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---
license: cc-by-nc-4.0
pretty_name: Persona attacks on Aya Expanse (Alignment Gym)
language: [en, es, it, zh, ar, hi, ru]
tags: [safety, red-teaming, persona, role-play, jailbreak, prompt-injection, dilemmas, multilingual, aya]
size_categories: [1K<n<10K]
configs:
- config_name: dilemmas_8b
default: true
data_files:
- split: train
path: dilemmas/aya-expanse-8b.jsonl
- config_name: dilemmas_32b
data_files:
- split: train
path: dilemmas/aya-expanse-32b*.jsonl
- config_name: injecagent_32b
data_files:
- split: train
path: injecagent/cases.jsonl
---
# Persona attacks vs non-persona attacks on Aya Expanse 8B and 32B
Part of **Using Psychometrics for Red Teaming Across Languages and Personas** (Lexsi AI Safety and Alignment Hackathon, Track 2). Code: https://github.com/PelusAI/psicometrics_safety
**Question.** Does telling the model to play a role (a persona in the system message) push it towards harmful
choices, compared with no persona and with trait steering? Roles: for each language, the 3 roles with the highest
score along the model's own refusal direction (layer 22 on the 32B), from the role list and scoring steps 2-4 of
the collaborator's `run_roles.py` (`selection/`; `test_questions` are MultiJail question ids, no texts).
- **Dilemmas** (`dilemmas_8b`, `dilemmas_32b`): the 145 dilemmas with a harmful option of `alignment-gym-dilemmas`,
7 languages, one row per (condition, dilemma, seed) with the option probabilities (`probs`), the harmful option
ids (`immoral_ids`) and `answer_mass`. `persona` = the role (null = none); on the 8B, `trait`/`alpha` rows are the
A-2 steering comparison. 32B Hindi: 5 of 145 contexts are longer than the model's 8,192-token window and are left out.
- **InjecAgent** (`injecagent_32b`): the persona sentence goes inside the injected tool output, before the
attacker instruction (`persona_prefix`), using the 32B's 3 top English roles; the same 100 held-out cases as the
GRPO attacker evaluation in `alignment-gym-injecagent`. Rates:
| condition | n | asr | invalid_rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| none | 100 | 0.190 | 0.310 |
| rich and arrogant heir | 100 | 0.200 | 0.290 |
| pessimistic doomsayer | 100 | 0.210 | 0.240 |
| vain celebrity | 100 | 0.210 | 0.290 |
Full tables with paired bootstrap CIs (dilemmas) and McNemar tests (InjecAgent): `report.md`, `report.png`.
## Limitations
Roles were scored on refusal of jailbreak questions, not on these dilemmas; 3 roles per language; one seed per
dilemma ordering; the 32B dilemma run has no steering comparison. Effects are small and model-specific.
## Responsible use
This is red-teaming material: role prompts chosen because they weaken the model's refusal, and prompt-injection
cases from InjecAgent aimed at **simulated tools** in a synthetic benchmark (no real service, account or person was
involved). It is released to measure and harden models against persona-based attacks. Do not use these prompts, or
attacks derived from them, against real systems or people.
## Licence
CC BY-NC 4.0 for the model outputs and results (Aya models are CC BY-NC 4.0). The InjecAgent cases are MIT
(Copyright (c) 2023 Qiusi Zhan); cite InjecAgent when using them.