open-stanag / docs /ARCHITECTURE.md
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Initial release of OpenSTANAG v1.0.0 (NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 Reference Guard)
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# OpenSTANAG Architecture Overview
## 1. High-Assurance Cross-Domain Design
OpenSTANAG provides a complete open-source reference implementation of Data-Centric Security (DCS) for defense, intelligence, and diplomatic coalitions. It strictly adheres to:
- **NATO STANAG 4774** (ADatP-4774 v1.3): Confidentiality Metadata Label Syntax
- **NATO STANAG 4778** (ADatP-4778.2 v1.4 / NCIA TN-1491): Metadata Binding Mechanism
- **W3C XML Digital Signatures (XMLDSIG)** & Exclusive Canonicalization (C14N)
- **NIST SP 800-207 & SP 800-207A**: Zero Trust Architecture
- **NIST SP 800-63-4**: Digital Identity Guidelines (AAL/IAL/FAL assurance profiles)
- **OASIS XACML 3.0 / Next Generation Access Control (NGAC)**
- **NSA NCDSMO Raise-the-Bar (RTB) RAIN Principles** (Redundant, Always Invoked, Independent, Non-bypassable)
---
## 2. RAIN Security Pipeline
```
Incoming Stream / File / Message
β”‚
β–Ό
[ Protocol Normalization ]
β”‚
β–Ό
[ Gate 1: Robust XML Schema Filtering ] <── Official NATO STANAG 4774 & 4778 XSDs
β”‚ (Fail -> QUARANTINE)
β–Ό
[ Gate 2: Cryptographic Binding Verification ] <── W3C XMLDSIG (RSA/ECDSA/HMAC, SHA-256)
β”‚ (Digest/Sig Fail -> QUARANTINE)
β–Ό
[ Gate 3: Payload & Sidecar Integrity Check ] <── SHA-256 Payload Hash Matching
β”‚ (Mismatch -> QUARANTINE)
β–Ό
[ Gate 4: Zero Trust ABAC PDP Evaluation ] <── NIST SP 800-207 & XACML 3.0 Lattice
β”‚ (Deny -> DENY)
β–Ό
[ Gate 5: Tamper-Evident Audit & Release ] ──> Outbound Transfer / Destination Domain
```
### Pillar Breakdown
1. **Redundant**:
- Cryptographic validation combines XMLDSIG signature authentication, multi-element hash digest verification (Binding, KeyInfo, Timestamp), and payload SHA-256 verification.
2. **Always Invoked**:
- Every file transfer, sidecar read, or API invocation executes the complete Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) verification sequence.
3. **Independent**:
- The Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Schema Validator operate independently of network transport layers (SOAP, REST, SMTP, Sidecar files).
4. **Non-bypassable**:
- Unverified raw byte streams cannot bypass the guard; only successfully verified and reconstituted documents are permitted through.
---
## 3. Cryptographic Binding Model (ADatP-4778.2)
Under ADatP-4778.2 Annex A & B, an encapsulating or detached BDO contains:
1. `<ds:Signature>`:
- `<ds:SignedInfo>` specifying Exclusive Canonicalization (`http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#`) and SignatureMethod (`http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256`).
- Three mandatory references:
- Reference to `#mb-1` (the `mb:MetadataBinding` element)
- Reference to `#sigprops-1` (the `SignatureProperties` containing OASIS WSU Timestamp)
- Reference to `#keyinfo-1` (the `KeyInfo` containing X.509 certificate)
- `<ds:SignatureValue>`: RSA or ECDSA signature over canonicalized `SignedInfo`.
2. `<mb:MetadataBindingContainer>`:
- `<mb:MetadataBinding Id="mb-1">`:
- `<mb:Metadata>`: Contains `<slab:originatorConfidentialityLabel>` (STANAG 4774)
- `<mb:DataReference URI="./payload.pdf"/>`: Points to the data object.