HyperFlow / docs /SECURITY.md
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HyperFlow security model

This document lists what HyperFlow defends against, how, and the test that proves each control. A control without a test is not claimed here. Test paths are relative to tests/flagship/.

Assets and trust boundaries

Asset Where it lives Boundary
Account passwords hf_accounts.password as salted scrypt (n=16384, r=8, p=1) Never stored or logged in plaintext
HyperFlow sessions hf_sessions.token_hash as SHA-256 of a 48-byte random token, 8-hour expiry The bearer token exists only in the client
Swiggy provider credentials AES-GCM ciphertext bound to the owning account, key from VAULT_SECRET_KEY Decryptable only with the operator key and the owning account ID
OAuth PKCE verifier AES-GCM-encrypted in the pending state record, 10-minute expiry Bound to account, state and exact redirect URI
Model artifacts Local registry written by the training job, SHA-256 recorded in the manifest Files the service wrote; the registry directory is trusted

Threats and controls

Threat Control Test
New endpoint shipped without authentication Every mounted /api/v1 and /api/v2 route is enumerated and must return 401/410 to an anonymous caller, except an explicit public allowlist test_phase1_boundary.py::test_every_api_route_rejects_anonymous_callers
Anonymous model replacement (found and fixed: unauthenticated /api/v{1,2}/ml/retrain promoted a model) Routes removed; training runs only through authenticated, admin-gated jobs same test
Password database leak scrypt with per-password salt; sessions stored only as hashes test_security_hardening.py::test_secrets_are_not_stored_in_plaintext
Guessable passwords 12 to 1024 characters, common long passwords and passwords containing the username rejected test_security_hardening.py::test_guessable_passwords_are_rejected
Username enumeration through login Missing users still run a full scrypt; identical status and body for unknown user and wrong password test_security_hardening.py::test_unknown_user_and_wrong_password_are_indistinguishable
Online guessing against one account from many addresses At most 5 failures per username per 15 minutes, counted across all addresses test_security_hardening.py::test_failed_logins_lock_only_the_targeted_username
Rate-limit bypass by forging X-Forwarded-For Forwarded headers are ignored unless HYPERFLOW_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS is set; then only the proxy-appended right-most hop is used test_forwarded_for_is_ignored_without_a_trusted_proxy, test_trusted_proxy_hop_is_read_from_the_right
One attacker behind a shared proxy locking out every user Per-client limits use the proxy-observed client address, not the proxy's own address test_trusted_proxy_hop_is_read_from_the_right
Memory exhaustion through one huge request body (any endpoint, including anonymous login) ASGI middleware rejects bodies over 1 MiB with 413, counting streamed bytes so a body without Content-Length cannot bypass it test_security_hardening.py::test_oversized_request_bodies_are_rejected_before_parsing
Connection-pool exhaustion through many open event streams (each polls the database every second) At most 3 streams per account and 50 in total, released on disconnect; sessions re-checked every 15 s test_security_hardening.py::test_event_streams_are_capped_per_account
Memory exhaustion through address churn Limiter state is pruned once it exceeds 10,000 keys covered by code review; not load-tested
Session reuse after logout Logout deletes the session row test_security_hardening.py::test_logout_revokes_the_session
Unbounded anonymous reviewer workspaces Reviewer creation limited per client; the worker deletes expired sessions and reviewer accounts older than 24 hours with their records and events test_prune_removes_expired_sessions_and_stale_reviewer_workspaces, test_worker_runs_the_prune
Clickjacking, injected scripts, referrer leaks Content-Security-Policy (default-src 'self', frame-ancestors 'none', object-src 'none', base-uri 'none'), X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, Permissions-Policy, HSTS on HTTPS test_security_headers_on_api_and_spa, test_hsts_only_over_https; browser verification records zero CSP console errors
Cross-origin reads of authenticated data CORS allows only origins listed in HYPERFLOW_ORIGINS test_security_hardening.py::test_cors_allows_only_configured_origins
OAuth state forgery, cross-account callback, redirect swap, expired state Encrypted, account-bound PKCE state with exact redirect match and expiry test_phase1_boundary.py::test_oauth_state_cross_account_redirect_expiry_and_secret_redaction
Provider credentials echoed in errors or responses Redaction before responses and logs test_oauth_provider_error_does_not_echo_credentials, test_verify_is_read_only_redacted_and_scoped_to_current_generation
One account decrypting another's provider credential Ciphertext authenticated with the owner's account ID test_phase1_identity.py::test_account_ciphertext_cannot_be_used_by_another_account
Model or provider text authorizing an order Mutations require a backend proposal, exact-version approval and a matching receipt; live placements disabled test_zero_spend_release_blocks_new_live_placements, test_final_boundary.py::test_cart_receipt_must_match_approved_address_and_price
Symlink attack on lock files in shared /tmp SQLite lock files live in a 0700 directory beside the database and are opened with O_NOFOLLOW test_security_hardening.py::test_sqlite_lock_files_are_private_and_refuse_symlinks

Supply chain and secrets (CI security job)

  • gitleaks scans the full git history on every push.
  • pip-audit -r requirements.txt and npm audit --audit-level=high fail the build on known vulnerabilities. On 23 October 2026 this removed 37 Python advisories (upgrading FastAPI/Starlette, scikit-learn and python-dotenv, and dropping five unused packages, including PyJWT) and 6 high npm advisories.
  • bandit -r backend -ll fails on medium or higher findings. Accepted exceptions are marked inline with their reason: three pickle.loads of hash-verified local registry artifacts, and two urlopen calls on constant HTTPS URLs.

Known limits

  • The rate limiter is in-process. It is correct for the single-container deployment but does not share state across replicas.
  • Registry artifacts are trusted because only this service writes them. Anyone with write access to the registry directory can replace both an artifact and its recorded hash; signing artifacts would close this.
  • Registration returns 409 for a taken username, so usernames can be enumerated at the registration rate limit (5 per minute per client).
  • There is no multi-factor authentication or account recovery flow.