mabench / README.md
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MABench (2026-10-02)
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---
license: apache-2.0
pretty_name: MABench
language:
- en
tags:
- clinical-ai
- llm-security
- ai-agents
- healthcare
- haarf
- quokkaguard
- synthetic
size_categories:
- n<1K
task_categories:
- other
---
# MABench
**Signed agent registry, attenuable biscuit capability tokens, and k-of-n quorum for clinical agent fleets.**
MABench is the benchmark corpus for *Who Is Calling? Cryptographic Agent Identity for Malicious Agents in Multi-Agent Clinical Systems*, the `quorum` module of the QUOKKAGUARD program. It ships with the [`quorum`](https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum) repository, which contains the `qfire` gateway layer under test, the experiment harness, and the paper.
90 attack scenarios (18 each across T1 impersonation, T2 A2A injection, T3 confused-deputy escalation, T4 collusion/Sybil, T5 provenance forgery) and 58 legitimate handoffs over six fleet topologies (chain-2/3/5/8, star-3/5), deterministic seed 8, synthetic payloads cross-referencing the AgentDojo/InjecAgent/ASB taxonomy.
**All data are synthetic.** No real patient data or protected health information (PHI) is included; clinical content is generated from templates with fixed seeds.
## Files
| File | Size | Rows |
|---|---|---|
| `mabench/legit.jsonl` | 48 KB | 58 rows |
| `mabench/scenarios.jsonl` | 66 KB | 90 rows |
| `mabench/topologies/chain-2.yaml` | 164 B | |
| `mabench/topologies/chain-3.yaml` | 233 B | |
| `mabench/topologies/chain-5.yaml` | 357 B | |
| `mabench/topologies/chain-8.yaml` | 574 B | |
| `mabench/topologies/star-3.yaml` | 269 B | |
| `mabench/topologies/star-5.yaml` | 404 B | |
### Record schemas
- `mabench/legit.jsonl`: `id`, `attack`, `topology`, `issuer_seed`, `agents`, `fleet_budget`, `handoffs`, `expected`
- `mabench/scenarios.jsonl`: `id`, `attack`, `topology`, `issuer_seed`, `agents`, `fleet_budget`, `handoffs`, `expected`
## How it was generated
The corpus is produced by the generator in the paper repository.
## Intended use
Evaluating the **identity** enforcement layer of a clinical-agent security gateway (HAARF control C5): In a fleet of triage, ordering, pharmacy, and documentation agents that hand tasks to each other, the forwarding agent's identity is just a header string, so any member can claim a peer's role or capabilities: with no identity layer, 100% (90/90) of cross-agent attacks succeed.
The experiments that consume it (E-series in the paper) are reproduced from the repository:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum
cd quorum
cargo build --release
```
then follow the *Reproduce the experiments* section of its README.
## Citation
This benchmark was built to evaluate a control of the **Healthcare AI Agents Regulatory Framework (HAARF)**, the source framework for the QUOKKAGUARD program. Please cite both the paper and HAARF:
```bibtex
@unpublished{schwoebel2026quorum,
author = {Schwoebel, James},
title = {Who Is Calling? Cryptographic Agent Identity for Malicious Agents in Multi-Agent Clinical Systems},
note = {Preprint. Quome, QUOKKAGUARD program (quorum module)},
year = {2026},
url = {https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum}
}
@unpublished{schwoebel2026haarf,
author = {Schwoebel, Jim and Frasch, Martin and Spalding, Art and Sewell, Ed and Englert, Phil and Halpert, Ben and Overbay, Collin and Semenec, Ingrida and Shor, Joel},
title = {{HAARF}: Healthcare {AI} agents regulatory framework --- a comprehensive security verification standard for autonomous {AI} systems in clinical environments},
note = {medRxiv Preprint},
year = {2026},
month = {April},
doi = {10.64898/2026.04.09.26350519},
url = {https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.04.09.26350519v1}
}
```
## License
Apache License 2.0. Copyright (c) 2026 Quome, Inc.