fsanyoto commited on
Commit
13e5577
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1 Parent(s): c4e6be8

Deploy AIOS web (React glide grid + FastAPI slice)

Browse files
RELEASES.json CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
  {
2
- "current": "74e86de",
3
  "releases": [
4
  {
5
  "version": "v29",
 
1
  {
2
+ "current": "caf2c2e",
3
  "releases": [
4
  {
5
  "version": "v29",
VERSION CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- 74e86de
 
1
+ caf2c2e
api/routes_admin.py CHANGED
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ def _registry():
81
  return reg
82
 
83
 
84
- def _view(uname, rec, governed=None, st=None):
85
  """What an administrator may see about an account. NEVER `salt` or `hash` β€” this function is
86
  the only projection these routes use, so there is one place that can leak and it does not.
87
 
@@ -105,11 +105,12 @@ def _view(uname, rec, governed=None, st=None):
105
  # S3 ask 4 β€” one sentence for the roster's Access column, so the list does not need
106
  # a /perms round trip per row to fill one cell. Computed from the same record the
107
  # editor will open, so the two cannot disagree.
108
- "accessSummary": _access_summary(rec, uname=uname, governed=governed, st=st),
 
109
  "perms_v": int(rec.get("perms_v") or 0)}
110
 
111
 
112
- def _access_summary(rec, uname="", governed=None, st=None):
113
  """One sentence describing what this account may reach. Deliberately says LESS than the
114
  editor: it is a signpost, not a rule listing, and a summary that tried to spell out filters
115
  would be wrong the moment a filter got interesting.
@@ -143,7 +144,17 @@ def _access_summary(rec, uname="", governed=None, st=None):
143
  entries = (rec.get("perms") or {})
144
  if governed:
145
  principal = users._public(uname, rec) if uname else rec
146
- opened = [k for k in governed if perm_scope.may_read(principal, k, st=st)]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147
  else:
148
  opened = [k for k, e in entries.items() if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("access", True)]
149
  restricted = sum(1 for k in opened
@@ -250,13 +261,16 @@ def list_users(session: Session = Depends(admin_gate)):
250
  # `_access_summary` can agree with the editor without paying a document copy per question.
251
  import core.user_tables as _ut
252
  try:
253
- governed = [m["key"] for m in _perm_modules(session)]
 
 
254
  lent = _ut.lend_defs(session.runtime)
255
  except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
256
  # A store that cannot list the tenant's databases must not take the roster down. The
257
  # summary degrades to the stored-entry reading, which is what it always was.
258
- governed, lent = None, None
259
- return {"users": [_view(u, reg[u], governed=governed, st=lent) for u in sorted(reg)
 
260
  if _tenant_of(reg[u]) == mine]}
261
 
262
 
@@ -434,7 +448,7 @@ def _governable_catalogue():
434
  _PERM_MODULES = tuple(m["key"] for m in _governable_catalogue())
435
 
436
 
437
- def _perm_modules(session):
438
  """The databases THIS tenant's permission editor governs: `[{key, label, enforced}]`.
439
 
440
  Three inputs, none of them a literal: the topic catalogue above, the tenant's provisioned
@@ -457,8 +471,23 @@ def _perm_modules(session):
457
  # A store that cannot list the tenant's databases must not take the whole editor down β€”
458
  # the topic half is still administrable, and an empty `ut_*` half is visibly empty.
459
  ut = ()
460
- return _perms.tenant_governable_modules(session.runtime, _governable_catalogue(),
461
- ut_entries=ut)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
462
 
463
 
464
  #: β›” `_enforced_keys` IS DELETED (W36-T22 / CONTRACT C2). It asked `perms.enforced_module_keys`
@@ -512,6 +541,13 @@ def _module_fields(key, session=None):
512
  """
513
  import aios_grid
514
  key = str(key or "")
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
515
  if key.startswith("ut_"):
516
  if session is None:
517
  raise err(400, "ungoverned_module",
@@ -959,7 +995,7 @@ def get_perms(username: str, session: Session = Depends(admin_gate)):
959
  # nurilab or gtmlab admin opened Manage user and saw Royal Imports' Customer and Product
960
  # databases. `_perm_modules` applies the tenant's own provisioning (the rule `routes_nav`
961
  # has applied since wave 18) and merges the tenant's own `ut_*` databases.
962
- modules = _perm_modules(session)
963
  # ⭐⭐ W36-T22 / C2 β€” EVERY listed database, not an `enforced` subset of them. See
964
  # `perms.tenant_governable_modules` for why the flag is deleted rather than defaulted.
965
  governed = [m["key"] for m in modules]
@@ -983,10 +1019,20 @@ def get_perms(username: str, session: Session = Depends(admin_gate)):
983
  # `users.json` and does not carry one INSIDE it, so `may_read` would hand `may_open` a
984
  # `None` viewer and get a fail-closed False β€” the very outage this line exists to prevent,
985
  # arriving through the fix for it. The same trap cost a gate double an hour earlier today.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
986
  perms_out[k] = e if isinstance(e, dict) else {
987
- "access": bool(perm_scope.may_read(users._public(uname, rec), k,
988
- st=session.runtime)),
989
- "filter": None, "hiddenFields": []}
990
  return {"username": uname,
991
  "perms": perms_out,
992
  # S3 ask 2 β€” the marker rides the GET. An absent module entry means DENY on a
@@ -1042,7 +1088,7 @@ def put_perms(username: str, body: dict = Body(default=None),
1042
  raise err(400, "self_perms",
1043
  "you cannot set permissions on your own account β€” ask another admin")
1044
 
1045
- _mods = _perm_modules(session)
1046
  # ⭐⭐ W36-T22 / C2 β€” ONE key set. It was two ("listed" and "enforced") with a refusal in the
1047
  # gap; W36-T21 closed the gap, so every database the editor shows is one whose wall the table
1048
  # routes apply. `session` rides so a `ut_*` schema can be read for THIS tenant.
 
81
  return reg
82
 
83
 
84
+ def _view(uname, rec, governed=None, st=None, surface_keys=None):
85
  """What an administrator may see about an account. NEVER `salt` or `hash` β€” this function is
86
  the only projection these routes use, so there is one place that can leak and it does not.
87
 
 
105
  # S3 ask 4 β€” one sentence for the roster's Access column, so the list does not need
106
  # a /perms round trip per row to fill one cell. Computed from the same record the
107
  # editor will open, so the two cannot disagree.
108
+ "accessSummary": _access_summary(rec, uname=uname, governed=governed, st=st,
109
+ surface_keys=surface_keys),
110
  "perms_v": int(rec.get("perms_v") or 0)}
111
 
112
 
113
+ def _access_summary(rec, uname="", governed=None, st=None, surface_keys=None):
114
  """One sentence describing what this account may reach. Deliberately says LESS than the
115
  editor: it is a signpost, not a rule listing, and a summary that tried to spell out filters
116
  would be wrong the moment a filter got interesting.
 
144
  entries = (rec.get("perms") or {})
145
  if governed:
146
  principal = users._public(uname, rec) if uname else rec
147
+ # β›” PER KIND, MIRRORING `get_perms`' OWN DEFAULTS β€” the first draft asked
148
+ # `nav_may_open` for EVERY key and that was a second idea of the count: for a migrated
149
+ # record with no topic entry the editor's default is `may_read` (DENY), so a blanket
150
+ # admission read would make the roster say "3 modules" about an account whose editor
151
+ # shows one box ticked. The roster's whole contract (leg 6 of the T22 section) is that
152
+ # it counts what the editor would show; a SURFACE key defaults from admission there,
153
+ # everything else from `may_read`, so this does exactly the same, key by key.
154
+ opened = [k for k in governed
155
+ if (perm_scope.nav_may_open(principal, k, st=st)
156
+ if k in (surface_keys or ()) else
157
+ perm_scope.may_read(principal, k, st=st))]
158
  else:
159
  opened = [k for k, e in entries.items() if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("access", True)]
160
  restricted = sum(1 for k in opened
 
261
  # `_access_summary` can agree with the editor without paying a document copy per question.
262
  import core.user_tables as _ut
263
  try:
264
+ _rows = _perm_modules(session, surfaces=True)
265
+ governed = [m["key"] for m in _rows]
266
+ surface_keys = {m["key"] for m in _rows if m.get("surface")}
267
  lent = _ut.lend_defs(session.runtime)
268
  except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
269
  # A store that cannot list the tenant's databases must not take the roster down. The
270
  # summary degrades to the stored-entry reading, which is what it always was.
271
+ governed, lent, surface_keys = None, None, None
272
+ return {"users": [_view(u, reg[u], governed=governed, st=lent, surface_keys=surface_keys)
273
+ for u in sorted(reg)
274
  if _tenant_of(reg[u]) == mine]}
275
 
276
 
 
448
  _PERM_MODULES = tuple(m["key"] for m in _governable_catalogue())
449
 
450
 
451
+ def _perm_modules(session, surfaces=False):
452
  """The databases THIS tenant's permission editor governs: `[{key, label, enforced}]`.
453
 
454
  Three inputs, none of them a literal: the topic catalogue above, the tenant's provisioned
 
471
  # A store that cannot list the tenant's databases must not take the whole editor down β€”
472
  # the topic half is still administrable, and an empty `ut_*` half is visibly empty.
473
  ut = ()
474
+ cat = _governable_catalogue()
475
+ skeys = set()
476
+ if surfaces:
477
+ # ⭐⭐ OWNER RULING 2026-08-18 β€” the Assistant and Agents surfaces are
478
+ # governable ACCESS toggles in the ACCOUNT editor. `surfaces` is caller-explicit and
479
+ # defaults CLOSED because the other consumer of this list is the CHANNEL-AGENT editor
480
+ # (`routes_slack.get_channel_agent`), whose principal is enforced per DATABASE
481
+ # (`agent_rows`/`agent_may_read`) and never opens an app surface: an Assistant toggle
482
+ # there would be a stored rule nothing applies, the exact class C2 deleted.
483
+ surf = _perms.governable_surface_modules()
484
+ skeys = {s["key"] for s in surf}
485
+ cat = cat + surf
486
+ rows = _perms.tenant_governable_modules(session.runtime, cat, ut_entries=ut)
487
+ # The marker survives OUTSIDE `tenant_governable_modules`, which builds bare {key,label}
488
+ # rows: the client needs it only to choose the schemaless help copy, and the server needs
489
+ # it only to pick the admission default in `get_perms`.
490
+ return [dict(r, surface=True) if r["key"] in skeys else r for r in rows]
491
 
492
 
493
  #: β›” `_enforced_keys` IS DELETED (W36-T22 / CONTRACT C2). It asked `perms.enforced_module_keys`
 
541
  """
542
  import aios_grid
543
  key = str(key or "")
544
+ if key in {s["key"] for s in perms.governable_surface_modules()}:
545
+ # ⭐ A SURFACE (Assistant, Agents) has NO field schema, and `[]` is the honest
546
+ # answer rather than the wave-26 empty-option trap: the editor's schemaless rendering
547
+ # is a deliberate state (access toggle only, R9), and `_clean_perms` refuses any
548
+ # filter or hiddenFields validated against this empty vocabulary. An unknown key
549
+ # still RAISES below β€” this arm admits exactly the derived surface list.
550
+ return []
551
  if key.startswith("ut_"):
552
  if session is None:
553
  raise err(400, "ungoverned_module",
 
995
  # nurilab or gtmlab admin opened Manage user and saw Royal Imports' Customer and Product
996
  # databases. `_perm_modules` applies the tenant's own provisioning (the rule `routes_nav`
997
  # has applied since wave 18) and merges the tenant's own `ut_*` databases.
998
+ modules = _perm_modules(session, surfaces=True)
999
  # ⭐⭐ W36-T22 / C2 β€” EVERY listed database, not an `enforced` subset of them. See
1000
  # `perms.tenant_governable_modules` for why the flag is deleted rather than defaulted.
1001
  governed = [m["key"] for m in modules]
 
1019
  # `users.json` and does not carry one INSIDE it, so `may_read` would hand `may_open` a
1020
  # `None` viewer and get a fail-closed False β€” the very outage this line exists to prevent,
1021
  # arriving through the fix for it. The same trap cost a gate double an hour earlier today.
1022
+ # β›”β›” A SURFACE KEY DEFAULTS FROM `nav_may_open`, NOT `may_read`, AND THE
1023
+ # DIFFERENCE IS A MASS REVOCATION. `may_read` on a non-`ut_` key falls through to
1024
+ # `may_access`, which reads migrated-and-undeclared as DENY β€” correct for a topic
1025
+ # (every save writes topic entries) and false for a surface, because NO surface entry
1026
+ # was storable before 2026-08-18, so every migrated account carries none. The editor
1027
+ # would paint Assistant unchecked for an account that opens it every day, and the next
1028
+ # save of ANY unrelated change would write the explicit deny for real. `nav_may_open`
1029
+ # is the evaluator the nav and the route gate actually ask, legacy fallback included,
1030
+ # so the box shows what the account can reach and an untouched save stays a no-op.
1031
+ _default = (perm_scope.nav_may_open(users._public(uname, rec), k)
1032
+ if any(m.get("surface") and m["key"] == k for m in modules) else
1033
+ perm_scope.may_read(users._public(uname, rec), k, st=session.runtime))
1034
  perms_out[k] = e if isinstance(e, dict) else {
1035
+ "access": bool(_default), "filter": None, "hiddenFields": []}
 
 
1036
  return {"username": uname,
1037
  "perms": perms_out,
1038
  # S3 ask 2 β€” the marker rides the GET. An absent module entry means DENY on a
 
1088
  raise err(400, "self_perms",
1089
  "you cannot set permissions on your own account β€” ask another admin")
1090
 
1091
+ _mods = _perm_modules(session, surfaces=True)
1092
  # ⭐⭐ W36-T22 / C2 β€” ONE key set. It was two ("listed" and "enforced") with a refusal in the
1093
  # gap; W36-T21 closed the gap, so every database the editor shows is one whose wall the table
1094
  # routes apply. `session` rides so a `ut_*` schema can be read for THIS tenant.
api/routes_query.py CHANGED
@@ -17,9 +17,17 @@ import uuid
17
  from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, Response
18
 
19
  from deps import (Session, assistant_read_scope, assistant_source_status, err,
20
- require_session)
21
-
22
- router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1")
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
 
24
  MAX_QUESTION = 500
25
  MAX_VISIBLE = 24
 
17
  from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, Response
18
 
19
  from deps import (Session, assistant_read_scope, assistant_source_status, err,
20
+ module_gate, require_session)
21
+
22
+ # β›”β›” GATED AS A ROUTER, BECAUSE UNTIL 2026-08-18 THESE ROUTES HAD NO MODULE GATE AT
23
+ # ALL β€” every door here was bare `require_session`, so "no Assistant" only ever meant "no
24
+ # button": the rail hid the surface while the API answered anyone signed in. The moment Manage
25
+ # user grew an Assistant toggle (owner ruling, same day), an unenforced deny would be a control
26
+ # that lies β€” the class this repo keeps paying for. One dependency on the router covers
27
+ # every route in the file, present and future, instead of fifteen signatures each one edit away
28
+ # from being the hole. `automation`'s routes have carried module_gate since wave 20; this brings
29
+ # the OTHER surface to the same rule, through the same `nav_may_open` the rail reads.
30
+ router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1", dependencies=[Depends(module_gate("analyst"))])
31
 
32
  MAX_QUESTION = 500
33
  MAX_VISIBLE = 24
platform/core/perms.py CHANGED
@@ -319,6 +319,36 @@ def tenant_governable_modules(runtime, topics, ut_entries=()):
319
  return out
320
 
321
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
322
  #: β›” `enforced_module_keys` IS DELETED (W36-T22 / C2), NOT NEUTERED TO "every governable key".
323
  #: It read `{m['key'] for m in modules if m.get('enforced')}`, so with the flag gone it would
324
  #: answer the EMPTY SET and `_clean_perms` would refuse every module β€” and "fix" it by returning
 
319
  return out
320
 
321
 
322
+ def governable_surface_modules():
323
+ """The live APP SURFACES an account grant can toggle: `[{'key','label'}]`, registry order.
324
+
325
+ ⭐⭐ OWNER RULING 2026-08-18, verbatim: *"I told you that everything needs to be
326
+ modular. And if there is a toggle for permissioning Assistant or Agent module view, it should
327
+ SHOW."* Until then the ONLY control over `analyst` and `automation` was the legacy
328
+ `user['modules']` array, which no screen has edited since the module editor was retired β€”
329
+ so three of tenant #0's four members lacked Assistant and Agents with no way to grant them
330
+ short of editing the store by hand.
331
+
332
+ β›” A SURFACE IS NOT A DATABASE AND THE EDITOR MUST KNOW THE DIFFERENCE. These rows have no
333
+ field schema, so the only rule that can exist for them is ACCESS β€” no row filter, no
334
+ hidden fields. `routes_admin._module_fields` answers `[]` for them (the editor's schemaless
335
+ rendering: a toggle and nothing else), and `_clean_perms`' field validation refuses any
336
+ filter or hiddenFields against an empty vocabulary, so a client cannot store a rule nothing
337
+ would apply.
338
+
339
+ ⭐ DERIVED, NEVER LISTED: every non-archived, non-`group_only` registry row with NO
340
+ `topic` that `nav_pages` would offer (not `validate_only`, not `api_surface: False`, not
341
+ `settings`). Today that is `analyst` (Assistant) and `automation` (Agents); a surface added
342
+ to the registry tomorrow is governable with no edit here β€” the same rule
343
+ `tenant_governable_modules` states for databases, applied to the other kind of row.
344
+ """
345
+ return [{'key': m['key'], 'label': m['label']}
346
+ for m in registry.REGISTRY
347
+ if not m.get('archived') and not m.get('group_only') and not m.get('topic')
348
+ and not m.get('validate_only') and m.get('api_surface') is not False
349
+ and m['key'] != 'settings']
350
+
351
+
352
  #: β›” `enforced_module_keys` IS DELETED (W36-T22 / C2), NOT NEUTERED TO "every governable key".
353
  #: It read `{m['key'] for m in modules if m.get('enforced')}`, so with the flag gone it would
354
  #: answer the EMPTY SET and `_clean_perms` would refuse every module β€” and "fix" it by returning
platform/core/registry.py CHANGED
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ REGISTRY = [
221
  'nav': False, # sidebar sentinel (account group) β€” owner IA 2026-07-12
222
  'note': 'User scope settings: the Business Unit toggle (strict isolation) and the Data basis '
223
  'toggle (Orders vs Invoiced) moved here from the sidebar.'},
224
- {'key': 'analyst', 'label': 'AIOS Analyst', 'brand': False, 'hq': True, 'validate': False,
225
  'nav': False, # sidebar sentinel button; eval gate = harness/evals.py (run pre-ship, NOT in validate.py β€” live LLM cost)
226
  'note': 'Ask the business a question in plain language: a small AI model calls governed tools over the semantic layer. Answers carry their query trace and drill links. AI-generated output (Art. 50 labeled).'},
227
  ]
 
221
  'nav': False, # sidebar sentinel (account group) β€” owner IA 2026-07-12
222
  'note': 'User scope settings: the Business Unit toggle (strict isolation) and the Data basis '
223
  'toggle (Orders vs Invoiced) moved here from the sidebar.'},
224
+ {'key': 'analyst', 'label': 'Assistant', 'brand': False, 'hq': True, 'validate': False,
225
  'nav': False, # sidebar sentinel button; eval gate = harness/evals.py (run pre-ship, NOT in validate.py β€” live LLM cost)
226
  'note': 'Ask the business a question in plain language: a small AI model calls governed tools over the semantic layer. Answers carry their query trace and drill links. AI-generated output (Art. 50 labeled).'},
227
  ]
web/src/settings/ModulePermsList.tsx CHANGED
@@ -135,8 +135,11 @@ export function ModulePermsList({
135
  disagree (`permsModel.toPutBody`). */}
136
  {on && schemaless ? (
137
  <p className="set-help">
138
- No field list is available for this database, so access is all this editor
139
- can set for it. Conditions and hidden fields need a schema.
 
 
 
140
  </p>
141
  ) : null}
142
 
 
135
  disagree (`permsModel.toPutBody`). */}
136
  {on && schemaless ? (
137
  <p className="set-help">
138
+ {m.surface
139
+ ? "Access is the whole rule for this module. It has no fields to hide " +
140
+ "and no records to filter."
141
+ : "No field list is available for this database, so access is all this " +
142
+ "editor can set for it. Conditions and hidden fields need a schema."}
143
  </p>
144
  ) : null}
145
 
web/src/settings/permsModel.ts CHANGED
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ export interface PermsModule {
177
  label: string;
178
  /** Empty β‡’ no readable schema β‡’ access toggle only (rule 1 above). */
179
  fields: Field[];
 
 
 
180
  /*
181
  * ⭐⭐ WAVE 36 (W36-T22 / CONTRACT C2 / OWNER RULING R6) β€” `enforced` IS DELETED
182
  * FROM THIS SHAPE, NOT DEFAULTED TO `true`.
@@ -310,13 +313,14 @@ export function parseField(raw: unknown): Field | null {
310
  * The LABEL does not come from here β€” it rides the payload's `modules` list,
311
  * which is also what fixes the ORDER. Anything unreadable yields an EMPTY field
312
  * list, which R9 already has a defined rendering for (access toggle only). */
313
- export function parseModule(key: string, label: string, raw: unknown): PermsModule {
 
314
  const fields: Field[] = [];
315
  for (const f of Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : []) {
316
  const parsed = parseField(f);
317
  if (parsed) fields.push(parsed);
318
  }
319
- return { key, label: label || key, fields };
320
  }
321
 
322
  /** A filter is taken WHOLE or not at all. A tree whose `nodes` is not a list is
@@ -415,17 +419,18 @@ export function parsePermsPayload(body: unknown): PermsPayload | null {
415
  // direction this can be wrong in safely. Every row the server declares is a row
416
  // whose wall `routes_tables` applies (W36-T21), so there is nothing left for a
417
  // per-row flag to distinguish.
418
- const declared: Array<{ key: string; label: string }> = Array.isArray(b.modules)
419
  ? (b.modules as unknown[]).flatMap((m) => {
420
  if (!m || typeof m !== "object") return [];
421
  const r = m as Record<string, unknown>;
422
  return typeof r.key === "string" && r.key
423
- ? [{ key: r.key, label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : r.key }]
 
424
  : [];
425
  })
426
  : Object.keys(byModule).map((k) => ({ key: k, label: k }));
427
 
428
- const modules = declared.map((d) => parseModule(d.key, d.label, byModule[d.key]));
429
  const entries: PermsRecord = {};
430
  for (const m of modules) entries[m.key] = parseEntry(rawPerms[m.key]);
431
 
 
177
  label: string;
178
  /** Empty β‡’ no readable schema β‡’ access toggle only (rule 1 above). */
179
  fields: Field[];
180
+ /** An app surface (Assistant, Agents): access is the whole rule, by construction and
181
+ * not by a missing schema, so the row can say so instead of apologising. */
182
+ surface?: boolean;
183
  /*
184
  * ⭐⭐ WAVE 36 (W36-T22 / CONTRACT C2 / OWNER RULING R6) β€” `enforced` IS DELETED
185
  * FROM THIS SHAPE, NOT DEFAULTED TO `true`.
 
313
  * The LABEL does not come from here β€” it rides the payload's `modules` list,
314
  * which is also what fixes the ORDER. Anything unreadable yields an EMPTY field
315
  * list, which R9 already has a defined rendering for (access toggle only). */
316
+ export function parseModule(key: string, label: string, raw: unknown,
317
+ surface = false): PermsModule {
318
  const fields: Field[] = [];
319
  for (const f of Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : []) {
320
  const parsed = parseField(f);
321
  if (parsed) fields.push(parsed);
322
  }
323
+ return { key, label: label || key, fields, ...(surface ? { surface: true } : {}) };
324
  }
325
 
326
  /** A filter is taken WHOLE or not at all. A tree whose `nodes` is not a list is
 
419
  // direction this can be wrong in safely. Every row the server declares is a row
420
  // whose wall `routes_tables` applies (W36-T21), so there is nothing left for a
421
  // per-row flag to distinguish.
422
+ const declared: Array<{ key: string; label: string; surface?: boolean }> = Array.isArray(b.modules)
423
  ? (b.modules as unknown[]).flatMap((m) => {
424
  if (!m || typeof m !== "object") return [];
425
  const r = m as Record<string, unknown>;
426
  return typeof r.key === "string" && r.key
427
+ ? [{ key: r.key, label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : r.key,
428
+ surface: r.surface === true }]
429
  : [];
430
  })
431
  : Object.keys(byModule).map((k) => ({ key: k, label: k }));
432
 
433
+ const modules = declared.map((d) => parseModule(d.key, d.label, byModule[d.key], d.surface));
434
  const entries: PermsRecord = {};
435
  for (const m of modules) entries[m.key] = parseEntry(rawPerms[m.key]);
436