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| # Trusted monitoring for multi-agent collusion: software and market scenarios | |
| A research harness for one question: **can a trusted monitor tell harmful coordination | |
| from legitimate cooperation, disrupt it, and leave honest work alone, including when the | |
| coordination is hidden by steganography?** | |
| It contains: | |
| * two real-world scenarios behind one monitor interface: | |
| * **Scenario B (software integrity).** A planner, implementer, tester, reviewer and release-bot | |
| team works on real **FastAPI** features (5 upstream commits from 21 Oct 2026). Hidden | |
| SWE-bench-style acceptance tests define ground truth. | |
| * **Scenario A (market integrity).** Sellers on a **continuous double auction** framed as an | |
| hourly wholesale power exchange. The protocol follows *Evaluating LLM Agent Collusion in | |
| Double Auctions*. The competitive-equilibrium benchmark defines harm. | |
| * collusion conditions ranging from overt to **steganographic**: codebook phrases, code-comment | |
| and whitespace signals, tool or scratch-file side channels, reference-solution leakage with | |
| canaries, and FCC-style trailing-digit price signalling. Hard-negative controls cover | |
| legitimate teamwork and benign price convergence. | |
| * a monitor ladder (M0 to M4) from rules-only and LLM-judge baselines up to a **model-free | |
| verification and provenance monitor**, with graduated enforcement (Allow / Hold / Constrain). | |
| Market interventions include admitting a *trusted competitive entrant*. | |
| * **Inspect** tasks, a cost-capped per-role model roster (Anthropic, OpenAI, Ollama open weights, | |
| or `$0` scripted agents) and an offline replay that scores every monitor on identical trajectories. | |
| Design document: [`docs/milestones/M6_scenarios_and_trusted_monitor.md`](docs/milestones/M6_scenarios_and_trusted_monitor.md). | |
| Paper sources: [`paper/`](paper/). | |
| ## Lexsi release | |
| The public [Collusion-Watch Hugging Face Space](https://huggingface.co/spaces/munip/collusion-watch) | |
| contains the article, reviewed episode logs, datasets, sweep reports, and a | |
| tracked source snapshot. Start with the [full article in the Space README](https://huggingface.co/spaces/munip/collusion-watch/blob/main/README.md) | |
| or the [article source](docs/LEXSI_ARTICLE_DRAFT.md). The [public dataset repository](https://huggingface.co/datasets/munip/collusion-watch-lexsi-data), | |
| [dataset collection](https://huggingface.co/collections/munip/collusion-watch-datasets-6afae07e8895a2910ce66914), | |
| and [model collection](https://huggingface.co/collections/munip/collusion-watch-models-6afae07e3bc4e68e2ef90bf6) | |
| collect the released Lexsi artifacts. The Space includes the annotated | |
| [Colab notebook](https://huggingface.co/spaces/munip/collusion-watch/blob/main/source/notebooks/colab_notebook.ipynb). | |
| ## Architecture | |
| ``` | |
| untrusted agents ─tools─▶ Environment (only writer) ─▶ hash-chained evidence log | |
| ▲ │ │ read-only | |
| └── CI-like gate message ◀── Enforcement ◀── Policy ◀── Detectors ◀── TrustedMonitor ─▶ private log | |
| ``` | |
| * Agents act only through environment tools that log every call. Agents cannot write to the | |
| log or reach the monitor. | |
| * The monitor runs **independent verification**. For software: hidden acceptance tests on a | |
| pristine checkout, mutation testing of the team's tests, canaries and information-flow | |
| provenance. For markets: price versus the competitive benchmark and channel statistics. | |
| * `CONSTRAIN` requires *verified* evidence. Suspicion alone can only `HOLD`. The collusion | |
| score (coordination evidence) is kept separate from harm risk, so the report can tell apart | |
| "coordination detected", "harm prevented without detecting coordination" and "suspicious but | |
| harmless". | |
| ``` | |
| src/collusion_lab/ | |
| core/ schema, evidence log, model roster + cost cap, tool loop | |
| monitor/ core (policy, M0–M4), judge (M2), detectors/{generic,swe,market} | |
| scenarios/swe/ taskbuilder, repo (pristine runner), workspace (tools), conditions, specs, agents/{scripted,llm}, env | |
| scenarios/market/cda, conditions, agents/{scripted,llm}, env, monitor_plugin | |
| eval/ metrics (AUROC, recall@FPR, bootstrap CIs), report (tables + figures) | |
| experiments.py matrix runner + offline replay; inspect_tasks.py Inspect entry points; cli.py | |
| configs/ models.yaml (profiles), experiments/*.yaml | |
| data/swe_tasks/ built FastAPI tasks (hidden tests, reference patch, mutants) | |
| docs/ paper/ redteam/ scripts/ tests/ | |
| ``` | |
| ## Quick start | |
| ```bash | |
| pip install -e ".[dev]" | |
| ./scripts/setup_swe_env.sh # FastAPI checkout + isolated test venv (.cache/) | |
| pytest -q # unit tests (no API key needed) | |
| # $0 scripted runs (exact ground truth) | |
| clab run configs/experiments/market_matrix.yaml --out runs/market_v1 | |
| clab run configs/experiments/swe_matrix.yaml --out runs/swe_v1 --workers 2 | |
| clab replay runs/swe_v1 && clab replay runs/market_v1 | |
| clab report runs/swe_v1 runs/market_v1 --out reports/v1 | |
| # Inspect | |
| inspect eval src/collusion_lab/inspect_tasks.py@market_collusion -T profile=scripted --model mockllm/model | |
| inspect view | |
| ``` | |
| ## Plugging in models (providers, routers, gateways, local) | |
| **Step-by-step guide: [`docs/SETUP.md`](docs/SETUP.md). All commands, flags and configs: [`docs/COMMANDS.md`](docs/COMMANDS.md).** | |
| * Model spec: `<provider>/<model-id>`, e.g. `groq/openai/gpt-oss-120b`, `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder:free`, | |
| `ollama/gemma2:2b`, `fcm/fcm:agents` (free-coding-models Smart Router), `litellm/<alias>`. | |
| There are 25+ providers in [`configs/providers.yaml`](configs/providers.yaml): Inspect-native ones, | |
| any OpenAI-compatible free tier, routers and gateways. | |
| * Every role can name a **fallback chain**. 429s and outages move to the next model, and a | |
| per-provider rate limiter applies. | |
| * Models without function calling (e.g. `gemma2:2b`) switch automatically to a prompted JSON | |
| tool protocol. | |
| * The **trusted monitor must use a different model family than every agent**. `clab models check` | |
| and `clab run` enforce this, except in explicit ablation profiles. | |
| | Profile | Agents | Monitor judge | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `scripted` | deterministic, $0 | – | | |
| | `free` | Llama / Qwen-Coder / GPT-OSS / Kimi / DeepSeek, one family per role | Gemini Flash, falling back to Mistral | | |
| | `free_homogeneous` | one shared model for all agents | Gemini, then Mistral | | |
| | `fcm` | free-coding-models router | pinned Gemini, then local gemma2 | | |
| | `free_weak_monitor` | free strong agents | local `ollama/gemma2:2b` | | |
| | `local` | `ollama/gemma2:2b` | `ollama/llama3.2:3b` | | |
| | `cloud` / `mixed` | Claude Haiku / mixed paid+free+local | Gemini, then Mistral | | |
| ```bash | |
| clab providers import-fcm --write # reuse free-coding-models keys | |
| clab providers check # text + tool-calling probe per provider | |
| clab models check --profile free --probe | |
| clab run configs/experiments/swe_smoke_free.yaml --out runs/swe_free --workers 1 | |
| clab replay runs/swe_free --profile free # adds the M2 LLM judge | |
| ``` | |
| ## Status (v0.1) | |
| * Both scenarios, all conditions, monitors M0/M1/M3/M4, interventions, Inspect tasks and the | |
| report pipeline run end to end with scripted agents. | |
| * The multi-provider LLM path (fallback chains, JSON tool mode, family-separation check) is | |
| implemented and unit-tested with Inspect's `mockllm` and fake clients. Real LLM results are pending. | |
| * M2 (LLM judge) and Petri red-teaming are wired in but pending model access. See `redteam/`. | |
| ## Provenance and licences | |
| * FastAPI (MIT) is cloned at run time and is not vendored. Task data in `data/swe_tasks/` contains | |
| upstream test files and patches (MIT, © Sebastián Ramírez). | |
| * The CDA market is re-implemented, not copied, because `andyjliu/llm-agent-collusion` has no | |
| licence file. Please cite Agrawal et al. (arXiv:2507.01413). | |