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HyperFlow security model
This document lists what HyperFlow defends against, how, and the test that proves each control. A control without
a test is not claimed here. Test paths are relative to tests/flagship/.
Assets and trust boundaries
| Asset | Where it lives | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Account passwords | hf_accounts.password as salted scrypt (n=16384, r=8, p=1) |
Never stored or logged in plaintext |
| HyperFlow sessions | hf_sessions.token_hash as SHA-256 of a 48-byte random token, 8-hour expiry |
The bearer token exists only in the client |
| Swiggy provider credentials | AES-GCM ciphertext bound to the owning account, key from VAULT_SECRET_KEY |
Decryptable only with the operator key and the owning account ID |
| OAuth PKCE verifier | AES-GCM-encrypted in the pending state record, 10-minute expiry | Bound to account, state and exact redirect URI |
| Model artifacts | Local registry written by the training job, SHA-256 recorded in the manifest | Files the service wrote; the registry directory is trusted |
Threats and controls
| Threat | Control | Test |
|---|---|---|
| New endpoint shipped without authentication | Every mounted /api/v1 and /api/v2 route is enumerated and must return 401/410 to an anonymous caller, except an explicit public allowlist |
test_phase1_boundary.py::test_every_api_route_rejects_anonymous_callers |
Anonymous model replacement (found and fixed: unauthenticated /api/v{1,2}/ml/retrain promoted a model) |
Routes removed; training runs only through authenticated, admin-gated jobs | same test |
| Password database leak | scrypt with per-password salt; sessions stored only as hashes | test_security_hardening.py::test_secrets_are_not_stored_in_plaintext |
| Guessable passwords | 12 to 1024 characters, common long passwords and passwords containing the username rejected | test_security_hardening.py::test_guessable_passwords_are_rejected |
| Username enumeration through login | Missing users still run a full scrypt; identical status and body for unknown user and wrong password | test_security_hardening.py::test_unknown_user_and_wrong_password_are_indistinguishable |
| Online guessing against one account from many addresses | At most 5 failures per username per 15 minutes, counted across all addresses | test_security_hardening.py::test_failed_logins_lock_only_the_targeted_username |
Rate-limit bypass by forging X-Forwarded-For |
Forwarded headers are ignored unless HYPERFLOW_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS is set; then only the proxy-appended right-most hop is used |
test_forwarded_for_is_ignored_without_a_trusted_proxy, test_trusted_proxy_hop_is_read_from_the_right |
| One attacker behind a shared proxy locking out every user | Per-client limits use the proxy-observed client address, not the proxy's own address | test_trusted_proxy_hop_is_read_from_the_right |
| Memory exhaustion through one huge request body (any endpoint, including anonymous login) | ASGI middleware rejects bodies over 1 MiB with 413, counting streamed bytes so a body without Content-Length cannot bypass it |
test_security_hardening.py::test_oversized_request_bodies_are_rejected_before_parsing |
| Connection-pool exhaustion through many open event streams (each polls the database every second) | At most 3 streams per account and 50 in total, released on disconnect; sessions re-checked every 15 s | test_security_hardening.py::test_event_streams_are_capped_per_account |
| Memory exhaustion through address churn | Limiter state is pruned once it exceeds 10,000 keys | covered by code review; not load-tested |
| Session reuse after logout | Logout deletes the session row | test_security_hardening.py::test_logout_revokes_the_session |
| Unbounded anonymous reviewer workspaces | Reviewer creation limited per client; the worker deletes expired sessions and reviewer accounts older than 24 hours with their records and events | test_prune_removes_expired_sessions_and_stale_reviewer_workspaces, test_worker_runs_the_prune |
| Clickjacking, injected scripts, referrer leaks | Content-Security-Policy (default-src 'self', frame-ancestors 'none', object-src 'none', base-uri 'none'), X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, Permissions-Policy, HSTS on HTTPS |
test_security_headers_on_api_and_spa, test_hsts_only_over_https; browser verification records zero CSP console errors |
| Cross-origin reads of authenticated data | CORS allows only origins listed in HYPERFLOW_ORIGINS |
test_security_hardening.py::test_cors_allows_only_configured_origins |
| OAuth state forgery, cross-account callback, redirect swap, expired state | Encrypted, account-bound PKCE state with exact redirect match and expiry | test_phase1_boundary.py::test_oauth_state_cross_account_redirect_expiry_and_secret_redaction |
| Provider credentials echoed in errors or responses | Redaction before responses and logs | test_oauth_provider_error_does_not_echo_credentials, test_verify_is_read_only_redacted_and_scoped_to_current_generation |
| One account decrypting another's provider credential | Ciphertext authenticated with the owner's account ID | test_phase1_identity.py::test_account_ciphertext_cannot_be_used_by_another_account |
| Model or provider text authorizing an order | Mutations require a backend proposal, exact-version approval and a matching receipt; live placements disabled | test_zero_spend_release_blocks_new_live_placements, test_final_boundary.py::test_cart_receipt_must_match_approved_address_and_price |
Symlink attack on lock files in shared /tmp |
SQLite lock files live in a 0700 directory beside the database and are opened with O_NOFOLLOW |
test_security_hardening.py::test_sqlite_lock_files_are_private_and_refuse_symlinks |
Supply chain and secrets (CI security job)
gitleaksscans the full git history on every push.pip-audit -r requirements.txtandnpm audit --audit-level=highfail the build on known vulnerabilities. On 23 October 2026 this removed 37 Python advisories (upgrading FastAPI/Starlette, scikit-learn and python-dotenv, and dropping five unused packages, including PyJWT) and 6 high npm advisories.bandit -r backend -llfails on medium or higher findings. Accepted exceptions are marked inline with their reason: threepickle.loadsof hash-verified local registry artifacts, and twourlopencalls on constant HTTPS URLs.
Known limits
- The rate limiter is in-process. It is correct for the single-container deployment but does not share state across replicas.
- Registry artifacts are trusted because only this service writes them. Anyone with write access to the registry directory can replace both an artifact and its recorded hash; signing artifacts would close this.
- Registration returns 409 for a taken username, so usernames can be enumerated at the registration rate limit (5 per minute per client).
- There is no multi-factor authentication or account recovery flow.