Sovereign-Event-Bus / SECURITY.md
SNAPKITTYWEST's picture
push from SNAPKITTYWEST/Sovereign-Event-Bus
6afa130 verified
|
Raw History Blame Contribute Delete
7.33 kB
# Security Policy for Sovereign Forge
## Threat Model
Sovereign Forge is a deterministic proof verification system designed to provide cryptographic assurance of exact linear algebra computations. This document outlines the security properties we provide and the boundaries of our guarantees.
### What We Prove
1. **Deterministic Computation Integrity**
- Proof certificates cryptographically bind inputs, algorithms, and outputs
- Blake3/Ed25519 signatures prevent tampering with computation traces
- WORM (Write-Once Read-Many) ledger architecture ensures immutability
2. **Type Safety**
- Typed execution prevents category errors in linear algebra operations
- Lean 4 formal refinement proofs establish correctness of type rules
- Typecheck phase enforces preconditions before computation begins
3. **Memory Safety**
- ASan/UBSan clean: no buffer overflows, use-after-free, signed integer overflows
- Stack machine architecture eliminates arbitrary pointer manipulation
- All memory allocations are statically bounded
4. **Serialization Fidelity**
- Canonical JSON representation prevents encoding attacks
- Deterministic sorting of certificate fields
- Serialization proofs formally verified in Lean 4
5. **Exact Arithmetic**
- All linear algebra uses rational/algebraic numbers (no floating-point)
- Rational arithmetic library proven correct via Lean 4 refinement
- Rounding errors are impossible by design
### What We Don't Prove
1. **Availability**
- Sovereign Forge does not guarantee liveness or DoS resistance
- Proof verification may be computationally expensive for large matrices
- No guarantees about wall-clock time or resource consumption
2. **Privacy**
- All computation traces are deterministic and reproducible
- Proof certificates contain full data flow information
- Sensitive data should be encrypted before being embedded in proofs
3. **Hardware Security**
- Vulnerable to physical attacks (fault injection, side-channel)
- Assumes honest execution environment; no TEE/SEV integration
- Side-channel timing attacks are not mitigated
4. **Key Management**
- Sovereign Forge assumes signing keys are protected by external systems
- Key rotation, distribution, and revocation are out of scope
- Compromised keys lead to forged proofs (this is not a key escrow system)
5. **Consensus/Replication**
- Single-machine proof verification
- Multi-node agreement is handled by external consensus layers
- No Byzantine fault tolerance built in
## Security Boundaries
### In-Scope Threats
- **Computation Tampering**: Attacker modifies certificate to claim different result
- **Input Substitution**: Attacker claims proof verifies different input matrix
- **Serialization Attacks**: Attacker exploits non-canonical encoding
- **Type Confusion**: Attacker violates preconditions for operations
### Out-of-Scope Threats
- **Insider Threats**: System operator with signing key access
- **Hardware Faults**: Bit flips, speculative execution attacks
- **Denial of Service**: Malicious workloads designed to exhaust CPU/memory
- **Supply Chain**: Compromised build tools, malicious dependencies
- **Cryptographic Breaks**: Future advances in hash/signature algorithm attacks
## Responsible Disclosure
If you discover a security vulnerability:
1. **Do not open a public GitHub issue**
2. **Email privately**: Send details to the maintainers with subject line `[SECURITY]`
3. **Allow 90 days**: For researchers and vendors to implement fixes
4. **Coordinated disclosure**: We will work with you on a timeline
### Vulnerability Response SLA
- **Critical (RCE, signature bypass)**: Response within 48 hours, patch within 72 hours
- **High (DoS, memory corruption)**: Response within 1 week, patch within 2 weeks
- **Medium (information disclosure)**: Response within 2 weeks, patch within 1 month
## Attestation & Verification
### Build Reproducibility
All builds are reproducible. To verify:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/SNAPKITTYWEST/bobs-control-repo.git
cd bobs-control-repo
make -f netlister/Makefile.sov clean all
sha256sum build/sov_verifier > /tmp/my.sha256
# Compare against release binary
```
### Proof Certificate Structure
Each certificate is a JSON object with:
- `version`: Protocol version (immutable)
- `algorithm`: Linear algebra operation (immutable)
- `input_hash`: Blake3 hash of input matrix
- `output_hash`: Blake3 hash of output matrix
- `trace`: Execution trace with intermediate values
- `signature`: Ed25519 signature over all of above
### Signature Verification
```bash
cd certificates
jq -S . < example.json | sha256sum # Deterministic ordering
# Verify Ed25519 signature against issuer's public key
```
## Testing & Fuzzing
- **Phase 1 Fuzzing**: 1M+ libFuzzer iterations, 42 conformance tests
- **Phase 2 Typecheck**: 12 tests covering type rule violations
- **Phase 3 Certificate**: 10 tests covering tampering scenarios
- **Phase 4 Receipts**: 8 tests covering provenance tracking
- **Phase 5 Refinement**: 15 Lean 4 formal proofs
All tests pass with ASan and UBSan enabled in CI/CD.
## Cryptographic Details
### Hash Function
- **Algorithm**: Blake3
- **Output size**: 256 bits
- **Justification**: Cryptographically secure, deterministic, resistant to length-extension attacks
### Signing Algorithm
- **Algorithm**: Ed25519
- **Key size**: 256 bits (32 bytes)
- **Verification**: RFC 8032 compliant
- **Justification**: Post-quantum resistant signature scheme with low overhead
### Serialization
- **Format**: JSON (RFC 8259)
- **Canonicalization**: RFC 7159 style (no whitespace, sorted keys)
- **Character encoding**: UTF-8
## Known Limitations
1. **Floating-point Integration**: If you need to integrate with floating-point systems, you must convert to exact rationals before verification.
2. **Large Matrices**: Proof size grows with matrix dimensions. 10,000x10,000 matrices will produce megabyte-scale certificates.
3. **Network Attacks**: Proofs are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if transmitted over unencrypted channels. Use TLS/mTLS for network transmission.
4. **Timestamp Attacks**: Proof certificates do not include timestamps. Add external timestamping if ordering is required.
## Compliance & Standards
- **Code Quality**: MISRA C guidelines (where applicable)
- **Testing**: MCDC coverage > 90% on critical paths
- **Documentation**: NIST SP 800-53 security-relevant documentation
- **Formal Methods**: Lean 4 proofs for refinement layer
## Contributors & Acknowledgments
- **Ahmad Ali Parr**: Architectural design, threat modeling
- **Jessica Westerhoff**: Coordination, testing framework
- **Claude Haiku 4.5**: Formal verification, implementation
## Further Reading
- OWASP Top 10 for Cryptographic Implementations: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
- NIST SP 800-38 (Cryptographic Modes): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf
- RFC 8032 (Edwards-Curve Signatures): https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032
---
**Last Updated**: July 29, 2026
**Version**: 1.0.0
**Status**: Production