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| # Unified Scientific Metric Definition Standard & Evaluation Glossary | |
| **Document Reference:** `CFI-SPEC-METRICS-2026-V1` | |
| **Applicable Governance Frameworks:** Federal Reserve SR 11-7 / OCC 2011-12 (Model Risk Management), EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) Article 15 (Accuracy, Robustness and Cybersecurity), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Working Paper 32. | |
| --- | |
| ## 1. Overview & Epistemological Purpose | |
| In enterprise federated machine learning and regulatory model risk validation, evaluation metrics must be mathematically unambiguous, strictly bounded, and suited to the underlying financial data distribution. | |
| Financial crime and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) transaction datasets exhibit **extreme class imbalance** (typically $\le 0.15$% fraud prevalence). Under extreme imbalance, standard machine learning metrics such as Accuracy or uncalibrated ROC-AUC produce dangerously misleading assessments: | |
| - An uncalibrated trivial classifier predicting the majority class achieves 99.85% accuracy while detecting **zero fraud**. | |
| - Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC-AUC) can remain superficially high ($> 0.95$) even when thousands of false alerts overwhelm human investigator queues, because the vast true negative denominator artificially suppresses the False Positive Rate ($\mathrm{FPR} = \frac{\mathrm{FP}}{\mathrm{FP} + \mathrm{TN}}$). | |
| This specification establishes the authoritative mathematical formulations, boundary constraints, operational thresholds, and regulatory mappings for all quantitative metrics reported across CF-Intelligence. | |
| --- | |
| ## 2. Core Classification & Detection Performance Metrics | |
| ### 2.1 Precision-Recall Area Under Curve (PR-AUC / Average Precision) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| Precision-Recall Area Under the Curve evaluates the trade-off between positive predictive value (Precision) and sensitivity (Recall) across all classification thresholds $\theta \in [0, 1]$: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC} = \int_{0}^{1} p(r) \, dr \approx \sum_{k=1}^{K} (r_k - r_{k-1}) \cdot p(r_k) | |
| $$ | |
| where Precision $p(r)$ and Recall $r$ are parameterized by threshold $\theta$: | |
| $$ | |
| p(\theta) = \frac{\mathrm{TP}(\theta)}{\mathrm{TP}(\theta) + \mathrm{FP}(\theta)}, \quad r(\theta) = \frac{\mathrm{TP}(\theta)}{\mathrm{TP}(\theta) + \mathrm{FN}(\theta)} | |
| $$ | |
| In finite sample implementations, CF-Intelligence uses the non-interpolated Average Precision ($\mathrm{AP}$) formulation: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{AP} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} (R_n - R_{n-1}) \cdot P_n | |
| $$ | |
| where $P_n$ and $R_n$ are the precision and recall at the $n$-th operational threshold. | |
| #### Operational Interpretation & Target Bounds | |
| - **Range:** $\mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC} \in [\pi, 1.0]$, where $\pi = \frac{P}{P + N}$ is the baseline fraud prevalence (random guessing baseline). | |
| - **Target Performance:** | |
| - $\mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC} \ge 0.75$: High-efficacy production champion candidate. | |
| - $\mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC} \in [0.40, 0.74]$: Acceptable multi-bank federated detector under non-IID skew ($\alpha \le 0.50$). | |
| - $\mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC} < 0.20$: Sub-baseline / non-converged local silo. | |
| --- | |
| ### 2.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic Area Under Curve (ROC-AUC) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| The ROC curve traces the True Positive Rate ($\mathrm{TPR}$) against the False Positive Rate ($\mathrm{FPR}$) across all continuous classification thresholds: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{ROC\text{-}AUC} = \int_{0}^{1} \mathrm{TPR}(\mathrm{FPR}^{-1}(t)) \, dt | |
| $$ | |
| Probabilistically, $\mathrm{ROC\text{-}AUC}$ equals the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney concordance probability that a randomly chosen fraudulent transaction $x^+$ receives a strictly higher predicted risk score than a randomly chosen legitimate transaction $x^-$: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{ROC\text{-}AUC} = \mathbb{P}\left(\hat{s}(x^+) > \hat{s}(x^-) \mid y(x^+) = 1, y(x^-) = 0\right) | |
| $$ | |
| In discrete finite samples: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{ROC\text{-}AUC} = \frac{1}{N^+ \cdot N^-} \sum_{i: y_i = 1} \sum_{j: y_j = 0} \left( \mathbb{I}(\hat{s}_i > \hat{s}_j) + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{I}(\hat{s}_i = \hat{s}_j) \right) | |
| $$ | |
| #### Operational Interpretation & Target Bounds | |
| - **Range:** $\mathrm{ROC\text{-}AUC} \in [0.0, 1.0]$ (random baseline: $0.50$). | |
| - **Regulatory Caveat (SR 11-7):** Must **never** be reported as the sole validation metric on imbalanced financial data. Must always be accompanied by $\mathrm{PR\text{-}AUC}$ and $\mathrm{Recall@FPR}$. | |
| --- | |
| ### 2.3 Recall at Fixed False Positive Rate (Recall@FPR) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| In production anti-fraud operations, human compliance investigator capacity is strictly bounded. Models cannot be evaluated at arbitrary probability thresholds (e.g. $\theta = 0.50$). Instead, the operational threshold $\theta^{\ast}$ is calibrated to guarantee that false alarms do not exceed a statutory ceiling $\alpha_{\mathrm{target}}$: | |
| $$ | |
| \theta^{\ast} = \inf \left\lbrace \theta \in [0, 1] : \mathrm{FPR}(\theta) \le \alpha_{\mathrm{target}} \right\rbrace | |
| $$ | |
| where: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{FPR}(\theta) = \frac{\sum_{j: y_j = 0} \mathbb{I}(\hat{s}_j \ge \theta)}{\sum_{j} \mathbb{I}(y_j = 0)} | |
| $$ | |
| $\mathrm{Recall@FPR}$ is the sensitivity achieved at this operational threshold: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{Recall}(\alpha_{\mathrm{target}}) = \mathrm{TPR}(\theta^{\ast}) = \frac{\sum_{i: y_i = 1} \mathbb{I}(\hat{s}_i \ge \theta^{\ast})}{\sum_{i} \mathbb{I}(y_i = 1)} | |
| $$ | |
| #### Standard Banking Operating Points | |
| - **Recall @ 0.01% FPR ($\alpha = 0.0001$):** Ultra-strict tier. Permits at most 1 false alarm per $10{,}000$ legitimate transactions. Target: $\ge 0.50$ (50% fraud caught before friction). | |
| - **Recall @ 0.1% FPR ($\alpha = 0.0010$):** Standard automated review tier. Permits at most 1 false alarm per $1{,}000$ legitimate transactions. Target: $\ge 0.60$. | |
| --- | |
| ## 3. Probability Calibration & Proper Scoring Rules | |
| ### 3.1 Expected Calibration Error (ECE) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| Expected Calibration Error quantifies the discrepancy between model predicted probabilities and empirical ground-truth event frequencies. Predictions $\hat{p}_i \in [0, 1]$ are partitioned into $M$ equal-width bins $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_M \subset [0, 1]$ (default $M=10$): | |
| $$ | |
| B_m = \left( \frac{m-1}{M}, \frac{m}{M} \right] | |
| $$ | |
| $\mathrm{ECE}$ is the weighted average absolute difference between empirical accuracy and average confidence across all bins: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{ECE} = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{|B_m|}{N} \left| \mathrm{acc}(B_m) - \mathrm{conf}(B_m) \right| | |
| $$ | |
| where: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{conf}(B_m) = \frac{1}{|B_m|} \sum_{i \in B_m} \hat{p}_i, \quad \mathrm{acc}(B_m) = \frac{1}{|B_m|} \sum_{i \in B_m} y_i | |
| $$ | |
| #### Operational Interpretation | |
| - **Range:** $\mathrm{ECE} \in [0.0, 1.0]$. | |
| - **Target:** $\mathrm{ECE} \le 0.030$ (3.0%). | |
| - **Implication:** Prevents overconfident deep learning models from distorting downstream Bayesian risk aggregators or automated payment blocking rules. | |
| --- | |
| ### 3.2 Brier Score (BS) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| The Brier Score is a strictly proper scoring rule quantifying the mean squared error of probabilistic forecasts: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{BS} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{p}_i - y_i)^2 | |
| $$ | |
| Under Murphy's decomposition (Murphy, 1973), the Brier Score decomposes into three orthogonal components: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{BS} = \mathrm{Reliability} - \mathrm{Resolution} + \mathrm{Uncertainty} | |
| $$ | |
| where: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{Reliability} = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{|B_m|}{N} \left( \mathrm{conf}(B_m) - \mathrm{acc}(B_m) \right)^2 | |
| $$ | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{Resolution} = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{|B_m|}{N} \left( \mathrm{acc}(B_m) - \bar{y} \right)^2 | |
| $$ | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{Uncertainty} = \bar{y}(1 - \bar{y}), \quad \bar{y} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^N y_i | |
| $$ | |
| #### Operational Interpretation | |
| - **Range:** $\mathrm{BS} \in [0.0, 1.0]$ (lower is strictly superior). | |
| - **Target:** $\mathrm{BS} \le 0.020$ on low-prevalence financial streams. | |
| --- | |
| ## 4. Distribution Drift & Population Stability Metrics | |
| ### 4.1 Population Stability Index (PSI) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| The Population Stability Index measures the shift between a baseline reference distribution $P$ (e.g. historical baseline or training partition) and an actual production distribution $Q$ partitioned across $B$ bins (default deciles $B=10$): | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{PSI} = \sum_{b=1}^{B} (q_b - p_b) \cdot \ln\left( \frac{q_b + \epsilon_{\mathrm{smooth}}}{p_b + \epsilon_{\mathrm{smooth}}} \right) | |
| $$ | |
| where $p_b$ is the proportion of reference samples in bin $b$, $q_b$ is the proportion of actual samples in bin $b$, and $\epsilon_{\mathrm{smooth}} = 10^{-7}$ prevents numerical division by zero. | |
| #### Regulatory Traffic-Light Action Matrix (Federal Reserve SR 11-7 / OCC) | |
| | PSI Value | Drift Classification | System Action & Governance Response | | |
| | :--- | :--- | :--- | | |
| | $\mathrm{PSI} < 0.10$ | **Stable / No Drift** | Model operates within validated baseline. No action required. | | |
| | $0.10 \le \mathrm{PSI} \le 0.25$ | **Moderate Drift** | Warning issued. Retraining queue enters `MONITORING_ALERT` status. | | |
| | $\mathrm{PSI} > 0.25$ | **Significant Drift** | Automated canary trigger: platform dispatches retrain task to coordinator. | | |
| --- | |
| ### 4.2 Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| The Jensen-Shannon Divergence is a symmetric, smoothed, and bounded version of the Kullback-Leibler ($\mathrm{KL}$) divergence between two probability distributions $P$ and $Q$: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathrm{JSD}(P \parallel Q) = \frac{1}{2} D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel M) + \frac{1}{2} D_{\mathrm{KL}}(Q \parallel M) | |
| $$ | |
| where $M = \frac{1}{2}(P + Q)$ is the equal mixture distribution, and $D_{\mathrm{KL}}$ is the discrete Kullback-Leibler divergence: | |
| $$ | |
| D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel M) = \sum_{x} P(x) \ln\left( \frac{P(x)}{M(x)} \right) | |
| $$ | |
| #### Key Mathematical Properties | |
| 1. **Symmetry:** $\mathrm{JSD}(P \parallel Q) = \mathrm{JSD}(Q \parallel P)$. | |
| 2. **Bounded:** When using base-2 logarithm ($\log_2$), $\mathrm{JSD} \in [0.0, 1.0]$. When using natural logarithm ($\ln$), $\mathrm{JSD} \in [0.0, \ln 2 \approx 0.6931]$. | |
| 3. **Metric Property:** The square root $\sqrt{\mathrm{JSD}(P \parallel Q)}$ satisfies the triangle inequality and qualifies as a true mathematical metric (Endres & Schindelin, 2003). | |
| --- | |
| ## 5. Financial Cost-Utility & Fairness Metrics | |
| ### 5.1 Financial Cost-Utility Function | |
| #### Mathematical Definition | |
| To ground statistical scores in bank profit-and-loss (P&L) economics, the platform defines the expected financial loss function $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{financial}}$ parameterized by empirical chargeback and review costs: | |
| $$ | |
| \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{financial}}(\theta) = C_{\mathrm{FN}} \cdot \mathrm{FN}(\theta) + C_{\mathrm{FP}} \cdot \mathrm{FP}(\theta) + C_{\mathrm{admin}} \cdot (\mathrm{TP}(\theta) + \mathrm{FP}(\theta)) | |
| $$ | |
| where empirical industry loss parameters are: | |
| - $C_{\mathrm{FN}} = 850\text{ USD}$ (direct fraud chargeback, card scheme penalty, customer dispute settlement). | |
| - $C_{\mathrm{FP}} = 25\text{ USD}$ (investigator triage labor, SMS two-factor step-up challenge, friction cost). | |
| - $C_{\mathrm{admin}} = 5\text{ USD}$ (automated routing, database ingestion, compliance ledger overhead). | |
| The optimal economic operating threshold $\theta^{\ast}_{\mathrm{cost}}$ minimizes total loss: | |
| $$ | |
| \theta^{\ast}_{\mathrm{cost}} = \arg\min_{\theta \in [0, 1]} \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{financial}}(\theta) | |
| $$ | |
| --- | |
| ### 5.2 Algorithmic Fairness Metrics (EEOC Four-Fifths & ECOA Regulation B) | |
| Pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA, 12 CFR Part 1002) and European Non-Discrimination mandates, proxy attributes ($A \in \{0, 1\}$) are audited for disparate impact: | |
| 1. **Disparate Impact Ratio (DIR):** | |
| $$\mathrm{DIR} = \frac{\mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)}{\mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)}$$ | |
| *EEOC 80% Rule Compliance Boundary:* $0.80 \le \mathrm{DIR} \le 1.25$. | |
| 2. **Equal Opportunity Difference (EOD):** | |
| $$\mathrm{EOD} = \mathrm{TPR}_{A=0} - \mathrm{TPR}_{A=1} = \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid Y=1, A=0) - \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid Y=1, A=1)$$ | |
| *Target Bound:* $|\mathrm{EOD}| \le 0.05$. | |
| 3. **Demographic Parity Difference (DPD):** | |
| $$\mathrm{DPD} = \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0) - \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)$$ | |
| *Target Bound:* $|\mathrm{DPD}| \le 0.05$. | |
| --- | |
| ## 6. Master Summary of Unified Metric Definitions | |
| | Metric Symbol | Full Metric Name | Domain & Purpose | Mathematical Bounds | Production Target | Regulatory Mapping | Implementation Module | | |
| | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- | | |
| | **PR-AUC** | Precision-Recall AUC | Extreme Imbalance Detection | $[\pi, 1.0]$ | $\ge 0.75$ | SR 11-7 Outcomes Analysis | `metrics_service.py` | | |
| | **ROC-AUC** | Receiver Operating Characteristic | General Discrimination Ranking | $[0.0, 1.0]$ | $\ge 0.95$ | SR 11-7 Model Discrimination | `metrics_service.py` | | |
| | **Recall @ 0.1% FPR** | Operational Recall | Fixed Investigator Capacity | $[0.0, 1.0]$ | $\ge 0.60$ | OCC 2011-12 SLA Bounds | `metrics_service.py` | | |
| | **ECE** | Expected Calibration Error | Probability Reliability | $[0.0, 1.0]$ | $\le 0.03$ | EU AI Act Art. 15 (Accuracy) | `run_factorial_ablation.py` | | |
| | **BS** | Brier Score | Proper Forecast Accuracy | $[0.0, 1.0]$ | $\le 0.02$ | SR 11-7 Probability Accuracy | `run_factorial_ablation.py` | | |
| | **PSI** | Population Stability Index | Feature & Concept Drift | $[0.0, \infty)$ | $< 0.10$ | SR 11-7 Ongoing Monitoring | `banks.py`, `drift_service.py` | | |
| | **JSD** | Jensen-Shannon Divergence | Symmetric Distribution Drift | $[0.0, 1.0]$ | $\le 0.15$ | BCBS 32 Model Risk | `banks.py`, `drift_service.py` | | |
| | **DIR** | Disparate Impact Ratio | Algorithmic Non-Discrimination | $[0.0, \infty)$ | $[0.80, 1.25]$ | ECOA Reg B / EEOC 80% Rule | `demographic_audit.py` | | |