PromptGate / promptgate_rules.py
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PromptGate v1.0.0: rule pack running client-side via Pyodide
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"""Reference matcher for the PromptGate rule pack.
Zero dependencies: standard library only, no torch, no transformers, no network.
The rules themselves live in `rules.json`; this module only compiles and applies
them, so you can audit or fork the rules without touching code.
Quick start
-----------
from promptgate_rules import RuleEngine
engine = RuleEngine.load_default() # reads ./rules.json
report = engine.assess("Ignore all previous instructions.")
print(report["verdict"], report["severity"])
masked, mapping = engine.redact(text, report["findings"])
CLI
---
python promptgate_rules.py "Ignore all previous instructions."
cat prompt.txt | python promptgate_rules.py
This matcher is verified to produce the same verdicts as the PromptGate Space
on every case in the `promptgate-eval` dataset.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import binascii
import json
import math
import os
import re
import sys
import unicodedata
from collections import Counter
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
__all__ = ["RuleEngine", "shannon_entropy", "luhn_ok", "__version__"]
__version__ = "1.0.0"
RX_FLAGS = re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE | re.UNICODE
DEFAULT_RULES_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "rules.json")
ROT13_TABLE = str.maketrans(
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ",
"nopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLM",
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- helpers
def shannon_entropy(value: str) -> float:
"""Guarantees: returns bits-per-character entropy >= 0.0 for any string."""
try:
if not value:
return 0.0
counts = Counter(value)
total = float(len(value))
return -sum((c / total) * math.log2(c / total) for c in counts.values())
except Exception:
return 0.0
def luhn_ok(digits: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True only when the digit string satisfies the Luhn checksum."""
try:
if not digits.isdigit() or not (13 <= len(digits) <= 19):
return False
total = 0
parity = len(digits) % 2
for idx, ch in enumerate(digits):
d = ord(ch) - 48
if idx % 2 == parity:
d *= 2
if d > 9:
d -= 9
total += d
return total % 10 == 0
except Exception:
return False
def _clip(value: float, lo: float = 0.0, hi: float = 1.0) -> float:
"""Guarantees: returns a float inside [lo, hi]."""
try:
return max(lo, min(hi, float(value)))
except Exception:
return lo
def normalize_for_matching(text: str, leet_map: Dict[str, str],
token_rx: Any, spaced_rx: Any,
zero_width_rx: Any, control_rx: Any) -> Tuple[str, List[int]]:
"""Guarantees: returns de-obfuscated text plus a per-character map back to original offsets."""
try:
chars: List[str] = []
index_map: List[int] = []
for position, ch in enumerate(text):
if zero_width_rx is not None and zero_width_rx.fullmatch(ch):
continue
if control_rx is not None and control_rx.fullmatch(ch):
continue
for folded in unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", ch):
chars.append(folded)
index_map.append(position)
interim = "".join(chars)
if token_rx is not None and leet_map:
for match in token_rx.finditer(interim):
token = match.group(0)
letters = sum(1 for c in token if c.isalpha())
if letters < 2 or letters / len(token) < 0.4:
continue
if not any(c in leet_map for c in token.lower()):
continue
for offset in range(match.start(), match.end()):
low = chars[offset].lower()
if low in leet_map:
chars[offset] = leet_map[low]
if spaced_rx is not None:
interim = "".join(chars)
drop = set()
for match in spaced_rx.finditer(interim):
for offset in range(match.start(), match.end()):
if not interim[offset].isalnum():
drop.add(offset)
if drop:
chars = [c for i, c in enumerate(chars) if i not in drop]
index_map = [v for i, v in enumerate(index_map) if i not in drop]
return "".join(chars), index_map
except Exception:
return text, list(range(len(text)))
def decode_base64_text(chunk: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Guarantees: returns the decoded text of a base64 chunk, or None when it is not text."""
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(chunk + "=" * (-len(chunk) % 4), validate=True)
if not raw or len(raw) > 8000:
return None
text = raw.decode("utf-8", "strict")
printable = sum(1 for c in text if c.isprintable() or c in "\n\r\t")
return text if printable / max(1, len(text)) > 0.85 else None
except Exception:
return None
def is_private_ipv4(value: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True for loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT, multicast and reserved IPv4."""
try:
parts = [int(p) for p in value.split(".")]
if len(parts) != 4 or any(p < 0 or p > 255 for p in parts):
return True
a, b = parts[0], parts[1]
if a in (0, 10, 127) or a >= 224:
return True
if a == 192 and b == 168:
return True
if a == 169 and b == 254:
return True
if a == 172 and 16 <= b <= 31:
return True
if a == 100 and 64 <= b <= 127:
return True
return False
except Exception:
return True
def _finding(kind: str, score: float, start: int, end: int, text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Guarantees: returns a finding dict with type, score, span and a short match."""
try:
snippet = text[start:end]
except Exception:
snippet = ""
if len(snippet) > 120:
snippet = snippet[:117] + "..."
return {"type": str(kind), "score": round(_clip(score), 3),
"span": [int(start), int(end)], "match": snippet}
def _dedupe_findings(items: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns findings sorted by position with duplicates removed."""
try:
seen = set()
uniq: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in sorted(items, key=lambda f: (f["span"][0], -(f["span"][1] - f["span"][0]), -f["score"])):
key = (item["type"], item["span"][0], item["span"][1])
if key in seen:
continue
seen.add(key)
uniq.append(item)
result: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in uniq:
contained = False
for other in uniq:
if other is item or other["type"] != item["type"]:
continue
if (other["span"][0] <= item["span"][0] and other["span"][1] >= item["span"][1]
and (other["span"][1] - other["span"][0]) > (item["span"][1] - item["span"][0])
and other["score"] >= item["score"]):
contained = True
break
if not contained:
result.append(item)
return result
except Exception:
return items
def _suppress_overlaps(items: List[Dict[str, Any]], priority: Dict[str, int]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns findings where overlapping spans keep the highest-priority type."""
try:
ordered = sorted(items, key=lambda f: (-priority.get(f["type"], 0),
-(f["span"][1] - f["span"][0]), f["span"][0]))
kept: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in ordered:
s, e = item["span"]
if any(not (e <= k["span"][0] or s >= k["span"][1]) for k in kept):
continue
kept.append(item)
return sorted(kept, key=lambda f: f["span"][0])
except Exception:
return items
# ------------------------------------------------------------- rule engine
class RuleEngine:
"""Guarantees: applies the PromptGate rule pack offline and never raises to the caller."""
def __init__(self, pack: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Guarantees: compiles every pattern in the pack, skipping any that will not compile."""
self.pack = pack or {}
self.version = str(self.pack.get("version", "unknown"))
self.thresholds = dict(self.pack.get("thresholds") or
{"block": 0.80, "sanitize": 0.35, "min_score": 0.30})
heur = dict(self.pack.get("heuristics") or {})
self.entropy_threshold = float(heur.get("entropy_threshold_bits_per_char", 3.60))
self.entropy_min_length = int(heur.get("entropy_min_length", 24))
self.base64_min_length = int(heur.get("base64_min_length", 32))
self.base64_min_entropy = float(heur.get("base64_min_entropy", 3.2))
self.phone_min_digits = int(heur.get("phone_min_digits", 9))
self.phone_max_digits = int(heur.get("phone_max_digits", 15))
self.injection = self._compile_list(self.pack.get("injection") or [], "family")
self.secrets = self._compile_list(self.pack.get("secrets") or [], "type")
self.pii = self._compile_pii(self.pack.get("pii") or {})
priority = dict(self.pack.get("priority") or {})
self.pii_priority = dict(priority.get("pii") or {})
self.secret_priority = dict(priority.get("secrets") or {})
self.rx_entropy = self._compile_one(heur.get("entropy_candidate_pattern"))
self.rx_base64 = self._compile_one(heur.get("base64_candidate_pattern"))
self.rx_zero_width = self._compile_one(heur.get("zero_width_pattern"))
self.rx_control = self._compile_one(heur.get("control_char_pattern"))
self.rx_rot13 = self._compile_one(heur.get("rot13_mention_pattern"))
self.rx_rot13_override = self._compile_one(heur.get("rot13_decoded_override_pattern"))
self.rx_fence = self._compile_one(heur.get("code_fence_pattern"))
self.rx_placeholder = self._compile_one(heur.get("placeholder_pattern"))
self.rx_hex_hash = self._compile_one(heur.get("hex_hash_pattern"))
self.rx_version_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("version_context_pattern"))
self.skip_private_ipv4 = bool(heur.get("skip_private_ipv4", True))
self.base64_rescan = bool(heur.get("base64_decode_and_rescan", True))
self.base64_attack_score = float(heur.get("base64_decoded_attack_score", 0.92))
self.invisible_base_score = float(heur.get("invisible_char_base_score", 0.80))
self.leet_map = dict(heur.get("leet_map") or {})
self.rx_leet_token = self._compile_one(heur.get("leet_token_pattern"))
self.rx_spaced_run = self._compile_one(heur.get("spaced_run_pattern"))
self.rx_digest_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("digest_context_pattern"))
self.normalization_enabled = bool(heur.get("normalization_enabled", True))
self.normalization_factor = float(heur.get("normalization_score_factor", 0.95))
self.rot13_rescan_score = float(heur.get("rot13_full_rescan_score", 0.90))
self.rx_meta_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("meta_context_pattern"))
self.meta_context_factor = float(heur.get("meta_context_score_factor", 0.30))
# ---------------------------------------------------------- loading
@staticmethod
def _compile_one(pattern: Optional[str]):
"""Guarantees: returns a compiled pattern or None; a bad pattern never raises."""
if not pattern:
return None
try:
return re.compile(pattern, RX_FLAGS)
except re.error:
return None
@classmethod
def _compile_list(cls, rows: List[Dict[str, Any]], key: str) -> List[Tuple[str, float, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns (label, score, compiled) triples, dropping uncompilable rows."""
out: List[Tuple[str, float, Any]] = []
for row in rows:
rx = cls._compile_one(row.get("pattern"))
if rx is None:
continue
try:
score = float(row.get("score", 0.5))
except Exception:
score = 0.5
out.append((str(row.get(key, "unknown")), score, rx))
return out
@classmethod
def _compile_pii(cls, spec: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns compiled PII detectors keyed by type, never raising."""
out: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for name, row in (spec or {}).items():
if not isinstance(row, dict):
continue
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for field, target in (("pattern", "rx"), ("pattern_v6", "rx_v6"),
("pattern_bare_date", "rx_bare"),
("pattern_with_context", "rx_ctx")):
rx = cls._compile_one(row.get(field))
if rx is not None:
entry[target] = rx
for field, target in (("confidence", "confidence"), ("confidence_v6", "confidence_v6"),
("confidence_bare_date", "confidence_bare"),
("confidence_with_context", "confidence_ctx")):
try:
if row.get(field) is not None:
entry[target] = float(row[field])
except Exception:
continue
if entry:
out[str(name)] = entry
return out
@classmethod
def load_default(cls, path: str = DEFAULT_RULES_PATH) -> "RuleEngine":
"""Guarantees: loads rules.json from disk and returns a ready engine."""
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
return cls(json.load(handle))
@classmethod
def from_hub(cls, repo_id: str = "NagaYu/promptgate-rules",
filename: str = "rules.json", **kwargs: Any) -> "RuleEngine":
"""Guarantees: downloads the rule pack from the Hub (needs huggingface_hub installed)."""
from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download # optional dependency
return cls.load_default(hf_hub_download(repo_id=repo_id, filename=filename, **kwargs))
# -------------------------------------------------------- detection
def detect_injection(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns injection findings with type/score/span/match, never raising."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for family, score, rx in self.injection:
for m in rx.finditer(text):
if m.end() - m.start() < 2:
continue
out.append(_finding(family, score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
out.extend(self._detect_encoded(text))
out.extend(self._detect_fence_flood(text))
out.extend(self._detect_obfuscated(text, out))
out = self._downgrade_meta_context(text, out)
return _dedupe_findings(out)
except Exception:
return []
def _looks_base64(self, chunk: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True only for strings that plausibly decode as base64 data."""
try:
if len(chunk) < self.base64_min_length:
return False
has_lower = any(c.islower() for c in chunk)
has_upper = any(c.isupper() for c in chunk)
has_digit = any(c.isdigit() for c in chunk)
if not ((has_lower and has_upper) or has_digit):
return False
if shannon_entropy(chunk) < self.base64_min_entropy:
return False
padded = chunk + "=" * (-len(chunk) % 4)
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(padded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
return False
if len(raw) < 12:
return False
printable = sum(1 for b in raw if 9 <= b <= 13 or 32 <= b <= 126)
return (printable / len(raw)) > 0.80 or shannon_entropy(chunk) > 4.2
except Exception:
return False
def _downgrade_meta_context(self, text: str,
findings: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: scales down findings that sit inside a documentation-writing task."""
try:
if self.rx_meta_context is None:
return findings
for item in findings:
start = int(item.get("span", [0, 0])[0])
if self.rx_meta_context.search(text[max(0, start - 90):start]):
item["score"] = round(item["score"] * self.meta_context_factor, 3)
item["meta_context"] = True
return findings
except Exception:
return findings
def _detect_obfuscated(self, text: str, already: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: re-runs the patterns on de-obfuscated text and maps hits back to real spans."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if not self.normalization_enabled:
return out
normalized, index_map = normalize_for_matching(
text, self.leet_map, self.rx_leet_token, self.rx_spaced_run,
self.rx_zero_width, self.rx_control)
if not normalized or not index_map or normalized == text:
return out
for family, score, rx in self.injection:
for m in rx.finditer(normalized):
start, end = m.span()
if end - start < 2 or start >= len(index_map):
continue
real_start = index_map[start]
real_end = (index_map[end - 1] + 1) if (end - 1) < len(index_map) else len(text)
if any(f["type"] == family
and not (real_end <= f["span"][0] or real_start >= f["span"][1])
for f in already):
continue
item = _finding(family, min(1.0, score * self.normalization_factor),
real_start, real_end, text)
item["normalized"] = True
out.append(item)
return out
except Exception:
return out
def _has_injection_signal(self, text: str, min_score: float = 0.60) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True when decoded text matches a strong injection pattern."""
try:
for _family, score, rx in self.injection:
if score >= min_score and rx.search(text):
return True
return False
except Exception:
return False
def _detect_encoded(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns encoded/obfuscated payload findings, never raising."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if self.rx_base64 is not None:
for m in self.rx_base64.finditer(text):
chunk = m.group(0)
if (self.rx_digest_context is not None
and self.rx_digest_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 24):m.start()])):
continue # a hash or fingerprint, not a smuggled payload
if self._looks_base64(chunk):
score = 0.55 + min(0.30, len(chunk) / 1200.0)
if self.base64_rescan:
decoded = decode_base64_text(chunk)
if decoded and self._has_injection_signal(decoded):
score = self.base64_attack_score
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_zero_width is not None:
for m in self.rx_zero_width.finditer(text):
score = self.invisible_base_score + min(0.15, (m.end() - m.start()) / 20.0)
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_control is not None:
for m in self.rx_control.finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.55, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_rot13 is not None:
for m in self.rx_rot13.finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.45, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_rot13_override is not None and len(text) < 20000:
decoded = text.translate(ROT13_TABLE)
for m in self.rx_rot13_override.finditer(decoded):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.80, m.start(), m.end(), text))
# Only report this when the attack is visible *after* decoding:
# rot13 is a no-op on non-ASCII text, so a plain-text attack
# would otherwise be relabelled as an encoded payload.
if (decoded != text and self._has_injection_signal(decoded, 0.80)
and not self._has_injection_signal(text, 0.80)):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", self.rot13_rescan_score,
0, min(len(text), 200), text))
except Exception:
return out
return out
def _detect_fence_flood(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: flags injected code-fence delimiters, never raising."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if self.rx_fence is None:
return out
fences = list(self.rx_fence.finditer(text))
if len(fences) >= 3 and len(fences) % 2 == 1:
m = fences[-1]
out.append(_finding("delimiter_escape", 0.70, m.start(), m.end(), text))
elif len(fences) >= 6:
m = fences[0]
out.append(_finding("delimiter_escape", 0.45, m.start(), m.end(), text))
except Exception:
return out
return out
def detect_pii(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns PII findings; credit cards are only reported when Luhn passes."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
email = self.pii.get("EMAIL", {})
if email.get("rx") is not None:
for m in email["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("EMAIL", email.get("confidence", 0.95), m.start(), m.end(), text))
card = self.pii.get("CREDIT_CARD", {})
if card.get("rx") is not None:
for m in card["rx"].finditer(text):
digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", m.group(0))
if luhn_ok(digits):
item = _finding("CREDIT_CARD", card.get("confidence", 0.96),
m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["match"] = "*" * max(0, len(digits) - 4) + digits[-4:]
out.append(item)
phone = self.pii.get("PHONE", {})
if phone.get("rx") is not None:
for m in phone["rx"].finditer(text):
raw = m.group(0)
digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", raw)
if not (self.phone_min_digits <= len(digits) <= self.phone_max_digits):
continue
stripped = raw.strip()
ip_rx = self.pii.get("IP_ADDRESS", {}).get("rx")
if ip_rx is not None and ip_rx.fullmatch(stripped):
continue
parts = stripped.split(".")
if len(parts) == 4 and all(p.isdigit() for p in parts):
continue
has_sep = bool(re.search(r"[\-.() \u3000]", raw))
plus = raw.lstrip().startswith("+")
if not (has_sep or plus or len(digits) in (10, 11)):
continue
if luhn_ok(digits) and len(digits) >= 13:
continue
conf = 0.88 if plus else (0.74 if has_sep else 0.55)
out.append(_finding("PHONE", conf, m.start(), m.end(), text))
ip = self.pii.get("IP_ADDRESS", {})
if ip.get("rx") is not None:
for m in ip["rx"].finditer(text):
if self.skip_private_ipv4 and is_private_ipv4(m.group(0)):
continue
if (self.rx_version_context is not None
and self.rx_version_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 14):m.start()])):
continue
out.append(_finding("IP_ADDRESS", ip.get("confidence", 0.72),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if ip.get("rx_v6") is not None:
for m in ip["rx_v6"].finditer(text):
if m.group(0).count(":") >= 4:
out.append(_finding("IP_ADDRESS", ip.get("confidence_v6", 0.55),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
dob = self.pii.get("DATE_OF_BIRTH", {})
if dob.get("rx") is not None:
for m in dob["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("DATE_OF_BIRTH", dob.get("confidence", 0.85),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if dob.get("rx_bare") is not None:
for m in dob["rx_bare"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("DATE_OF_BIRTH", dob.get("confidence_bare", 0.50),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
postal = self.pii.get("POSTAL_CODE", {})
if postal.get("rx") is not None:
for m in postal["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("POSTAL_CODE", postal.get("confidence", 0.58),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if postal.get("rx_ctx") is not None:
for m in postal["rx_ctx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("POSTAL_CODE", postal.get("confidence_ctx", 0.78),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
return _suppress_overlaps(_dedupe_findings(out), self.pii_priority)
except Exception:
return []
def detect_secrets(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns secret findings from prefixes, JWTs and high-entropy strings."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for kind, score, rx in self.secrets:
for m in rx.finditer(text):
raw = m.group(0)
if self.rx_placeholder is not None and self.rx_placeholder.search(raw):
continue # documentation placeholder, not a live credential
item = _finding(kind, score, m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["match"] = (raw[:6] + "***" + raw[-4:]) if len(raw) > 14 else "***"
out.append(item)
if self.rx_entropy is not None:
for m in self.rx_entropy.finditer(text):
chunk = m.group(0)
if not any(c.isdigit() for c in chunk) or not any(c.isalpha() for c in chunk):
continue
if self.rx_hex_hash is not None and self.rx_hex_hash.match(chunk):
continue # digest, not a credential
if self.rx_placeholder is not None and self.rx_placeholder.search(chunk):
continue
if (self.rx_digest_context is not None
and self.rx_digest_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 24):m.start()])):
continue # "SHA256:..." is a fingerprint, not a secret
entropy = shannon_entropy(chunk)
if entropy < self.entropy_threshold:
continue
conf = _clip(0.40 + (entropy - self.entropy_threshold) * 0.35, 0.40, 0.85)
item = _finding("HIGH_ENTROPY_STRING", conf, m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["entropy"] = round(entropy, 3)
item["match"] = chunk[:6] + "***" + chunk[-4:]
out.append(item)
return _suppress_overlaps(_dedupe_findings(out), self.secret_priority)
except Exception:
return []
# ------------------------------------------------------- redaction
def redact(self, text: str, findings: Any) -> Tuple[str, Dict[str, str]]:
"""Guarantees: returns (masked_text, mapping); the mapping is returned, never logged."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return "", {}
flat: List[Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]] = []
if isinstance(findings, dict):
for category, items in findings.items():
if isinstance(items, list):
for item in items:
if isinstance(item, dict) and "span" in item:
flat.append((str(category), item))
elif isinstance(findings, list):
for item in findings:
if isinstance(item, dict) and "span" in item:
flat.append((str(item.get("category", "risk")), item))
if not flat:
return text, {}
prefixes = {"pii": "PII", "secrets": "SECRET", "injection": "RISK"}
flat.sort(key=lambda pair: (pair[1]["span"][0], -(pair[1]["span"][1] - pair[1]["span"][0])))
claimed: List[Tuple[int, int]] = []
planned: List[Tuple[int, int, str]] = []
mapping: Dict[str, str] = {}
counters: Dict[str, int] = {}
assigned: Dict[Tuple[str, str], str] = {}
for category, item in flat:
start, end = int(item["span"][0]), int(item["span"][1])
if start < 0 or end > len(text) or end <= start:
continue
if any(not (end <= cs or start >= ce) for cs, ce in claimed):
continue
claimed.append((start, end))
label = "{}_{}".format(
prefixes.get(category, "RISK"),
re.sub(r"[^A-Z0-9]+", "_", str(item.get("type", "UNKNOWN")).upper()).strip("_") or "UNKNOWN")
original = text[start:end]
placeholder = assigned.get((label, original))
if placeholder is None:
counters[label] = counters.get(label, 0) + 1
placeholder = "<{}_{}>".format(label, counters[label])
assigned[(label, original)] = placeholder
mapping[placeholder] = original
planned.append((start, end, placeholder))
masked = text
for start, end, placeholder in sorted(planned, key=lambda t: -t[0]):
masked = masked[:start] + placeholder + masked[end:]
return masked, mapping
except Exception:
return text if isinstance(text, str) else "", {}
# ------------------------------------------------------ assessment
def assess(self, text: str, thresholds: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Guarantees: always returns a verdict of allow/sanitize/block plus scored findings."""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {
"verdict": "allow", "severity": 0.0,
"scores": {"injection": 0.0, "pii": 0.0, "secrets": 0.0},
"counts": {"injection": 0, "pii": 0, "secrets": 0},
"risk_types": [], "findings": {"injection": [], "pii": [], "secrets": []},
"thresholds": dict(self.thresholds), "rules_version": self.version, "error": None,
}
try:
merged = dict(self.thresholds)
if isinstance(thresholds, dict):
for key, value in thresholds.items():
try:
merged[str(key)] = float(value)
except Exception:
continue
result["thresholds"] = merged
min_score = _clip(merged.get("min_score", 0.30))
text = text if isinstance(text, str) else ""
injection = [f for f in self.detect_injection(text) if f["score"] >= min_score]
pii = [f for f in self.detect_pii(text) if f["score"] >= min(min_score, 0.5)]
secrets = [f for f in self.detect_secrets(text) if f["score"] >= min(min_score, 0.4)]
inj_max = max((f["score"] for f in injection), default=0.0)
families = {f["type"] for f in injection}
injection_risk = 0.0
if injection:
injection_risk = _clip(inj_max * (1.0 + 0.06 * (len(families) - 1)) + 0.02 * (len(injection) - 1))
secret_risk = _clip(max((f["score"] for f in secrets), default=0.0))
pii_risk = _clip(min(0.50, 0.22 + 0.08 * len(pii))) if pii else 0.0
severity = _clip(max(injection_risk, secret_risk, pii_risk))
if injection_risk >= merged.get("block", 0.80):
verdict = "block"
elif secrets or pii or severity >= merged.get("sanitize", 0.35):
verdict = "sanitize"
else:
verdict = "allow"
result.update({
"verdict": verdict,
"severity": round(severity, 3),
"scores": {"injection": round(injection_risk, 3), "pii": round(pii_risk, 3),
"secrets": round(secret_risk, 3)},
"counts": {"injection": len(injection), "pii": len(pii), "secrets": len(secrets)},
"risk_types": sorted(families | {f["type"] for f in pii} | {f["type"] for f in secrets}),
"findings": {"injection": injection, "pii": pii, "secrets": secrets},
})
return result
except Exception as exc:
result["error"] = {"code": "assess_failed", "message": str(exc)[:300]}
return result
def _cli(argv: List[str]) -> int:
"""Guarantees: prints one JSON assessment for argv text or stdin and returns an exit code."""
text = " ".join(argv[1:]) if len(argv) > 1 else sys.stdin.read()
engine = RuleEngine.load_default()
report = engine.assess(text)
print(json.dumps(report, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
return 0 if report["verdict"] != "block" else 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(_cli(sys.argv))