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| # Deterministic HF external integrations | |
| Starting source SHA: `8ca0c0d20ebf045fb2e62905176546a11e507dcb`. | |
| Branch: `jules/argus-openoperator-supervisor`; review remains PR #29, no merge. | |
| Final committed delivery SHA is recorded in the PR and delivery message. | |
| ## Runtime and token authority | |
| `helpers.runtime.is_huggingface_space()` detects nonblank `SPACE_ID`, the documented | |
| Space variable. `HF_SPACE` does not control detection. This is not authentication; | |
| `requires_auth` and `csrf_protect` have no HF bypass. Browser settings/message | |
| endpoints retain normal session/login and CSRF behavior. External | |
| `/api/settings_probe` and `/api/api_message` retain API-key auth without browser | |
| cookies or CSRF. | |
| Set the operator-owned HF **secret** `SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY` before releasing. | |
| Use a random value chosen/stored by the operator. It is the shared incoming | |
| API/MCP/A2A credential; this change never invents or reveals a production key. | |
| On a Space, no canonical key means missing authority even if old settings or | |
| `A0_SET_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN` exist. MCP/A2A are disabled and external key endpoints | |
| return 503 with a safe missing-token diagnostic. The UI can still boot. | |
| Locally the order remains deployment secret → persisted environment | |
| `A0_SET_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN` → configured token → stable generated local token. | |
| Source diagnostics use only `deployment_secret`, `persisted_environment`, | |
| `configured`, `generated_local`, `missing`. Generated local authority never counts | |
| as production-ready on a Space. | |
| The HF entrypoint explicitly sets both MCP and A2A enabled flags according to | |
| canonical-secret presence and prints only a safe enabled/disabled message. Settings | |
| normalization enforces the same rule, protecting against stale persistent flags. | |
| The real key remains masked as `************` in settings output. Safe metadata is | |
| available through authenticated browser settings `additional.external_services` | |
| and API-key-protected settings_probe `external_services`: presence, source, | |
| effective enabled flags and a missing-token diagnostic. Neither tokens nor hashes | |
| are returned; `/health` remains source provenance only. | |
| ## Connections | |
| Replace `YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY` in the examples with the value you stored | |
| as the HF secret. The token is intentionally not retrievable from OpenOperator. | |
| The UI never substitutes the settings mask into an executable connection example. | |
| - External API: POST `/api/settings_probe` or `/api/api_message`, header | |
| `X-API-KEY: YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY`. | |
| - A2A: `/a2a` with `Authorization: Bearer YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY` or | |
| `X-API-KEY`, or compatible `/a2a/t-YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY` path. | |
| - MCP SSE: `/mcp/t-YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY/sse`. | |
| - MCP streamable HTTP: `/mcp/t-YOUR_SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY/http`. | |
| Existing MCP uses token-path routing, not newly invented header auth. A2A retains | |
| both header modes and token-path compatibility. All use the existing port 7860. | |
| Never post the real URLs/headers/tokens in chat, logs or Argus evidence. | |
| ## Exact-SHA deployment | |
| `scripts/deploy_hf_space.py` checks tracked and untracked worktree changes before | |
| any upload and refuses dirty state. There is no implicit dirty-tree override. | |
| It resolves the requested commit to its full SHA, prints local HEAD, deployment | |
| SHA, clean state and HF target, then archives only that commit. A historical | |
| `--sha` is explicitly identified. `openoperator-build.json` records that exact | |
| resolved SHA. The HF credential stays in the subprocess environment/askpass | |
| channel, not a credential-bearing Git remote URL or printed transport output. | |
| After a clean commit and authorized branch push: | |
| ```bash | |
| python scripts/deploy_hf_space.py \ | |
| --sha <approved-full-source-sha> --space Leon4gr45/openoperator --verify | |
| ``` | |
| The operator must configure the canonical secret in the **HF Space** first. | |
| Authenticated upload also needs `HF_TOKEN` with write access to that Space. | |
| Provide credentials through secure environment bindings, never command arguments | |
| or chat. Successful push alone is not qualification. `--verify` requires live | |
| `https://leon4gr45-openoperator.hf.space/health` to report the exact requested SHA; | |
| a mismatch/unavailable health returns failure. A build may still be starting, | |
| so retry the read-only health verification after readiness instead of treating | |
| push success as a successful rollout. No merge or main-source push is required | |
| for this explicitly authorized feature-branch snapshot. | |
| ## Local qualification | |
| 25 new tests cover documented detection, local/HF resolution priorities, missing | |
| canonical secret, effective flags/masking/diagnostics, normal HTTP browser and | |
| external API routing, CSRF, A2A Bearer/header/path auth, both MCP path transports, | |
| wrong credentials, MCP missing-token refusal, actual HF entrypoint settings logic, | |
| tracked/untracked dirty refusal, committed historical archive identity and exact | |
| health-SHA comparison. API-message model execution is controlled in the auth test; | |
| this proves authentication/dispatch, not a live model response. MCP downstream | |
| protocol work is controlled; routing/auth and middleware are real. | |
| Final broad selection: **532 passed, zero failed/skipped**, including all 25 new | |
| checks and the existing 507-test Argus/reliability selection. | |
| ```bash | |
| ARGUS_TEST_ARGUS_PYTHON=/workspace/venvs/argus/bin/python \ | |
| ARGUS_TEST_FOREMAN_PYTHON=/workspace/venvs/foreman/bin/python \ | |
| /workspace/venvs/openoperator/bin/python -m pytest \ | |
| plugins/argus_supervisor/tests tests/test_hf_integration_auth.py \ | |
| plugins/_chat_naming/tests plugins/_goal/tests \ | |
| tests/test_spynel.py tests/test_spynel_resolver.py \ | |
| tests/test_spynel_dispatch_integration.py tests/test_spynel_profile_guard.py \ | |
| tests/test_search_reliability.py tests/test_tinyfish_fallback.py \ | |
| tests/test_document_query_plugin.py tests/test_document_query_fallback.py \ | |
| tests/test_hf_deployment_control.py tests/test_hf_searxng_startup.py \ | |
| tests/test_specialist_profiles.py tests/test_subagent_profiles.py \ | |
| tests/test_hf_space_defaults.py tests/test_prompt_improver.py tests/test_colab_a0.py \ | |
| tests/test_blocking_a2a.py tests/test_fasta2a_server.py tests/test_fasta2a_client.py \ | |
| tests/test_goal_state_contract.py tests/test_http_auth_csrf.py \ | |
| tests/test_api_token_authority.py tests/test_sidebar_row_actions.py \ | |
| tests/test_settings_probe.py tests/test_runtime_dockerized.py \ | |
| tests/test_settings_root_password.py tests/test_settings_mcp.py tests/test_hf_smoke.py \ | |
| tests/test_memory_extension_hf.py tests/test_webui_icons.py \ | |
| tests/test_tiny_coder_model_binding.py tests/test_worktree_isolation_contract.py -q | |
| /workspace/venvs/openoperator/bin/ruff check \ | |
| scripts/deploy_hf_space.py tests/test_hf_integration_auth.py | |
| bash -n docker/run/fs/exe/huggingface-entrypoint.sh | |
| ``` | |
| Compilation of changed Python modules, JavaScript syntax checks of the three | |
| changed example scripts and whitespace checks also pass. Existing helper modules | |
| have unrelated pre-existing Ruff findings; no blanket helper-lint pass is claimed. | |
| ## Live observations and blockers (17 October 2026) | |
| Read-only public HF access succeeded. The SDK reports the Space RUNNING and HF | |
| repository commit `644af8260f54d0646f4aa6edab5904efa4f1b1a9`. That is the **HF | |
| repository SHA**, not a proven deployed GitHub source SHA. The committed | |
| `openoperator-build.json` lookup returned 404. Live `/health` also returned 404, | |
| so no running-source identity could be proven. | |
| | Live probe | Observed result | | |
| | --- | --- | | |
| | Browser POST `/api/settings_get`, no login | 302; browser auth still enforced | | |
| | POST `/api/settings_probe`, wrong key | 401 | | |
| | POST `/api/api_message`, wrong key | 401 | | |
| | A2A discovery, wrong X-API-KEY | 401 | | |
| | MCP HTTP, wrong token path | 403 | | |
| | Correct-token settings_probe/api_message | Not run: canonical credential unavailable | | |
| | Authenticated A2A discovery/harmless task | Not run: canonical credential unavailable | | |
| | Authenticated MCP SSE/HTTP negotiation | Not run: canonical credential unavailable | | |
| | Requested source SHA deployed and health matched | Not performed/qualified | | |
| The local environment has no `HF_TOKEN` or canonical integration-token binding. | |
| Hugging Face SDK `whoami()` confirms `LocalTokenNotFoundError`, so public reads do | |
| not establish write authentication. Canonical secret presence in the HF Space | |
| cannot be established without authorized credential metadata access. No secret | |
| value was requested in chat, generated, logged, retrieved from settings or changed | |
| in HF. Secure optional cloud binding requirements have been saved for review; | |
| that does not populate values, apply/publish configuration or configure HF secrets. | |
| Deployment is authorized by this follow-up but blocked by those concrete | |
| prerequisites. The operator must set `SPYNEL_AGENT_ZERO_API_KEY` in HF, bind a | |
| write-scoped `HF_TOKEN` for upload, and bind the same canonical secret securely | |
| for external acceptance tests. No upload/rebuild/restart/merge was performed. | |
| After access is supplied, deploy the final committed SHA, wait for the exact health | |
| SHA, then test correct-token API responses, one harmless A2A request and both MCP | |
| transports; repeat wrong-token and browser-protection checks. Until then this is | |
| locally qualified code with partial live negative-auth evidence, not a qualified | |
| production deployment. | |