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Oct 16

Choosing LLMs for Strategic Agent Interactions

Game-theoretic benchmarks claim that large language model (LLM) strategic decision-making varies across game types, interaction structures, and capability dimensions. However, they only evaluate strategic performance across individual fixed models. In parallel, contemporary LLM routers pick models under quality-cost trade-offs, but with no notion of a strategic structure. They do not account for an opponent that might be unknown, and that can adapt over time and shift the feedback signal. To address this, we extend the game-theoretic evaluations and define strategic selection as the meta game layered on top of the base game. In each round, a strategic selector fields an LLM from a portfolio of models to navigate a game payoff matrix that is latent and learned online. We find that the evaluation signal is game-specific, and that extracting a reliable signal requires a much higher number of seed runs N compared to traditional benchmarking setups. Evaluating across 5 games and 10 LLMs, we show a model's strategic competence varies significantly depending on the game setup and the opponent faced. Building on this, we implement a suite of selector methods and find that approaches that rely on query embeddings or LLM self-reflection do not consistently capture the underlying strategic signal. A lightweight multi-armed bandit algorithm performs more reliably across games, though it still falls short of the best fixed model. Finally, we show that simple non-stationary and adversarial bandit variants fail to outperform a stationary bandit baseline, pointing to a gap in how current methods handle a shifting opponent in strategic settings.

CORE-AIx CORE-AIx
·
Oct 12 3

Coopetition-Gym v1: A Formally Grounded Platform for Mixed-Motive Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning under Strategic Coopetition

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

  • 2 authors
·
May 2

TRACE: Turn-level Reward Assignment via Credit Estimation for Long-Horizon Agents

Multi-turn agents solve complex tasks through extended sequences of tool interactions before producing a final answer, making credit assignment a fundamental challenge during post-training. Outcome rewards provide reliable supervision for short-horizon reasoning, but become sparse and high-variance as trajectories grow to tens or hundreds of tool calls. They can also be misleading: a failed rollout may contain many useful actions that move the agent closer to the goal, yet outcome-only training assigns them the same negative advantage as the eventual mistake. We propose TRACE (Turn-level Reward Assignment via Credit Estimation), a dense credit-assignment method for agentic reinforcement learning. TRACE represents rollouts as state transitions at tool-call boundaries, obtains gold-answer log-probabilities from a frozen reference model, transforms them into log-ratio state values, and derives per-action rewards as Temporal-Difference changes in those values. This requires no additional critic or process-label training, and its one-step log-ratio TD component telescopes across redundant tool calls. On long-horizon complex search, TRACE substantially improves base-model tool-use ability using pure RL, without a cold-start supervised fine-tuning stage, an agentic mid-training stage, or training on live-web data. On the closed-web BrowseComp-Plus benchmark, it raises Qwen3-4B from 7.2 to 35.6 and Qwen3-30B-A3B from 8.4 to 42.6. The learned search behavior also transfers to open-web benchmarks, and the learning curves show earlier improvement and faster convergence during RL training.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 14

Aggregate in the Advantage, Not the Ratio: A Canonical-Form Analysis of Cooperative Multi-Agent Policy Optimization

Multi-agent policy optimization, exemplified by PPO-based methods, is a key branch of cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). A central design question is how many neighboring agentsIn this paper, "neighbors" refer not only to physical proximity but also to agents whose actions influence one another. to aggregate in order to effectively utilize global information for cooperation. This decision must be made along two dimensions: in the advantage (which agents' rewards contribute to the credit signal) and in the ratio (which agents' likelihood ratios form the clipped importance weight). Existing methods occupy scattered, underexplored points on these two axes: IPPO treats both separately; MAPPO pairs a team-level advantage with per-agent ratios; HAPPO employs sequential ratios with per-agent advantages; and single-agent reductions operating on factorized joint policies aggregate both into fully joint products. We formalize these two design choices as support matrices SA and SR, and prove a canonical structure: the expected multi-agent policy optimization objective depends on the pair (SA,SR) only through their matrix product tS=SRSA. This yields two key consequences: (i) Redundancy: the two support matrices are interchangeable with respect to the signal, meaning neither aggregation pattern is inherently superior.(ii) Variance Ordering: the advantage aggregates rewards as a sum (additive variance with an interior bias-variance optimum at the coupling neighborhood), whereas the ratio aggregates likelihood ratios as a product (multiplicative variance that grows exponentially with support size, with no accompanying bias reduction). The resulting design principle is unambiguous: aggregate neighbors in the advantage, sized to the coupling neighborhood, and keep the ratio per-agent.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 19

One Proposal for Every Margin: Zero-Shot Amortized Sequential Importance Sampling for Binary Matrices

In ecology, psychometrics, and the analysis of social and financial networks, binary matrices are often analyzed conditional on their observed row and column sums, which restricts the problem to a finite sample space of matrices with the same margins. Two fundamental problems are to count this space and to sample uniformly from it. Sequential importance sampling (SIS) addresses both with independent weighted samples and an unbiased count estimator, but its efficiency depends critically on the proposal distribution. Existing proposals are analytically designed, and their accuracy can vary substantially with the margins. We show that the ideal SIS proposal, under which every weight equals the count and the variance vanishes, is exactly the policy of a generative flow network (GFlowNet) with unit reward on every matrix that has the given margins. We therefore propose MarginFlow, a framework that turns the design of the proposal into a learning problem and amortizes it across margins by exploiting their self-similarity. Every partial matrix is itself an instance with reduced margins, so one set transformer that reads the remaining margins serves every margin. We train MarginFlow on a pool of 1904 margins and evaluate it zero-shot on 1190 held-out margins, synthetic and real, from 3times3 to 870times6. On 1187 of the 1190 margins it matches or beats the best of 31 analytically designed configurations, chosen post hoc for each margin, and its median effective sample fraction is 99.8%. On the 56 margins where that best loses more than one nat of effective sample size, MarginFlow wins every one and raises the median effective sample fraction from 10.3% to 94.1%.

A Game-Theoretic Framework for Managing Risk in Multi-Agent Systems

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

  • 6 authors
·
May 30, 2022

SkillGate: Training In-Policy Skill Selection in Long-Horizon Agents

Agent frameworks increasingly package procedural knowledge as skills: instruction files an agent reads on demand, while public libraries now hold thousands of them. Which skill to read has thus become a decision the policy itself makes in the middle of an episode, yet no existing signal trains it. We show that the default remedy, outcome-rewarded RL over the candidate slate, cannot teach it, for a structural reason we identify and name selector credit starvation: under a broadcast, sequence-level advantage, the few tokens that name the chosen skill carry a vanishing share of the loss, and the credit they inherit is increasingly wrong-signed as trajectories lengthen. A correct choice is punished whenever the execution after it fails, even though the choice itself is among the most valuable decisions in the trajectory. Auditing a completed run's own training artifacts confirms all three properties, each worsening monotonically with horizon. SkillGate removes the failure by construction: it partitions the token support into two disjoint credit channels, outcome credit reaching only execution tokens, and a separate action-local advantage reaching exactly the skill-naming tokens, positive only when a trajectory's single read is the correct one. On five agentic benchmarks under a 16-candidate slate, SkillGate lifts a 9B policy from 40.8% to 53.2% trial success, well ahead of the identical budget spent on outcome reward alone, while cutting exposure to misleading candidates by two thirds and reading fewer skills.

FM-Bench: A Benchmark for Long-Horizon Management with Competing Agents

Language model agents now execute bounded tasks reliably. Whether they can sustain effective decision-making over long horizons, where actions have cumulative consequences and the environment responds to their choices, remains largely unmeasured. FM-Bench (Football Management Benchmark) measures this. An LLM agent runs a football club for 20 in-game years through 26 tools and roughly 340 to 400 decision stops. It drafts a squad on the same budget as every rival, trades players, negotiates contracts, invests in facilities and youth, sets lineups, and answers to a board that can fire it, while a deterministic engine accumulates every year into one final score with no LLM judge or human rater. The solo track plays each of 15 frontier models against a frozen scripted world, and the Arena places the same models plus a scripted anchor in one shared 20-year world; to our knowledge, the first head-to-head evaluation at this scale. We measure six behavioral capabilities behind the score. Across three seeds, all 15 models complete every horizon while the blind scripted baselines die out in most of theirs, and claude-fable-5 tops the solo board on mean score and the Arena, where the title nonetheless rotates among ten models. Neither scale, price, nor vendor predicts the order; the order settles only late in the horizon, and the best first-play human lands only at the bottom of the model board. What separates the models is managerial behavior rather than computation. Higher-scoring models reduce slow-payoff investment near the end, keep cash invested rather than idle, and open renewals well before the deadline, while token spend predicts nothing. No model learns the market's hidden prices from hundreds of rejected bids, and self-managed memory fails in two opposite modes: an archive that only grows or a plan rewritten every season. Code is available at https://github.com/Analogy-AI/fm-bench.

  • 9 authors
·
Aug 18 1

GTAlign: Game-Theoretic Alignment of LLM Assistants for Mutual Welfare

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Game-theoretic LLM: Agent Workflow for Negotiation Games

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

  • 12 authors
·
Nov 8, 2024 2

Rethinking Reinforcement Fine-Tuning in LVLM: Convergence, Reward Decomposition, and Generalization

Reinforcement fine-tuning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for equipping large vision-language models (LVLMs) with agentic capabilities such as tool use and multi-step reasoning. Despite striking empirical successes, most notably Visual Agentic Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (Visual-ARFT), the theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm remain poorly understood. In particular, two critical questions lack rigorous answers: (i)~how does the composite structure of verifiable rewards (format compliance, answer accuracy, tool executability) affect the convergence of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and (ii)~why does training on a small set of tool-augmented tasks transfer to out-of-distribution domains? We address these gaps by introducing the Tool-Augmented Markov Decision Process (TA-MDP), a formal framework that models multimodal agentic decision-making with bounded-depth tool calls. Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we prove that GRPO under composite verifiable rewards converges to a first-order stationary point at rate O(1/T) with explicit dependence on the number of reward components and group size (Theorem~1). Second, we derive a Reward Decomposition Theorem that bounds the sub-optimality gap between decomposed per-component optimization and joint optimization, providing a precise characterization of when reward decomposition is beneficial (Theorem~2). Third, we establish a PAC-Bayes generalization bound for tool-augmented policies that explains the strong out-of-distribution transfer observed in Visual-ARFT (Theorem~3).

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 20

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 12, 2023 1

TACO: Tool-Augmented Credit Optimization for Agentic Tool Use

Agentic multimodal models perform diverse operations on an image via code and reason over the returned view, an effective paradigm for fine-grained visual question answering. However, code operations can be useful, redundant, or misleading. Outcome-only rewards cannot precisely distinguish these cases, and existing process rewards either fail to attribute final correctness to individual tool calls, or require an external judge model. To address this, we introduce Tool-Augmented Credit Optimization (TACO), a GRPO variant for code-tool agents built on two coupled advantage channels. The first, Differential Answer-Probe Reward (DAPR), is a self-supervised, judge-free tool-contribution advantage that credits each tool call by its own effect on answering correctly. Probe tokens inserted into the model's reasoning elicit its predictions with and without the tool, and the difference in outcome reward is taken as the call's value: positive for a useful call, negative for a misleading one, and zero for one that changes nothing. This reuses the existing answer checker with no auxiliary judge, and, being a difference rather than an absolute probe score, is naturally robust to probe-hacking. The second is the outcome advantage from the final answer, distributed by Outcome-Gated Advantage Routing (OGAR): a parameter-free rule that, conditioned on the call's outcome, delivers this credit only to the responsible segments, suppressing wasted tool calls without any cost term. We train TACO through a two-stage SFT+RL pipeline. Extensive experiments across perception, reasoning, and general multimodal benchmarks show that it yields consistent accuracy gains and learns to invoke its tools only when they help.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 28 2

IAPO: Influence-Aware Policy Optimization for Credit Assignment in Multi-Turn Service Agents

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly solve long-horizon tasks through multi-turn interactions with users and external tools. In these settings, relevant task information often unfolds over time rather than being fully specified at the initial prompt. Service agents make this challenge especially concrete: users may clarify or revise their goals, while tool responses provide information needed for subsequent decisions. Thus, a final reward alone cannot indicate which actions contributed to resolving the task. Recent methods rely on comparative evidence from other trajectories or resampled continuations, or on separately constructed step-level learning signals, to refine credit. However, a completed rollout already records how information and errors flow between agent actions. We introduce Influence-Aware Policy Optimization (IAPO), which represents each rollout as a typed influence-dependency graph over trainable agent actions, with user and tool observations serving as evidence. IAPO converts support-use and failed-use structure into routing weights that redistribute the same trajectory-level advantage. Experiments with Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-8B demonstrate superior performance over multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) baselines across three service-agent benchmarks: {τ^2}-Bench, UserBench, and AgentChangeBench. BFCL-v4 Multi-Turn further shows that these gains do not compromise multi-turn function-calling performance. This work advances the understanding of credit assignment in multi-turn user interactions and provides a principled approach to training service agents from sparse outcome feedback.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 25

What Benefits Drive Membership in Medicare Advantage Plans?

We seek to identify the most relevant benefits offered by Medicare Advantage Health Plans that drive membership and market share. As an example, we explore plans operating in a single county in New Jersey between 2018 and 2023. A dataset of benefits from publicly available data sources was created and the variance inflation factor was applied to identify the correlation between the extracted features, to avoid multicollinearity and overparameterization problems. We categorized the variable Market Share and used it as a multinomial response variable with three categories: less than 0.3\%, 0.3\% to 1.5\%, and over 1.5\%. Categories were chosen to achieve approximately uniform distribution of plans (47, 60, and 65 respectively). We built a multinomial Lasso model using 5-fold cross-validation to tune the penalty parameter. Lasso forced some features to be dropped from the model, which reduces the risk of overfitting and increases the interpretability of the results. For each category, important variables are different. Certain brands drive market share, as do PPO plans and prescription drug coverage. Benefits, particularly ancillary benefits that are not part of CMS's required benefits, appear to have little influence, while financial terms such as deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket limits are associated with higher market share. Finally, we evaluated the predictive accuracy of the Lasso model with the test set. The accuracy is 0.76.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 3, 2025

ReCAST: Reward Credit Assignment across Timesteps for Online Diffusion Reinforcement

Training diffusion models with multiple rewards requires distinguishing user preference from reward informativeness. User preference determines how much each reward should contribute to the overall objective; reward informativeness determines when its feedback is useful during denoising. Some rewards can meaningfully evaluate a sample as soon as global structure emerges, but others become informative only when the sample is nearly clean. To address both questions jointly, we propose ReCAST (Reward Credit ASsignment across T}imesteps), the first method, to our knowledge, for per-reward, timestep-dependent credit assignment in diffusion reward fine-tuning. ReCAST separates user preferences from temporal allocation through a reward-by-timestep weight matrix W, whose row sums match the user-specified reward budgets λ, while its column sums are equal, assigning the same total weight to each denoising step. Under these marginal constraints, ReCAST allocates weight according to each reward's informativeness, quantified by its Rényi discriminability gain at each step. These gains telescope to the total discriminability between the reward-induced positive policy and the current policy, providing a basis for temporal credit assignment. We evaluate ReCAST by training SD3.5-Medium under two distinct four-reward settings, each across five reward budgets λ. ReCAST improves the training rewards in one setting and matches them in the other, improves every held-out judge in both, and is preferred by an independent LLM-as-a-Judge. Together, these results show that ReCAST yields improvements that generalize beyond the training rewards and support its core principle: assigning each reward greater weight at the denoising timesteps where its feedback is most informative.

The Dark Room in the Reward Channel: Dense Prediction Rewards Collapse GRPO-Trained LLM Agents -- and What Actually Works

Dense per-step supervision is an appealing remedy for sparse-reward, long-horizon LLM agents: reward the agent for predicting its next observation, and memory should follow. We show that under group-normalized RL (GRPO), this recipe does not merely fail -- it destroys the policy. Across Qwen3-1.7B/4B/8B on ALFWorld, a potential-based prediction reward drives every run into a degenerate absorbing state (prediction accuracy -> 1.0, task success -> 0,episode length pinned at the horizon): the "dark room" pathology, built automatically by the optimizer. A single-factor ablation localizes the cause -- removing only GRPO's std normalization turns the same reward from catastrophic (0%) into baseline parity -- and a two-line proposition explains why: in all-fail groups the z-scored advantage is invariant to the shaping coefficient, so bounded rewards become unbounded pressure and annealing cannot help. Our central insight generalizes this: what z-scoring amplifies is a dense signal's within-group variance while all-fail groups dominate, so signals whose variance decays by mastery are structurally amplifier-safe.This variance-profile criterion retrodicts our collapses, carries preregistered predictions for arms that had not yet run, and is consistent with published reward-channel successes (a compatibility check, not an independent test). Finally, a controlled signal-delivery matrix (identical signal, varying only the consumption mechanism) shows the reward channel is at best neutral while the auxiliary-loss channel gains ~20 points -- and a shuffled-gold placebo matches the true-gold arm, so the gap survives without correct labels. Endpoints are single-seed; seed replication and group-size controls are preregistered and in progress.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 22

SCOUT: Self-Checking and Recovery-Aware Tool-Thought Agents for Ultra-Long Egocentric Video Reasoning

Ultra-long egocentric video understanding requires reasoning over temporally sparse evidence distributed across hours or days, challenging current multimodal models with limited context and the grounding of key video segments. While Chain-of-Tool-Thought (CoTT) agent systems enable iterative retrieval and inspection, they suffer from error propagation due to rigid zoom-in strategies that lack recovery mechanisms. In this work, we address these challenges through SCOUT (Self-Checking Chain-Of-Tool-thought), a recovery-aware agentic framework introducing an adaptive policy that evaluates intermediate tool observations and dynamically trades off exploitation (zoom-in) and exploration (region switching), enabling robust multi-hop reasoning over extremely long horizons. However, training such multi-turn tool-using agents remains challenging, as existing RL methods rely on sparse outcome-level rewards and lack supervision over extended decision trajectories, resulting in suboptimal credit assignment for long-horizon reasoning. To address this, we develop UPS-GRPO, an uncertainty-prioritized policy optimization method that concentrates exploration on high-uncertainty post-tool states while preserving sample efficiency. We further introduce a turn-level advantage decomposition that integrates outcome rewards with tool-grounded temporal alignment rewards for improved credit assignment. Experiments show that SCOUT achieves state-of-the-art results on ultra-long egocentric benchmarks, while remaining competitive on shorter-horizon long-video settings.

  • 8 authors
·
Aug 7