Datasets:

FINAL-Bench
/

Obfuscated-Shell-Gate

---
license: cc-by-4.0
task_categories:
- text-classification
language:
- en
tags:
- security
- shell
- obfuscation
- agent-safety
- bash
size_categories:
- n<1K
configs:
- config_name: default
  data_files:
  - split: dev
    path: data/dev.jsonl
---
# Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark (Bash, dev)

A benchmark for safety gates and coding agents: decide ALLOW / ASK / DENY on a
single bash command whose surface form may be obfuscated. Each risky command is
paired with a benign command carrying the same obfuscation surface, so a gate is
scored on reading the decoded intent, not on spotting that something looks
encoded.

## What is inside
- 222 bash commands, 103 risky and 119 benign.
- 17 intent families: b64_data, cred_read, data_exfil, destructive, disable_logging, download_exec, eval_legit, heredoc_config, ifs_parse, persistence, pipeline_jq, printf_fmt, privesc_fetch, readonly_ops, reverse_shell, tr_text, var_build.
- 13 surface forms including plain: b64_chunked, b64_pipe, backslash_break, chain_ifs_b64, chain_rev_b64, hex_pipe, ifs_split, none, octal_printf, quote_break, rev_pipe, rot13_pipe, var_concat.
- Every row is verified in real bash: encoded rows decode back to their plain
  `canonical` form, and rewritten rows parse to the same argv. The `verified`
  field records which check passed. No payload is ever executed.
## Safety of the data
Every network destination is an unresolvable `.invalid` host (RFC 6761).
Destructive and credential examples target a sandbox path, never a real system
path. The set exercises detection of a pattern; it is not runnable malware.
## Fields
`id`, `seed_id`, `family`, `is_risky`, `label` (ALLOW/ASK/DENY), `shell`,
`command` (the possibly obfuscated form), `canonical` (plain equivalent),
`transform`, `transform_chain`, `verified`.

## Using it
```python
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("FINAL-Bench/Obfuscated-Shell-Gate", split="dev")
```
Score your gate's verdict against `label`. Report risky recall and benign
false-block rate separately; a single accuracy number hides the trade-off that
this set is built to expose.

## Reference baselines (dev)
| baseline | accuracy | risky recall | benign false-block |
|---|---|---|---|
| deny-everything-obfuscated | 0.47 | 0.92 | 0.92 |
| naive keyword match | 0.47 | 0.61 | 0.65 |

Both surface baselines score at chance level, which is the intended property:
the benign-obfuscated pairs make surface matching ineffective.

## Held-out test
A private held-out split of comparable size is kept off the hub by design, so it
stays usable as a true test rather than becoming training data.

## Citation
VIDRAFT / FINAL-Bench, Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark, 2026.

	---
	license: cc-by-4.0
	task_categories:
	- text-classification
	language:
	- en
	tags:
	- security
	- shell
	- obfuscation
	- agent-safety
	- bash
	size_categories:
	- n<1K
	configs:
	- config_name: default
	data_files:
	- split: dev
	path: data/dev.jsonl
	---

	# Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark (Bash, dev)

	A benchmark for safety gates and coding agents: decide ALLOW / ASK / DENY on a
	single bash command whose surface form may be obfuscated. Each risky command is
	paired with a benign command carrying the same obfuscation surface, so a gate is
	scored on reading the decoded intent, not on spotting that something looks
	encoded.

	## What is inside
	- 222 bash commands, 103 risky and 119 benign.
	- 17 intent families: b64_data, cred_read, data_exfil, destructive, disable_logging, download_exec, eval_legit, heredoc_config, ifs_parse, persistence, pipeline_jq, printf_fmt, privesc_fetch, readonly_ops, reverse_shell, tr_text, var_build.
	- 13 surface forms including plain: b64_chunked, b64_pipe, backslash_break, chain_ifs_b64, chain_rev_b64, hex_pipe, ifs_split, none, octal_printf, quote_break, rev_pipe, rot13_pipe, var_concat.
	- Every row is verified in real bash: encoded rows decode back to their plain
	`canonical` form, and rewritten rows parse to the same argv. The `verified`
	field records which check passed. No payload is ever executed.

	## Safety of the data
	Every network destination is an unresolvable `.invalid` host (RFC 6761).
	Destructive and credential examples target a sandbox path, never a real system
	path. The set exercises detection of a pattern; it is not runnable malware.

	## Fields
	`id`, `seed_id`, `family`, `is_risky`, `label` (ALLOW/ASK/DENY), `shell`,
	`command` (the possibly obfuscated form), `canonical` (plain equivalent),
	`transform`, `transform_chain`, `verified`.

	## Using it
	```python
	from datasets import load_dataset
	ds = load_dataset("FINAL-Bench/Obfuscated-Shell-Gate", split="dev")
	```
	Score your gate's verdict against `label`. Report risky recall and benign
	false-block rate separately; a single accuracy number hides the trade-off that
	this set is built to expose.

	## Reference baselines (dev)
	\| baseline \| accuracy \| risky recall \| benign false-block \|
	\|---\|---\|---\|---\|
	\| deny-everything-obfuscated \| 0.47 \| 0.92 \| 0.92 \|
	\| naive keyword match \| 0.47 \| 0.61 \| 0.65 \|

	Both surface baselines score at chance level, which is the intended property:
	the benign-obfuscated pairs make surface matching ineffective.

	## Held-out test
	A private held-out split of comparable size is kept off the hub by design, so it
	stays usable as a true test rather than becoming training data.

	## Citation
	VIDRAFT / FINAL-Bench, Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark, 2026.