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| # OpenSTANAG Architecture Overview | |
| ## 1. High-Assurance Cross-Domain Design | |
| OpenSTANAG provides a complete open-source reference implementation of Data-Centric Security (DCS) for defense, intelligence, and diplomatic coalitions. It strictly adheres to: | |
| - **NATO STANAG 4774** (ADatP-4774 v1.3): Confidentiality Metadata Label Syntax | |
| - **NATO STANAG 4778** (ADatP-4778.2 v1.4 / NCIA TN-1491): Metadata Binding Mechanism | |
| - **W3C XML Digital Signatures (XMLDSIG)** & Exclusive Canonicalization (C14N) | |
| - **NIST SP 800-207 & SP 800-207A**: Zero Trust Architecture | |
| - **NIST SP 800-63-4**: Digital Identity Guidelines (AAL/IAL/FAL assurance profiles) | |
| - **OASIS XACML 3.0 / Next Generation Access Control (NGAC)** | |
| - **NSA NCDSMO Raise-the-Bar (RTB) RAIN Principles** (Redundant, Always Invoked, Independent, Non-bypassable) | |
| --- | |
| ## 2. RAIN Security Pipeline | |
| ``` | |
| Incoming Stream / File / Message | |
| β | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Protocol Normalization ] | |
| β | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Gate 1: Robust XML Schema Filtering ] <ββ Official NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 XSDs | |
| β (Fail -> QUARANTINE) | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Gate 2: Cryptographic Binding Verification ] <ββ W3C XMLDSIG (RSA/ECDSA/HMAC, SHA-256) | |
| β (Digest/Sig Fail -> QUARANTINE) | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Gate 3: Payload & Sidecar Integrity Check ] <ββ SHA-256 Payload Hash Matching | |
| β (Mismatch -> QUARANTINE) | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Gate 4: Zero Trust ABAC PDP Evaluation ] <ββ NIST SP 800-207 & XACML 3.0 Lattice | |
| β (Deny -> DENY) | |
| βΌ | |
| [ Gate 5: Tamper-Evident Audit & Release ] ββ> Outbound Transfer / Destination Domain | |
| ``` | |
| ### Pillar Breakdown | |
| 1. **Redundant**: | |
| - Cryptographic validation combines XMLDSIG signature authentication, multi-element hash digest verification (Binding, KeyInfo, Timestamp), and payload SHA-256 verification. | |
| 2. **Always Invoked**: | |
| - Every file transfer, sidecar read, or API invocation executes the complete Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) verification sequence. | |
| 3. **Independent**: | |
| - The Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Schema Validator operate independently of network transport layers (SOAP, REST, SMTP, Sidecar files). | |
| 4. **Non-bypassable**: | |
| - Unverified raw byte streams cannot bypass the guard; only successfully verified and reconstituted documents are permitted through. | |
| --- | |
| ## 3. Cryptographic Binding Model (ADatP-4778.2) | |
| Under ADatP-4778.2 Annex A & B, an encapsulating or detached BDO contains: | |
| 1. `<ds:Signature>`: | |
| - `<ds:SignedInfo>` specifying Exclusive Canonicalization (`http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#`) and SignatureMethod (`http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256`). | |
| - Three mandatory references: | |
| - Reference to `#mb-1` (the `mb:MetadataBinding` element) | |
| - Reference to `#sigprops-1` (the `SignatureProperties` containing OASIS WSU Timestamp) | |
| - Reference to `#keyinfo-1` (the `KeyInfo` containing X.509 certificate) | |
| - `<ds:SignatureValue>`: RSA or ECDSA signature over canonicalized `SignedInfo`. | |
| 2. `<mb:MetadataBindingContainer>`: | |
| - `<mb:MetadataBinding Id="mb-1">`: | |
| - `<mb:Metadata>`: Contains `<slab:originatorConfidentialityLabel>` (STANAG 4774) | |
| - `<mb:DataReference URI="./payload.pdf"/>`: Points to the data object. | |