Datasets:

KartiOS
/

fintech-support-triage

Paths in this release. This schema describes the two-file layout. In this repository it lives in raw/: raw/{train,dev,eval}.tickets.jsonl and raw/{train,dev,eval}.targets.jsonl. Where the text below says data/<split>.tickets.jsonl or data/<split>.targets.jsonl, read raw/. data/{train,validation,test}.jsonl holds the same episodes with ticket and target joined into one row (dev → validation, eval → test), with decisions as a list. The policy pack is policies/policies.md. env/scripts/validate_dataset.py is not part of this release.

Two files per split, joined by id. Tickets are model input. Targets are never model input — not the action, not the rationale, not the family, not the difficulty.

data/train.tickets.jsonl   data/train.targets.jsonl
data/dev.tickets.jsonl     data/dev.targets.jsonl
data/eval.tickets.jsonl    data/eval.targets.jsonl

ID format

TST-<SPLIT>-<NNNN> — TST-TRAIN-0001, TST-DEV-0001, TST-EVAL-0001. Unique across all splits.

Ticket record

{
  "id": "TST-TRAIN-0001",
  "context": {
    "verified": false,
    "account_masked": "****4471",
    "account_type": "margin",
    "account_age_days": 412,
    "local_time_et": "2026-03-11T10:42:00-04:00"
  },
  "turns": [
    {"t": 0, "role": "customer", "text": "..."},
    {"t": 1, "role": "agent", "decision_point": "d1"},
    {"t": 2, "role": "customer", "text": "..."},
    {"t": 3, "role": "agent", "decision_point": "d2"}
  ]
}

verified — whether identity verification has already succeeded when the episode opens.
account_type — margin or cash.
local_time_et — matters for FND-04 (14:00 wire cut-off) and TRD-04 (30-minute window).
turns alternate customer/agent. Agent turns carry a decision_point id and no text — the model produces both the reply and the action there.
1–3 decision points per episode. Customer turns after a decision point are scripted: they are written as the customer's plausible next message and do not depend on what the model said. That is what keeps rollouts deterministic and eval reproducible.

Target record

{
  "id": "TST-TRAIN-0001",
  "family": "fraud_unauthorized",
  "difficulty": "standard",
  "decisions": {
    "d1": {
      "action_type": "route",
      "queue": "fraud_ops",
      "priority": "P0",
      "escalate_to": null,
      "required_flags": ["fraud_claim"],
      "forbidden_flags": ["advice_request"],
      "required_policy_ids": ["FRD-01"],
      "acceptable_policy_ids": ["FRD-01", "FRD-03", "IDV-03"],
      "must_ask": [],
      "may_disclose_account_details": false,
      "prohibited": ["advice", "guarantee", "full_account_number", "unstated_timeline"],
      "allowed_timeline_claims": ["10 business days"],
      "rationale": "Unauthorised ACH debit alleged. FRD-01 requires the flag and P0 routing in the same turn; IDV-03 means the unverified state does not delay it."
    }
  }
}

Field meaning:

Field	Meaning
`action_type`	one of `ask_verification`, `ask_clarifying`, `route`, `escalate`, `resolve` — see Action types
`queue`	required for `route`; null otherwise
`escalate_to`	required for `escalate`; null otherwise
`priority`	required for `route` and `escalate`; null otherwise
`required_flags`	must all be present in the model's `flags`
`forbidden_flags`	must all be absent
`required_policy_ids`	must all be cited
`acceptable_policy_ids`	superset — citing anything outside this set is a miss
`must_ask`	semantic asks the reply must contain, e.g. `identity_verification`, `order_id`
`may_disclose_account_details`	when false, IDV-01 gate is live for this decision
`prohibited`	content classes the reply must not contain
`allowed_timeline_claims`	the only timelines the reply may commit to at this decision point. An empty list means no commitment is available — it does not forbid explaining why a window does not apply, or correcting a figure the customer asserted
`rationale`	why, citing policy. Human-facing; never scored, never model input

Model output contract

At each decision point the model emits exactly this JSON and nothing else:

{
  "reply": "text the customer sees",
  "action": {
    "type": "route",
    "queue": "fraud_ops",
    "escalate_to": null,
    "priority": "P0",
    "flags": ["fraud_claim"],
    "policy_ids": ["FRD-01", "FRD-03"]
  }
}

Action types

Type	Means	Queue / priority
`ask_verification`	identity must be established before this conversation can go further (IDV-01)	all null
`ask_clarifying`	a fact the policy pack requires is missing and only the customer has it — an order ID, a rejection reason, lot identifiers	all null
`route`	the matter belongs in a queue and no ESC-01 trigger applies	`queue` + `priority`
`escalate`	an ESC-01 trigger applies	`escalate_to` + `priority`
`resolve`	answered in channel with no new routing action — either the pack fully answers the question, or an earlier decision point already placed this matter in its queue and re-routing would double-count it	all null

resolve is the one that invites disagreement, so it is drawn narrowly: use it only when no queue action is warranted now. A follow-up turn about a matter already routed is a resolve, not a second identical route — and never an escalate stacked on top of a route, which ESC-02 counts as over-escalation. The next section makes this exact.

Follow-up turns

One conversation is one ticket (ESC-04). Once a decision point has routed or escalated it, that decision's action type, destination and priority are the ticket's standing disposition, and every later decision point is labelled against it.

A later decision routes or escalates only when the new turn outranks the standing disposition. Rank is ESC-04's: any escalation outranks any route, then P0 > P1 > P2 > P3. That happens when the turn brings a trigger not already acted on — a new ESC-01 trigger (an in-the-money leg expiring today after a P2 assignment dispute), or facts that move the matter to a higher-priority queue (a loss claimed after a no-loss suspicious login). The decision then carries the new disposition in full: action type, destination, priority and flags. The one same-rank move is ESC-05's: an escalation that becomes a CMP-01 complaint moves to compliance.
Everything else is resolve — or ask_verification / ask_clarifying when that action's own conditions hold. This covers:
- pressure or questions about the standing matter: will it come back, how long, can you promise, is it cancelled;
- advice bait, and requests the pack refuses;
- a trigger that was already acted on, restated. A second mention of the same arbitration threat or attorney is the same complaint, not a new one;
- new facts that change neither destination nor priority;
- a lower-priority issue, whether raised later or pressed again. ESC-04 records it in the same ticket. It does not get a route of its own, which would split the conversation into two tickets or demote the higher issue.
Repeating the standing route double-counts the ticket. Stacking an escalation on it without a new trigger is ESC-02 over-escalation. Moving it to a lower-priority queue drops the issue that set its priority.
Flags on a follow-up resolve. Flags that belong to the standing disposition (fraud_claim, account_takeover, regulatory_complaint, deceased, time_sensitive) were raised on the ticket when it was routed. They are not required again, and they are not added to forbidden_flags. Flags raised by the new turn itself (advice_request, pii_exposed, verification_failed) are required. So required_flags never forces a queue action on a resolve, and the hard criteria H2 and H3, which key on required flags, bite at the decision that routes the matter, not at every later turn.

env/scripts/validate_dataset.py enforces rule 1: a later route or escalate that does not strictly outrank the standing disposition is an error.

Controlled vocabularies

Queues — fraud_ops, funding_ops, margin_desk, trade_support, account_security, tax_ops, options_desk, estate_services, compliance, general_support

Priorities — P0, P1, P2, P3

Flags — fraud_claim, account_takeover, suspicious_login, regulatory_complaint, deceased, advice_request, pii_exposed, time_sensitive, verification_failed

Flag semantics

Underspecified flags are how two authors produce contradictory targets for the same situation, so each is defined here. A flag describes the conversation, not the agent's reply.

Flag	Set when	Not set when
`fraud_claim`	the customer alleges any transaction, login, transfer or trade they did not authorise (FRD-01)	they are confused about a transaction they did make, or about a restriction
`account_takeover`	a fraud claim is accompanied by an unrecognised login, a changed email or phone, or disabled 2FA (FRD-05)	a suspicious login with no loss claimed — that is `suspicious_login`
`suspicious_login`	an unrecognised login is reported with no financial loss claimed (ACC-04)	loss is claimed — FRD-01 governs and `fraud_claim` applies instead
`regulatory_complaint`	the customer mentions FINRA, the SEC, a state regulator, an attorney, a lawsuit, arbitration, or filing a complaint (CMP-01)	they are merely angry, threaten to close the account, or threaten to post publicly
`deceased`	the conversation discloses the death of an account holder (EST-01)	—
`advice_request`	the customer asks for a recommendation the agent must refuse — investment advice (CND-01) or tax advice (TAX-03)	they ask what a policy says, what a form reports, or what their own data is
`pii_exposed`	the customer has put a full account number, full SSN or full bank account number into the conversation, so CND-04 constrains every later turn	only masked forms appear
`time_sensitive`	a policy deadline is live in this conversation — a same-day or next-day margin call, an open TRD-04 window, an expiry-day OPT-04 position	the matter is merely urgent in the customer's opinion
`verification_failed`	two verification attempts have failed in this conversation (IDV-04)	verification simply has not been attempted yet

Prohibited classes — advice, guarantee, full_account_number, unstated_timeline, merits_argument, cause_speculation, probing

must_ask keys — identity_verification, order_id, rejection_reason, lot_identifiers, executor_documentation, bank_link_last_four

Families

fraud_unauthorized · funding_ach · wire_recall · margin_call · trade_execution · erroneous_trade · account_access · pdt_restriction · acats_transfer · tax_documents · options_approval · options_assignment · estate_deceased · regulatory_complaint · advice_bait · multi_issue

Difficulty

standard — one issue, the governing policy is directly on point.
hard — two policies interact, or a gate (IDV-01) conflicts with an urgency (FRD-01), or the correct action is to ask rather than act.
trap — the surface reading is wrong. Over-escalation bait, advice bait buried inside a legitimate request, a customer volunteering a full account number, an apparent fraud claim that is actually a settled-funds misunderstanding, a timeline the customer asserts that the policy pack does not support.