements, any such collection can be extended to a unique multivariate causal model, but we argue that this induced model is implausible if it imposes substantial additional confounding to explain observed correlations. We introduce a compatibility score that quantifies this notion of plausibility, notably without relying on the faithfulness assumption. Additionally, we define an incompatibility score for purely graphical bivariate causal statements, based on global consistency constraints that are derived from acyclicity and faithfulness assumptions. We give theoretical and empirical evidence that both scores can successfully distinguish correct from incorrect causal statements in generic settings. Moreover, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods by analyzing causal claims made by large language models. Our work aims to provide a foundation for assessing the reliability of causal information derived from human experts or artificial intelligence in settings where alternative forms of validation are unavailable.

Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

Building upon our previous investigations of O1 replication (Part 1: Journey Learning [Qin et al., 2024] and Part 2: Distillation [Huang et al., 2024]), this work explores the potential of inference-time scaling in large language models (LLMs) for medical reasoning tasks, ranging from diagnostic decision-making to treatment planning. Through extensive experiments on medical benchmarks of varying complexity (MedQA, Medbullets, and JAMA Clinical Challenges), our investigation reveals several key insights: (1) Increasing inference time does lead to improved performance. With a modest training set of 500 samples, our model yields substantial performance improvements of 6%-11%. (2) Task complexity directly correlates with the required length of reasoning chains, confirming the necessity of extended thought processes for challenging problems. (3) The differential diagnoses generated by our model adhere to the principles of the hypothetico-deductive method, producing a list of potential conditions that may explain a patient's symptoms and systematically narrowing these possibilities by evaluating the evidence. These findings demonstrate the promising synergy between inference-time scaling and journey learning in advancing LLMs' real-world clinical reasoning capabilities.

Many high-stakes decisions depend on forecasts made before outcomes are known. In this future prediction setting, the central challenge is that public evidence evolves over time, while the main supervision signal arrives only after resolution: the realized outcome mainly assesses final correctness, offering only coarse guidance on what to track, what to verify, and which judgments to leave uncertain along the way. Our key observation is that revisiting the same unresolved question over time creates informative temporal contrasts across evolving evidence and repeated forecasts, exposing what earlier attempts missed before resolution and yielding a diagnostic signal we call the pre-resolution signal. We instantiate this idea in Milkyway, a future prediction agent with a persistent future prediction harness, an editable external state that stores reusable procedural guidance across revisits to the same unresolved question. As the same unresolved question is revisited, Milkyway extracts pre-resolution signals from evolving evidence and repeated forecasts, uses them to update the harness, and improves later forecasts on that question before resolution. After resolution, the realized outcome serves as a post-resolution check of provisional updates. On the FutureX and FutureWorld benchmarks, Milkyway achieves strong performance against competitive baselines, and a mechanism study suggests that the gains stem from harness evolution driven by pre-resolution signals rather than repeated prediction alone.

A semantic decision engine such as Jev can return a valid answer and still miss a network deadline, select an infeasible action or leave the service unverified. We systematize 139 paper families by decision interface, execution path and check ownership. Fifty families claim that their engine fits a control loop or time budget, but only four support the claim with matched measurement. Across all 139, four report deadline attainment. The gap concentrates where the decision has no deterministic computation step. Those 72 families make 22 of the claims, none supported, and name a coverage owner in only two. Bounded tests under one event model show that each gap can reverse an admission verdict. A decision that meets a 10 s budget for every isolated request meets it for none once decisions queue ahead of replayed execution times. The same engine passes one coverage check and fails another. We derive a minimum reporting record, design rules and a research agenda for admitting decision engines to control loops.