| # Penetration Testing Scope & Rules of Engagement |
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| This document defines the authorized penetration testing scope, target systems, out-of-scope infrastructure, attack surface architecture, test scenarios, and rules of engagement for security assessments of the Collaborative Fraud Intelligence (CFI) Platform. |
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| ## 1. Authorized Testing Scope |
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| The following application interfaces, REST endpoints, and WebSocket channels are **IN SCOPE** for authorized white-box, gray-box, and black-box security penetration testing: |
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| | Endpoint Path | Protocol | Target System / Function | Required Authorization Level | Permitted Test Types | |
| | :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | |
| | `POST /v1/inference/score`<br>`POST /api/v1/predict/score`<br>`POST /api/v1/transactions/score` | HTTP REST | Real-time transaction risk scoring engine ([realtime_inference.py](../../backend/app/presentation/routers/realtime_inference.py), [predict.py](../../backend/app/presentation/routers/predict.py)) | Authenticated Bank API Key / JWT | Input validation fuzzing, payload injection, rate limit evasion, circuit breaker tripping | |
| | `POST /api/v1/cases`<br>`GET /api/v1/cases` | HTTP REST | Case management workbench API ([cases.py](../../backend/app/presentation/routers/cases.py), [case_workbench.py](../../backend/app/application/services/case_workbench.py)) | Authenticated Analyst JWT (`role: investigator`) | BOLA / IDOR, cross-tenant case leakage, privilege escalation | |
| | `POST /api/v1/cases/{case_id}/transition` | HTTP REST | Case lifecycle state machine & Four-Eyes dual control gating | Authenticated Supervisor JWT (`role: supervisor`) | State bypass attacks, anti-collusion single-supervisor signoff attempts | |
| | `POST /api/v1/cases/{case_id}/file-sar`<br>`POST /api/v1/cases/generate-sar` | HTTP REST | FinCEN BSA SAR 2.0 XML generator ([regulatory_reporter.py](../../backend/app/application/services/regulatory_reporter.py)) | Authenticated Compliance Officer JWT | XML External Entity (XXE) injection, schema poisoning, unapproved filing bypass | |
| | `POST /api/v1/cases/{case_id}/copilot-narrative` | HTTP REST | Agentic AML Copilot narrative generator ([aml_agentic_copilot.py](../../backend/app/application/services/aml_agentic_copilot.py)) | Authenticated Lead Analyst JWT | Prompt injection, unauthorized data exfiltration, LLM hallucination boundary testing | |
| | `POST /api/v1/psi/run`<br>`POST /api/v1/entities/fuzzy-resolve` | HTTP REST | Diffie-Hellman Private Set Intersection & MinHash LSH ([psi_service.py](../../backend/app/application/services/psi_service.py), [entity_resolution.py](../../backend/app/application/services/entity_resolution.py)) | Authenticated Bank Client mTLS / JWT | Cryptographic parameter tampering, membership inference, set exhaustion | |
| | `GET /v1/compliance/soc2-evidence`<br>`POST /v1/compliance/soc2-evidence` | HTTP REST | Automated SOC 2 evidence collection API ([compliance.py](../../backend/app/presentation/routers/compliance.py)) | Authenticated Security Auditor JWT | Evidence manipulation, false compliance injection | |
| | `POST /api/v1/onboarding/request`<br>`GET /api/v1/banks` | HTTP REST | Self-service bank onboarding & consortium node registry ([onboarding.py](../../backend/app/presentation/routers/onboarding.py)) | Authenticated Node Operator / Admin | Sybil identity injection, unauthorized node registration, CSRF | |
| | `WS /ws/alerts`<br>`WS /ws/scenarios`<br>`WS /ws/training` | WebSocket | Real-time fraud alert, scenario replay, and training telemetry streams | Authenticated WebSocket Bearer Token | Connection hijacking, unauthenticated subscription, cross-tenant frame injection | |
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| ## 2. Out-of-Scope Components |
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| The following infrastructure components, internal network channels, and administrative control planes are strictly **OUT OF SCOPE** for penetration testing: |
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| 1. **Internal Microservice Mesh & Inter-Node Transport**: |
| - `grpcs://coordinator:50051` and internal docker bridge network channels (`net-bank-a`, `net-bank-b`, `net-bank-c`, `net-coordinator`). |
| 2. **Key Management Systems (KMS) & Vault Administrative Interfaces**: |
| - HashiCorp Vault root management port (`:8200`), AWS KMS API keys, and unsealed Vault master keys. |
| 3. **Database Engine Management Interfaces**: |
| - Direct PostgreSQL port `5432` and Redis port `6379` direct network socket access (must only be accessed via application endpoints). |
| 4. **Cloud Infrastructure & Managed Kubernetes Control Planes**: |
| - AWS EKS control plane APIs, AWS IAM administrative credentials, and cloud provider hypervisors. |
| 5. **Physical Enclave Hardware**: |
| - Physical extraction of Intel SGX / AWS Nitro memory chips or CPU side-channel timing analysis requiring laboratory hardware access. |
| 6. **Denial of Service (DoS / DDoS)**: |
| - Volumetric network flood attacks (SYN flood, UDP flood) or resource exhaustion attacks targeting shared cloud transit gateways. |
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| ## 3. Known Attack Surface & Trust Boundaries |
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| ``` |
| [ External Client / Bank IT / Auditor ] |
| │ |
| ▼ (HTTPS / TLS 1.3 + OAuth2 JWT / mTLS) |
| ┌───────────────────┐ |
| │ Perimeter WAF │ (OWASP Top 10 Guard: SQLi, XSS, Null Byte, Sensitive Path, Auth Lockout) |
| └─────────┬─────────┘ |
| │ (Inspected Requests) |
| ▼ |
| ┌───────────────────┐ |
| │ FastAPI Gateway │ (Dynamic ABAC, Tenant Isolation: tenant_{bank_id}, Rate Limiting) |
| └─────────┬─────────┘ |
| │ |
| ├──► [ Application Layer Services ] (RiskEngine, PSI, Workbench, RegulatoryReporter) |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| ┌───────────────────┐ |
| │ Persistence Layer │ (PostgreSQL schema-per-tenant, Redis Cache, Vault PKI / KMS) |
| └───────────────────┘ |
| ``` |
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| ### Core Trust Boundaries |
| 1. **Multi-Tenant Isolation**: Each participant bank institution is strictly schema-isolated at the database engine level (`tenant_{bank_id}`). Cross-tenant data access is blocked by tenant context dependencies in [dependencies.py](../../backend/app/dependencies.py). |
| 2. **Zero-PII Transmission**: All customer and transaction identifiers are normalized and hashed locally via type-salted HMAC-SHA256. Raw PII never traverses network boundaries. |
| 3. **Differential Privacy Budgeting**: Local model training executes Opacus DP-SGD ($\epsilon \le 2.0, \delta = 10^{-5}$), mathematically bounding membership inference risk. |
| 4. **Four-Eyes Dual-Control Governance**: High-risk case resolutions (`RESOLVED_TRUE_POSITIVE`, `RESOLVED_FALSE_POSITIVE`) and FinCEN SAR filings mandate two distinct supervisor cryptographic signatures (`SIG_SUPERVISOR_<ID>`). |
| 5. **Cryptographic Payload Signing**: Coordinator-to-client federation REST traffic mandates HMAC-SHA256 signature verification (`X-Payload-Signature`, `X-Payload-Timestamp`) within a $\pm 300\text{s}$ tolerance window. |
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| ## 4. Permitted Attack Scenarios & Exploit Objectives |
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| Penetration testers are authorized to execute the following threat scenarios against in-scope endpoints: |
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| ### Scenario A — Authentication & Authorization Bypass |
| * **JWT Claim Tampering**: Modifying `bank_id`, `roles`, or `clearance_level` claims within bearer tokens to evaluate signature validation robustness. |
| * **Horizontal Privilege Escalation (BOLA/IDOR)**: Attempting to retrieve, modify, or delete cases belonging to peer banks (e.g. Bank Alpha accessing `case_bank_beta_102`). |
| * **Broken Object Property Level Authorization (BOPLA)**: Submitting administrative fields during case updates (e.g., attempting to self-sign supervisor signatures). |
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| ### Scenario B — Injection & Input Validation Fuzzing |
| * **SQL Injection (SQLi)**: Injecting stacked SQL queries, UNION statements, and blind boolean vectors into transaction scoring and case search fields to test [perimeter_waf.py](../../backend/app/infrastructure/security/perimeter_waf.py). |
| * **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)**: Injecting DOM payloads (`<script>`, `javascript:`) into case notes and investigator narrative fields. |
| * **Null Byte & Path Traversal**: Supplying `\x00` null bytes and directory traversal patterns (`../`) to test sensitive path blocking. |
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| ### Scenario C — Business Logic & Anti-Collusion Verification |
| * **Four-Eyes Gating Bypass**: Attempting to resolve a fraud case or generate FinCEN SAR XML using a single supervisor signature or identical dual signatures (`first == second`). |
| * **State Machine Invariant Violation**: Attempting illegal state transitions (e.g., transitioning directly from `NEW` to `RESOLVED_TRUE_POSITIVE` without `UNDER_INVESTIGATION`). |
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| ### Scenario D — Adversarial Machine Learning & Privacy Auditing |
| * **Membership Inference Attacks (MIA)**: Submitting transaction feature vectors to measure loss distribution anomalies and evaluate membership exposure via [privacy_audit_service.py](../../backend/app/application/services/privacy_audit_service.py). |
| * **Model Inversion**: Testing gradient norm variance to verify reconstruction resistance. |
| * **Deep Leakage from Gradients (DLG)**: Evaluating Pearson correlation leakage between candidate feature vectors and model updates. |
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| ## 5. Rules of Engagement & Emergency Procedures |
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| ### Pre-Testing Coordination |
| * Security assessment teams must provide **72 hours advance written notification** prior to beginning active testing. |
| * Testing must be conducted within agreed operational testing windows (typically 01:00 UTC – 05:00 UTC) to minimize potential impact on production simulation runs. |
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| ### Prohibited Activities |
| * **Destructive Data Modification**: Altering or deleting production audit chains, baseline model checkpoints, or regulatory archive filings. |
| * **Social Engineering & Phishing**: Physical access attempts, spear-phishing bank personnel, or credential harvesting targeting administrative staff. |
| * **Denial of Service**: Exceeding testing traffic thresholds or launching volumetric DDoS attacks. |
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| ### Critical Escalation & Emergency Stop |
| If an assessor identifies a critical vulnerability (CVSS v3.1 $\ge 9.0$, such as unauthenticated Remote Code Execution, full database compromise, or cross-tenant private key exposure) or causes unintended platform instability: |
| 1. **Immediately Halt Testing**: Stop all active automated scanners and manual exploit execution. |
| 2. **Contact Incident Response**: Notify the Security Operations Center at `secops@cfi-platform.org` with the subject line `[CRITICAL-PENTEST-FINDING]`. |
| 3. **Execute Emergency Protocols**: Follow the formal containment and triage workflows defined in the [Incident Response Playbook](../incident_response_playbook.md). |
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| ## 6. Automated Security & Attack Surface Test Matrix |
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| The platform's attack surface defenses, authentication invariants, WAF filters, and gateway boundaries are continuously verified through unit tests under [backend/tests/unit/](../../backend/tests/unit): |
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| | Test Suite | Targeted Attack Surface | Verified Defensive Invariant | Test Count | Status | |
| | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | |
| | [test_security_controls_audit.py](../../backend/tests/unit/test_security_controls_audit.py) | **WAF & Perimeter Defense** | SQLi rejection, sensitive path protection, auth lockout (5 attempts), CORS origin whitelisting | 10 | ✅ 100% Pass | |
| | [test_security_gateway.py](../../backend/tests/unit/test_security_gateway.py) | **API Gateway & Routing** | Route prefix enforcement, unauthenticated request rejection, rate limiting | 14 | ✅ 100% Pass | |
| | [test_auth_security.py](../../backend/tests/unit/test_auth_security.py) | **Authentication & Tokens** | JWT cryptographic signatures, expiration handling, role authorization, tenant claims | 9 | ✅ 100% Pass | |
| | [test_auth_routes.py](../../backend/tests/unit/test_auth_routes.py) | **Auth Routes & ABAC Isolation** | Endpoint discovery, Bearer token lifecycle, tenant boundary isolation, /me profile, lockout status | 12 | ✅ 100% Pass | |
| | [test_security_headers.py](../../backend/tests/unit/test_security_headers.py) | **HTTP Header Hardening** | OWASP A02 headers (`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `X-XSS-Protection`) | 2 | ✅ 100% Pass | |
| | **Total Verified** | **5 Dedicated Security Suites** | **Penetration Testing Attack Surface Parity** | **47 Tests** | **100% Pass** | |
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