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license: cc-by-nc-4.0
pretty_name: Persona attacks on Aya Expanse (Alignment Gym)
language:
- en
- es
- it
- zh
- ar
- hi
- ru
tags:
- safety
- red-teaming
- persona
- role-play
- jailbreak
- prompt-injection
- dilemmas
- multilingual
- aya
size_categories:
- 1K<n<10K
configs:
- config_name: dilemmas_8b
default: true
data_files:
- split: train
path: dilemmas/aya-expanse-8b.jsonl
- config_name: dilemmas_32b
data_files:
- split: train
path: dilemmas/aya-expanse-32b*.jsonl
- config_name: injecagent_32b
data_files:
- split: train
path: injecagent/cases.jsonl
Persona attacks vs non-persona attacks on Aya Expanse 8B and 32B
Part of Using Psychometrics for Red Teaming Across Languages and Personas (Lexsi AI Safety and Alignment Hackathon, Track 2). Code: https://github.com/PelusAI/psicometrics_safety
Question. Does telling the model to play a role (a persona in the system message) push it towards harmful
choices, compared with no persona and with trait steering? Roles: for each language, the 3 roles with the highest
score along the model's own refusal direction (layer 22 on the 32B), from the role list and scoring steps 2-4 of
the collaborator's run_roles.py (selection/; test_questions are MultiJail question ids, no texts).
- Dilemmas (
dilemmas_8b,dilemmas_32b): the 145 dilemmas with a harmful option ofalignment-gym-dilemmas, 7 languages, one row per (condition, dilemma, seed) with the option probabilities (probs), the harmful option ids (immoral_ids) andanswer_mass.persona= the role (null = none); on the 8B,trait/alpharows are the A-2 steering comparison. 32B Hindi: 5 of 145 contexts are longer than the model's 8,192-token window and are left out. - InjecAgent (
injecagent_32b): the persona sentence goes inside the injected tool output, before the attacker instruction (persona_prefix), using the 32B's 3 top English roles; the same 100 held-out cases as the GRPO attacker evaluation inalignment-gym-injecagent. Rates:
| condition | n | asr | invalid_rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| none | 100 | 0.190 | 0.310 |
| rich and arrogant heir | 100 | 0.200 | 0.290 |
| pessimistic doomsayer | 100 | 0.210 | 0.240 |
| vain celebrity | 100 | 0.210 | 0.290 |
Full tables with paired bootstrap CIs (dilemmas) and McNemar tests (InjecAgent): report.md, report.png.
Limitations
Roles were scored on refusal of jailbreak questions, not on these dilemmas; 3 roles per language; one seed per dilemma ordering; the 32B dilemma run has no steering comparison. Effects are small and model-specific.
Responsible use
This is red-teaming material: role prompts chosen because they weaken the model's refusal, and prompt-injection cases from InjecAgent aimed at simulated tools in a synthetic benchmark (no real service, account or person was involved). It is released to measure and harden models against persona-based attacks. Do not use these prompts, or attacks derived from them, against real systems or people.
Licence
CC BY-NC 4.0 for the model outputs and results (Aya models are CC BY-NC 4.0). The InjecAgent cases are MIT (Copyright (c) 2023 Qiusi Zhan); cite InjecAgent when using them.