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Security Policy for Sovereign Forge

Threat Model

Sovereign Forge is a deterministic proof verification system designed to provide cryptographic assurance of exact linear algebra computations. This document outlines the security properties we provide and the boundaries of our guarantees.

What We Prove

Deterministic Computation Integrity
- Proof certificates cryptographically bind inputs, algorithms, and outputs
- Blake3/Ed25519 signatures prevent tampering with computation traces
- WORM (Write-Once Read-Many) ledger architecture ensures immutability
Type Safety
- Typed execution prevents category errors in linear algebra operations
- Lean 4 formal refinement proofs establish correctness of type rules
- Typecheck phase enforces preconditions before computation begins
Memory Safety
- ASan/UBSan clean: no buffer overflows, use-after-free, signed integer overflows
- Stack machine architecture eliminates arbitrary pointer manipulation
- All memory allocations are statically bounded
Serialization Fidelity
- Canonical JSON representation prevents encoding attacks
- Deterministic sorting of certificate fields
- Serialization proofs formally verified in Lean 4
Exact Arithmetic
- All linear algebra uses rational/algebraic numbers (no floating-point)
- Rational arithmetic library proven correct via Lean 4 refinement
- Rounding errors are impossible by design

What We Don't Prove

Availability
- Sovereign Forge does not guarantee liveness or DoS resistance
- Proof verification may be computationally expensive for large matrices
- No guarantees about wall-clock time or resource consumption
Privacy
- All computation traces are deterministic and reproducible
- Proof certificates contain full data flow information
- Sensitive data should be encrypted before being embedded in proofs
Hardware Security
- Vulnerable to physical attacks (fault injection, side-channel)
- Assumes honest execution environment; no TEE/SEV integration
- Side-channel timing attacks are not mitigated
Key Management
- Sovereign Forge assumes signing keys are protected by external systems
- Key rotation, distribution, and revocation are out of scope
- Compromised keys lead to forged proofs (this is not a key escrow system)
Consensus/Replication
- Single-machine proof verification
- Multi-node agreement is handled by external consensus layers
- No Byzantine fault tolerance built in

Security Boundaries

In-Scope Threats

Computation Tampering: Attacker modifies certificate to claim different result
Input Substitution: Attacker claims proof verifies different input matrix
Serialization Attacks: Attacker exploits non-canonical encoding
Type Confusion: Attacker violates preconditions for operations

Out-of-Scope Threats

Insider Threats: System operator with signing key access
Hardware Faults: Bit flips, speculative execution attacks
Denial of Service: Malicious workloads designed to exhaust CPU/memory
Supply Chain: Compromised build tools, malicious dependencies
Cryptographic Breaks: Future advances in hash/signature algorithm attacks

Responsible Disclosure

If you discover a security vulnerability:

Do not open a public GitHub issue
Email privately: Send details to the maintainers with subject line [SECURITY]
Allow 90 days: For researchers and vendors to implement fixes
Coordinated disclosure: We will work with you on a timeline

Vulnerability Response SLA

Critical (RCE, signature bypass): Response within 48 hours, patch within 72 hours
High (DoS, memory corruption): Response within 1 week, patch within 2 weeks
Medium (information disclosure): Response within 2 weeks, patch within 1 month

Attestation & Verification

Build Reproducibility

All builds are reproducible. To verify:

git clone https://github.com/SNAPKITTYWEST/bobs-control-repo.git
cd bobs-control-repo
make -f netlister/Makefile.sov clean all
sha256sum build/sov_verifier > /tmp/my.sha256
# Compare against release binary

Proof Certificate Structure

Each certificate is a JSON object with:

version: Protocol version (immutable)
algorithm: Linear algebra operation (immutable)
input_hash: Blake3 hash of input matrix
output_hash: Blake3 hash of output matrix
trace: Execution trace with intermediate values
signature: Ed25519 signature over all of above

Signature Verification

cd certificates
jq -S . < example.json | sha256sum  # Deterministic ordering
# Verify Ed25519 signature against issuer's public key

Testing & Fuzzing

Phase 1 Fuzzing: 1M+ libFuzzer iterations, 42 conformance tests
Phase 2 Typecheck: 12 tests covering type rule violations
Phase 3 Certificate: 10 tests covering tampering scenarios
Phase 4 Receipts: 8 tests covering provenance tracking
Phase 5 Refinement: 15 Lean 4 formal proofs

All tests pass with ASan and UBSan enabled in CI/CD.

Cryptographic Details

Hash Function

Algorithm: Blake3
Output size: 256 bits
Justification: Cryptographically secure, deterministic, resistant to length-extension attacks

Signing Algorithm

Algorithm: Ed25519
Key size: 256 bits (32 bytes)
Verification: RFC 8032 compliant
Justification: Post-quantum resistant signature scheme with low overhead

Serialization

Format: JSON (RFC 8259)
Canonicalization: RFC 7159 style (no whitespace, sorted keys)
Character encoding: UTF-8

Known Limitations

Floating-point Integration: If you need to integrate with floating-point systems, you must convert to exact rationals before verification.
Large Matrices: Proof size grows with matrix dimensions. 10,000x10,000 matrices will produce megabyte-scale certificates.
Network Attacks: Proofs are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if transmitted over unencrypted channels. Use TLS/mTLS for network transmission.
Timestamp Attacks: Proof certificates do not include timestamps. Add external timestamping if ordering is required.

Compliance & Standards

Code Quality: MISRA C guidelines (where applicable)
Testing: MCDC coverage > 90% on critical paths
Documentation: NIST SP 800-53 security-relevant documentation
Formal Methods: Lean 4 proofs for refinement layer

Contributors & Acknowledgments

Ahmad Ali Parr: Architectural design, threat modeling
Jessica Westerhoff: Coordination, testing framework
Claude Haiku 4.5: Formal verification, implementation

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