Daily Papers

In a polar material, a neutral exciton couples to phonons through the sum of the electron and hole deformation potentials. Because the total source vanishes by charge neutrality, the elastic exciton-phonon vertex is regularized by electron-hole interference. Here we determine the non-perturbative fate of this interference by exact diagonalization of a Holstein-exciton model. By parameterizing the mass asymmetry to decouple it from the small-polaron atomic limit, we map a regime map comprising an internal dressing crossover and a dissociation boundary. We prove analytically and verify numerically that for equal masses, the symmetric exciton ground state is protected from phonon dressing by an exact exchange selection rule, provided the phonon source is odd under electron-hole exchange (the neutral case). As mass asymmetry increases, this selection rule is broken and the exciton acquires a strong local polaronic cloud. We show that the dissociation boundary, conversely, is set by a global energy balance between Coulomb binding and polaronic stabilization, and is nearly independent of the internal dressing. Paradoxically, the very symmetry that protects the exciton from dressing denies it polaronic stabilization, driving it toward dissociation at strong coupling. We discuss these results in the context of lattice exciton-polaron models and their implications for sharp versus broad excitonic lines in mass-symmetric versus mass-asymmetric polar semiconductors.

This paper measures hour-of-day effects, filter precision, fragility, and realised yield in a 15-day paper-traded deployment of an autonomous memecoin trading system on Solana decentralised exchanges. The 190-trade sample (March 29 to April 12, 2026) shows a 40.5 percent win rate, mean per-trade return of +0.62 percent, cumulative +117.7 percent (net SOL +0.039), skewness -1.21, excess kurtosis 6.61. A Mann-Whitney U test of three poorest-performing UTC hours (2, 13, 23) against the others yields U = 1,274, p = 0.22; directional but not significant at n = 190. The three hours were selected in-sample, so the comparison is exploratory, not confirmatory. A parallel counterfactual rejection-tracking system collected 4,874 forward-sample observations across 184 distinct rejection events. Of those events, 17.9 percent reached a 50 percent drawdown from reference within 24 hours; 26.0 percent of forward samples recorded the rejected token below half-reference. The filter stack avoided these realised drawdowns: evidence that the rejection criteria are net-positive against forward-market outcomes. Fragility is the principal caveat. Removing the top three trades (1.6 percent of sample) flips cumulative return unprofitable. Profitability rests on a small number of large winners and is structurally fragile. The dataset and audit script are deposited under CC-BY-4.0 (Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20043302).

Algorithmic trading systems on decentralised exchanges (DEXs) reject most candidate tokens they evaluate. The counterfactual outcome of rejected candidates (what would have happened had the system entered) is rarely measured. This paper introduces Post-Rejection Follow-up Sampling (PRFS). A separate tracking subsystem samples each rejected token's price and liquidity at a configurable cadence, over a horizon of up to twenty-four hours. PRFS produces the data needed to evaluate filter precision against actual market outcomes of rejected candidates, not against synthetic backtest reconstructions. The methodology, data architecture, and deposit format are described in Section III. The companion dataset contains 67,000 forward-outcome observation rows across 2,997 rejection events spanning 457 unique mints, collected over a continuous eight-day window (2026-04-10 to 2026-04-19, UTC). Approximately 55 percent of rejection events receive at least one forward observation; coverage at the mint level is complete. The principal binding constraint on downstream classification is per-event horizon density, not event-level coverage. PRFS is dataset-independent. It generalises to any algorithmic decision system in which rejections substantially outnumber executions.

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Self-improving LLM systems propose changes to themselves and keep those that score better on a small evaluation set. We treat this keep-if-better step as selection under measurement noise, model the correlated errors of the candidates in a single decision, and study empirically what happens when the evaluation set is reused. In runs where Qwen models rewrite their own instructions and every candidate is also scored on 600 held-out items, most proposals after the first are harmful, and the model gives the size of the winner's curse of a generation's best candidate. With a prior from a separate pilot, it matches the average overstatement of first-generation commits in native loops, though not setting by setting. In a pre-registered study, the final selection-set score of greedy loops exceeded held-out accuracy by 13 to 20 points with 16 selection items and by 1 to 5 points with 256. Held-out gains grew with the selection set on TREC but not on GSM8K, and the tested acceptance rules did not beat greedy acceptance over whole runs. Gains measured on the selection set also exceeded held-out gains when a current model refined a competent instruction, and in the validation scores of GEPA and MIPROv2. Scoring the starting and the current instruction on 64 items never used for selection removes the average bias of a loop's reported gain, but single estimates remain off by about 6 points. Self-improvement studies should report held-out gains with their uncertainty.

This paper presents a novel methodology for predicting international bilateral trade flows, emphasizing the growing importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in the global trade landscape. Acknowledging the limitations of traditional models like the Gravity Model of Trade, this study introduces a two-stage approach combining explainable machine learning and factorization models. The first stage employs SHAP Explainer for effective variable selection, identifying key provisions in PTAs, while the second stage utilizes Factorization Machine models to analyze the pairwise interaction effects of these provisions on trade flows. By analyzing comprehensive datasets, the paper demonstrates the efficacy of this approach. The findings not only enhance the predictive accuracy of trade flow models but also offer deeper insights into the complex dynamics of international trade, influenced by specific bilateral trade provisions.

Some security-development settings require local models that map an objective to an ordered, checkable plan. We present a low-rank decomposition adapter and release a case-disjoint corpus with 24 authored decompositions and 83 derived next-step examples across 24 satellite-security cases. To prevent reference-plan leakage, prompts contain one objective and eight shuffled SPARTA candidates. The evaluation candidate sets are constructed with oracle inclusion of every reference technique, so this study measures selection from a controlled set, not retrieval. On six fixed cases and five decoding seeds, mean scores vary across adapters and prompted Qwen2.5 baselines; a separate greedy check over three adapter training seeds shows non-negligible training variance. A 24-fold greedy leave-one-case-out control at the two compact sizes likewise shows tradeoffs: at 1.5B, adapter precision is 0.583 against 0.480 for two-shot prompting, while recall is 0.586 against 0.660. Case-resampling intervals for adapter precision relative to the strongest prompted baseline cross zero at 1.5B and 7B. The adapter is also substantially more format-compliant, which prevents attributing all score differences to selection. Autoregressive next-step accuracy is 0.08, 0.06, and 0.29 at 0.5B, 1.5B, and 7B. We therefore offer the formulation, leakage-controlled dataset, reproducibility package, and descriptive analysis as a proof of concept, not evidence of a reliable stand-alone decomposition system or a general adapter advantage. A separate diagnostic tests contract reuse.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

Consider the problem of finding the best matching in a weighted graph where we only have access to predictions of the actual stochastic weights, based on an underlying context. If the predictor is the Bayes optimal one, then computing the best matching based on the predicted weights is optimal. However, in practice, this perfect information scenario is not realistic. Given an imperfect predictor, a suboptimal decision rule may compensate for the induced error and thus outperform the standard optimal rule. In this paper, we propose multicalibration as a way to address this problem. This fairness notion requires a predictor to be unbiased on each element of a family of protected sets of contexts. Given a class of matching algorithms mathcal C and any predictor γ of the edge-weights, we show how to construct a specific multicalibrated predictor hat γ, with the following property. Picking the best matching based on the output of hat γ is competitive with the best decision rule in mathcal C applied onto the original predictor γ. We complement this result by providing sample complexity bounds.

Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over \60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental trilemma: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange solvency, revenue, and fairness to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of moral hazard grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange revenue. We analyze these mechanisms on the Hyperliquid dataset from October 10, 2025, when ADL was used repeatedly to close 2.1 billion of positions in 12 minutes. By comparing production ADL to transparent benchmark allocations, we find that Hyperliquid's production algorithm overshot the minimum trader profit haircut required to cover the shortfall. Our methodology suggests the excess profits lost by profitable traders is between \45.0M and 51.7M. In terms of the positions liquidated, this corresponds to roughly \$653.6M of positions being closed. This comparison also suggests that Binance overutilized ADL far more than Hyperliquid. Our results show both theoretically and empirically that optimized ADL mechanisms can dramatically reduce losses of trader profitability while maintaining exchange solvency.

A selector that allocates work across opaque components must evaluate them without being told how they performed. We study the least communication that suffices. Each parent maintains an allocation vector over its children and updates it from outcomes by proportional redistribution. Each child reads the sign of its own allocation change, one bit per round it is selected, so no evaluation message crosses the parent-child boundary. (1) The update preserves the simplex with strict positivity. (2) Conditional on being selected, a child's sign is exactly the root outcome at every depth, a sufficient statistic. The conditioning is necessary. (3) Under interiority a single selector has a unique interior equilibrium, exact and closed-form for N=2, with almost sure convergence under decreasing steps. For general N an equi-ratio condition gives an explicit affine equilibrium. (4) The linearised mean flow has real, strictly negative tangent eigenvalues with explicit bounds for all N >= 2. (5) The mean flow converges globally. An explicit potential, up to normalisation the KL divergence between the failure and slack distributions, decreases at a rate equal to the variance of the equi-ratio statistic. Without interiority the rule drops exactly the children below the surviving support's threshold. (6) The update law composes along a single active path, since ancestors select a node's active rounds but do not alter a realised signal. No joint convergence theorem for a hierarchy whose levels adapt simultaneously is claimed. (7) The one-bit interface admits exactly four deterministic memoryless distortions, and at a single selector passing the bit on unchanged delivers strictly higher mean quality upward than negation or constant transmission. Illustrations on synthetic hierarchies up to 16,384 leaves and three real datasets (3.4 billion comparisons, no mismatches) are consistent with the theory.

Large language model (LLM) trading agents can combine market data, news, and executable analysis, but their behavior is often controlled by static hand-written tool-use policies that are fixed before deployment. This limits their ability to adapt how they gather evidence, invoke tools, verify signals, and manage risk under changing market regimes. We introduce EvolveTrade, a self-evolving framework that treats the system prompt of a tool-using trading agent as a text-parameterized policy. After each update interval, a Policy Agent revises this policy using accumulated decision traces and realized portfolio feedback, while keeping the backbone LLM fixed. The updated policy is then used for the next batch of trading decisions, enabling the agent to refine its information-acquisition and portfolio-construction procedure over time. Experiments across multiple market regimes and two LLM backbones show that EvolveTrade often improves Sharpe Ratio and Cumulative Return over fixed-policy LLM baselines, achieving the improved SR and CR in most evaluated settings. Behavioral analyses further show that self-evolved policies increase code-mediated analysis and activate regime-relevant computations; case-level policy-to-return attributions trace how policy-induced allocation changes contribute to realized return differences. These results suggest that adapting the reusable procedure governing tool use is a key direction for building more robust LLM trading agents.

We present a continuous, population-scale measurement record of autonomous language-model trading agents operating in production across two systems with one design lineage: DX Terminal Pro (3,505 user-funded vaults trading real ETH in Base memecoin markets for 21 days, February to March 2026) and the DXAP live alpha fleet (500 to 599 user-created agents all-history, 91 to 117 concurrently active, trading Hyperliquid perpetuals, June to August 2026). The record spans roughly six months, 7.5M single-model invocations with about 300K onchain actions, and a further 231,638 multi-tool turns producing 14,596 fills. Four findings carry the paper. First, the operating layer determines behavior more than anything written in strategy text: a risk slider explains leverage (+0.425 per level), agent fixed effects absorb 60% of variance, and a leaderboard render boundary causally routes selection (regression discontinuity 1.75x at the top-3 cut). Second, sizing is volatility-blind: median leverage is 5.0x in every volatility sextile, and one posture-slider cell (11% of the book) holds 62% of liquidations. Third, agents capture almost none of the upside they reach: 43.2% of positions saw at least +300 bps of favorable excursion within 24h, yet 49.3% of those closed with a negative trade return; a mechanical bracket recovers +39.0 bps per position. Fourth, neither fleet shows a directional edge. The DXAP fleet is not profitable and trails a matched Hyperliquid retail benchmark (41% vs. 50% roundtrip win rate). A paired-replay league of frontier models on 416 captured production scenarios finds decision quality statistically indistinguishable at this horizon, while choice stability differs sharply across model families. Every headline survives day-clustered inference, permutation nulls, and a common-fee restatement; the paper closes with a 17-rule methodology canon bought with our own retractions.