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OpenSTANAG Architecture Overview
1. High-Assurance Cross-Domain Design
OpenSTANAG provides a complete open-source reference implementation of Data-Centric Security (DCS) for defense, intelligence, and diplomatic coalitions. It strictly adheres to:
- NATO STANAG 4774 (ADatP-4774 v1.3): Confidentiality Metadata Label Syntax
- NATO STANAG 4778 (ADatP-4778.2 v1.4 / NCIA TN-1491): Metadata Binding Mechanism
- W3C XML Digital Signatures (XMLDSIG) & Exclusive Canonicalization (C14N)
- NIST SP 800-207 & SP 800-207A: Zero Trust Architecture
- NIST SP 800-63-4: Digital Identity Guidelines (AAL/IAL/FAL assurance profiles)
- OASIS XACML 3.0 / Next Generation Access Control (NGAC)
- NSA NCDSMO Raise-the-Bar (RTB) RAIN Principles (Redundant, Always Invoked, Independent, Non-bypassable)
2. RAIN Security Pipeline
Incoming Stream / File / Message
β
βΌ
[ Protocol Normalization ]
β
βΌ
[ Gate 1: Robust XML Schema Filtering ] <ββ Official NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 XSDs
β (Fail -> QUARANTINE)
βΌ
[ Gate 2: Cryptographic Binding Verification ] <ββ W3C XMLDSIG (RSA/ECDSA/HMAC, SHA-256)
β (Digest/Sig Fail -> QUARANTINE)
βΌ
[ Gate 3: Payload & Sidecar Integrity Check ] <ββ SHA-256 Payload Hash Matching
β (Mismatch -> QUARANTINE)
βΌ
[ Gate 4: Zero Trust ABAC PDP Evaluation ] <ββ NIST SP 800-207 & XACML 3.0 Lattice
β (Deny -> DENY)
βΌ
[ Gate 5: Tamper-Evident Audit & Release ] ββ> Outbound Transfer / Destination Domain
Pillar Breakdown
- Redundant:
- Cryptographic validation combines XMLDSIG signature authentication, multi-element hash digest verification (Binding, KeyInfo, Timestamp), and payload SHA-256 verification.
- Always Invoked:
- Every file transfer, sidecar read, or API invocation executes the complete Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) verification sequence.
- Independent:
- The Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Schema Validator operate independently of network transport layers (SOAP, REST, SMTP, Sidecar files).
- Non-bypassable:
- Unverified raw byte streams cannot bypass the guard; only successfully verified and reconstituted documents are permitted through.
3. Cryptographic Binding Model (ADatP-4778.2)
Under ADatP-4778.2 Annex A & B, an encapsulating or detached BDO contains:
<ds:Signature>:<ds:SignedInfo>specifying Exclusive Canonicalization (http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#) and SignatureMethod (http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256).- Three mandatory references:
- Reference to
#mb-1(themb:MetadataBindingelement) - Reference to
#sigprops-1(theSignaturePropertiescontaining OASIS WSU Timestamp) - Reference to
#keyinfo-1(theKeyInfocontaining X.509 certificate)
- Reference to
<ds:SignatureValue>: RSA or ECDSA signature over canonicalizedSignedInfo.
<mb:MetadataBindingContainer>:<mb:MetadataBinding Id="mb-1">:<mb:Metadata>: Contains<slab:originatorConfidentialityLabel>(STANAG 4774)<mb:DataReference URI="./payload.pdf"/>: Points to the data object.