open-stanag / docs /ARCHITECTURE.md
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Initial release of OpenSTANAG v1.0.0 (NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 Reference Guard)
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OpenSTANAG Architecture Overview

1. High-Assurance Cross-Domain Design

OpenSTANAG provides a complete open-source reference implementation of Data-Centric Security (DCS) for defense, intelligence, and diplomatic coalitions. It strictly adheres to:

  • NATO STANAG 4774 (ADatP-4774 v1.3): Confidentiality Metadata Label Syntax
  • NATO STANAG 4778 (ADatP-4778.2 v1.4 / NCIA TN-1491): Metadata Binding Mechanism
  • W3C XML Digital Signatures (XMLDSIG) & Exclusive Canonicalization (C14N)
  • NIST SP 800-207 & SP 800-207A: Zero Trust Architecture
  • NIST SP 800-63-4: Digital Identity Guidelines (AAL/IAL/FAL assurance profiles)
  • OASIS XACML 3.0 / Next Generation Access Control (NGAC)
  • NSA NCDSMO Raise-the-Bar (RTB) RAIN Principles (Redundant, Always Invoked, Independent, Non-bypassable)

2. RAIN Security Pipeline

Incoming Stream / File / Message
             β”‚
             β–Ό
   [ Protocol Normalization ]
             β”‚
             β–Ό
   [ Gate 1: Robust XML Schema Filtering ]  <── Official NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 XSDs
             β”‚ (Fail -> QUARANTINE)
             β–Ό
   [ Gate 2: Cryptographic Binding Verification ] <── W3C XMLDSIG (RSA/ECDSA/HMAC, SHA-256)
             β”‚ (Digest/Sig Fail -> QUARANTINE)
             β–Ό
   [ Gate 3: Payload & Sidecar Integrity Check ] <── SHA-256 Payload Hash Matching
             β”‚ (Mismatch -> QUARANTINE)
             β–Ό
   [ Gate 4: Zero Trust ABAC PDP Evaluation ] <── NIST SP 800-207 & XACML 3.0 Lattice
             β”‚ (Deny -> DENY)
             β–Ό
   [ Gate 5: Tamper-Evident Audit & Release ] ──> Outbound Transfer / Destination Domain

Pillar Breakdown

  1. Redundant:
    • Cryptographic validation combines XMLDSIG signature authentication, multi-element hash digest verification (Binding, KeyInfo, Timestamp), and payload SHA-256 verification.
  2. Always Invoked:
    • Every file transfer, sidecar read, or API invocation executes the complete Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) verification sequence.
  3. Independent:
    • The Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Schema Validator operate independently of network transport layers (SOAP, REST, SMTP, Sidecar files).
  4. Non-bypassable:
    • Unverified raw byte streams cannot bypass the guard; only successfully verified and reconstituted documents are permitted through.

3. Cryptographic Binding Model (ADatP-4778.2)

Under ADatP-4778.2 Annex A & B, an encapsulating or detached BDO contains:

  1. <ds:Signature>:
    • <ds:SignedInfo> specifying Exclusive Canonicalization (http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#) and SignatureMethod (http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256).
    • Three mandatory references:
      • Reference to #mb-1 (the mb:MetadataBinding element)
      • Reference to #sigprops-1 (the SignatureProperties containing OASIS WSU Timestamp)
      • Reference to #keyinfo-1 (the KeyInfo containing X.509 certificate)
    • <ds:SignatureValue>: RSA or ECDSA signature over canonicalized SignedInfo.
  2. <mb:MetadataBindingContainer>:
    • <mb:MetadataBinding Id="mb-1">:
      • <mb:Metadata>: Contains <slab:originatorConfidentialityLabel> (STANAG 4774)
      • <mb:DataReference URI="./payload.pdf"/>: Points to the data object.