No. 18-3904\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JOEY D. WISEMAN, JR., │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00464-1—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Marisa L. Serrat, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Scott Zarzycki, UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Joey Wiseman appeals his\\nconviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and\\npossession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In the early hours of August 4, 2017, Wiseman\\nintercepted a would-be-robber entering his home through a window, disarmed the intruder, and\\nshot him with a gun already in Wiseman’s possession. Wiseman subsequently placed the gun in\\na safe containing individual baggies of drugs in a vehicle parked in his driveway prior to\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 2\\n\\n\\ncooperating with the police who investigated the shooting. Wiseman now argues that the First\\nStep Act of 2018 renders his sentencing improper, that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the\\njustification defense, and that testimony about his parolee status was improperly admitted. We\\nreject his challenges and AFFIRM his conviction and sentence.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\nA. Factual Background\\n\\n On August 4, 2017, at around 6:30 a.m., several Elyria Police Department officers were\\ndispatched to 201 George Street in Elyria, Ohio and observed blood on the lower part of the\\nframe of an open window of the home. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 104–07) (Page ID #426–29).\\nWiseman soon appeared from between the house and a GMC Yukon parked in the driveway. He\\nheld his hands up and informed the officers that there was a handgun laying in the driveway. Id.\\nat 113, 222 (Page ID #435, 544). The handgun was black and stainless steel. Id. at 114 (Page ID\\n#436). The officers entered the home and observed a teenaged male, Jaymone Whitaker, in a\\npool of blood on the living-room floor close to the window with the bloody frame; he appeared\\nto have been shot multiple times. Id. at 121 (Page ID #443). Paramedics took Whitaker to the\\nhospital, and officers brought Wiseman to the police station. Id. at 124–25, 153 (Page ID #446–\\n47, 475).\\n\\n The police collected the gun, a loaded Taurus PT 709 9mm, from the driveway. They\\ncollected a package with approximately .3 grams of white powder containing cocaine from the\\nkitchen floor and several 9mm Luger shell casings from the living room, where there were signs\\nof a struggle. Id. at 186–87, 224 (Page ID #508–09, 546). They also observed that there were\\nsurveillance cameras on the outside of the home and a monitor in the living room that displayed\\nthe security footage.\\n\\n At the police station, officers swabbed Wiseman’s hands for gun residue and collected\\n$4,949.00 in cash from Wiseman’s person. Id. at 154, 190–91 (Trial Tr. at 476, 512–13).\\nWiseman was Mirandized, and he indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with\\nthe police officers. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 325) (Page ID #647). The interview was recorded on\\nvideo. Id. at 326 (Page ID #648).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 3\\n\\n\\n Wiseman informed the police that he had been awoken by a voice, used the restroom,\\ncame back, sat down on the couch, and then, aided by his surveillance monitor, he saw Whitaker\\n“coming up to his window, peeking in, wearing the mask.” Id. at 337, 360 (Page ID #659, 682).\\nWiseman stated that he had knocked Whitaker’s gun out of his hand as Whitaker entered the\\nhome and then Wiseman shot Whitaker with a black Lorcin gun that Wiseman had in the house\\nwith him prior to the robber’s entry. Id. at 338 (Page ID #660). Wiseman subsequently placed\\nthe black Lorcin gun in a safe in the back of the Yukon parked in the driveway. Id. at 335 (Page\\nID #657). Wiseman admitted that between five and twenty-five grams of cocaine were also\\ninside of the safe. Id. at 333, 341–42 (Page ID #655, 663–664). Wiseman stated that he had not\\ncalled 9-1-1 after shooting Whitaker, but rather Wiseman’s first response had been to gather his\\nmoney and other things prior to calling the authorities. Id. at 334 (Page ID #656).\\n\\n Wiseman provided the officers with the combination to the safe in the Yukon. Id. at 342\\n(Page ID #664). The officers obtained a search warrant, towed the vehicle to the police station,\\nand searched the safe. Id. at 343 (Page ID #665). It contained the black Lorcin 9mm handgun\\nwith a defaced serial number, 11 individual bags of similar quantities of a white powder\\ncontaining cocaine, a bag of cutting material, and a shoebox containing a digital scale, spoon,\\nscissors, and baggies. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 158–60) (Page ID #480–82); R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 343)\\n(Page ID #665). The safe also contained documents bearing Wiseman’s name. R. 75 (Trial Tr.\\nat 343–44) (Page ID #665–66).\\n\\n The officers obtained Wiseman’s consent to view the surveillance video from the home.\\nId. at 346 (Page ID #668). It showed Whitaker entering the home through the window and\\nholding a black and silver gun. Id. at 350 (Page ID #672). It subsequently showed Wiseman\\nwalking outside the home. Id. at 352–53, 355 (Page ID #674–75, 677).\\n\\nB. Procedural History\\n\\n On November 8, 2017, Wiseman was indicted on three counts stemming from the August\\n4 events. R. 1 (Indictment) (Page ID #1–2). Count 1 charged him with possession with intent to\\ndistribute approximately .28 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C).\\nCount 2 charged him with possession with intent to distribute approximately 11.28 grams of\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 4\\n\\n\\ncocaine in violation of the same statute. Count 3 charged him with being a felon in possession of\\na firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924.\\n\\n On January 23, 2018, the government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)\\nstating the previous felony drug offense convictions that it intended to rely upon in enhancing his\\nsentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). R. 18 (Information) (Page ID #57–59). These\\nconvictions were for: (1) Possession of Cocaine in 2016; (2) Illegal Conveyance of Drugs of\\nAbuse onto the Grounds of a Specified Government Facility, Trafficking in Drugs and\\nPossession of Drugs in 2015; (3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and (4) Trafficking in Cocaine in\\n2012. On June 8, 2018, Wiseman filed a proposed jury instruction on a justification defense.\\nR. 47 (Def.’s Proposed Jury Instruction) (Page ID #201–02).\\n\\n Wiseman’s jury trial commenced on June 12, 2018. R. 50 (Trial Minutes) (Page ID\\n#206). At trial, Special Agent Eric French testified about his involvement in the case. When\\nasked how he had come to be involved in the case, he testified that he got “a call from Adult\\nParole Authority,” specifically Parole Officer Daniel Riley. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259) (Page ID\\n#581). Wiseman objected to this testimony and the court instructed the government to move on.\\nId. at 259–60 (Page ID #581–82). French went on to testify that his role in the case involved\\nattempting to trace the Lorcin gun. Id. at 260–68 (Page ID #582–90). At the close of trial,\\nWiseman reiterated his request for a jury instruction on a justification defense, and the district\\ncourt heard oral argument from both sides and ultimately declined to issue such an instruction.\\nR. 75 (Trial Tr. at 375–82) (Page ID #697–704). Wiseman moved for a judgment of acquittal on\\nall counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29; the court denied his motion. R. 75\\n(Trial Tr. at 409) (Page ID #731).\\n\\n Wiseman was acquitted of Count 1 and convicted of Counts 2 and 3. R. 52 (Jury Verdict\\non Count 1) (Page ID #208); R. 53 (Jury Verdict on Count 2) (Page ID #210); R. 54 (Jury\\nVerdict on Count 3) (Page ID #212). The jury found via a special verdict form that Wiseman\\npossessed the Lorcin pistol with an obliterated serial number and ammunition. R. 55 (Special\\nVerdict Form) (Page ID #214).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 5\\n\\n\\n The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated the adjusted offense level, after grouping, to\\nbe 28. PSR at 5. The amount of drugs and the government’s filing of an information under\\n21 U.S.C. § 851(a) increased the maximum term of imprisonment from 20 to 30 years.\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The PSR then applied the career offender enhancement under\\n§ 4B1.1(b), based on the fact that the offense of conviction was a felony controlled substance\\noffense and Wiseman’s having at least two prior felony convictions for a controlled substance\\noffense: (1) Trafficking in Cocaine in 2012; (2) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and\\n(3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2015. This meant that the offense level increased to 34. PSR at 5.\\nThe resulting guideline range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. Id. at 16.\\n\\n On September 19, 2018, the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months for Count 2\\nand 120 months for Count 3, to run concurrently. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings) (Page ID\\n#292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). Wiseman timely filed his notice of\\nappeal. R. 65 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #301).\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Wiseman advances four claims of error on appeal. We address and reject each one in turn.\\n\\nA. First Step Act and qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) & 851(a)\\n\\n We review de novo the sufficiency of an information filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) to\\nsupport the enhancement of a statutory penalty. United States v. Pritchett, 496 F.3d 537, 541\\n(6th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Wiseman argues that he has not committed any “serious drug felonies” as defined by the\\nFirst Step Act of 2018, and therefore that he is not eligible for the sentencing enhancement under\\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 851(a). The government counters that the First Step Act does not\\napply to Wiseman both because he was sentenced before its effective date and also because the\\nFirst Step Act did not alter 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the subsection under which Wiseman was\\nconvicted.\\n\\n Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory maximum penalty increases from twenty to\\nthirty years of imprisonment if the perpetrator has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 6\\n\\n\\nThe government must file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) informing the defendant\\nand court of the defendant’s qualifying prior conviction or convictions. Here, the government\\nfiled its January 23, 2018 notice informing Wiseman and the court that it would rely on three of\\nWiseman’s prior felony drug offense convictions to seek the enhanced penalty.\\n\\n Wiseman’s First Step Act argument fails for both independent reasons advanced by the\\ngovernment. First, the First Step Act is largely forward-looking and not retroactive, applying\\nonly where “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the] date of enactment.” Pub.\\nL. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(c). Section 404 of the Act makes retroactive only certain\\nstatutory changes pertaining to threshold crack cocaine weights triggering mandatory minimum\\nsentences that were enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. See Pub. L. No. 115-391,\\n132 Stat. 5194, § 404(b); see also United States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2019)\\n(noting that § 404 of the First Step Act applies retroactively); United States v. Jones, 767 F.\\nApp’x 475, 476 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting the process to attain retroactive application\\nof the Fair Sentencing Act under the First Step Act); United States v. Bedford, 770 F. App’x 260,\\n262 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing the limited retroactivity of the First Step Act). This provision\\ndoes not pertain to Wiseman’s case. The First Step Act had an effective date of December 21,\\n2018, but Wiseman was sentenced on September 19, 2018. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings)\\n(Page ID #292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). He therefore cannot benefit\\nfrom the First Step Act as he was sentenced prior to its effective date and its limited retroactivity\\ndoes not apply to him.\\n\\n Second, the First Step Act did not alter the definition of “felony drug offense[s]” that\\nserve as qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). It did, however, impact\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), changing qualifying convictions under these sections from\\n“felony drug offense[s]” to “serious drug felon[ies]” as defined by the First Step Act. Pub. L.\\nNo. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(2)(A) & (B); see Potter, 927 F.3d at 455 (briefly\\ndiscussing the impact of the First Step Act on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). A felony drug offense, as\\ndefined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) is “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than\\none year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or\\nrestricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 7\\n\\n\\nstimulant substances.” A “serious drug felony” under the First Step Act and 21 U.S.C. § 802(57)\\ncovers a smaller set of crimes, offenses “described in [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2) for which-- (A) the\\noffender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the offender’s release\\nfrom any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the commencement of the instant\\noffense.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 802(57).\\n\\n Because Wiseman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), not § 841(b)(1)(A) or\\n(B), the First Step Act’s narrowing of qualifying convictions to serious drug felonies rather than\\nfelony drug offenses under those provisions would not impact him, even if he had been\\nsentenced after the First Step Act’s effective date. We therefore reject Wiseman’s first claim of\\nerror.\\n\\nB. Justification jury instruction\\n\\n Next, Wiseman argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on his\\nproposed justification defense. The government argues that the district court properly rejected\\nthe proposed instruction because Wiseman did not produce evidence that would have supported\\neach element of the defense.\\n\\n We generally review challenges to jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, assessing\\nthe instructions in their entirety “to determine whether they adequately informed the jury of the\\nrelevant considerations and provided a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.”\\nUnited States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Frederick,\\n406 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, “[w]here a defendant claims an affirmative\\ndefense, and that defense finds some support in the evidence and in the law, the defendant is\\nentitled to have the claimed defense discussed in the jury instructions.” United States v. Clark,\\n485 F. App’x 816, 818 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 467 (6th\\nCir. 2005)). In such circumstances, “[r]efusal to give an accurate jury instruction is reversible if\\nit impairs the defendant’s theory of the case and is not covered adequately by the instructions\\ngiven.” Id. (quoting United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994)).\\n\\n Wiseman appears to suggest that he was entitled to a justification instruction if he made\\nout only a prima facie case for that defense. Appellant Br. at 29–30. To be clear, a prima facie\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 8\\n\\n\\ncase for the justification defense entitles the defendant to present evidence to support it, but when\\nthe defendant requests such an instruction at the close of evidence, the instruction is proper only\\nif he has “produce[d] evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance\\nof the evidence” that the defense was established. United States v. Ridner, 512 F.3d 846, 849–50\\n(6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the different questions asked at different stages of the litigation); see\\nalso United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sloan, 401 F.\\nApp’x 66, 69 (6th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n In the Sixth Circuit, the defendant advancing a justification defense must prove each of\\nfive requirements set out in United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990):\\n\\n (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending\\n threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death\\n or serious bodily injury;\\n (2) that the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a\\n situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the\\n criminal conduct;\\n (3) that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a\\n chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened\\n harm;\\n (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the\\n criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm;\\n (5) that the defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than\\n absolutely necessary.\\n\\nSloan, 401 F. App’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). “The justification defense ‘arises only\\nin “rare situations” and “should be construed very narrowly.”’” Id. (quoting Kemp, 546 F.3d at\\n765).\\n\\n In United States v. Ridner, in analyzing an assertion of the justification defense in a\\nfelon-in-possession case, we quoted the Seventh Circuit’s observation that “[t]he defense of\\nnecessity [or justification] will rarely lie in a felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not\\nbeing engaged in criminal activity, does nothing more than grab a gun with which he or another\\nis being threatened.” 512 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir.\\n1996)). In United States v. Sloan, for example, we determined that the district court had properly\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 9\\n\\n\\nrefused to instruct the jury on the justification defense where the ex-felon defendant argued that\\nhe was justified in possessing a weapon because of “bizarre occurrences” around the mobile\\nhome where he was living, including “a man with an assault rifle standing on the property,\\nlooking at the mobile home,” and then “disappear[ing] into the woods,” unlawful and mysterious\\nspraying of chemicals, and the deaths of animals on the property. 401 F. App’x at 68–69.\\nWe found these strange occurrences insufficient to establish the first Singleton requirement. Id.\\nat 69. We further concluded that the defendant could not meet the fifth Singleton requirement\\nbecause he maintained the gun at his residence for ten days and “there was no ‘imminent’ or\\n‘impending’ threat.” Id. at 70.\\n\\n Wiseman similarly has failed to show evidence of at least the first and fifth Singleton\\nrequirements. First, Wiseman was not “under an unlawful and present, imminent, and\\nimpending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious\\nbodily injury” when he first possessed the gun with which he shot Whitaker. Sloan, 401 F.\\nApp’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). Wiseman possessed the gun and had it accessible\\nlong before he observed the would-be-robber’s entry; he did not begin to possess it only when he\\nlearned of the imminent robbery. To hold that a situation such as this could give rise to a\\njustification defense would be to authorize all felons continually to possess guns within their\\nhomes on the off-chance that they might one day be burglarized. Second, Wiseman clearly did\\n“maintain the illegal conduct . . . longer than absolutely necessary.” Id. (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at\\n569). After defending himself against Whitaker, he stashed the gun he had used in a safe to\\nwhich he possessed the combination and in which he maintained other contraband, rather than\\nimmediately relinquishing it. A justification defense could not be supported by the facts here,\\nand accordingly we affirm the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on it.\\n\\nC. Suggestion of Wiseman’s status as a parolee\\n\\n Wiseman argues that he was prejudiced by Officer Eric French’s testimony, which\\nsuggested to the jury that Wiseman was a parolee. The government responds that French’s\\ntestimony did not make clear that Wiseman was a parolee and that any error in the admission of\\nthis testimony was harmless.\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 10\\n\\n\\n “We review the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.” United States v. Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, 547 (6th Cir. 2007). Erroneous admissions of\\nevidence by the district court are “subject to harmless error analysis, and it is well settled that an\\nerror which is not of constitutional dimension is harmless ‘unless it is more probable than not\\nthat the error materially affected the verdict.’” United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th\\nCir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993)).\\n\\n We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing French to\\nrelate that he had been alerted to the case by the Adult Parole Authority because any error was\\nharmless.1 “[W]here the government is required to prove as an element of the offense that the\\ndefendant has previously committed a felony, as in a [felon-in-possession] prosecution, the\\npotential for prejudice [from the jury hearing evidence of parole status] is substantially\\nlessened.” United States v. Griffin, 476 F. App’x 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States\\nv. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2004)) (alterations in original). In United States v.\\nGriffin, we determined that a police officer’s revelation that the defendant was a parolee in\\nexplaining why no search warrant was required to search his home was harmless error. Id. at\\n597–98.\\n\\n Here, as in Griffin, “[t]he jury was already well aware that the defendant had a felony\\nconviction because [he] was being prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits\\nconvicted felons from possessing firearms [and ammunition].” Id. at 598. Wiseman stipulated\\nthat he had been convicted of crimes punishable under Ohio law with a term of imprisonment of\\nover one year. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 397) (Page ID #719). This stipulation was read to the jury,\\nmeaning that the jury would have learned that Wiseman had past involvement with the criminal\\njustice system even without French’s comment. The evidence against Wiseman was also\\noverwhelming. Any error in the admission of French’s testimony regarding his communication\\nwith the parole officer was harmless.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1We do note, however, that the district court did not allow this testimony to go on for long and responded\\nto Wiseman’s objections immediately by instructing the government to “[p]ut another question” and “[m]ove on to\\nsomething else.” R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259–60) (Page ID #581–82).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 11\\n\\n\\nD. Career offender enhancement\\n\\n Finally, Wiseman argues that his prior felony controlled substance convictions should not\\nserve as qualifying offenses for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement because he\\nserved less than a year of imprisonment for each conviction; he claims that the First Step Act\\nshould inform our analysis. He essentially asks us to replace the definition of a qualifying\\noffense under the career offender Guideline with the definition of a “serious drug felony” from\\nthe First Step Act. The government counters that the First Step Act did not impact this Guideline\\nenhancement and that Wiseman’s offenses qualified because they were punishable by a term of\\nimprisonment exceeding one year.\\n\\n We review de novo the legal question of whether a conviction is a qualifying offense for\\na career offender sentencing enhancement. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th\\nCir. 2006).\\n\\n The government is correct that the First Step Act did not affect the definition of offenses\\nthat qualify for career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.\\n5194. It is not the role of this court to alter the Guidelines’ content. That is the province of the\\nSentencing Commission.\\n\\n As it stands, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides:\\n\\n A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years\\n old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the\\n instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a\\n controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony\\n convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.\\n\\nUnder the Guidelines, a controlled substance offense is\\n\\n an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term\\n exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or\\n dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession\\n of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute or dispense.\\n\\nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Wiseman does not argue that he was not at least 18 years\\nold when he was convicted of the qualifying offenses, that the offense of conviction is not a\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 12\\n\\n\\ncontrolled substance offense, that the designated prior felony convictions were not for controlled\\nsubstance offenses, or that they were not punishable for a term exceeding one year, even if he\\nhimself did not actually serve more than one year for each conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\\napp. n.1 (noting that a prior conviction need only have presented the possibility of a sentence of\\nmore than a year, “regardless of the actual sentence imposed”). We therefore reject his final\\nclaim of error.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Wiseman’s conviction and sentence.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420614/\", \"author_raw\": \"KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MOORE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643361/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joey D. WISEMAN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0169p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-3904\n v. │\n │\n │\n JOEY D. WISEMAN, JR., │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\n No. 1:17-cr-00464-1—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\n\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Marisa L. Serrat, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Scott Zarzycki, UNITED\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Joey Wiseman appeals his\nconviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and\npossession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In the early hours of August 4, 2017, Wiseman\nintercepted a would-be-robber entering his home through a window, disarmed the intruder, and\nshot him with a gun already in Wiseman’s possession. Wiseman subsequently placed the gun in\na safe containing individual baggies of drugs in a vehicle parked in his driveway prior to\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 2\n\n\ncooperating with the police who investigated the shooting. Wiseman now argues that the First\nStep Act of 2018 renders his sentencing improper, that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the\njustification defense, and that testimony about his parolee status was improperly admitted. We\nreject his challenges and AFFIRM his conviction and sentence.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\nA. Factual Background\n\n On August 4, 2017, at around 6:30 a.m., several Elyria Police Department officers were\ndispatched to 201 George Street in Elyria, Ohio and observed blood on the lower part of the\nframe of an open window of the home. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 104–07) (Page ID #426–29).\nWiseman soon appeared from between the house and a GMC Yukon parked in the driveway. He\nheld his hands up and informed the officers that there was a handgun laying in the driveway. Id.\nat 113, 222 (Page ID #435, 544). The handgun was black and stainless steel. Id. at 114 (Page ID\n#436). The officers entered the home and observed a teenaged male, Jaymone Whitaker, in a\npool of blood on the living-room floor close to the window with the bloody frame; he appeared\nto have been shot multiple times. Id. at 121 (Page ID #443). Paramedics took Whitaker to the\nhospital, and officers brought Wiseman to the police station. Id. at 124–25, 153 (Page ID #446–\n47, 475).\n\n The police collected the gun, a loaded Taurus PT 709 9mm, from the driveway. They\ncollected a package with approximately .3 grams of white powder containing cocaine from the\nkitchen floor and several 9mm Luger shell casings from the living room, where there were signs\nof a struggle. Id. at 186–87, 224 (Page ID #508–09, 546). They also observed that there were\nsurveillance cameras on the outside of the home and a monitor in the living room that displayed\nthe security footage.\n\n At the police station, officers swabbed Wiseman’s hands for gun residue and collected\n$4,949.00 in cash from Wiseman’s person. Id. at 154, 190–91 (Trial Tr. at 476, 512–13).\nWiseman was Mirandized, and he indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with\nthe police officers. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 325) (Page ID #647). The interview was recorded on\nvideo. Id. at 326 (Page ID #648).\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 3\n\n\n Wiseman informed the police that he had been awoken by a voice, used the restroom,\ncame back, sat down on the couch, and then, aided by his surveillance monitor, he saw Whitaker\n“coming up to his window, peeking in, wearing the mask.” Id. at 337, 360 (Page ID #659, 682).\nWiseman stated that he had knocked Whitaker’s gun out of his hand as Whitaker entered the\nhome and then Wiseman shot Whitaker with a black Lorcin gun that Wiseman had in the house\nwith him prior to the robber’s entry. Id. at 338 (Page ID #660). Wiseman subsequently placed\nthe black Lorcin gun in a safe in the back of the Yukon parked in the driveway. Id. at 335 (Page\nID #657). Wiseman admitted that between five and twenty-five grams of cocaine were also\ninside of the safe. Id. at 333, 341–42 (Page ID #655, 663–664). Wiseman stated that he had not\ncalled 9-1-1 after shooting Whitaker, but rather Wiseman’s first response had been to gather his\nmoney and other things prior to calling the authorities. Id. at 334 (Page ID #656).\n\n Wiseman provided the officers with the combination to the safe in the Yukon. Id. at 342\n(Page ID #664). The officers obtained a search warrant, towed the vehicle to the police station,\nand searched the safe. Id. at 343 (Page ID #665). It contained the black Lorcin 9mm handgun\nwith a defaced serial number, 11 individual bags of similar quantities of a white powder\ncontaining cocaine, a bag of cutting material, and a shoebox containing a digital scale, spoon,\nscissors, and baggies. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 158–60) (Page ID #480–82); R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 343)\n(Page ID #665). The safe also contained documents bearing Wiseman’s name. R. 75 (Trial Tr.\nat 343–44) (Page ID #665–66).\n\n The officers obtained Wiseman’s consent to view the surveillance video from the home.\nId. at 346 (Page ID #668). It showed Whitaker entering the home through the window and\nholding a black and silver gun. Id. at 350 (Page ID #672). It subsequently showed Wiseman\nwalking outside the home. Id. at 352–53, 355 (Page ID #674–75, 677).\n\nB. Procedural History\n\n On November 8, 2017, Wiseman was indicted on three counts stemming from the August\n4 events. R. 1 (Indictment) (Page ID #1–2). Count 1 charged him with possession with intent to\ndistribute approximately .28 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C).\nCount 2 charged him with possession with intent to distribute approximately 11.28 grams of\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 4\n\n\ncocaine in violation of the same statute. Count 3 charged him with being a felon in possession of\na firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924.\n\n On January 23, 2018, the government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)\nstating the previous felony drug offense convictions that it intended to rely upon in enhancing his\nsentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). R. 18 (Information) (Page ID #57–59). These\nconvictions were for: (1) Possession of Cocaine in 2016; (2) Illegal Conveyance of Drugs of\nAbuse onto the Grounds of a Specified Government Facility, Trafficking in Drugs and\nPossession of Drugs in 2015; (3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and (4) Trafficking in Cocaine in\n2012. On June 8, 2018, Wiseman filed a proposed jury instruction on a justification defense.\nR. 47 (Def.’s Proposed Jury Instruction) (Page ID #201–02).\n\n Wiseman’s jury trial commenced on June 12, 2018. R. 50 (Trial Minutes) (Page ID\n#206). At trial, Special Agent Eric French testified about his involvement in the case. When\nasked how he had come to be involved in the case, he testified that he got “a call from Adult\nParole Authority,” specifically Parole Officer Daniel Riley. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259) (Page ID\n#581). Wiseman objected to this testimony and the court instructed the government to move on.\nId. at 259–60 (Page ID #581–82). French went on to testify that his role in the case involved\nattempting to trace the Lorcin gun. Id. at 260–68 (Page ID #582–90). At the close of trial,\nWiseman reiterated his request for a jury instruction on a justification defense, and the district\ncourt heard oral argument from both sides and ultimately declined to issue such an instruction.\nR. 75 (Trial Tr. at 375–82) (Page ID #697–704). Wiseman moved for a judgment of acquittal on\nall counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29; the court denied his motion. R. 75\n(Trial Tr. at 409) (Page ID #731).\n\n Wiseman was acquitted of Count 1 and convicted of Counts 2 and 3. R. 52 (Jury Verdict\non Count 1) (Page ID #208); R. 53 (Jury Verdict on Count 2) (Page ID #210); R. 54 (Jury\nVerdict on Count 3) (Page ID #212). The jury found via a special verdict form that Wiseman\npossessed the Lorcin pistol with an obliterated serial number and ammunition. R. 55 (Special\nVerdict Form) (Page ID #214).\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 5\n\n\n The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated the adjusted offense level, after grouping, to\nbe 28. PSR at 5. The amount of drugs and the government’s filing of an information under\n21 U.S.C. § 851(a) increased the maximum term of imprisonment from 20 to 30 years.\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The PSR then applied the career offender enhancement under\n§ 4B1.1(b), based on the fact that the offense of conviction was a felony controlled substance\noffense and Wiseman’s having at least two prior felony convictions for a controlled substance\noffense: (1) Trafficking in Cocaine in 2012; (2) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and\n(3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2015. This meant that the offense level increased to 34. PSR at 5.\nThe resulting guideline range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. Id. at 16.\n\n On September 19, 2018, the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months for Count 2\nand 120 months for Count 3, to run concurrently. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings) (Page ID\n#292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). Wiseman timely filed his notice of\nappeal. R. 65 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #301).\n\n II. DISCUSSION\n\n Wiseman advances four claims of error on appeal. We address and reject each one in turn.\n\nA. First Step Act and qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) & 851(a)\n\n We review de novo the sufficiency of an information filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) to\nsupport the enhancement of a statutory penalty. United States v. Pritchett, 496 F.3d 537, 541\n(6th Cir. 2007).\n\n Wiseman argues that he has not committed any “serious drug felonies” as defined by the\nFirst Step Act of 2018, and therefore that he is not eligible for the sentencing enhancement under\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 851(a). The government counters that the First Step Act does not\napply to Wiseman both because he was sentenced before its effective date and also because the\nFirst Step Act did not alter 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the subsection under which Wiseman was\nconvicted.\n\n Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory maximum penalty increases from twenty to\nthirty years of imprisonment if the perpetrator has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 6\n\n\nThe government must file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) informing the defendant\nand court of the defendant’s qualifying prior conviction or convictions. Here, the government\nfiled its January 23, 2018 notice informing Wiseman and the court that it would rely on three of\nWiseman’s prior felony drug offense convictions to seek the enhanced penalty.\n\n Wiseman’s First Step Act argument fails for both independent reasons advanced by the\ngovernment. First, the First Step Act is largely forward-looking and not retroactive, applying\nonly where “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the] date of enactment.” Pub.\nL. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(c). Section 404 of the Act makes retroactive only certain\nstatutory changes pertaining to threshold crack cocaine weights triggering mandatory minimum\nsentences that were enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. See Pub. L. No. 115-391,\n132 Stat. 5194, § 404(b); see also United States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2019)\n(noting that § 404 of the First Step Act applies retroactively); United States v. Jones, 767 F.\nApp’x 475, 476 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting the process to attain retroactive application\nof the Fair Sentencing Act under the First Step Act); United States v. Bedford, 770 F. App’x 260,\n262 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing the limited retroactivity of the First Step Act). This provision\ndoes not pertain to Wiseman’s case. The First Step Act had an effective date of December 21,\n2018, but Wiseman was sentenced on September 19, 2018. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings)\n(Page ID #292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). He therefore cannot benefit\nfrom the First Step Act as he was sentenced prior to its effective date and its limited retroactivity\ndoes not apply to him.\n\n Second, the First Step Act did not alter the definition of “felony drug offense[s]” that\nserve as qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). It did, however, impact\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), changing qualifying convictions under these sections from\n“felony drug offense[s]” to “serious drug felon[ies]” as defined by the First Step Act. Pub. L.\nNo. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(2)(A) & (B); see Potter, 927 F.3d at 455 (briefly\ndiscussing the impact of the First Step Act on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). A felony drug offense, as\ndefined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) is “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than\none year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or\nrestricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 7\n\n\nstimulant substances.” A “serious drug felony” under the First Step Act and 21 U.S.C. § 802(57)\ncovers a smaller set of crimes, offenses “described in [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2) for which-- (A) the\noffender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the offender’s release\nfrom any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the commencement of the instant\noffense.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 802(57).\n\n Because Wiseman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), not § 841(b)(1)(A) or\n(B), the First Step Act’s narrowing of qualifying convictions to serious drug felonies rather than\nfelony drug offenses under those provisions would not impact him, even if he had been\nsentenced after the First Step Act’s effective date. We therefore reject Wiseman’s first claim of\nerror.\n\nB. Justification jury instruction\n\n Next, Wiseman argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on his\nproposed justification defense. The government argues that the district court properly rejected\nthe proposed instruction because Wiseman did not produce evidence that would have supported\neach element of the defense.\n\n We generally review challenges to jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, assessing\nthe instructions in their entirety “to determine whether they adequately informed the jury of the\nrelevant considerations and provided a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.”\nUnited States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Frederick,\n406 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, “[w]here a defendant claims an affirmative\ndefense, and that defense finds some support in the evidence and in the law, the defendant is\nentitled to have the claimed defense discussed in the jury instructions.” United States v. Clark,\n485 F. App’x 816, 818 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 467 (6th\nCir. 2005)). In such circumstances, “[r]efusal to give an accurate jury instruction is reversible if\nit impairs the defendant’s theory of the case and is not covered adequately by the instructions\ngiven.” Id. (quoting United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994)).\n\n Wiseman appears to suggest that he was entitled to a justification instruction if he made\nout only a prima facie case for that defense. Appellant Br. at 29–30. To be clear, a prima facie\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 8\n\n\ncase for the justification defense entitles the defendant to present evidence to support it, but when\nthe defendant requests such an instruction at the close of evidence, the instruction is proper only\nif he has “produce[d] evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance\nof the evidence” that the defense was established. United States v. Ridner, 512 F.3d 846, 849–50\n(6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the different questions asked at different stages of the litigation); see\nalso United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sloan, 401 F.\nApp’x 66, 69 (6th Cir. 2010).\n\n In the Sixth Circuit, the defendant advancing a justification defense must prove each of\nfive requirements set out in United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990):\n\n (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending\n threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death\n or serious bodily injury;\n (2) that the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a\n situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the\n criminal conduct;\n (3) that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a\n chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened\n harm;\n (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the\n criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm;\n (5) that the defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than\n absolutely necessary.\n\nSloan, 401 F. App’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). “The justification defense ‘arises only\nin “rare situations” and “should be construed very narrowly.”’” Id. (quoting Kemp, 546 F.3d at\n765).\n\n In United States v. Ridner, in analyzing an assertion of the justification defense in a\nfelon-in-possession case, we quoted the Seventh Circuit’s observation that “[t]he defense of\nnecessity [or justification] will rarely lie in a felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not\nbeing engaged in criminal activity, does nothing more than grab a gun with which he or another\nis being threatened.” 512 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir.\n1996)). In United States v. Sloan, for example, we determined that the district court had properly\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 9\n\n\nrefused to instruct the jury on the justification defense where the ex-felon defendant argued that\nhe was justified in possessing a weapon because of “bizarre occurrences” around the mobile\nhome where he was living, including “a man with an assault rifle standing on the property,\nlooking at the mobile home,” and then “disappear[ing] into the woods,” unlawful and mysterious\nspraying of chemicals, and the deaths of animals on the property. 401 F. App’x at 68–69.\nWe found these strange occurrences insufficient to establish the first Singleton requirement. Id.\nat 69. We further concluded that the defendant could not meet the fifth Singleton requirement\nbecause he maintained the gun at his residence for ten days and “there was no ‘imminent’ or\n‘impending’ threat.” Id. at 70.\n\n Wiseman similarly has failed to show evidence of at least the first and fifth Singleton\nrequirements. First, Wiseman was not “under an unlawful and present, imminent, and\nimpending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious\nbodily injury” when he first possessed the gun with which he shot Whitaker. Sloan, 401 F.\nApp’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). Wiseman possessed the gun and had it accessible\nlong before he observed the would-be-robber’s entry; he did not begin to possess it only when he\nlearned of the imminent robbery. To hold that a situation such as this could give rise to a\njustification defense would be to authorize all felons continually to possess guns within their\nhomes on the off-chance that they might one day be burglarized. Second, Wiseman clearly did\n“maintain the illegal conduct . . . longer than absolutely necessary.” Id. (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at\n569). After defending himself against Whitaker, he stashed the gun he had used in a safe to\nwhich he possessed the combination and in which he maintained other contraband, rather than\nimmediately relinquishing it. A justification defense could not be supported by the facts here,\nand accordingly we affirm the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on it.\n\nC. Suggestion of Wiseman’s status as a parolee\n\n Wiseman argues that he was prejudiced by Officer Eric French’s testimony, which\nsuggested to the jury that Wiseman was a parolee. The government responds that French’s\ntestimony did not make clear that Wiseman was a parolee and that any error in the admission of\nthis testimony was harmless.\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 10\n\n\n “We review the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of\ndiscretion.” United States v. Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, 547 (6th Cir. 2007). Erroneous admissions of\nevidence by the district court are “subject to harmless error analysis, and it is well settled that an\nerror which is not of constitutional dimension is harmless ‘unless it is more probable than not\nthat the error materially affected the verdict.’” United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th\nCir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993)).\n\n We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing French to\nrelate that he had been alerted to the case by the Adult Parole Authority because any error was\nharmless.1 “[W]here the government is required to prove as an element of the offense that the\ndefendant has previously committed a felony, as in a [felon-in-possession] prosecution, the\npotential for prejudice [from the jury hearing evidence of parole status] is substantially\nlessened.” United States v. Griffin, 476 F. App’x 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States\nv. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2004)) (alterations in original). In United States v.\nGriffin, we determined that a police officer’s revelation that the defendant was a parolee in\nexplaining why no search warrant was required to search his home was harmless error. Id. at\n597–98.\n\n Here, as in Griffin, “[t]he jury was already well aware that the defendant had a felony\nconviction because [he] was being prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits\nconvicted felons from possessing firearms [and ammunition].” Id. at 598. Wiseman stipulated\nthat he had been convicted of crimes punishable under Ohio law with a term of imprisonment of\nover one year. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 397) (Page ID #719). This stipulation was read to the jury,\nmeaning that the jury would have learned that Wiseman had past involvement with the criminal\njustice system even without French’s comment. The evidence against Wiseman was also\noverwhelming. Any error in the admission of French’s testimony regarding his communication\nwith the parole officer was harmless.\n\n\n\n\n 1We do note, however, that the district court did not allow this testimony to go on for long and responded\nto Wiseman’s objections immediately by instructing the government to “[p]ut another question” and “[m]ove on to\nsomething else.” R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259–60) (Page ID #581–82).\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 11\n\n\nD. Career offender enhancement\n\n Finally, Wiseman argues that his prior felony controlled substance convictions should not\nserve as qualifying offenses for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement because he\nserved less than a year of imprisonment for each conviction; he claims that the First Step Act\nshould inform our analysis. He essentially asks us to replace the definition of a qualifying\noffense under the career offender Guideline with the definition of a “serious drug felony” from\nthe First Step Act. The government counters that the First Step Act did not impact this Guideline\nenhancement and that Wiseman’s offenses qualified because they were punishable by a term of\nimprisonment exceeding one year.\n\n We review de novo the legal question of whether a conviction is a qualifying offense for\na career offender sentencing enhancement. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th\nCir. 2006).\n\n The government is correct that the First Step Act did not affect the definition of offenses\nthat qualify for career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.\n5194. It is not the role of this court to alter the Guidelines’ content. That is the province of the\nSentencing Commission.\n\n As it stands, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides:\n\n A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years\n old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the\n instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a\n controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony\n convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.\n\nUnder the Guidelines, a controlled substance offense is\n\n an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term\n exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or\n dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession\n of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\n import, export, distribute or dispense.\n\nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Wiseman does not argue that he was not at least 18 years\nold when he was convicted of the qualifying offenses, that the offense of conviction is not a\n\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 12\n\n\ncontrolled substance offense, that the designated prior felony convictions were not for controlled\nsubstance offenses, or that they were not punishable for a term exceeding one year, even if he\nhimself did not actually serve more than one year for each conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\napp. n.1 (noting that a prior conviction need only have presented the possibility of a sentence of\nmore than a year, “regardless of the actual sentence imposed”). We therefore reject his final\nclaim of error.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Wiseman’s conviction and sentence.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joey D. WISEMAN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0169p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3904\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JOEY D. WISEMAN, JR., │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00464-1—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Marisa L. Serrat, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Scott Zarzycki, UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Joey Wiseman appeals his\\nconviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and\\npossession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In the early hours of August 4, 2017, Wiseman\\nintercepted a would-be-robber entering his home through a window, disarmed the intruder, and\\nshot him with a gun already in Wiseman’s possession. Wiseman subsequently placed the gun in\\na safe containing individual baggies of drugs in a vehicle parked in his driveway prior to\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 2\\n\\n\\ncooperating with the police who investigated the shooting. Wiseman now argues that the First\\nStep Act of 2018 renders his sentencing improper, that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the\\njustification defense, and that testimony about his parolee status was improperly admitted. We\\nreject his challenges and AFFIRM his conviction and sentence.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\nA. Factual Background\\n\\n On August 4, 2017, at around 6:30 a.m., several Elyria Police Department officers were\\ndispatched to 201 George Street in Elyria, Ohio and observed blood on the lower part of the\\nframe of an open window of the home. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 104–07) (Page ID #426–29).\\nWiseman soon appeared from between the house and a GMC Yukon parked in the driveway. He\\nheld his hands up and informed the officers that there was a handgun laying in the driveway. Id.\\nat 113, 222 (Page ID #435, 544). The handgun was black and stainless steel. Id. at 114 (Page ID\\n#436). The officers entered the home and observed a teenaged male, Jaymone Whitaker, in a\\npool of blood on the living-room floor close to the window with the bloody frame; he appeared\\nto have been shot multiple times. Id. at 121 (Page ID #443). Paramedics took Whitaker to the\\nhospital, and officers brought Wiseman to the police station. Id. at 124–25, 153 (Page ID #446–\\n47, 475).\\n\\n The police collected the gun, a loaded Taurus PT 709 9mm, from the driveway. They\\ncollected a package with approximately .3 grams of white powder containing cocaine from the\\nkitchen floor and several 9mm Luger shell casings from the living room, where there were signs\\nof a struggle. Id. at 186–87, 224 (Page ID #508–09, 546). They also observed that there were\\nsurveillance cameras on the outside of the home and a monitor in the living room that displayed\\nthe security footage.\\n\\n At the police station, officers swabbed Wiseman’s hands for gun residue and collected\\n$4,949.00 in cash from Wiseman’s person. Id. at 154, 190–91 (Trial Tr. at 476, 512–13).\\nWiseman was Mirandized, and he indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with\\nthe police officers. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 325) (Page ID #647). The interview was recorded on\\nvideo. Id. at 326 (Page ID #648).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 3\\n\\n\\n Wiseman informed the police that he had been awoken by a voice, used the restroom,\\ncame back, sat down on the couch, and then, aided by his surveillance monitor, he saw Whitaker\\n“coming up to his window, peeking in, wearing the mask.” Id. at 337, 360 (Page ID #659, 682).\\nWiseman stated that he had knocked Whitaker’s gun out of his hand as Whitaker entered the\\nhome and then Wiseman shot Whitaker with a black Lorcin gun that Wiseman had in the house\\nwith him prior to the robber’s entry. Id. at 338 (Page ID #660). Wiseman subsequently placed\\nthe black Lorcin gun in a safe in the back of the Yukon parked in the driveway. Id. at 335 (Page\\nID #657). Wiseman admitted that between five and twenty-five grams of cocaine were also\\ninside of the safe. Id. at 333, 341–42 (Page ID #655, 663–664). Wiseman stated that he had not\\ncalled 9-1-1 after shooting Whitaker, but rather Wiseman’s first response had been to gather his\\nmoney and other things prior to calling the authorities. Id. at 334 (Page ID #656).\\n\\n Wiseman provided the officers with the combination to the safe in the Yukon. Id. at 342\\n(Page ID #664). The officers obtained a search warrant, towed the vehicle to the police station,\\nand searched the safe. Id. at 343 (Page ID #665). It contained the black Lorcin 9mm handgun\\nwith a defaced serial number, 11 individual bags of similar quantities of a white powder\\ncontaining cocaine, a bag of cutting material, and a shoebox containing a digital scale, spoon,\\nscissors, and baggies. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 158–60) (Page ID #480–82); R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 343)\\n(Page ID #665). The safe also contained documents bearing Wiseman’s name. R. 75 (Trial Tr.\\nat 343–44) (Page ID #665–66).\\n\\n The officers obtained Wiseman’s consent to view the surveillance video from the home.\\nId. at 346 (Page ID #668). It showed Whitaker entering the home through the window and\\nholding a black and silver gun. Id. at 350 (Page ID #672). It subsequently showed Wiseman\\nwalking outside the home. Id. at 352–53, 355 (Page ID #674–75, 677).\\n\\nB. Procedural History\\n\\n On November 8, 2017, Wiseman was indicted on three counts stemming from the August\\n4 events. R. 1 (Indictment) (Page ID #1–2). Count 1 charged him with possession with intent to\\ndistribute approximately .28 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C).\\nCount 2 charged him with possession with intent to distribute approximately 11.28 grams of\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 4\\n\\n\\ncocaine in violation of the same statute. Count 3 charged him with being a felon in possession of\\na firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924.\\n\\n On January 23, 2018, the government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)\\nstating the previous felony drug offense convictions that it intended to rely upon in enhancing his\\nsentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). R. 18 (Information) (Page ID #57–59). These\\nconvictions were for: (1) Possession of Cocaine in 2016; (2) Illegal Conveyance of Drugs of\\nAbuse onto the Grounds of a Specified Government Facility, Trafficking in Drugs and\\nPossession of Drugs in 2015; (3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and (4) Trafficking in Cocaine in\\n2012. On June 8, 2018, Wiseman filed a proposed jury instruction on a justification defense.\\nR. 47 (Def.’s Proposed Jury Instruction) (Page ID #201–02).\\n\\n Wiseman’s jury trial commenced on June 12, 2018. R. 50 (Trial Minutes) (Page ID\\n#206). At trial, Special Agent Eric French testified about his involvement in the case. When\\nasked how he had come to be involved in the case, he testified that he got “a call from Adult\\nParole Authority,” specifically Parole Officer Daniel Riley. R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259) (Page ID\\n#581). Wiseman objected to this testimony and the court instructed the government to move on.\\nId. at 259–60 (Page ID #581–82). French went on to testify that his role in the case involved\\nattempting to trace the Lorcin gun. Id. at 260–68 (Page ID #582–90). At the close of trial,\\nWiseman reiterated his request for a jury instruction on a justification defense, and the district\\ncourt heard oral argument from both sides and ultimately declined to issue such an instruction.\\nR. 75 (Trial Tr. at 375–82) (Page ID #697–704). Wiseman moved for a judgment of acquittal on\\nall counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29; the court denied his motion. R. 75\\n(Trial Tr. at 409) (Page ID #731).\\n\\n Wiseman was acquitted of Count 1 and convicted of Counts 2 and 3. R. 52 (Jury Verdict\\non Count 1) (Page ID #208); R. 53 (Jury Verdict on Count 2) (Page ID #210); R. 54 (Jury\\nVerdict on Count 3) (Page ID #212). The jury found via a special verdict form that Wiseman\\npossessed the Lorcin pistol with an obliterated serial number and ammunition. R. 55 (Special\\nVerdict Form) (Page ID #214).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 5\\n\\n\\n The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated the adjusted offense level, after grouping, to\\nbe 28. PSR at 5. The amount of drugs and the government’s filing of an information under\\n21 U.S.C. § 851(a) increased the maximum term of imprisonment from 20 to 30 years.\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The PSR then applied the career offender enhancement under\\n§ 4B1.1(b), based on the fact that the offense of conviction was a felony controlled substance\\noffense and Wiseman’s having at least two prior felony convictions for a controlled substance\\noffense: (1) Trafficking in Cocaine in 2012; (2) Trafficking in Drugs in 2014; and\\n(3) Trafficking in Drugs in 2015. This meant that the offense level increased to 34. PSR at 5.\\nThe resulting guideline range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. Id. at 16.\\n\\n On September 19, 2018, the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months for Count 2\\nand 120 months for Count 3, to run concurrently. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings) (Page ID\\n#292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). Wiseman timely filed his notice of\\nappeal. R. 65 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #301).\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Wiseman advances four claims of error on appeal. We address and reject each one in turn.\\n\\nA. First Step Act and qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) & 851(a)\\n\\n We review de novo the sufficiency of an information filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) to\\nsupport the enhancement of a statutory penalty. United States v. Pritchett, 496 F.3d 537, 541\\n(6th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Wiseman argues that he has not committed any “serious drug felonies” as defined by the\\nFirst Step Act of 2018, and therefore that he is not eligible for the sentencing enhancement under\\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 851(a). The government counters that the First Step Act does not\\napply to Wiseman both because he was sentenced before its effective date and also because the\\nFirst Step Act did not alter 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the subsection under which Wiseman was\\nconvicted.\\n\\n Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory maximum penalty increases from twenty to\\nthirty years of imprisonment if the perpetrator has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 6\\n\\n\\nThe government must file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) informing the defendant\\nand court of the defendant’s qualifying prior conviction or convictions. Here, the government\\nfiled its January 23, 2018 notice informing Wiseman and the court that it would rely on three of\\nWiseman’s prior felony drug offense convictions to seek the enhanced penalty.\\n\\n Wiseman’s First Step Act argument fails for both independent reasons advanced by the\\ngovernment. First, the First Step Act is largely forward-looking and not retroactive, applying\\nonly where “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the] date of enactment.” Pub.\\nL. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(c). Section 404 of the Act makes retroactive only certain\\nstatutory changes pertaining to threshold crack cocaine weights triggering mandatory minimum\\nsentences that were enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. See Pub. L. No. 115-391,\\n132 Stat. 5194, § 404(b); see also United States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2019)\\n(noting that § 404 of the First Step Act applies retroactively); United States v. Jones, 767 F.\\nApp’x 475, 476 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting the process to attain retroactive application\\nof the Fair Sentencing Act under the First Step Act); United States v. Bedford, 770 F. App’x 260,\\n262 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing the limited retroactivity of the First Step Act). This provision\\ndoes not pertain to Wiseman’s case. The First Step Act had an effective date of December 21,\\n2018, but Wiseman was sentenced on September 19, 2018. R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings)\\n(Page ID #292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). He therefore cannot benefit\\nfrom the First Step Act as he was sentenced prior to its effective date and its limited retroactivity\\ndoes not apply to him.\\n\\n Second, the First Step Act did not alter the definition of “felony drug offense[s]” that\\nserve as qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). It did, however, impact\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), changing qualifying convictions under these sections from\\n“felony drug offense[s]” to “serious drug felon[ies]” as defined by the First Step Act. Pub. L.\\nNo. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(2)(A) & (B); see Potter, 927 F.3d at 455 (briefly\\ndiscussing the impact of the First Step Act on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). A felony drug offense, as\\ndefined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) is “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than\\none year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or\\nrestricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 7\\n\\n\\nstimulant substances.” A “serious drug felony” under the First Step Act and 21 U.S.C. § 802(57)\\ncovers a smaller set of crimes, offenses “described in [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2) for which-- (A) the\\noffender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the offender’s release\\nfrom any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the commencement of the instant\\noffense.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 401(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 802(57).\\n\\n Because Wiseman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), not § 841(b)(1)(A) or\\n(B), the First Step Act’s narrowing of qualifying convictions to serious drug felonies rather than\\nfelony drug offenses under those provisions would not impact him, even if he had been\\nsentenced after the First Step Act’s effective date. We therefore reject Wiseman’s first claim of\\nerror.\\n\\nB. Justification jury instruction\\n\\n Next, Wiseman argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on his\\nproposed justification defense. The government argues that the district court properly rejected\\nthe proposed instruction because Wiseman did not produce evidence that would have supported\\neach element of the defense.\\n\\n We generally review challenges to jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, assessing\\nthe instructions in their entirety “to determine whether they adequately informed the jury of the\\nrelevant considerations and provided a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.”\\nUnited States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Frederick,\\n406 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, “[w]here a defendant claims an affirmative\\ndefense, and that defense finds some support in the evidence and in the law, the defendant is\\nentitled to have the claimed defense discussed in the jury instructions.” United States v. Clark,\\n485 F. App’x 816, 818 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 467 (6th\\nCir. 2005)). In such circumstances, “[r]efusal to give an accurate jury instruction is reversible if\\nit impairs the defendant’s theory of the case and is not covered adequately by the instructions\\ngiven.” Id. (quoting United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994)).\\n\\n Wiseman appears to suggest that he was entitled to a justification instruction if he made\\nout only a prima facie case for that defense. Appellant Br. at 29–30. To be clear, a prima facie\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 8\\n\\n\\ncase for the justification defense entitles the defendant to present evidence to support it, but when\\nthe defendant requests such an instruction at the close of evidence, the instruction is proper only\\nif he has “produce[d] evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance\\nof the evidence” that the defense was established. United States v. Ridner, 512 F.3d 846, 849–50\\n(6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the different questions asked at different stages of the litigation); see\\nalso United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sloan, 401 F.\\nApp’x 66, 69 (6th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n In the Sixth Circuit, the defendant advancing a justification defense must prove each of\\nfive requirements set out in United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990):\\n\\n (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending\\n threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death\\n or serious bodily injury;\\n (2) that the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a\\n situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the\\n criminal conduct;\\n (3) that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a\\n chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened\\n harm;\\n (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the\\n criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm;\\n (5) that the defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than\\n absolutely necessary.\\n\\nSloan, 401 F. App’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). “The justification defense ‘arises only\\nin “rare situations” and “should be construed very narrowly.”’” Id. (quoting Kemp, 546 F.3d at\\n765).\\n\\n In United States v. Ridner, in analyzing an assertion of the justification defense in a\\nfelon-in-possession case, we quoted the Seventh Circuit’s observation that “[t]he defense of\\nnecessity [or justification] will rarely lie in a felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not\\nbeing engaged in criminal activity, does nothing more than grab a gun with which he or another\\nis being threatened.” 512 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir.\\n1996)). In United States v. Sloan, for example, we determined that the district court had properly\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 9\\n\\n\\nrefused to instruct the jury on the justification defense where the ex-felon defendant argued that\\nhe was justified in possessing a weapon because of “bizarre occurrences” around the mobile\\nhome where he was living, including “a man with an assault rifle standing on the property,\\nlooking at the mobile home,” and then “disappear[ing] into the woods,” unlawful and mysterious\\nspraying of chemicals, and the deaths of animals on the property. 401 F. App’x at 68–69.\\nWe found these strange occurrences insufficient to establish the first Singleton requirement. Id.\\nat 69. We further concluded that the defendant could not meet the fifth Singleton requirement\\nbecause he maintained the gun at his residence for ten days and “there was no ‘imminent’ or\\n‘impending’ threat.” Id. at 70.\\n\\n Wiseman similarly has failed to show evidence of at least the first and fifth Singleton\\nrequirements. First, Wiseman was not “under an unlawful and present, imminent, and\\nimpending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious\\nbodily injury” when he first possessed the gun with which he shot Whitaker. Sloan, 401 F.\\nApp’x at 69 (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at 569). Wiseman possessed the gun and had it accessible\\nlong before he observed the would-be-robber’s entry; he did not begin to possess it only when he\\nlearned of the imminent robbery. To hold that a situation such as this could give rise to a\\njustification defense would be to authorize all felons continually to possess guns within their\\nhomes on the off-chance that they might one day be burglarized. Second, Wiseman clearly did\\n“maintain the illegal conduct . . . longer than absolutely necessary.” Id. (quoting Riffe, 28 F.3d at\\n569). After defending himself against Whitaker, he stashed the gun he had used in a safe to\\nwhich he possessed the combination and in which he maintained other contraband, rather than\\nimmediately relinquishing it. A justification defense could not be supported by the facts here,\\nand accordingly we affirm the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on it.\\n\\nC. Suggestion of Wiseman’s status as a parolee\\n\\n Wiseman argues that he was prejudiced by Officer Eric French’s testimony, which\\nsuggested to the jury that Wiseman was a parolee. The government responds that French’s\\ntestimony did not make clear that Wiseman was a parolee and that any error in the admission of\\nthis testimony was harmless.\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 10\\n\\n\\n “We review the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.” United States v. Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, 547 (6th Cir. 2007). Erroneous admissions of\\nevidence by the district court are “subject to harmless error analysis, and it is well settled that an\\nerror which is not of constitutional dimension is harmless ‘unless it is more probable than not\\nthat the error materially affected the verdict.’” United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th\\nCir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993)).\\n\\n We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing French to\\nrelate that he had been alerted to the case by the Adult Parole Authority because any error was\\nharmless.1 “[W]here the government is required to prove as an element of the offense that the\\ndefendant has previously committed a felony, as in a [felon-in-possession] prosecution, the\\npotential for prejudice [from the jury hearing evidence of parole status] is substantially\\nlessened.” United States v. Griffin, 476 F. App’x 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States\\nv. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2004)) (alterations in original). In United States v.\\nGriffin, we determined that a police officer’s revelation that the defendant was a parolee in\\nexplaining why no search warrant was required to search his home was harmless error. Id. at\\n597–98.\\n\\n Here, as in Griffin, “[t]he jury was already well aware that the defendant had a felony\\nconviction because [he] was being prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits\\nconvicted felons from possessing firearms [and ammunition].” Id. at 598. Wiseman stipulated\\nthat he had been convicted of crimes punishable under Ohio law with a term of imprisonment of\\nover one year. R. 75 (Trial Tr. at 397) (Page ID #719). This stipulation was read to the jury,\\nmeaning that the jury would have learned that Wiseman had past involvement with the criminal\\njustice system even without French’s comment. The evidence against Wiseman was also\\noverwhelming. Any error in the admission of French’s testimony regarding his communication\\nwith the parole officer was harmless.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1We do note, however, that the district court did not allow this testimony to go on for long and responded\\nto Wiseman’s objections immediately by instructing the government to “[p]ut another question” and “[m]ove on to\\nsomething else.” R. 74 (Trial Tr. at 259–60) (Page ID #581–82).\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 11\\n\\n\\nD. Career offender enhancement\\n\\n Finally, Wiseman argues that his prior felony controlled substance convictions should not\\nserve as qualifying offenses for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement because he\\nserved less than a year of imprisonment for each conviction; he claims that the First Step Act\\nshould inform our analysis. He essentially asks us to replace the definition of a qualifying\\noffense under the career offender Guideline with the definition of a “serious drug felony” from\\nthe First Step Act. The government counters that the First Step Act did not impact this Guideline\\nenhancement and that Wiseman’s offenses qualified because they were punishable by a term of\\nimprisonment exceeding one year.\\n\\n We review de novo the legal question of whether a conviction is a qualifying offense for\\na career offender sentencing enhancement. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th\\nCir. 2006).\\n\\n The government is correct that the First Step Act did not affect the definition of offenses\\nthat qualify for career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.\\n5194. It is not the role of this court to alter the Guidelines’ content. That is the province of the\\nSentencing Commission.\\n\\n As it stands, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides:\\n\\n A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years\\n old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the\\n instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a\\n controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony\\n convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.\\n\\nUnder the Guidelines, a controlled substance offense is\\n\\n an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term\\n exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or\\n dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession\\n of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute or dispense.\\n\\nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Wiseman does not argue that he was not at least 18 years\\nold when he was convicted of the qualifying offenses, that the offense of conviction is not a\\n\\f No. 18-3904 United States v. Wiseman Page 12\\n\\n\\ncontrolled substance offense, that the designated prior felony convictions were not for controlled\\nsubstance offenses, or that they were not punishable for a term exceeding one year, even if he\\nhimself did not actually serve more than one year for each conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\\napp. n.1 (noting that a prior conviction need only have presented the possibility of a sentence of\\nmore than a year, “regardless of the actual sentence imposed”). We therefore reject his final\\nclaim of error.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Wiseman’s conviction and sentence.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3060,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643362,"string":"4,643,362"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Davi Sarah BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Davi Bailey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2388"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Clay, Larsen, Readler\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LARSEN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0168p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-2388\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n DAVI SARAH BAILEY, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\\n No. 1:18-cr-00156-1—Janet T. Neff, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Lawrence J. Phelan, Walker, Michigan, for Appellant. Davin M. Reust, UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Several days after watching a victim testify at trial, Davi Bailey\\nthreatened to harm the victim’s sister in retaliation for the victim’s testimony. Bailey later\\npleaded guilty to retaliating against a witness, and the district court sentenced her to seventy-\\neight months’ imprisonment. Bailey now argues that her sentence was procedurally and\\nsubstantively unreasonable. We disagree and AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In December 2017, authorities charged Michael Clayton with sexual exploitation of a\\nminor, among other offenses. Clayton is the father of Bailey’s child and was, at that time,\\nBailey’s boyfriend. Clayton went to trial in June 2018. Bailey was present at Clayton’s trial\\nwhen one of the victims, K.P., testified. Following her testimony, K.P. and her mother reported\\nthat Bailey had threatened to assault K.P. in retaliation for her testimony. That same day, Bailey\\nwas also heard making threats to another testifying victim. The next day, the jury found Clayton\\nguilty on all counts.\\n\\n Four days after the jury returned its verdict, Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send\\nK.P.’s sister the following:\\n\\n Every time I see you bitch I’m going upside your idc if you got your\\n daughter with u or not for that shit your sister did rat ass bitch and don’t think I\\n don’t kno where you stay and your boy can get it too every time you walk out\\n them apartment doors you better take a double look hoe . . . on god I’m beating\\n your ass cuz of your sister and your fat ass momma can get it too . . . now go and\\n show the police this you fucking rats.\\n\\nIn later messages, Bailey again threatened to physically assault K.P’s sister.\\n\\n In July 2018, Bailey was indicted on two counts of witness retaliation in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. § 1513(b)(1), (c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2). In August, Bailey pleaded guilty to\\nthe second count, which specifically charged her with threatening K.P.’s sister in retaliation for\\nK.P.’s testimony.\\n\\n The Presentence Investigation Report recommended that the court apply a cross reference\\npursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1) (the “cross reference”), for obstructing the prosecution of\\nClayton’s criminal case. Pursuant to § 2J1.2(c)(1), “[i]f the offense involved obstructing the\\ninvestigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) in\\nrespect to that criminal offense.” Section 2X3.1(a) then provides that the offense level shall be 6\\nlevels lower than that of the underlying offense (the offense that was obstructed) as long as the\\nresulting offense level is not less than 4 and not greater than 30. The offense level underlying\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 3\\n\\n\\nBailey’s obstruction—Clayton’s sexual exploitation of a minor—was 40. Bailey’s offense level\\nunder the cross reference became 30 by virtue of the upper limit of § 2X3.1(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n The PSIR alternatively recommended enhancing Bailey’s offense level pursuant to\\nU.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) (the “enhancement”), which dictates an 8-level enhancement for\\n“threatening to cause physical injury to a person . . . in order to obstruct the administration of\\njustice.” With the enhancement, Bailey’s base offense level would have become 22. The\\nenhancement, however, ultimately did not affect Bailey’s offense level; when the cross reference\\nresults in a greater offense level than the enhancement, the cross reference controls. See\\n§ 2J1.2(c)(1).\\n\\n Bailey submitted written objections to both the cross reference and the enhancement and\\nrenewed her objections at the sentencing hearing. The district court overruled both objections.\\nUsing only the cross reference, the district court found that Bailey’s Guidelines range was\\nseventy-eight to ninety-seven months and sentenced her to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment.\\nBailey timely appealed, arguing that her sentence is both procedurally and substantively\\nunreasonable.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A criminal sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United\\nStates v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). Procedural reasonableness requires the\\ncourt to “properly calculate the guidelines range, treat that range as advisory, consider the\\nsentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrain from considering impermissible factors, select\\nthe sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose\\nthe sentence.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Substantive reasonableness, however, focuses on whether\\n“a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals).” Id. at 442. “The point is not that the district\\ncourt failed to consider a factor or considered an inappropriate factor; that’s the job of procedural\\nunreasonableness.” Id. Instead, substantive unreasonableness is “a complaint that the court\\nplaced too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing\\nthe individual.” Id. We review the district court’s legal determination about the Guidelines\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 4\\n\\n\\nde novo, its factual findings for clear error, and the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Bailey argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court\\nerroneously enhanced her sentence based on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference. Bailey primarily\\nargues that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction,” i.e., conduct that did\\nnot actually hinder or affect a prosecution. She argues that for this section to apply, she must\\nhave successfully hindered the prosecution; Clayton’s conviction, she argues, is proof that she\\ndid not succeed.\\n\\n We disagree. This court has recognized, albeit in dictum, that the cross reference applies\\nto attempts to obstruct justice. United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607, 610 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003)\\n(“Even if Roche had not been successful in obstructing justice by submitting the false\\ndocuments, § 2J1.2(c) still would apply. Section 2J1.2(c), and its cross reference to § 2X3.1,\\napply equally to attempts to obstruct justice.” (citing United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306,\\n1316 (4th Cir. 1993))). Though we are not bound by the dictum of a previously published\\nopinion, see United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993), Roche’s conclusion that\\n§ 2J1.2(c) applies to attempts to obstruct justice is also consistent with this circuit’s caselaw. We\\nhave frequently affirmed the application of the cross reference in cases that Bailey would label\\nmere “attempted obstruction”—that is, when a prosecution succeeded despite the defendant’s\\nefforts. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 305 F.3d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.\\nPrice, 30 F. App’x 333, 333–34, 336 (6th Cir. 2002). Roche’s conclusion is also consistent with\\nother circuits that have addressed this issue. See United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226, 1231\\n(D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and stating that “every circuit to consider the issue has held\\nthat the [cross reference] covers attempts”).\\n\\n Of at least equal import, the Guidelines’ text supports the conclusion that the cross\\nreference covers attempts. The Obstruction of Justice Guideline, § 2J1.2, specifically accounts\\nfor success in one subsection. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (providing for a three-level increase “if\\nthe offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice” (emphasis\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 5\\n\\n\\nadded)). No such language appears in the cross reference—the offense must only “involve[]\\nobstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.” § 2J1.2(c)(1). In other\\nwords, the Obstruction of Justice Guideline accords special treatment in subsection (b)(2) to\\nsuccessfully impeding a criminal case, singling out such conduct for a three-level increase. It\\nfollows that even an ineffective attempt to interfere is subject to the cross reference provided for\\nin subsection (c), which applies even if subsection (b)(2) does not. For these reasons, we reject\\nBailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction.”\\n\\n Bailey also cursorily argues that use of the cross reference was inappropriate because she\\nmade the threats after K.P. had finished testifying. To the extent Bailey suggests that use of the\\ncross reference was inappropriate because Clayton’s prosecution had ended, we disagree.\\nAlthough Bailey’s threats occurred after the jury had returned its guilty verdict, the threats came\\nwell before Clayton was sentenced. The “prosecution of a criminal offense” under § 2J1.2(c)(1)\\nincludes the sentencing stage. Roche, 321 F.3d at 610. This makes sense. A victim’s role in a\\n“prosecution” does not necessarily end with the factfinder’s determination of guilt; courts can\\nand do rely on victim testimony during sentencing to determine a defendant’s appropriate\\npunishment. See, e.g., United States v. Klups, 514 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (requiring that the district court give a victim the opportunity to be heard\\nprior to sentencing). A threat to retaliate against a witness prior to his or her testimony at\\nsentencing could cause the victim to consider withholding that testimony.1\\n\\n Bailey next argues that using the cross reference was inappropriate because she had no\\nrole in the underlying offense. But application of the cross reference does not require\\ninvolvement in the underlying crime. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c); see also id. at § 2J1.2,\\nBackground (“Use of this cross reference will provide an enhanced offense level when the\\nobstruction is in respect to a particularly serious offense, whether such offense was committed by\\nthe defendant or another person.”); Kimble, 305 F.3d at 486 (“[I]t does not matter whether the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1For similar reasons, we reject Bailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply because she did\\nnot carry out her threats. Bailey’s obstruction of an ongoing prosecution was complete the moment she threatened\\nto retaliate against a witness—making the threat is itself sufficient.\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 6\\n\\n\\ndefendant is actually guilty of the crime referenced in § 2X3.1 in order for the higher sentence\\nrecommendation to be imposed.”).\\n\\n And, finally, to the extent that Bailey argues that the cross reference is too harsh because\\nit does not discount for threats that were neither carried out against the victim nor effective in\\nthwarting the criminal proceedings, we see no error on behalf of the district court. The district\\ncourt acknowledged Bailey’s variance request and the advisory nature of the Guidelines but\\nexplained why it believed Bailey’s offense supported application of the cross reference and a\\nwithin-Guidelines sentence. The district court labeled her conduct atrocious and “very, very\\nserious.” As to the fact that Bailey never acted on the threat, the court explained, “Whether there\\nwas an acting out to carry through with the threat, or not, is I think almost irrelevant. Words can\\nbe very blunt instruments, particularly here where they victimized people who had already been\\nvictimized. It just added a layer of victimization on [top] of what happened to the young women\\nwho were manipulated and poorly used by . . . Mr. Clayton.” The district court adequately\\nexplained why it chose the sentence it did, even over Bailey’s objection that application of the\\ncross reference was too harsh. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440.\\n\\n Bailey’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, as the district court appropriately\\nrelied on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference in setting her offense level. Because the cross reference\\nprovided a higher offense level than the enhancement, we need not address whether the district\\ncourt was right to overrule Bailey’s objection to the enhancement.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Bailey also challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. Her sentence, at\\nthe very bottom of the Guidelines range, is afforded a presumption of reasonableness. United\\nStates v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2019). Bailey has failed to overcome this\\npresumption.\\n\\n Bailey contends that the district court gave the cross reference too much weight given the\\nfacts of her case, and that the cross reference “excessively punished her.” But in our analysis of\\nthe procedural reasonableness of her sentence, we rejected the same arguments—finding both\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 7\\n\\n\\nthat application of the cross reference was appropriate and that the district court adequately\\nexplained why the egregiousness of Bailey’s conduct supported the sentence.\\n\\n Bailey also argues that the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, both\\nby placing too much weight on general deterrence and by failing, given the cross reference, to\\ngive greater emphasis to the remaining § 3553(a) factors. We see no indication of either. The\\ncourt explained why “general deterrence is particularly important in this case,” noting that\\nwitness retaliation is “very, very serious.” And as described above, the court explained that it\\nbelieved Bailey’s conduct to be “atrocious” because victims of Clayton’s crimes—minors who\\nhad been sexually exploited—were victimized a second time. On the other hand, the court\\nacknowledged the facts that might weigh in Bailey’s favor. For example, the court recognized\\nthat Bailey, a single mother with a tenth-grade education, had “a difficult life,” but expressed\\nconcern that she had “not made a whole lot of effort to deal with that.” The court allowed that,\\naround the time Bailey made her threats, Bailey’s sister had been killed in a car accident that also\\nseriously injured Bailey’s niece. The court recognized that Bailey had medical problems but\\nobserved that they were treatable, and that Bailey had been non-compliant with her medical\\ntreatment. And the court noted that this was Bailey’s first felony. After elaborating at length,\\nthe district court sentenced Bailey to the bottom of the Guidelines range. Given the court’s\\ncareful consideration of the facts and § 3553(a) factors, we see no indication the district court\\nabused its discretion in sentencing Bailey to the very bottom of the Guidelines range.\\n\\n ***\\n\\n We AFFIRM Bailey’s sentence.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420615/\", \"author_raw\": \"LARSEN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LARSEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"READLER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643362/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Davi Sarah BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0168p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-2388\n v. │\n │\n │\n DAVI SARAH BAILEY, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\n No. 1:18-cr-00156-1—Janet T. Neff, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\n\n Before: CLAY, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Lawrence J. Phelan, Walker, Michigan, for Appellant. Davin M. Reust, UNITED\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Several days after watching a victim testify at trial, Davi Bailey\nthreatened to harm the victim’s sister in retaliation for the victim’s testimony. Bailey later\npleaded guilty to retaliating against a witness, and the district court sentenced her to seventy-\neight months’ imprisonment. Bailey now argues that her sentence was procedurally and\nsubstantively unreasonable. We disagree and AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 2\n\n\n I.\n\n In December 2017, authorities charged Michael Clayton with sexual exploitation of a\nminor, among other offenses. Clayton is the father of Bailey’s child and was, at that time,\nBailey’s boyfriend. Clayton went to trial in June 2018. Bailey was present at Clayton’s trial\nwhen one of the victims, K.P., testified. Following her testimony, K.P. and her mother reported\nthat Bailey had threatened to assault K.P. in retaliation for her testimony. That same day, Bailey\nwas also heard making threats to another testifying victim. The next day, the jury found Clayton\nguilty on all counts.\n\n Four days after the jury returned its verdict, Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send\nK.P.’s sister the following:\n\n Every time I see you bitch I’m going upside your idc if you got your\n daughter with u or not for that shit your sister did rat ass bitch and don’t think I\n don’t kno where you stay and your boy can get it too every time you walk out\n them apartment doors you better take a double look hoe . . . on god I’m beating\n your ass cuz of your sister and your fat ass momma can get it too . . . now go and\n show the police this you fucking rats.\n\nIn later messages, Bailey again threatened to physically assault K.P’s sister.\n\n In July 2018, Bailey was indicted on two counts of witness retaliation in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 1513(b)(1), (c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2). In August, Bailey pleaded guilty to\nthe second count, which specifically charged her with threatening K.P.’s sister in retaliation for\nK.P.’s testimony.\n\n The Presentence Investigation Report recommended that the court apply a cross reference\npursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1) (the “cross reference”), for obstructing the prosecution of\nClayton’s criminal case. Pursuant to § 2J1.2(c)(1), “[i]f the offense involved obstructing the\ninvestigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) in\nrespect to that criminal offense.” Section 2X3.1(a) then provides that the offense level shall be 6\nlevels lower than that of the underlying offense (the offense that was obstructed) as long as the\nresulting offense level is not less than 4 and not greater than 30. The offense level underlying\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 3\n\n\nBailey’s obstruction—Clayton’s sexual exploitation of a minor—was 40. Bailey’s offense level\nunder the cross reference became 30 by virtue of the upper limit of § 2X3.1(a)(3)(A).\n\n The PSIR alternatively recommended enhancing Bailey’s offense level pursuant to\nU.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) (the “enhancement”), which dictates an 8-level enhancement for\n“threatening to cause physical injury to a person . . . in order to obstruct the administration of\njustice.” With the enhancement, Bailey’s base offense level would have become 22. The\nenhancement, however, ultimately did not affect Bailey’s offense level; when the cross reference\nresults in a greater offense level than the enhancement, the cross reference controls. See\n§ 2J1.2(c)(1).\n\n Bailey submitted written objections to both the cross reference and the enhancement and\nrenewed her objections at the sentencing hearing. The district court overruled both objections.\nUsing only the cross reference, the district court found that Bailey’s Guidelines range was\nseventy-eight to ninety-seven months and sentenced her to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment.\nBailey timely appealed, arguing that her sentence is both procedurally and substantively\nunreasonable.\n\n II.\n\n A criminal sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United\nStates v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). Procedural reasonableness requires the\ncourt to “properly calculate the guidelines range, treat that range as advisory, consider the\nsentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrain from considering impermissible factors, select\nthe sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose\nthe sentence.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Substantive reasonableness, however, focuses on whether\n“a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals).” Id. at 442. “The point is not that the district\ncourt failed to consider a factor or considered an inappropriate factor; that’s the job of procedural\nunreasonableness.” Id. Instead, substantive unreasonableness is “a complaint that the court\nplaced too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing\nthe individual.” Id. We review the district court’s legal determination about the Guidelines\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 4\n\n\nde novo, its factual findings for clear error, and the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).\n\n III.\n\n Bailey argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court\nerroneously enhanced her sentence based on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference. Bailey primarily\nargues that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction,” i.e., conduct that did\nnot actually hinder or affect a prosecution. She argues that for this section to apply, she must\nhave successfully hindered the prosecution; Clayton’s conviction, she argues, is proof that she\ndid not succeed.\n\n We disagree. This court has recognized, albeit in dictum, that the cross reference applies\nto attempts to obstruct justice. United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607, 610 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003)\n(“Even if Roche had not been successful in obstructing justice by submitting the false\ndocuments, § 2J1.2(c) still would apply. Section 2J1.2(c), and its cross reference to § 2X3.1,\napply equally to attempts to obstruct justice.” (citing United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306,\n1316 (4th Cir. 1993))). Though we are not bound by the dictum of a previously published\nopinion, see United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993), Roche’s conclusion that\n§ 2J1.2(c) applies to attempts to obstruct justice is also consistent with this circuit’s caselaw. We\nhave frequently affirmed the application of the cross reference in cases that Bailey would label\nmere “attempted obstruction”—that is, when a prosecution succeeded despite the defendant’s\nefforts. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 305 F.3d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.\nPrice, 30 F. App’x 333, 333–34, 336 (6th Cir. 2002). Roche’s conclusion is also consistent with\nother circuits that have addressed this issue. See United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226, 1231\n(D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and stating that “every circuit to consider the issue has held\nthat the [cross reference] covers attempts”).\n\n Of at least equal import, the Guidelines’ text supports the conclusion that the cross\nreference covers attempts. The Obstruction of Justice Guideline, § 2J1.2, specifically accounts\nfor success in one subsection. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (providing for a three-level increase “if\nthe offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice” (emphasis\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 5\n\n\nadded)). No such language appears in the cross reference—the offense must only “involve[]\nobstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.” § 2J1.2(c)(1). In other\nwords, the Obstruction of Justice Guideline accords special treatment in subsection (b)(2) to\nsuccessfully impeding a criminal case, singling out such conduct for a three-level increase. It\nfollows that even an ineffective attempt to interfere is subject to the cross reference provided for\nin subsection (c), which applies even if subsection (b)(2) does not. For these reasons, we reject\nBailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction.”\n\n Bailey also cursorily argues that use of the cross reference was inappropriate because she\nmade the threats after K.P. had finished testifying. To the extent Bailey suggests that use of the\ncross reference was inappropriate because Clayton’s prosecution had ended, we disagree.\nAlthough Bailey’s threats occurred after the jury had returned its guilty verdict, the threats came\nwell before Clayton was sentenced. The “prosecution of a criminal offense” under § 2J1.2(c)(1)\nincludes the sentencing stage. Roche, 321 F.3d at 610. This makes sense. A victim’s role in a\n“prosecution” does not necessarily end with the factfinder’s determination of guilt; courts can\nand do rely on victim testimony during sentencing to determine a defendant’s appropriate\npunishment. See, e.g., United States v. Klups, 514 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (requiring that the district court give a victim the opportunity to be heard\nprior to sentencing). A threat to retaliate against a witness prior to his or her testimony at\nsentencing could cause the victim to consider withholding that testimony.1\n\n Bailey next argues that using the cross reference was inappropriate because she had no\nrole in the underlying offense. But application of the cross reference does not require\ninvolvement in the underlying crime. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c); see also id. at § 2J1.2,\nBackground (“Use of this cross reference will provide an enhanced offense level when the\nobstruction is in respect to a particularly serious offense, whether such offense was committed by\nthe defendant or another person.”); Kimble, 305 F.3d at 486 (“[I]t does not matter whether the\n\n\n\n\n 1For similar reasons, we reject Bailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply because she did\nnot carry out her threats. Bailey’s obstruction of an ongoing prosecution was complete the moment she threatened\nto retaliate against a witness—making the threat is itself sufficient.\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 6\n\n\ndefendant is actually guilty of the crime referenced in § 2X3.1 in order for the higher sentence\nrecommendation to be imposed.”).\n\n And, finally, to the extent that Bailey argues that the cross reference is too harsh because\nit does not discount for threats that were neither carried out against the victim nor effective in\nthwarting the criminal proceedings, we see no error on behalf of the district court. The district\ncourt acknowledged Bailey’s variance request and the advisory nature of the Guidelines but\nexplained why it believed Bailey’s offense supported application of the cross reference and a\nwithin-Guidelines sentence. The district court labeled her conduct atrocious and “very, very\nserious.” As to the fact that Bailey never acted on the threat, the court explained, “Whether there\nwas an acting out to carry through with the threat, or not, is I think almost irrelevant. Words can\nbe very blunt instruments, particularly here where they victimized people who had already been\nvictimized. It just added a layer of victimization on [top] of what happened to the young women\nwho were manipulated and poorly used by . . . Mr. Clayton.” The district court adequately\nexplained why it chose the sentence it did, even over Bailey’s objection that application of the\ncross reference was too harsh. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440.\n\n Bailey’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, as the district court appropriately\nrelied on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference in setting her offense level. Because the cross reference\nprovided a higher offense level than the enhancement, we need not address whether the district\ncourt was right to overrule Bailey’s objection to the enhancement.\n\n IV.\n\n Bailey also challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. Her sentence, at\nthe very bottom of the Guidelines range, is afforded a presumption of reasonableness. United\nStates v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2019). Bailey has failed to overcome this\npresumption.\n\n Bailey contends that the district court gave the cross reference too much weight given the\nfacts of her case, and that the cross reference “excessively punished her.” But in our analysis of\nthe procedural reasonableness of her sentence, we rejected the same arguments—finding both\n\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 7\n\n\nthat application of the cross reference was appropriate and that the district court adequately\nexplained why the egregiousness of Bailey’s conduct supported the sentence.\n\n Bailey also argues that the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, both\nby placing too much weight on general deterrence and by failing, given the cross reference, to\ngive greater emphasis to the remaining § 3553(a) factors. We see no indication of either. The\ncourt explained why “general deterrence is particularly important in this case,” noting that\nwitness retaliation is “very, very serious.” And as described above, the court explained that it\nbelieved Bailey’s conduct to be “atrocious” because victims of Clayton’s crimes—minors who\nhad been sexually exploited—were victimized a second time. On the other hand, the court\nacknowledged the facts that might weigh in Bailey’s favor. For example, the court recognized\nthat Bailey, a single mother with a tenth-grade education, had “a difficult life,” but expressed\nconcern that she had “not made a whole lot of effort to deal with that.” The court allowed that,\naround the time Bailey made her threats, Bailey’s sister had been killed in a car accident that also\nseriously injured Bailey’s niece. The court recognized that Bailey had medical problems but\nobserved that they were treatable, and that Bailey had been non-compliant with her medical\ntreatment. And the court noted that this was Bailey’s first felony. After elaborating at length,\nthe district court sentenced Bailey to the bottom of the Guidelines range. Given the court’s\ncareful consideration of the facts and § 3553(a) factors, we see no indication the district court\nabused its discretion in sentencing Bailey to the very bottom of the Guidelines range.\n\n ***\n\n We AFFIRM Bailey’s sentence.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Davi Sarah BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0168p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-2388\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n DAVI SARAH BAILEY, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\\n No. 1:18-cr-00156-1—Janet T. Neff, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Lawrence J. Phelan, Walker, Michigan, for Appellant. Davin M. Reust, UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Several days after watching a victim testify at trial, Davi Bailey\\nthreatened to harm the victim’s sister in retaliation for the victim’s testimony. Bailey later\\npleaded guilty to retaliating against a witness, and the district court sentenced her to seventy-\\neight months’ imprisonment. Bailey now argues that her sentence was procedurally and\\nsubstantively unreasonable. We disagree and AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In December 2017, authorities charged Michael Clayton with sexual exploitation of a\\nminor, among other offenses. Clayton is the father of Bailey’s child and was, at that time,\\nBailey’s boyfriend. Clayton went to trial in June 2018. Bailey was present at Clayton’s trial\\nwhen one of the victims, K.P., testified. Following her testimony, K.P. and her mother reported\\nthat Bailey had threatened to assault K.P. in retaliation for her testimony. That same day, Bailey\\nwas also heard making threats to another testifying victim. The next day, the jury found Clayton\\nguilty on all counts.\\n\\n Four days after the jury returned its verdict, Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send\\nK.P.’s sister the following:\\n\\n Every time I see you bitch I’m going upside your idc if you got your\\n daughter with u or not for that shit your sister did rat ass bitch and don’t think I\\n don’t kno where you stay and your boy can get it too every time you walk out\\n them apartment doors you better take a double look hoe . . . on god I’m beating\\n your ass cuz of your sister and your fat ass momma can get it too . . . now go and\\n show the police this you fucking rats.\\n\\nIn later messages, Bailey again threatened to physically assault K.P’s sister.\\n\\n In July 2018, Bailey was indicted on two counts of witness retaliation in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. § 1513(b)(1), (c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2). In August, Bailey pleaded guilty to\\nthe second count, which specifically charged her with threatening K.P.’s sister in retaliation for\\nK.P.’s testimony.\\n\\n The Presentence Investigation Report recommended that the court apply a cross reference\\npursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1) (the “cross reference”), for obstructing the prosecution of\\nClayton’s criminal case. Pursuant to § 2J1.2(c)(1), “[i]f the offense involved obstructing the\\ninvestigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) in\\nrespect to that criminal offense.” Section 2X3.1(a) then provides that the offense level shall be 6\\nlevels lower than that of the underlying offense (the offense that was obstructed) as long as the\\nresulting offense level is not less than 4 and not greater than 30. The offense level underlying\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 3\\n\\n\\nBailey’s obstruction—Clayton’s sexual exploitation of a minor—was 40. Bailey’s offense level\\nunder the cross reference became 30 by virtue of the upper limit of § 2X3.1(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n The PSIR alternatively recommended enhancing Bailey’s offense level pursuant to\\nU.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) (the “enhancement”), which dictates an 8-level enhancement for\\n“threatening to cause physical injury to a person . . . in order to obstruct the administration of\\njustice.” With the enhancement, Bailey’s base offense level would have become 22. The\\nenhancement, however, ultimately did not affect Bailey’s offense level; when the cross reference\\nresults in a greater offense level than the enhancement, the cross reference controls. See\\n§ 2J1.2(c)(1).\\n\\n Bailey submitted written objections to both the cross reference and the enhancement and\\nrenewed her objections at the sentencing hearing. The district court overruled both objections.\\nUsing only the cross reference, the district court found that Bailey’s Guidelines range was\\nseventy-eight to ninety-seven months and sentenced her to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment.\\nBailey timely appealed, arguing that her sentence is both procedurally and substantively\\nunreasonable.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A criminal sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United\\nStates v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). Procedural reasonableness requires the\\ncourt to “properly calculate the guidelines range, treat that range as advisory, consider the\\nsentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrain from considering impermissible factors, select\\nthe sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose\\nthe sentence.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Substantive reasonableness, however, focuses on whether\\n“a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals).” Id. at 442. “The point is not that the district\\ncourt failed to consider a factor or considered an inappropriate factor; that’s the job of procedural\\nunreasonableness.” Id. Instead, substantive unreasonableness is “a complaint that the court\\nplaced too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing\\nthe individual.” Id. We review the district court’s legal determination about the Guidelines\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 4\\n\\n\\nde novo, its factual findings for clear error, and the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Bailey argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court\\nerroneously enhanced her sentence based on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference. Bailey primarily\\nargues that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction,” i.e., conduct that did\\nnot actually hinder or affect a prosecution. She argues that for this section to apply, she must\\nhave successfully hindered the prosecution; Clayton’s conviction, she argues, is proof that she\\ndid not succeed.\\n\\n We disagree. This court has recognized, albeit in dictum, that the cross reference applies\\nto attempts to obstruct justice. United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607, 610 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003)\\n(“Even if Roche had not been successful in obstructing justice by submitting the false\\ndocuments, § 2J1.2(c) still would apply. Section 2J1.2(c), and its cross reference to § 2X3.1,\\napply equally to attempts to obstruct justice.” (citing United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306,\\n1316 (4th Cir. 1993))). Though we are not bound by the dictum of a previously published\\nopinion, see United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993), Roche’s conclusion that\\n§ 2J1.2(c) applies to attempts to obstruct justice is also consistent with this circuit’s caselaw. We\\nhave frequently affirmed the application of the cross reference in cases that Bailey would label\\nmere “attempted obstruction”—that is, when a prosecution succeeded despite the defendant’s\\nefforts. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 305 F.3d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.\\nPrice, 30 F. App’x 333, 333–34, 336 (6th Cir. 2002). Roche’s conclusion is also consistent with\\nother circuits that have addressed this issue. See United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226, 1231\\n(D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and stating that “every circuit to consider the issue has held\\nthat the [cross reference] covers attempts”).\\n\\n Of at least equal import, the Guidelines’ text supports the conclusion that the cross\\nreference covers attempts. The Obstruction of Justice Guideline, § 2J1.2, specifically accounts\\nfor success in one subsection. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (providing for a three-level increase “if\\nthe offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice” (emphasis\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 5\\n\\n\\nadded)). No such language appears in the cross reference—the offense must only “involve[]\\nobstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.” § 2J1.2(c)(1). In other\\nwords, the Obstruction of Justice Guideline accords special treatment in subsection (b)(2) to\\nsuccessfully impeding a criminal case, singling out such conduct for a three-level increase. It\\nfollows that even an ineffective attempt to interfere is subject to the cross reference provided for\\nin subsection (c), which applies even if subsection (b)(2) does not. For these reasons, we reject\\nBailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply to “attempted obstruction.”\\n\\n Bailey also cursorily argues that use of the cross reference was inappropriate because she\\nmade the threats after K.P. had finished testifying. To the extent Bailey suggests that use of the\\ncross reference was inappropriate because Clayton’s prosecution had ended, we disagree.\\nAlthough Bailey’s threats occurred after the jury had returned its guilty verdict, the threats came\\nwell before Clayton was sentenced. The “prosecution of a criminal offense” under § 2J1.2(c)(1)\\nincludes the sentencing stage. Roche, 321 F.3d at 610. This makes sense. A victim’s role in a\\n“prosecution” does not necessarily end with the factfinder’s determination of guilt; courts can\\nand do rely on victim testimony during sentencing to determine a defendant’s appropriate\\npunishment. See, e.g., United States v. Klups, 514 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (requiring that the district court give a victim the opportunity to be heard\\nprior to sentencing). A threat to retaliate against a witness prior to his or her testimony at\\nsentencing could cause the victim to consider withholding that testimony.1\\n\\n Bailey next argues that using the cross reference was inappropriate because she had no\\nrole in the underlying offense. But application of the cross reference does not require\\ninvolvement in the underlying crime. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c); see also id. at § 2J1.2,\\nBackground (“Use of this cross reference will provide an enhanced offense level when the\\nobstruction is in respect to a particularly serious offense, whether such offense was committed by\\nthe defendant or another person.”); Kimble, 305 F.3d at 486 (“[I]t does not matter whether the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1For similar reasons, we reject Bailey’s argument that the cross reference does not apply because she did\\nnot carry out her threats. Bailey’s obstruction of an ongoing prosecution was complete the moment she threatened\\nto retaliate against a witness—making the threat is itself sufficient.\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 6\\n\\n\\ndefendant is actually guilty of the crime referenced in § 2X3.1 in order for the higher sentence\\nrecommendation to be imposed.”).\\n\\n And, finally, to the extent that Bailey argues that the cross reference is too harsh because\\nit does not discount for threats that were neither carried out against the victim nor effective in\\nthwarting the criminal proceedings, we see no error on behalf of the district court. The district\\ncourt acknowledged Bailey’s variance request and the advisory nature of the Guidelines but\\nexplained why it believed Bailey’s offense supported application of the cross reference and a\\nwithin-Guidelines sentence. The district court labeled her conduct atrocious and “very, very\\nserious.” As to the fact that Bailey never acted on the threat, the court explained, “Whether there\\nwas an acting out to carry through with the threat, or not, is I think almost irrelevant. Words can\\nbe very blunt instruments, particularly here where they victimized people who had already been\\nvictimized. It just added a layer of victimization on [top] of what happened to the young women\\nwho were manipulated and poorly used by . . . Mr. Clayton.” The district court adequately\\nexplained why it chose the sentence it did, even over Bailey’s objection that application of the\\ncross reference was too harsh. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440.\\n\\n Bailey’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, as the district court appropriately\\nrelied on § 2J1.2(c)(1)’s cross reference in setting her offense level. Because the cross reference\\nprovided a higher offense level than the enhancement, we need not address whether the district\\ncourt was right to overrule Bailey’s objection to the enhancement.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Bailey also challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. Her sentence, at\\nthe very bottom of the Guidelines range, is afforded a presumption of reasonableness. United\\nStates v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2019). Bailey has failed to overcome this\\npresumption.\\n\\n Bailey contends that the district court gave the cross reference too much weight given the\\nfacts of her case, and that the cross reference “excessively punished her.” But in our analysis of\\nthe procedural reasonableness of her sentence, we rejected the same arguments—finding both\\n\\f No. 18-2388 United States v. Bailey Page 7\\n\\n\\nthat application of the cross reference was appropriate and that the district court adequately\\nexplained why the egregiousness of Bailey’s conduct supported the sentence.\\n\\n Bailey also argues that the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, both\\nby placing too much weight on general deterrence and by failing, given the cross reference, to\\ngive greater emphasis to the remaining § 3553(a) factors. We see no indication of either. The\\ncourt explained why “general deterrence is particularly important in this case,” noting that\\nwitness retaliation is “very, very serious.” And as described above, the court explained that it\\nbelieved Bailey’s conduct to be “atrocious” because victims of Clayton’s crimes—minors who\\nhad been sexually exploited—were victimized a second time. On the other hand, the court\\nacknowledged the facts that might weigh in Bailey’s favor. For example, the court recognized\\nthat Bailey, a single mother with a tenth-grade education, had “a difficult life,” but expressed\\nconcern that she had “not made a whole lot of effort to deal with that.” The court allowed that,\\naround the time Bailey made her threats, Bailey’s sister had been killed in a car accident that also\\nseriously injured Bailey’s niece. The court recognized that Bailey had medical problems but\\nobserved that they were treatable, and that Bailey had been non-compliant with her medical\\ntreatment. And the court noted that this was Bailey’s first felony. After elaborating at length,\\nthe district court sentenced Bailey to the bottom of the Guidelines range. Given the court’s\\ncareful consideration of the facts and § 3553(a) factors, we see no indication the district court\\nabused its discretion in sentencing Bailey to the very bottom of the Guidelines range.\\n\\n ***\\n\\n We AFFIRM Bailey’s sentence.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3061,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643674,"string":"4,643,674"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony NOVAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF PARMA; Kevin Riley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio ; Thomas Connor, Individually and as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony Novak v. City of Parma"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3373"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Merritt, Thapar, Readler\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0170p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n ANTHONY NOVAK, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n │\\n v. > No. 18-3373\\n │\\n │\\n CITY OF PARMA; KEVIN RILEY, Individually and in his │\\n Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of │\\n Parma, Ohio; THOMAS CONNOR, Individually and as │\\n an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:17-cv-02148—Dan A. Polster, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: June 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 29, 2019\\n\\n Before: MERRITT, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Steven D. Strang, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.\\nSubodh Chandra, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON\\nBRIEF: Steven D. Strang, Monica A. Sansalone, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus,\\nOhio, for Appellants. Subodh Chandra, Patrick S. Kabat, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC,\\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Apple pie, baseball, and the right to ridicule the government.\\nEach holds an important place in American history and tradition. So thought Anthony Novak\\nwhen he created a Facebook page to mock the Parma Police Department. He styled his page to\\nlook like the department’s official Facebook page. But the similarities ended there. Novak\\nshared posts like an advertisement for a “Pedophile Reform event,” at which pedophiles would\\nreceive honorary police commissions.\\n\\n Novak’s page delighted, disgusted, and confused. Not everyone understood it. But when\\nit comes to parody, the law requires a reasonable reader standard, not a “most gullible person on\\nFacebook” standard. The First Amendment does not depend on whether everyone is in on the\\njoke. Neither is it bothered by public disapproval, whether tepid or red-hot.\\n\\n Novak’s Facebook page was either a protected parody in the great American tradition of\\nridiculing the government or a disruptive violation of state law. Maybe both. At this stage, we\\ndecide only whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. For some of Novak’s claims\\nthey are, but for others they are not.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This case comes to us after a motion to dismiss, so we take the facts as Novak alleges\\nthem and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d\\n513, 520 (6th Cir. 2016). Novak created a “farcical Facebook account” designed to look like the\\npolice department’s official page. R. 6, Pg. ID 1239. The page was up for twelve hours and\\npublished several posts. Among the posts was a recruitment advertisement that “strongly\\nencourag[ed] minorities to not apply.” Id. at 1250. Novak also posted an apology from the\\ndepartment for “neglecting to inform the public about an armed white male who robbed a\\nSubway sandwich shop,” while promising to bring to justice an “African American woman” who\\nwas loitering outside the Subway during the robbery. Id.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The page was polarizing. Some of its about 100 followers thought it was “the funniest\\nthing ever.” Id. at 1253. Others were angry. And yet others were confused, wondering whether\\nthis was the actual Parma police official Facebook page. A handful of people were so angry or\\nconfused that they called the police station. In all, the station received twelve minutes of calls.\\nOthers continued to enjoy the page, which soon “became a platform for a wide range of citizens\\nto air their grievances about the Department.” Id. at 1259. The officers later testified that they\\nworried the page would confuse the public and that the “likely result is that people would call.”\\nId. at 1271.\\n\\n One of the page’s audiences—the Parma Police Department—did not find the page\\nfunny. Once the officers got wind of Novak’s page, they “all stopped what [they] were doing to\\ntake a look at it, and a couple of [them] tried to figure out who did it.” Id. at 1253. One officer\\nsaid they “just wanted it down.” Id. at 1254. They took several steps to make that happen.\\n\\n A Facebook battle ensued. First, the department posted a warning on its official\\nFacebook page. The warning alerted the public to the fake page and assured them that the matter\\nwas “currently being investigated.” Id. at 1255–56. Then Novak reposted the exact same\\nwarning on his own page. He claims he did this to “deepen his satire.” Id. at 1259. For the\\nsame reason, Novak deleted “pedantic comments” on his page explaining that the page was fake,\\nas these “clumsy explication[s]” only “belabored the joke.” Id. at 1253.\\n\\n After that, the conflict moved offline and into the real world. Officer Kevin Riley\\nassigned Officer Thomas Connor to the case and tasked him with finding out who ran the page.\\nSo Connor sent a letter to Facebook requesting that the page be shut down immediately. He also\\nsent an email to a different Facebook representative asking that the page be taken down. The\\npolice also informed local news outlets of the investigation. The case of the fake police page\\neven appeared on the nightly news. At that point, Novak decided to delete his creation. He had\\nheard of the department’s investigation and was worried about the consequences.\\n\\n Though Novak was done posting, the police department was not done investigating.\\nThey still wanted to find the person behind the laptop. So Connor subpoenaed records from\\nFacebook. Riley directed Connor to go further and obtain a search warrant for Facebook. Novak\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\nalleges that Connor made several “material misrepresentations and omissions” to obtain that\\nwarrant. Id. at 1260. The warrant still issued, and Facebook disclosed that Novak was the one\\nbehind the fake account.\\n\\n Once the department realized that Novak was the cyber culprit, Riley directed Connor to\\nobtain two more warrants—one to search Novak’s apartment and one to arrest him. The\\nwarrants said that Novak unlawfully impaired the department’s functions, in violation of Ohio\\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B). Novak responds that, other than twelve minutes of phone calls to the\\ndepartment, the police department suffered no disruption to its functions. And Novak claims the\\nofficers were unaware of the twelve minutes of call time when they obtained the warrants. But,\\nonce again, the warrants still issued, and the department arrested Novak. The case went to trial,\\nand Novak was acquitted.\\n\\n After he was acquitted of the criminal charge, Novak sued the City of Parma and Officers\\nRiley and Connor. He alleged (in over thirty claims) that the city and its officers violated his\\nconstitutional and statutory rights under federal and Ohio law. The defendants moved to dismiss\\nhis thirty-plus claims. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, with\\ntwenty-six claims left standing. On appeal, the police claim that qualified immunity shields them\\nfrom Novak’s lawsuit. We review de novo whether the officers are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with that question. Courtright, 839 F.3d at 517–\\n18, 523.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials like the Parma police officers from\\nbeing liable for money damages if their conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or\\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,\\n457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable\\nwhen they exercise power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield officials from harassment,\\ndistraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555\\nU.S. 223, 231 (2009).\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n Officers Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a\\nfederal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly\\nestablished at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). For a right to be “clearly established,” the “constitutionality of the\\nofficer’s conduct” must have been “beyond debate” in the “particular circumstances before him.”\\nId. at 589–90 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court has\\ncautioned that “clearly established” must not be defined “at a high level of generality.” Id. at\\n590. Instead, we must be sensitive to the fact that police officers work in the real world, which is\\noften messier than law books would have us believe. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725\\n(2019) (“Police officers conduct approximately 29,000 arrests every day—a dangerous task that\\nrequires making quick decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly\\nevolving.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). So when it comes to holding police\\nofficers liable for heat-of-the-moment decisions they make in the line of duty, abstract legal\\nprinciples will not do the trick.\\n\\n On both the facts and the law, specificity is our guiding light. But we must also be\\nmindful of the stage of the proceedings. This case reaches us early, after a motion to dismiss.\\nAnd while we always hope to resolve qualified immunity claims at the earliest possible point in\\nthe litigation, we cannot resolve such claims when we need more factual development to do so.\\nPhillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that an appeal of a denial of\\nqualified immunity must be “premised not on a factual dispute, but rather on ‘neat abstract issues\\nof law’” (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995))). We consider each of Novak’s\\nclaims under these standards.\\n\\n III. Retaliation\\n\\n Novak argues that the officers retaliated against him because of his protected speech.\\nThe retaliation claim turns on two issues: (1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody and\\n(2) whether the Parma police had probable cause to arrest Novak for his page. Because resolving\\nboth issues involves questions of fact, the claim survives. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898\\n(6th Cir. 2002) (“Because of the fact-intensive nature of the requisite inquiry, . . . we would be\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nusurping the role of the jury were we to attempt to [resolve it] . . . at this stage of the\\nproceeding.”).\\n\\n To allege a retaliation claim, Novak must show that: (1) he “engaged in a\\nconstitutionally protected activity,” (2) the officers’ adverse actions caused Novak “to suffer an\\ninjury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing that activity, and\\n(3) the officers were motivated, at least in part, by his exercise of his constitutional rights. Paige\\nv. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010). At this stage, the parties dispute whether Novak’s\\nFacebook page was protected speech.\\n\\n a. Parody\\n\\n Was Novak’s speech protected? The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that\\nalmost all speech is protected other than “in a few limited areas.” United States v. Stevens, 559\\nU.S. 460, 468 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). These “limited areas” include speech\\nexpressed as part of a crime, obscene expression, incitement, and fraud. See United States v.\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717, 720 (2012). It is clearly established, though, that parody does not\\nfall in one of these “limited areas.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57\\n(1988). It is protected speech. Id.\\n\\n The question, then, is whether Novak’s page was a parody. The officers claim that his\\nFacebook page was false and meant to mislead the public, not a parody. But they are wrong to\\nthink that we just look to a few confused people to determine if the page is protected parody.\\n\\n Our nation’s long-held First Amendment protection for parody does not rise and fall with\\nwhether a few people are confused. Instead, we must apply a “reasonable reader” test. Id.\\nSpeech that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts” is a parody, even\\nif “patently offensive.” Id. The test is not whether one person, or even ten people, or even one\\nhundred people were confused by Novak’s page. Indeed, the genius of parody is that it comes\\nclose enough to reality to spark a moment of doubt in the reader’s mind before she realizes the\\njoke. “The germ of parody lies in the definition of the Greek parodeia . . . as a song sung\\nalongside another.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). And masterful parody may skirt that line even closer. Benjamin\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nFranklin’s 1784 satirical essay in the Journal de Paris came so close to the truth that it\\nanticipated reality before it happened. Franklin spoke of the benefits of daylight and joked that\\nthe French should consider waking up earlier to save money on candles. In his tongue-in-cheek\\nproposal, Franklin recommended several measures for the implementation of his plan.\\nHe suggested that: “Every morning, as soon as the sun rises, let all the bells in every church be\\nset ringing; and if that is not sufficient?, let cannon be fired in every street, to wake the sluggards\\neffectually, and make them open their eyes to see their true interest.”\\nBenjamin Franklin, An Economical Project, Letter to the Editor of the Journal of Paris\\n(1784), http://www.webexhibits.org/daylightsaving/franklin3.html. Through his satire, Franklin\\npredicted the reality of daylight saving time, which would come a century and a half later.\\n\\n And a parody need not spoil its own punchline by declaring itself a parody. “Parody\\nserves its goals whether labeled or not, and there is no reason to require parody to state the\\nobvious (or even the reasonably perceived).” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 n.17. Imagine if The\\nOnion were required to disclaim that parodical headlines like the following are, in reality, false:\\nPresidential Debate Sidetracked By Booker, De Blasio Arguing About Best Place In Lower\\nManhattan To Get Tapas, or, John Bolton Urges War Against the Sun After Uncovering\\nEvidence It Has Nuclear Capabilities. News in Brief, The Onion (June\\n26, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/presidential-debate-sidetracked-by-booker-de-blasio-ar-\\n1835870332; News in Brief, The Onion (June 10, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/john-\\nbolton-urges-war-against-the-sun-after-uncovering-1835805360. The law of parody does not\\nrequire us to strain credulity so far. And that is not because everyone always understands the\\njoke. Susanna Kim, All the Times People Were Fooled by The Onion, ABC News (June 1,\\n2015), https://abcnews.go.com/International/times-people-fooled-onion/story?id=31444478.\\n\\n Instead, the test for parody is whether a reasonable reader would have seen Novak’s\\nFacebook page and concluded that the posts stated “actual facts.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50. Our\\nnation boasts a long history of protecting parody and satire. “[F]rom the early cartoon portraying\\nGeorge Washington as an ass down to the present day, . . . satirical cartoons have played a\\nprominent role in public and political debate.” Id. at 54. And parody, like all protected speech,\\nneed not be high-minded or respectful to find safe haven under the First Amendment. “One of\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nthe prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and\\nthat means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and\\nwithout moderation.” Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (Frankfurter,\\nJ.). “The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided.”\\nHustler, 485 U.S. at 54. We uphold this right, even where parody shocks us, because “[o]ur trust\\nin the good sense of the people on deliberate reflection goes deep.” Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at\\n674.\\n\\n Whether Novak’s page was a protected parody is a question of fact that we cannot answer\\nat this stage. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (“The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to\\nbe that the ad parody was not reasonably believable, and in accordance with our custom we\\naccept this finding.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, the jury will have\\nto answer that question. At this stage, though, Novak has alleged enough facts that a reasonable\\njury could find that his page was a parody.\\n\\n b. Probable Cause\\n\\n Since we accept for now that the page was protected speech, we move to the second\\nquestion: did the Parma police have probable cause to arrest Novak? Probable cause exists\\nwhere there is a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that officers will discover evidence of\\ncriminal activity. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). To\\nanswer this question, we need more facts. We need to know whether the citizen calls to the\\npolice station gave the officers probable cause to think there was a “disruption” or “interruption”\\nof police operations under Ohio law. Thus, whether the police had probable cause to arrest\\nNovak is an issue of fact, which we do not have jurisdiction to decide. Swiecicki v. Delgado,\\n463 F.3d 489, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Probable cause is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve if\\nthere are any genuine issues of material fact that are relevant to the inquiry.”), abrogated on\\nother grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Of course, a retaliation claim is like a\\nflow chart—once you decide one issue, it leads to the next. So, we move on. In the probable\\ncause inquiry that follows, we assume that Novak’s page was protected speech.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n If the police did not have probable cause to arrest Novak, then he may bring a claim of\\nretaliation. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725. To prevail on this claim, Novak will need to show that\\nthe officers arrested him based on a “forbidden” retaliatory motive. Id. at 1722–23. But\\nretaliatory motive is often difficult to prove. After all, “protected speech is often a ‘wholly\\nlegitimate consideration’ for officers when deciding whether to make an arrest.” Id. at 1723–24\\n(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012)) (explaining that the “content and tone”\\nof a suspect’s speech may indicate whether he presents a threat). A plaintiff alleging retaliatory\\narrest must disentangle these “wholly legitimate” considerations of speech from any wholly\\nillegitimate retaliatory motives.\\n\\n To do so, the threshold question Novak must answer is whether “retaliation was a\\nsubstantial or motivating factor” for his arrest. Id. at 1725. Novak bears the burden of making\\nthat showing. If he does, the next question is whether the officers would have arrested him\\nabsent that retaliatory motive. Id. (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945,\\n1952–53 (2018)). The burden to answer that lies on the officers. Id. If they show that they\\nwould have arrested Novak even if he had not criticized the police department, his retaliatory-\\narrest claim fails. Id. So the questions will be: (1) Can Novak show that the officers were\\nmotivated by retaliatory animus, not legitimate motivations? (Novak’s burden); if yes, (2) Can\\nthe officers justify Novak’s arrest based on something other than retaliation—i.e., a mistaken but\\nhonest belief that there was probable cause? (Officers’ burden).\\n\\n If the officers did have probable cause, on the other hand, they are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity. The Supreme Court has said as much. “This Court has never recognized a First\\nAmendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.”\\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 664–65. The Supreme Court said that in 2012, and it remains true today.\\n\\n The Supreme Court decided two retaliation cases after Reichle. Neither case clearly\\nestablished Novak’s right to be free from a retaliatory arrest based on probable cause. First, the\\nSupreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach. There, the Court held that a plaintiff\\ncan bring a retaliation claim if the police had probable cause to arrest but only against official\\nmunicipal policies of retaliation. 138 S. Ct. at 1954–55. So Lozman does not apply where, as\\nhere, the plaintiff sues individual officers. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (noting that the facts in\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nLozman were “far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim” and recognizing that Lozman’s\\nholding was “limited . . . to arrests that result from official policies of retaliation”). Second, the\\nCourt held most recently in Nieves that a plaintiff generally cannot bring a retaliation claim if the\\npolice had probable cause to arrest. Id. at 1725. Though Nieves also created an exception to that\\ngeneral rule that we will discuss later, the exception does not apply here because the officers\\nwould not have been aware of it at the time of Novak’s arrest since the case was decided later.\\n\\n Nor has our circuit clearly established the law on this issue. In Sandul v. Larion, the\\nSixth Circuit denied an officer qualified immunity for a First Amendment retaliation claim and\\nheld that “protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of any of the . . . ordinances.”\\n119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1997). But in that case, the ordinance criminalized the plaintiff’s\\nspeech directly, and there was little question whether the speech was protected. Id. at 1255–56\\n(“These cases should leave little doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that the mere words\\nand gesture ‘f—k you’ are constitutionally protected speech.”). Plus, it is not clearly established\\nhow we reconcile the apparent holding in Sandul that protected speech cannot be the basis for\\nprobable cause with the rule that protected speech can be a “wholly legitimate consideration” for\\nofficers when they decide whether to arrest someone. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668. “[I]f judges thus\\ndisagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking\\nthe losing side of the controversy.” Id. at 669–70 (citation omitted). Simply put, Ohio’s statute\\nappears to punish the effects of speech (interruptions), not the speech itself, and whether\\nenforcing such a statute in these circumstances violates the First Amendment is not clearly\\nestablished. So the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n To sum up, to resolve the retaliation claim, the factfinder below will have to decide:\\n(1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody, and thus protected speech, and; (2) whether\\nthe officers had probable cause to arrest Novak under the Ohio statute. If the officers did not\\nhave probable cause, they are not entitled to qualified immunity, and Novak can attempt to show\\nthe arrest was retaliatory. If the officers did have probable cause, they are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity even if Novak’s page was protected speech because the law at the time did not clearly\\nestablish that charging Novak under the statute would violate his constitutional rights.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n c. Future Issues\\n\\n At this stage, we have jurisdiction to review only whether the officers are entitled to\\nqualified immunity. But a few interesting issues remain. They do not bear on the qualified\\nimmunity analysis above because, as with most interesting legal issues, the law is not clearly\\nestablished.\\n\\n Issue 1. The Supreme Court held recently in Nieves that to bring a First Amendment\\nretaliatory arrest claim, a plaintiff must generally show that there was no probable cause for the\\narrest. 139 S. Ct. at 1727. But the Nieves Court also recognized a narrow exception to this rule\\n“where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to\\ndo so.” Id. For example, “[i]f an individual who has been vocally complaining about police\\nconduct is arrested for jaywalking . . . it would seem insufficiently protective of First\\nAmendment rights to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground that there\\nwas undoubted probable cause for the arrest.” Id. It is plausible that Novak’s arrest under Ohio\\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B), or one like it, would trigger the exception—i.e., if officers never or\\nrarely arrested someone under this statute. Unfortunately for Novak, this exception was not\\nclearly established before Nieves.\\n\\n Issue 2. Even if Novak’s case would not fall within the narrow exception of Nieves, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1727, there is good reason to believe that in the future probable cause alone may not\\nprotect the officers.\\n\\n First, this case may not be subject to the general rule of Nieves because the sole basis for\\nprobable cause was speech. Besides posting to his Facebook page, Novak committed no other\\nact that could have created probable cause. In other First Amendment retaliation cases on point,\\nby contrast, the defendant’s conduct was a mix of protected speech and unprotected conduct.\\nThat is, the defendants both said something and did something. See, e.g., id. at 1720–21\\n(defendant made remarks to police officers (protected speech) and acted aggressively toward\\nthem in an intoxicated state (unprotected conduct)); Reichle, 566 U.S. at 660–61 (defendant\\nmade political remarks (protected speech) and unlawfully touched the Vice President\\n(unprotected conduct)); Swiecki, 463 F.3d at 491–92 (defendant made comments to the officer\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n(protected speech) and engaged in disorderly conduct while intoxicated (unprotected conduct)).\\nHere, we have nothing like that. Novak did not create a Facebook page criticizing police and use\\nhis computer to hack into police servers to disrupt operations. The sole basis for probable cause\\nto arrest Novak was his speech. And there is good reason to believe that, based on the reasoning\\nunderlying the First Amendment retaliation cases, this is an important difference.\\n\\n This is important because in Nieves and its predecessors, the Court based its reasoning on\\nthe thorny causation issue that comes up in cases with both protected speech and unprotected\\nconduct. The idea is that in cases where the plaintiff both did something and said something to\\nget arrested, the factfinder will not be able to disentangle whether the officer arrested him\\nbecause of what he did or because of what he said. “[R]etaliatory arrest cases . . . present a\\ntenuous causal connection between the defendant’s alleged animus and the plaintiff’s injury.”\\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 668. For example, in Mt. Healthy, the Court held there was no retaliation “if\\nthe same decision would have been reached absent [plaintiff’s] protected speech.” Nieves, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285\\n(1977)). Here, that inquiry gets us nowhere because “absent [Novak’s] protected speech,” there\\nwould be no basis for probable cause. So, in this case, the causal connection is not so tenuous.\\nAnd the reason for requiring that plaintiff show an absence of probable cause where probable\\ncause is based only on protected speech is not so clear.\\n\\n Second, this case strikes at the heart of a problem the Court has recognized in the recent\\nretaliation cases. “[T]here is a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as a\\nmeans of suppressing speech.” Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953. The Court also recognized this risk\\nin Nieves. The jaywalking exception acknowledges that officers can use probable cause as a\\npretext for retaliation. “In such a case, . . . probable cause does little to prove or disprove the\\ncausal connection between animus and injury . . . .” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. Novak’s case is\\nprime ground for the pretext that the Supreme Court has worried about.\\n\\n For one, potential probable cause was based on protected speech alone. That is not\\ndispositive because the officers’ consideration of his protected speech may have been “wholly\\nlegitimate.” Id. at 1723–24. But the fact that the arrest was made based only on protected\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nspeech at least raises a concern that probable cause “does little to prove or disprove the causal\\nconnection” between Novak’s criticism of the police and his arrest. Id. at 1727.\\n\\n Issue 3. Finally, the vague language of the Ohio statute further heightens the concern\\nraised in Issue 2. That statute makes it a crime to “use any computer . . . or the internet so as to\\ndisrupt, interrupt, or impair the functions of any police . . . operations.” Ohio Rev. Code §\\n2909.04(B). To see how broad this statute reaches, consider an example. An activist tweets the\\nfollowing message: “The police are violating our rights #TakeAction #MakeYourVoiceHeard.”\\nPeople in the community see the tweet and begin calling the police department to share their\\nviews. A small protest even forms in the town square. Police station employees spend time\\nfielding the calls, and a couple of officers go down to monitor the protest. Under the plain text\\nof the Ohio statute, have these acts of civic engagement “interrupt[ed]” police operations?\\nTaken at face value, the Ohio law seems to criminalize speech well in the heartland of First\\nAmendment protection. This broad reach gives the police cover to retaliate against all kinds of\\nspeech under the banner of probable cause. Critical online comments, mail-in or phone bank\\ncampaigns, or even informational websites that incite others to “disrupt” or “interrupt” police\\noperations could violate the law. See id.\\n\\n Where a statute gives police broad cover to find probable cause on speech alone,\\nprobable cause does little to disentangle retaliatory motives from legitimate ones. Thus, this case\\nraises new questions under Nieves. It may be that, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in\\nthat case and others, the general rule of requiring plaintiffs to prove the absence of probable\\ncause should not apply here. We need not decide that now.\\n\\n IV. Other Claims\\n\\n Prior Restraint. Novak alleges that the Parma police imposed a prior restraint on his\\nspeech. This claim survives, for now.\\n\\n A prior restraint is an “administrative” or “judicial order[]” that forbids protected speech\\nin advance. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). An action taken after the\\nspeech is expressed, like a punishment for disfavored speech, is not a prior restraint. Id. at 554\\n(admonishing that courts not “blur the line separating prior restraints from subsequent\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\npunishments” for speech). The First Amendment guarantees “greater protection from prior\\nrestraints.” Id. Indeed, we generally presume prior restraints are unconstitutional. See Se.\\nPromotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). But the question is whether Novak has\\nalleged a prior restraint. He alleges that the police issued a press release threatening to prosecute\\nhim, sent a letter and an email to Facebook demanding the page be taken down, and confiscated\\nsome of his computer equipment. He says the letter and email to Facebook “demanded” that the\\npage be taken down with an “implicit threat of adverse governmental action” against Facebook if\\nthey refused. R. 6, Pg. ID 1257. This question turns on whether these communications were an\\nadministrative order. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550.\\n\\n First, in light of our long history of guarding against prior restraints on speech, cf.\\nRespublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); see also 4 William Blackstone,\\nCommentaries on the Laws of England *151, we should not be overly formalistic in defining\\nwhat counts as an administrative order. But courts have not always been clear about what counts\\nas an administrative order, and that poses a problem when we are talking about what is clearly\\nestablished. Take Alexander. That case held that a prior restraint must raise a “legal\\nimpediment” to speech and described the “classic examples of prior restraints” as temporary\\nrestraining orders, permanent injunctions, and court orders. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550–51. But\\nthe formality of these classic cases should be a sufficient condition for prior restraint, not a\\nnecessary one. See id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Though perhaps not in the form of a\\nclassic prior restraint, the application of the forfeiture statute here bears its censorial cast.”). A\\ngovernment official should not have to declare his order official or jump through certain\\nprocedural hoops to create a prior restraint. Such a rule would allow government officials to\\ncloak unconstitutional restraints on speech under the cover of informality. To borrow a concept,\\nwhen an officer “carr[ies] a badge of authority of the government and represent[s] it in some\\ncapacity,” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,\\ndissenting), his order to a private party to take a specific action may fairly be called an\\n“administrative order.” This is true even if the order is not on its terms binding. Bantam Books,\\nInc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (recognizing “a system of prior administrative restraints”\\neven where affected parties were free to ignore the notices). And because taking down the page\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\nwould mean Novak could no longer post critical comments about the police on his page, the\\nletter and email to Facebook could be administrative orders that constituted a prior restraint.\\n\\n Novak also plausibly alleges that the officers created a prior restraint with their press\\nrelease threatening to take legal action. In the release, the department announced that it had\\nopened a criminal investigation into Novak’s page. Under Bantam Books, a threat of\\nprosecution can trigger a prior restraint, even if the threat is non-binding. 372 U.S. at 60, 71.\\nTrue, the facts in Bantam Books were more extreme than what we have here. There, Rhode\\nIsland created an eerily titled “Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth” to investigate\\nobscene or impure literature. Id. at 59. The commission sent notices to publishers saying certain\\nbooks were too objectionable to sell and that violators may be prosecuted. Id. at 60–62. Police\\nthen visited the publishers’ book distributors to see if the objectionable books had been removed.\\nId. at 63. But the facts of Bantam Books need not be perfectly analogous for the rule to apply.\\nRather, we need more facts to determine whether the facts in this case are close enough.\\n\\n These issues were not briefed here or decided below. And the officers do not argue that\\ntheir Facebook communications were not an administrative order. So, we leave this decision in\\nthe first instance in the capable hands of the district court. The prior restraint claim goes on.\\n\\n Additional First Amendment Claims. Novak argues that when Officers Riley and Connor\\ndeleted comments on the official police Facebook page, they unlawfully censored speech in a\\npublic forum and violated his right to receive information. These claims fail because they are\\nnot based on clearly established law.\\n\\n The First Amendment no doubt applies to the wild and “vast democratic forums of the\\nInternet.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). But when it comes to\\nonline speech, the law lags behind the times. And rightly so. “The forces and directions of the\\nInternet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they\\nsay today might be obsolete tomorrow.” Id. at 1736; see also id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring in\\nthe judgment) (noting that courts should “proceed circumspectly, taking one step at a time” in\\napplying “free speech precedents” to the Internet).\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n Courts have not reached consensus on how First Amendment protections will apply to\\ncomments on social media platforms. So far, the courts that have considered the issue have\\ntaken different approaches. See Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1012–13 (E.D. Ky.\\n2018) (denying preliminary injunction regarding the deletion of Facebook and Twitter comments\\nin a case of first impression). But see Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687–88 (4th Cir. 2019)\\n(holding that a government official violated the First Amendment by banning a critical\\nconstituent from a Facebook page). No doubt, any right Novak or the commenters may have to\\npost or receive comments was not “beyond debate” at the time the officers deleted the comments.\\nal–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity from these\\nclaims.\\n\\n Anonymity. Novak argues that the officers violated his right to speak anonymously. This\\nclaim does not survive because Novak does not allege a violation of clearly established law.\\n\\n The right to speak anonymously is deeply rooted in American political tradition and in\\nFirst Amendment doctrine. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); id.\\nat 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). From Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense”\\n(originally published anonymously during the Revolution) to the debates between Federalists and\\nAnti-Federalists during Ratification, anonymity was core at the Founding. Id. at 368 (Thomas,\\nJ., concurring in the judgment). When some Federalists encouraged newspapers to ban\\nanonymous speech, the Anti-Federalists defended their right to remain anonymous. Id. at 364–\\n66 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Free speech was originally understood to include\\nthe right to speak without being known. Consistent with this original understanding, the\\nSupreme Court has upheld the right by striking down laws banning anonymous speech. Id. at\\n357; id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65\\n(1960).\\n\\n But Novak is not contesting a law or policy that bans anonymous speech. Instead, he\\nargues that the police officers disclosed his identity as part of their criminal investigation. Yet he\\nhas pointed to no law clearly establishing that investigative actions by police can violate the right\\nto speak anonymously. Investigations are often public events. So too are criminal trials. See\\nCraig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). True, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\ncan reduce a criminal trial’s publicity, but only under the right to a fair trial, not under a right to\\nremain anonymous. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976).\\n\\n It is not clearly established that announcements made in an ongoing criminal\\ninvestigation can violate Novak’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The officers\\nare entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.\\n\\n Search and seizure and malicious prosecution. Novak alleges that the officers\\nunlawfully searched him and seized his property. He also alleges wrongful arrest and malicious\\nprosecution. These claims survive as well at this stage of the litigation. Ultimately, Novak will\\nhave to show that Officer Connor lied to get a warrant (for unlawful seizure) or lied in the course\\nof his prosecution (for malicious prosecution). And Novak will have to make this showing in\\nlight of the Ohio statute that grants broad discretion to officers.\\n\\n To prove malicious prosecution, Novak must show (1) that the officers’ “deliberate or\\nreckless falsehoods result[ed] in arrest and prosecution without probable cause” and (2) that the\\nofficers did more than passively participate in the decision to prosecute or to keep prosecuting\\nhim. Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Johnson v.\\nMoseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654–55 (6th Cir. 2015). Novak must also show the absence of probable\\ncause. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Usually, a warrant from a neutral magistrate, like the ones Connor got in this case, would\\nbe a “complete defense” to these § 1983 claims. Id. at 305, 310 & n.8; Knott v. Sullivan, 418\\nF.3d 561, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2005). Not so here. Warrants are typically a defense because they\\ndemonstrate probable cause. But warrants do not demonstrate probable cause if the officer\\n“ma[de] false statements and omissions to the judge” and if probable cause would not exist but\\nfor those false statements or omissions. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305 (quoting Vakilian v. Shaw, 335\\nF.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003)). In these limited circumstances, officers may be held liable for\\ntheir searches, seizures, and arrests even though they obtained a warrant. Id. at 308.\\n\\n Thus, these claims turn on whether Officer Connor made false statements or omissions.\\nAccording to Novak, Officer Connor falsely represented that Novak (1) “disrupted and\\nimpaired” the functioning of the Parma Police Department “by knowingly posting false\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\ninformation,” (2) “altered or affected” the department’s official page, and (3) falsely represented\\nhe was “a representative of the Parma Police Department.” R. 6, Pg. ID 1265–66. Further,\\nNovak says that Connor knew there was no interruption or disruption. As for malicious\\nprosecution, he alleges that Connor and Riley lied at trial by testifying that Novak’s page caused\\na disruption when they knew it did not. See Moseley, 790 F.3d at 655 (noting a plausible\\nallegation of malicious prosecution has been made when officers testify at trial and provide\\n“false statements [and] flagrant misrepresentations, or fail[] to disclose key items of evidence”\\n(citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 301–02, 306–07, 311–17)). For now, those allegations are enough.\\n\\n Privacy Protection Act. Novak alleges a violation of the Privacy Protection Act. This\\nclaim too depends on whether the officers lacked probable cause to search Novak’s apartment\\nand seize his property. Because Novak has alleged facts that make it plausible that the officers\\nlacked probable cause, the claim survives for now.\\n\\n The Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful for a government officer to “search for or\\nseize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to\\ndisseminate” information to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). But the statute has a “suspect\\nexception.” S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 567 (6th Cir. 2007).\\nThe Act does not apply if the officers have “probable cause to believe that the person possessing\\nsuch materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials\\nrelate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1); see S.H.A.R.K., 499 F.3d at 567. Novak has alleged that the\\nofficers lacked probable cause to search and seize the contents of his apartment, so the “suspect\\nexception” does not apply at this stage. The claim goes forward.\\n\\n Supervisory liability. Novak seeks to hold Riley, Connor’s supervisor, liable for\\nConnor’s alleged constitutional violations. But Novak sues under § 1983, and under that law, a\\nplaintiff cannot sue for vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 676 (2009). So Riley can be held responsible only for his own actions, not for his\\nsupervision of anyone else. Id. Novak must allege that Riley “encouraged the specific\\n[unconstitutional conduct] or in some other way directly participated in it.” McQueen v. Beecher\\nCmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th\\nCir. 1999)). He has so alleged, so the supervisory liability claim survives.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n Novak alleges that Officer Riley first assigned Officer Connor to investigate the\\nFacebook page and then directed Connor to take the allegedly unconstitutional actions. Novak\\nalso attaches a transcript from his criminal trial where Riley testified that he “contacted Detective\\nConnor, asked him to look into [Novak’s page], [and] assigned the case to him.” R. 6-1, Pg. ID\\n1369. At this stage, these allegations are enough. Novak may proceed against Riley for his own\\nactions and for any of Connor’s actions that Riley directed or supervised.\\n\\n Conspiracy. Novak brings a claim against Riley, Connor, and “John Doe” of the Ohio\\nInternet Crimes Against Children Task Force for conspiring to shut down his Facebook page.\\nJohn Doe allegedly told Connor how to contact Facebook and shut down the page.\\n\\n In this circuit, the test for conspiracy is simple. “All that must be shown [for conspiracy]\\nis that there was a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial\\nobjective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused\\ninjury . . . .” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985). The officers respond that\\nNovak’s allegations are conclusory. But allegations alone, even if conclusory or improbable,\\nmay suffice for this early stage of litigation. Novak names the coconspirators, suggests that they\\ncame to an agreement, and alleges that they acted against his Facebook page. These are “enough\\nfact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”\\nBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).\\n\\n But that is not the end of the conspiracy inquiry. In the time since the district court\\ndenied the officers’ motion to dismiss, our circuit has changed its law on conspiracy. We held\\nthat the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine” applies to § 1983 lawsuits like this one. Jackson v.\\nCity of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 818 (6th Cir. 2019). That doctrine holds that “members of the\\nsame legal entity cannot conspire with one another as long as their alleged acts were within the\\nscope of their employment.” Id. at 819 (citation omitted). At this time, the intracorporate\\nconspiracy doctrine does not apply here. Novak alleges that Doe is a member of a different\\nagency than Riley and Connor—the Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. So they\\nare not in the same “legal entity.” With more facts, the district court should consider whether\\nDoe does work for the Task Force and whether the Task Force is a different agency for purposes\\nof the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under Jackson.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n Municipal liability. Novak brings several claims against the City of Parma. The district\\ncourt denied Parma’s motion to dismiss on these claims, and the city now appeals. We do not\\nhave jurisdiction over these claims.\\n\\n This appeal is limited to qualified immunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with it.\\nCourtright, 839 F.3d at 523–24. Two claims are “inextricably intertwined” if resolving one\\nclaim will “necessarily determine” the other. Id. Here, the officers’ liability depends on their\\nactions against Novak. The city’s liability, in contrast, depends on a separate analysis of “its\\nmunicipal policies, training programs, and customs.” Id. So Parma’s liability is not\\n“inextricably intertwined” with qualified immunity, and we do not have jurisdiction to consider\\nmunicipal liability at this stage. Id.\\n\\n State claims. Finally, Novak brings several state law claims. The officers raise one\\ndefense. They argue that they are protected by an Ohio statute that insulates police officers from\\nliability unless their actions were taken “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or\\nreckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The officers say that Novak has not\\nshown their conduct was in bad faith, wanton, or reckless. Here again, the stage of proceedings\\ninforms this question. As the district court rightly noted, to dismiss Novak’s complaint at this\\nstage, we must find that it is “devoid of [allegations] tending to show that the [officers] acted” as\\nNovak alleges. Irving v. Austin, 741 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see also Range v.\\nDouglas, 763 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2014). The complaint is not devoid of such allegations.\\nIndeed, it is filled to the brim with them. Novak alleges that the officers lied to Facebook to take\\ndown his page, lied to secure warrants to arrest him, and lied on the witness stand about their\\nactions. At this early motion-to-dismiss stage, that is enough to plausibly allege that the officers\\nacted with a “dishonest purpose” constituting bad faith. Cook v. Hubbard Exempted Vill. Bd. of\\nEduc., 688 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1996). Novak’s state law claims live to fight\\nanother day.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n Though Novak’s Facebook page mocking the Parma Police Department has since left the\\ncyber world, several of his legal claims will live on. Others will end here. We REVERSE the\\ndistrict court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss on Novak’s claims related to anonymous\\nspeech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech. We AFFIRM the district\\ncourt’s decision with respect to all other claims except municipal liability, over which we lack\\njurisdiction.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420927/\", \"author_raw\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MERRITT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"READLER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643674/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Anthony NOVAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF PARMA; Kevin Riley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio ; Thomas Connor, Individually and as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0170p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n ANTHONY NOVAK, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n │\n v. > No. 18-3373\n │\n │\n CITY OF PARMA; KEVIN RILEY, Individually and in his │\n Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of │\n Parma, Ohio; THOMAS CONNOR, Individually and as │\n an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\n No. 1:17-cv-02148—Dan A. Polster, District Judge.\n\n Argued: June 20, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: July 29, 2019\n\n Before: MERRITT, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Steven D. Strang, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.\nSubodh Chandra, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON\nBRIEF: Steven D. Strang, Monica A. Sansalone, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus,\nOhio, for Appellants. Subodh Chandra, Patrick S. Kabat, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC,\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Apple pie, baseball, and the right to ridicule the government.\nEach holds an important place in American history and tradition. So thought Anthony Novak\nwhen he created a Facebook page to mock the Parma Police Department. He styled his page to\nlook like the department’s official Facebook page. But the similarities ended there. Novak\nshared posts like an advertisement for a “Pedophile Reform event,” at which pedophiles would\nreceive honorary police commissions.\n\n Novak’s page delighted, disgusted, and confused. Not everyone understood it. But when\nit comes to parody, the law requires a reasonable reader standard, not a “most gullible person on\nFacebook” standard. The First Amendment does not depend on whether everyone is in on the\njoke. Neither is it bothered by public disapproval, whether tepid or red-hot.\n\n Novak’s Facebook page was either a protected parody in the great American tradition of\nridiculing the government or a disruptive violation of state law. Maybe both. At this stage, we\ndecide only whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. For some of Novak’s claims\nthey are, but for others they are not.\n\n I.\n\n This case comes to us after a motion to dismiss, so we take the facts as Novak alleges\nthem and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d\n513, 520 (6th Cir. 2016). Novak created a “farcical Facebook account” designed to look like the\npolice department’s official page. R. 6, Pg. ID 1239. The page was up for twelve hours and\npublished several posts. Among the posts was a recruitment advertisement that “strongly\nencourag[ed] minorities to not apply.” Id. at 1250. Novak also posted an apology from the\ndepartment for “neglecting to inform the public about an armed white male who robbed a\nSubway sandwich shop,” while promising to bring to justice an “African American woman” who\nwas loitering outside the Subway during the robbery. Id.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 3\n\n\n The page was polarizing. Some of its about 100 followers thought it was “the funniest\nthing ever.” Id. at 1253. Others were angry. And yet others were confused, wondering whether\nthis was the actual Parma police official Facebook page. A handful of people were so angry or\nconfused that they called the police station. In all, the station received twelve minutes of calls.\nOthers continued to enjoy the page, which soon “became a platform for a wide range of citizens\nto air their grievances about the Department.” Id. at 1259. The officers later testified that they\nworried the page would confuse the public and that the “likely result is that people would call.”\nId. at 1271.\n\n One of the page’s audiences—the Parma Police Department—did not find the page\nfunny. Once the officers got wind of Novak’s page, they “all stopped what [they] were doing to\ntake a look at it, and a couple of [them] tried to figure out who did it.” Id. at 1253. One officer\nsaid they “just wanted it down.” Id. at 1254. They took several steps to make that happen.\n\n A Facebook battle ensued. First, the department posted a warning on its official\nFacebook page. The warning alerted the public to the fake page and assured them that the matter\nwas “currently being investigated.” Id. at 1255–56. Then Novak reposted the exact same\nwarning on his own page. He claims he did this to “deepen his satire.” Id. at 1259. For the\nsame reason, Novak deleted “pedantic comments” on his page explaining that the page was fake,\nas these “clumsy explication[s]” only “belabored the joke.” Id. at 1253.\n\n After that, the conflict moved offline and into the real world. Officer Kevin Riley\nassigned Officer Thomas Connor to the case and tasked him with finding out who ran the page.\nSo Connor sent a letter to Facebook requesting that the page be shut down immediately. He also\nsent an email to a different Facebook representative asking that the page be taken down. The\npolice also informed local news outlets of the investigation. The case of the fake police page\neven appeared on the nightly news. At that point, Novak decided to delete his creation. He had\nheard of the department’s investigation and was worried about the consequences.\n\n Though Novak was done posting, the police department was not done investigating.\nThey still wanted to find the person behind the laptop. So Connor subpoenaed records from\nFacebook. Riley directed Connor to go further and obtain a search warrant for Facebook. Novak\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 4\n\n\nalleges that Connor made several “material misrepresentations and omissions” to obtain that\nwarrant. Id. at 1260. The warrant still issued, and Facebook disclosed that Novak was the one\nbehind the fake account.\n\n Once the department realized that Novak was the cyber culprit, Riley directed Connor to\nobtain two more warrants—one to search Novak’s apartment and one to arrest him. The\nwarrants said that Novak unlawfully impaired the department’s functions, in violation of Ohio\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B). Novak responds that, other than twelve minutes of phone calls to the\ndepartment, the police department suffered no disruption to its functions. And Novak claims the\nofficers were unaware of the twelve minutes of call time when they obtained the warrants. But,\nonce again, the warrants still issued, and the department arrested Novak. The case went to trial,\nand Novak was acquitted.\n\n After he was acquitted of the criminal charge, Novak sued the City of Parma and Officers\nRiley and Connor. He alleged (in over thirty claims) that the city and its officers violated his\nconstitutional and statutory rights under federal and Ohio law. The defendants moved to dismiss\nhis thirty-plus claims. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, with\ntwenty-six claims left standing. On appeal, the police claim that qualified immunity shields them\nfrom Novak’s lawsuit. We review de novo whether the officers are entitled to qualified\nimmunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with that question. Courtright, 839 F.3d at 517–\n18, 523.\n\n II.\n\n Qualified immunity protects government officials like the Parma police officers from\nbeing liable for money damages if their conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,\n457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable\nwhen they exercise power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield officials from harassment,\ndistraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555\nU.S. 223, 231 (2009).\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 5\n\n\n Officers Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a\nfederal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly\nestablished at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal\nquotation marks omitted). For a right to be “clearly established,” the “constitutionality of the\nofficer’s conduct” must have been “beyond debate” in the “particular circumstances before him.”\nId. at 589–90 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court has\ncautioned that “clearly established” must not be defined “at a high level of generality.” Id. at\n590. Instead, we must be sensitive to the fact that police officers work in the real world, which is\noften messier than law books would have us believe. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725\n(2019) (“Police officers conduct approximately 29,000 arrests every day—a dangerous task that\nrequires making quick decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly\nevolving.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). So when it comes to holding police\nofficers liable for heat-of-the-moment decisions they make in the line of duty, abstract legal\nprinciples will not do the trick.\n\n On both the facts and the law, specificity is our guiding light. But we must also be\nmindful of the stage of the proceedings. This case reaches us early, after a motion to dismiss.\nAnd while we always hope to resolve qualified immunity claims at the earliest possible point in\nthe litigation, we cannot resolve such claims when we need more factual development to do so.\nPhillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that an appeal of a denial of\nqualified immunity must be “premised not on a factual dispute, but rather on ‘neat abstract issues\nof law’” (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995))). We consider each of Novak’s\nclaims under these standards.\n\n III. Retaliation\n\n Novak argues that the officers retaliated against him because of his protected speech.\nThe retaliation claim turns on two issues: (1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody and\n(2) whether the Parma police had probable cause to arrest Novak for his page. Because resolving\nboth issues involves questions of fact, the claim survives. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898\n(6th Cir. 2002) (“Because of the fact-intensive nature of the requisite inquiry, . . . we would be\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 6\n\n\nusurping the role of the jury were we to attempt to [resolve it] . . . at this stage of the\nproceeding.”).\n\n To allege a retaliation claim, Novak must show that: (1) he “engaged in a\nconstitutionally protected activity,” (2) the officers’ adverse actions caused Novak “to suffer an\ninjury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing that activity, and\n(3) the officers were motivated, at least in part, by his exercise of his constitutional rights. Paige\nv. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010). At this stage, the parties dispute whether Novak’s\nFacebook page was protected speech.\n\n a. Parody\n\n Was Novak’s speech protected? The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that\nalmost all speech is protected other than “in a few limited areas.” United States v. Stevens, 559\nU.S. 460, 468 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). These “limited areas” include speech\nexpressed as part of a crime, obscene expression, incitement, and fraud. See United States v.\nAlvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717, 720 (2012). It is clearly established, though, that parody does not\nfall in one of these “limited areas.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57\n(1988). It is protected speech. Id.\n\n The question, then, is whether Novak’s page was a parody. The officers claim that his\nFacebook page was false and meant to mislead the public, not a parody. But they are wrong to\nthink that we just look to a few confused people to determine if the page is protected parody.\n\n Our nation’s long-held First Amendment protection for parody does not rise and fall with\nwhether a few people are confused. Instead, we must apply a “reasonable reader” test. Id.\nSpeech that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts” is a parody, even\nif “patently offensive.” Id. The test is not whether one person, or even ten people, or even one\nhundred people were confused by Novak’s page. Indeed, the genius of parody is that it comes\nclose enough to reality to spark a moment of doubt in the reader’s mind before she realizes the\njoke. “The germ of parody lies in the definition of the Greek parodeia . . . as a song sung\nalongside another.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (internal\nquotation marks omitted). And masterful parody may skirt that line even closer. Benjamin\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 7\n\n\nFranklin’s 1784 satirical essay in the Journal de Paris came so close to the truth that it\nanticipated reality before it happened. Franklin spoke of the benefits of daylight and joked that\nthe French should consider waking up earlier to save money on candles. In his tongue-in-cheek\nproposal, Franklin recommended several measures for the implementation of his plan.\nHe suggested that: “Every morning, as soon as the sun rises, let all the bells in every church be\nset ringing; and if that is not sufficient?, let cannon be fired in every street, to wake the sluggards\neffectually, and make them open their eyes to see their true interest.”\nBenjamin Franklin, An Economical Project, Letter to the Editor of the Journal of Paris\n(1784), http://www.webexhibits.org/daylightsaving/franklin3.html. Through his satire, Franklin\npredicted the reality of daylight saving time, which would come a century and a half later.\n\n And a parody need not spoil its own punchline by declaring itself a parody. “Parody\nserves its goals whether labeled or not, and there is no reason to require parody to state the\nobvious (or even the reasonably perceived).” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 n.17. Imagine if The\nOnion were required to disclaim that parodical headlines like the following are, in reality, false:\nPresidential Debate Sidetracked By Booker, De Blasio Arguing About Best Place In Lower\nManhattan To Get Tapas, or, John Bolton Urges War Against the Sun After Uncovering\nEvidence It Has Nuclear Capabilities. News in Brief, The Onion (June\n26, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/presidential-debate-sidetracked-by-booker-de-blasio-ar-\n1835870332; News in Brief, The Onion (June 10, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/john-\nbolton-urges-war-against-the-sun-after-uncovering-1835805360. The law of parody does not\nrequire us to strain credulity so far. And that is not because everyone always understands the\njoke. Susanna Kim, All the Times People Were Fooled by The Onion, ABC News (June 1,\n2015), https://abcnews.go.com/International/times-people-fooled-onion/story?id=31444478.\n\n Instead, the test for parody is whether a reasonable reader would have seen Novak’s\nFacebook page and concluded that the posts stated “actual facts.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50. Our\nnation boasts a long history of protecting parody and satire. “[F]rom the early cartoon portraying\nGeorge Washington as an ass down to the present day, . . . satirical cartoons have played a\nprominent role in public and political debate.” Id. at 54. And parody, like all protected speech,\nneed not be high-minded or respectful to find safe haven under the First Amendment. “One of\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 8\n\n\nthe prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and\nthat means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and\nwithout moderation.” Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (Frankfurter,\nJ.). “The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided.”\nHustler, 485 U.S. at 54. We uphold this right, even where parody shocks us, because “[o]ur trust\nin the good sense of the people on deliberate reflection goes deep.” Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at\n674.\n\n Whether Novak’s page was a protected parody is a question of fact that we cannot answer\nat this stage. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (“The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to\nbe that the ad parody was not reasonably believable, and in accordance with our custom we\naccept this finding.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, the jury will have\nto answer that question. At this stage, though, Novak has alleged enough facts that a reasonable\njury could find that his page was a parody.\n\n b. Probable Cause\n\n Since we accept for now that the page was protected speech, we move to the second\nquestion: did the Parma police have probable cause to arrest Novak? Probable cause exists\nwhere there is a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that officers will discover evidence of\ncriminal activity. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). To\nanswer this question, we need more facts. We need to know whether the citizen calls to the\npolice station gave the officers probable cause to think there was a “disruption” or “interruption”\nof police operations under Ohio law. Thus, whether the police had probable cause to arrest\nNovak is an issue of fact, which we do not have jurisdiction to decide. Swiecicki v. Delgado,\n463 F.3d 489, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Probable cause is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve if\nthere are any genuine issues of material fact that are relevant to the inquiry.”), abrogated on\nother grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Of course, a retaliation claim is like a\nflow chart—once you decide one issue, it leads to the next. So, we move on. In the probable\ncause inquiry that follows, we assume that Novak’s page was protected speech.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 9\n\n\n If the police did not have probable cause to arrest Novak, then he may bring a claim of\nretaliation. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725. To prevail on this claim, Novak will need to show that\nthe officers arrested him based on a “forbidden” retaliatory motive. Id. at 1722–23. But\nretaliatory motive is often difficult to prove. After all, “protected speech is often a ‘wholly\nlegitimate consideration’ for officers when deciding whether to make an arrest.” Id. at 1723–24\n(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012)) (explaining that the “content and tone”\nof a suspect’s speech may indicate whether he presents a threat). A plaintiff alleging retaliatory\narrest must disentangle these “wholly legitimate” considerations of speech from any wholly\nillegitimate retaliatory motives.\n\n To do so, the threshold question Novak must answer is whether “retaliation was a\nsubstantial or motivating factor” for his arrest. Id. at 1725. Novak bears the burden of making\nthat showing. If he does, the next question is whether the officers would have arrested him\nabsent that retaliatory motive. Id. (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945,\n1952–53 (2018)). The burden to answer that lies on the officers. Id. If they show that they\nwould have arrested Novak even if he had not criticized the police department, his retaliatory-\narrest claim fails. Id. So the questions will be: (1) Can Novak show that the officers were\nmotivated by retaliatory animus, not legitimate motivations? (Novak’s burden); if yes, (2) Can\nthe officers justify Novak’s arrest based on something other than retaliation—i.e., a mistaken but\nhonest belief that there was probable cause? (Officers’ burden).\n\n If the officers did have probable cause, on the other hand, they are entitled to qualified\nimmunity. The Supreme Court has said as much. “This Court has never recognized a First\nAmendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.”\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 664–65. The Supreme Court said that in 2012, and it remains true today.\n\n The Supreme Court decided two retaliation cases after Reichle. Neither case clearly\nestablished Novak’s right to be free from a retaliatory arrest based on probable cause. First, the\nSupreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach. There, the Court held that a plaintiff\ncan bring a retaliation claim if the police had probable cause to arrest but only against official\nmunicipal policies of retaliation. 138 S. Ct. at 1954–55. So Lozman does not apply where, as\nhere, the plaintiff sues individual officers. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (noting that the facts in\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 10\n\n\nLozman were “far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim” and recognizing that Lozman’s\nholding was “limited . . . to arrests that result from official policies of retaliation”). Second, the\nCourt held most recently in Nieves that a plaintiff generally cannot bring a retaliation claim if the\npolice had probable cause to arrest. Id. at 1725. Though Nieves also created an exception to that\ngeneral rule that we will discuss later, the exception does not apply here because the officers\nwould not have been aware of it at the time of Novak’s arrest since the case was decided later.\n\n Nor has our circuit clearly established the law on this issue. In Sandul v. Larion, the\nSixth Circuit denied an officer qualified immunity for a First Amendment retaliation claim and\nheld that “protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of any of the . . . ordinances.”\n119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1997). But in that case, the ordinance criminalized the plaintiff’s\nspeech directly, and there was little question whether the speech was protected. Id. at 1255–56\n(“These cases should leave little doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that the mere words\nand gesture ‘f—k you’ are constitutionally protected speech.”). Plus, it is not clearly established\nhow we reconcile the apparent holding in Sandul that protected speech cannot be the basis for\nprobable cause with the rule that protected speech can be a “wholly legitimate consideration” for\nofficers when they decide whether to arrest someone. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668. “[I]f judges thus\ndisagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking\nthe losing side of the controversy.” Id. at 669–70 (citation omitted). Simply put, Ohio’s statute\nappears to punish the effects of speech (interruptions), not the speech itself, and whether\nenforcing such a statute in these circumstances violates the First Amendment is not clearly\nestablished. So the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity.\n\n To sum up, to resolve the retaliation claim, the factfinder below will have to decide:\n(1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody, and thus protected speech, and; (2) whether\nthe officers had probable cause to arrest Novak under the Ohio statute. If the officers did not\nhave probable cause, they are not entitled to qualified immunity, and Novak can attempt to show\nthe arrest was retaliatory. If the officers did have probable cause, they are entitled to qualified\nimmunity even if Novak’s page was protected speech because the law at the time did not clearly\nestablish that charging Novak under the statute would violate his constitutional rights.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 11\n\n\n c. Future Issues\n\n At this stage, we have jurisdiction to review only whether the officers are entitled to\nqualified immunity. But a few interesting issues remain. They do not bear on the qualified\nimmunity analysis above because, as with most interesting legal issues, the law is not clearly\nestablished.\n\n Issue 1. The Supreme Court held recently in Nieves that to bring a First Amendment\nretaliatory arrest claim, a plaintiff must generally show that there was no probable cause for the\narrest. 139 S. Ct. at 1727. But the Nieves Court also recognized a narrow exception to this rule\n“where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to\ndo so.” Id. For example, “[i]f an individual who has been vocally complaining about police\nconduct is arrested for jaywalking . . . it would seem insufficiently protective of First\nAmendment rights to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground that there\nwas undoubted probable cause for the arrest.” Id. It is plausible that Novak’s arrest under Ohio\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B), or one like it, would trigger the exception—i.e., if officers never or\nrarely arrested someone under this statute. Unfortunately for Novak, this exception was not\nclearly established before Nieves.\n\n Issue 2. Even if Novak’s case would not fall within the narrow exception of Nieves, 139\nS. Ct. at 1727, there is good reason to believe that in the future probable cause alone may not\nprotect the officers.\n\n First, this case may not be subject to the general rule of Nieves because the sole basis for\nprobable cause was speech. Besides posting to his Facebook page, Novak committed no other\nact that could have created probable cause. In other First Amendment retaliation cases on point,\nby contrast, the defendant’s conduct was a mix of protected speech and unprotected conduct.\nThat is, the defendants both said something and did something. See, e.g., id. at 1720–21\n(defendant made remarks to police officers (protected speech) and acted aggressively toward\nthem in an intoxicated state (unprotected conduct)); Reichle, 566 U.S. at 660–61 (defendant\nmade political remarks (protected speech) and unlawfully touched the Vice President\n(unprotected conduct)); Swiecki, 463 F.3d at 491–92 (defendant made comments to the officer\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 12\n\n\n(protected speech) and engaged in disorderly conduct while intoxicated (unprotected conduct)).\nHere, we have nothing like that. Novak did not create a Facebook page criticizing police and use\nhis computer to hack into police servers to disrupt operations. The sole basis for probable cause\nto arrest Novak was his speech. And there is good reason to believe that, based on the reasoning\nunderlying the First Amendment retaliation cases, this is an important difference.\n\n This is important because in Nieves and its predecessors, the Court based its reasoning on\nthe thorny causation issue that comes up in cases with both protected speech and unprotected\nconduct. The idea is that in cases where the plaintiff both did something and said something to\nget arrested, the factfinder will not be able to disentangle whether the officer arrested him\nbecause of what he did or because of what he said. “[R]etaliatory arrest cases . . . present a\ntenuous causal connection between the defendant’s alleged animus and the plaintiff’s injury.”\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 668. For example, in Mt. Healthy, the Court held there was no retaliation “if\nthe same decision would have been reached absent [plaintiff’s] protected speech.” Nieves, 139\nS. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285\n(1977)). Here, that inquiry gets us nowhere because “absent [Novak’s] protected speech,” there\nwould be no basis for probable cause. So, in this case, the causal connection is not so tenuous.\nAnd the reason for requiring that plaintiff show an absence of probable cause where probable\ncause is based only on protected speech is not so clear.\n\n Second, this case strikes at the heart of a problem the Court has recognized in the recent\nretaliation cases. “[T]here is a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as a\nmeans of suppressing speech.” Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953. The Court also recognized this risk\nin Nieves. The jaywalking exception acknowledges that officers can use probable cause as a\npretext for retaliation. “In such a case, . . . probable cause does little to prove or disprove the\ncausal connection between animus and injury . . . .” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. Novak’s case is\nprime ground for the pretext that the Supreme Court has worried about.\n\n For one, potential probable cause was based on protected speech alone. That is not\ndispositive because the officers’ consideration of his protected speech may have been “wholly\nlegitimate.” Id. at 1723–24. But the fact that the arrest was made based only on protected\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 13\n\n\nspeech at least raises a concern that probable cause “does little to prove or disprove the causal\nconnection” between Novak’s criticism of the police and his arrest. Id. at 1727.\n\n Issue 3. Finally, the vague language of the Ohio statute further heightens the concern\nraised in Issue 2. That statute makes it a crime to “use any computer . . . or the internet so as to\ndisrupt, interrupt, or impair the functions of any police . . . operations.” Ohio Rev. Code §\n2909.04(B). To see how broad this statute reaches, consider an example. An activist tweets the\nfollowing message: “The police are violating our rights #TakeAction #MakeYourVoiceHeard.”\nPeople in the community see the tweet and begin calling the police department to share their\nviews. A small protest even forms in the town square. Police station employees spend time\nfielding the calls, and a couple of officers go down to monitor the protest. Under the plain text\nof the Ohio statute, have these acts of civic engagement “interrupt[ed]” police operations?\nTaken at face value, the Ohio law seems to criminalize speech well in the heartland of First\nAmendment protection. This broad reach gives the police cover to retaliate against all kinds of\nspeech under the banner of probable cause. Critical online comments, mail-in or phone bank\ncampaigns, or even informational websites that incite others to “disrupt” or “interrupt” police\noperations could violate the law. See id.\n\n Where a statute gives police broad cover to find probable cause on speech alone,\nprobable cause does little to disentangle retaliatory motives from legitimate ones. Thus, this case\nraises new questions under Nieves. It may be that, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in\nthat case and others, the general rule of requiring plaintiffs to prove the absence of probable\ncause should not apply here. We need not decide that now.\n\n IV. Other Claims\n\n Prior Restraint. Novak alleges that the Parma police imposed a prior restraint on his\nspeech. This claim survives, for now.\n\n A prior restraint is an “administrative” or “judicial order[]” that forbids protected speech\nin advance. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). An action taken after the\nspeech is expressed, like a punishment for disfavored speech, is not a prior restraint. Id. at 554\n(admonishing that courts not “blur the line separating prior restraints from subsequent\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 14\n\n\npunishments” for speech). The First Amendment guarantees “greater protection from prior\nrestraints.” Id. Indeed, we generally presume prior restraints are unconstitutional. See Se.\nPromotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). But the question is whether Novak has\nalleged a prior restraint. He alleges that the police issued a press release threatening to prosecute\nhim, sent a letter and an email to Facebook demanding the page be taken down, and confiscated\nsome of his computer equipment. He says the letter and email to Facebook “demanded” that the\npage be taken down with an “implicit threat of adverse governmental action” against Facebook if\nthey refused. R. 6, Pg. ID 1257. This question turns on whether these communications were an\nadministrative order. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550.\n\n First, in light of our long history of guarding against prior restraints on speech, cf.\nRespublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); see also 4 William Blackstone,\nCommentaries on the Laws of England *151, we should not be overly formalistic in defining\nwhat counts as an administrative order. But courts have not always been clear about what counts\nas an administrative order, and that poses a problem when we are talking about what is clearly\nestablished. Take Alexander. That case held that a prior restraint must raise a “legal\nimpediment” to speech and described the “classic examples of prior restraints” as temporary\nrestraining orders, permanent injunctions, and court orders. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550–51. But\nthe formality of these classic cases should be a sufficient condition for prior restraint, not a\nnecessary one. See id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Though perhaps not in the form of a\nclassic prior restraint, the application of the forfeiture statute here bears its censorial cast.”). A\ngovernment official should not have to declare his order official or jump through certain\nprocedural hoops to create a prior restraint. Such a rule would allow government officials to\ncloak unconstitutional restraints on speech under the cover of informality. To borrow a concept,\nwhen an officer “carr[ies] a badge of authority of the government and represent[s] it in some\ncapacity,” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,\ndissenting), his order to a private party to take a specific action may fairly be called an\n“administrative order.” This is true even if the order is not on its terms binding. Bantam Books,\nInc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (recognizing “a system of prior administrative restraints”\neven where affected parties were free to ignore the notices). And because taking down the page\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 15\n\n\nwould mean Novak could no longer post critical comments about the police on his page, the\nletter and email to Facebook could be administrative orders that constituted a prior restraint.\n\n Novak also plausibly alleges that the officers created a prior restraint with their press\nrelease threatening to take legal action. In the release, the department announced that it had\nopened a criminal investigation into Novak’s page. Under Bantam Books, a threat of\nprosecution can trigger a prior restraint, even if the threat is non-binding. 372 U.S. at 60, 71.\nTrue, the facts in Bantam Books were more extreme than what we have here. There, Rhode\nIsland created an eerily titled “Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth” to investigate\nobscene or impure literature. Id. at 59. The commission sent notices to publishers saying certain\nbooks were too objectionable to sell and that violators may be prosecuted. Id. at 60–62. Police\nthen visited the publishers’ book distributors to see if the objectionable books had been removed.\nId. at 63. But the facts of Bantam Books need not be perfectly analogous for the rule to apply.\nRather, we need more facts to determine whether the facts in this case are close enough.\n\n These issues were not briefed here or decided below. And the officers do not argue that\ntheir Facebook communications were not an administrative order. So, we leave this decision in\nthe first instance in the capable hands of the district court. The prior restraint claim goes on.\n\n Additional First Amendment Claims. Novak argues that when Officers Riley and Connor\ndeleted comments on the official police Facebook page, they unlawfully censored speech in a\npublic forum and violated his right to receive information. These claims fail because they are\nnot based on clearly established law.\n\n The First Amendment no doubt applies to the wild and “vast democratic forums of the\nInternet.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). But when it comes to\nonline speech, the law lags behind the times. And rightly so. “The forces and directions of the\nInternet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they\nsay today might be obsolete tomorrow.” Id. at 1736; see also id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring in\nthe judgment) (noting that courts should “proceed circumspectly, taking one step at a time” in\napplying “free speech precedents” to the Internet).\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 16\n\n\n Courts have not reached consensus on how First Amendment protections will apply to\ncomments on social media platforms. So far, the courts that have considered the issue have\ntaken different approaches. See Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1012–13 (E.D. Ky.\n2018) (denying preliminary injunction regarding the deletion of Facebook and Twitter comments\nin a case of first impression). But see Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687–88 (4th Cir. 2019)\n(holding that a government official violated the First Amendment by banning a critical\nconstituent from a Facebook page). No doubt, any right Novak or the commenters may have to\npost or receive comments was not “beyond debate” at the time the officers deleted the comments.\nal–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity from these\nclaims.\n\n Anonymity. Novak argues that the officers violated his right to speak anonymously. This\nclaim does not survive because Novak does not allege a violation of clearly established law.\n\n The right to speak anonymously is deeply rooted in American political tradition and in\nFirst Amendment doctrine. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); id.\nat 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). From Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense”\n(originally published anonymously during the Revolution) to the debates between Federalists and\nAnti-Federalists during Ratification, anonymity was core at the Founding. Id. at 368 (Thomas,\nJ., concurring in the judgment). When some Federalists encouraged newspapers to ban\nanonymous speech, the Anti-Federalists defended their right to remain anonymous. Id. at 364–\n66 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Free speech was originally understood to include\nthe right to speak without being known. Consistent with this original understanding, the\nSupreme Court has upheld the right by striking down laws banning anonymous speech. Id. at\n357; id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65\n(1960).\n\n But Novak is not contesting a law or policy that bans anonymous speech. Instead, he\nargues that the police officers disclosed his identity as part of their criminal investigation. Yet he\nhas pointed to no law clearly establishing that investigative actions by police can violate the right\nto speak anonymously. Investigations are often public events. So too are criminal trials. See\nCraig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). True, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 17\n\n\ncan reduce a criminal trial’s publicity, but only under the right to a fair trial, not under a right to\nremain anonymous. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976).\n\n It is not clearly established that announcements made in an ongoing criminal\ninvestigation can violate Novak’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The officers\nare entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.\n\n Search and seizure and malicious prosecution. Novak alleges that the officers\nunlawfully searched him and seized his property. He also alleges wrongful arrest and malicious\nprosecution. These claims survive as well at this stage of the litigation. Ultimately, Novak will\nhave to show that Officer Connor lied to get a warrant (for unlawful seizure) or lied in the course\nof his prosecution (for malicious prosecution). And Novak will have to make this showing in\nlight of the Ohio statute that grants broad discretion to officers.\n\n To prove malicious prosecution, Novak must show (1) that the officers’ “deliberate or\nreckless falsehoods result[ed] in arrest and prosecution without probable cause” and (2) that the\nofficers did more than passively participate in the decision to prosecute or to keep prosecuting\nhim. Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Johnson v.\nMoseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654–55 (6th Cir. 2015). Novak must also show the absence of probable\ncause. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010).\n\n Usually, a warrant from a neutral magistrate, like the ones Connor got in this case, would\nbe a “complete defense” to these § 1983 claims. Id. at 305, 310 & n.8; Knott v. Sullivan, 418\nF.3d 561, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2005). Not so here. Warrants are typically a defense because they\ndemonstrate probable cause. But warrants do not demonstrate probable cause if the officer\n“ma[de] false statements and omissions to the judge” and if probable cause would not exist but\nfor those false statements or omissions. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305 (quoting Vakilian v. Shaw, 335\nF.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003)). In these limited circumstances, officers may be held liable for\ntheir searches, seizures, and arrests even though they obtained a warrant. Id. at 308.\n\n Thus, these claims turn on whether Officer Connor made false statements or omissions.\nAccording to Novak, Officer Connor falsely represented that Novak (1) “disrupted and\nimpaired” the functioning of the Parma Police Department “by knowingly posting false\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 18\n\n\ninformation,” (2) “altered or affected” the department’s official page, and (3) falsely represented\nhe was “a representative of the Parma Police Department.” R. 6, Pg. ID 1265–66. Further,\nNovak says that Connor knew there was no interruption or disruption. As for malicious\nprosecution, he alleges that Connor and Riley lied at trial by testifying that Novak’s page caused\na disruption when they knew it did not. See Moseley, 790 F.3d at 655 (noting a plausible\nallegation of malicious prosecution has been made when officers testify at trial and provide\n“false statements [and] flagrant misrepresentations, or fail[] to disclose key items of evidence”\n(citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 301–02, 306–07, 311–17)). For now, those allegations are enough.\n\n Privacy Protection Act. Novak alleges a violation of the Privacy Protection Act. This\nclaim too depends on whether the officers lacked probable cause to search Novak’s apartment\nand seize his property. Because Novak has alleged facts that make it plausible that the officers\nlacked probable cause, the claim survives for now.\n\n The Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful for a government officer to “search for or\nseize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to\ndisseminate” information to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). But the statute has a “suspect\nexception.” S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 567 (6th Cir. 2007).\nThe Act does not apply if the officers have “probable cause to believe that the person possessing\nsuch materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials\nrelate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1); see S.H.A.R.K., 499 F.3d at 567. Novak has alleged that the\nofficers lacked probable cause to search and seize the contents of his apartment, so the “suspect\nexception” does not apply at this stage. The claim goes forward.\n\n Supervisory liability. Novak seeks to hold Riley, Connor’s supervisor, liable for\nConnor’s alleged constitutional violations. But Novak sues under § 1983, and under that law, a\nplaintiff cannot sue for vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n662, 676 (2009). So Riley can be held responsible only for his own actions, not for his\nsupervision of anyone else. Id. Novak must allege that Riley “encouraged the specific\n[unconstitutional conduct] or in some other way directly participated in it.” McQueen v. Beecher\nCmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th\nCir. 1999)). He has so alleged, so the supervisory liability claim survives.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 19\n\n\n Novak alleges that Officer Riley first assigned Officer Connor to investigate the\nFacebook page and then directed Connor to take the allegedly unconstitutional actions. Novak\nalso attaches a transcript from his criminal trial where Riley testified that he “contacted Detective\nConnor, asked him to look into [Novak’s page], [and] assigned the case to him.” R. 6-1, Pg. ID\n1369. At this stage, these allegations are enough. Novak may proceed against Riley for his own\nactions and for any of Connor’s actions that Riley directed or supervised.\n\n Conspiracy. Novak brings a claim against Riley, Connor, and “John Doe” of the Ohio\nInternet Crimes Against Children Task Force for conspiring to shut down his Facebook page.\nJohn Doe allegedly told Connor how to contact Facebook and shut down the page.\n\n In this circuit, the test for conspiracy is simple. “All that must be shown [for conspiracy]\nis that there was a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial\nobjective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused\ninjury . . . .” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985). The officers respond that\nNovak’s allegations are conclusory. But allegations alone, even if conclusory or improbable,\nmay suffice for this early stage of litigation. Novak names the coconspirators, suggests that they\ncame to an agreement, and alleges that they acted against his Facebook page. These are “enough\nfact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”\nBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).\n\n But that is not the end of the conspiracy inquiry. In the time since the district court\ndenied the officers’ motion to dismiss, our circuit has changed its law on conspiracy. We held\nthat the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine” applies to § 1983 lawsuits like this one. Jackson v.\nCity of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 818 (6th Cir. 2019). That doctrine holds that “members of the\nsame legal entity cannot conspire with one another as long as their alleged acts were within the\nscope of their employment.” Id. at 819 (citation omitted). At this time, the intracorporate\nconspiracy doctrine does not apply here. Novak alleges that Doe is a member of a different\nagency than Riley and Connor—the Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. So they\nare not in the same “legal entity.” With more facts, the district court should consider whether\nDoe does work for the Task Force and whether the Task Force is a different agency for purposes\nof the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under Jackson.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 20\n\n\n Municipal liability. Novak brings several claims against the City of Parma. The district\ncourt denied Parma’s motion to dismiss on these claims, and the city now appeals. We do not\nhave jurisdiction over these claims.\n\n This appeal is limited to qualified immunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with it.\nCourtright, 839 F.3d at 523–24. Two claims are “inextricably intertwined” if resolving one\nclaim will “necessarily determine” the other. Id. Here, the officers’ liability depends on their\nactions against Novak. The city’s liability, in contrast, depends on a separate analysis of “its\nmunicipal policies, training programs, and customs.” Id. So Parma’s liability is not\n“inextricably intertwined” with qualified immunity, and we do not have jurisdiction to consider\nmunicipal liability at this stage. Id.\n\n State claims. Finally, Novak brings several state law claims. The officers raise one\ndefense. They argue that they are protected by an Ohio statute that insulates police officers from\nliability unless their actions were taken “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or\nreckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The officers say that Novak has not\nshown their conduct was in bad faith, wanton, or reckless. Here again, the stage of proceedings\ninforms this question. As the district court rightly noted, to dismiss Novak’s complaint at this\nstage, we must find that it is “devoid of [allegations] tending to show that the [officers] acted” as\nNovak alleges. Irving v. Austin, 741 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see also Range v.\nDouglas, 763 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2014). The complaint is not devoid of such allegations.\nIndeed, it is filled to the brim with them. Novak alleges that the officers lied to Facebook to take\ndown his page, lied to secure warrants to arrest him, and lied on the witness stand about their\nactions. At this early motion-to-dismiss stage, that is enough to plausibly allege that the officers\nacted with a “dishonest purpose” constituting bad faith. Cook v. Hubbard Exempted Vill. Bd. of\nEduc., 688 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1996). Novak’s state law claims live to fight\nanother day.\n\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 21\n\n\n * * *\n\n Though Novak’s Facebook page mocking the Parma Police Department has since left the\ncyber world, several of his legal claims will live on. Others will end here. We REVERSE the\ndistrict court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss on Novak’s claims related to anonymous\nspeech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech. We AFFIRM the district\ncourt’s decision with respect to all other claims except municipal liability, over which we lack\njurisdiction.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Anthony NOVAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF PARMA; Kevin Riley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio ; Thomas Connor, Individually and as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0170p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n ANTHONY NOVAK, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n │\\n v. > No. 18-3373\\n │\\n │\\n CITY OF PARMA; KEVIN RILEY, Individually and in his │\\n Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of │\\n Parma, Ohio; THOMAS CONNOR, Individually and as │\\n an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:17-cv-02148—Dan A. Polster, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: June 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 29, 2019\\n\\n Before: MERRITT, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Steven D. Strang, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.\\nSubodh Chandra, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON\\nBRIEF: Steven D. Strang, Monica A. Sansalone, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Columbus,\\nOhio, for Appellants. Subodh Chandra, Patrick S. Kabat, THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC,\\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Apple pie, baseball, and the right to ridicule the government.\\nEach holds an important place in American history and tradition. So thought Anthony Novak\\nwhen he created a Facebook page to mock the Parma Police Department. He styled his page to\\nlook like the department’s official Facebook page. But the similarities ended there. Novak\\nshared posts like an advertisement for a “Pedophile Reform event,” at which pedophiles would\\nreceive honorary police commissions.\\n\\n Novak’s page delighted, disgusted, and confused. Not everyone understood it. But when\\nit comes to parody, the law requires a reasonable reader standard, not a “most gullible person on\\nFacebook” standard. The First Amendment does not depend on whether everyone is in on the\\njoke. Neither is it bothered by public disapproval, whether tepid or red-hot.\\n\\n Novak’s Facebook page was either a protected parody in the great American tradition of\\nridiculing the government or a disruptive violation of state law. Maybe both. At this stage, we\\ndecide only whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. For some of Novak’s claims\\nthey are, but for others they are not.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This case comes to us after a motion to dismiss, so we take the facts as Novak alleges\\nthem and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d\\n513, 520 (6th Cir. 2016). Novak created a “farcical Facebook account” designed to look like the\\npolice department’s official page. R. 6, Pg. ID 1239. The page was up for twelve hours and\\npublished several posts. Among the posts was a recruitment advertisement that “strongly\\nencourag[ed] minorities to not apply.” Id. at 1250. Novak also posted an apology from the\\ndepartment for “neglecting to inform the public about an armed white male who robbed a\\nSubway sandwich shop,” while promising to bring to justice an “African American woman” who\\nwas loitering outside the Subway during the robbery. Id.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The page was polarizing. Some of its about 100 followers thought it was “the funniest\\nthing ever.” Id. at 1253. Others were angry. And yet others were confused, wondering whether\\nthis was the actual Parma police official Facebook page. A handful of people were so angry or\\nconfused that they called the police station. In all, the station received twelve minutes of calls.\\nOthers continued to enjoy the page, which soon “became a platform for a wide range of citizens\\nto air their grievances about the Department.” Id. at 1259. The officers later testified that they\\nworried the page would confuse the public and that the “likely result is that people would call.”\\nId. at 1271.\\n\\n One of the page’s audiences—the Parma Police Department—did not find the page\\nfunny. Once the officers got wind of Novak’s page, they “all stopped what [they] were doing to\\ntake a look at it, and a couple of [them] tried to figure out who did it.” Id. at 1253. One officer\\nsaid they “just wanted it down.” Id. at 1254. They took several steps to make that happen.\\n\\n A Facebook battle ensued. First, the department posted a warning on its official\\nFacebook page. The warning alerted the public to the fake page and assured them that the matter\\nwas “currently being investigated.” Id. at 1255–56. Then Novak reposted the exact same\\nwarning on his own page. He claims he did this to “deepen his satire.” Id. at 1259. For the\\nsame reason, Novak deleted “pedantic comments” on his page explaining that the page was fake,\\nas these “clumsy explication[s]” only “belabored the joke.” Id. at 1253.\\n\\n After that, the conflict moved offline and into the real world. Officer Kevin Riley\\nassigned Officer Thomas Connor to the case and tasked him with finding out who ran the page.\\nSo Connor sent a letter to Facebook requesting that the page be shut down immediately. He also\\nsent an email to a different Facebook representative asking that the page be taken down. The\\npolice also informed local news outlets of the investigation. The case of the fake police page\\neven appeared on the nightly news. At that point, Novak decided to delete his creation. He had\\nheard of the department’s investigation and was worried about the consequences.\\n\\n Though Novak was done posting, the police department was not done investigating.\\nThey still wanted to find the person behind the laptop. So Connor subpoenaed records from\\nFacebook. Riley directed Connor to go further and obtain a search warrant for Facebook. Novak\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\nalleges that Connor made several “material misrepresentations and omissions” to obtain that\\nwarrant. Id. at 1260. The warrant still issued, and Facebook disclosed that Novak was the one\\nbehind the fake account.\\n\\n Once the department realized that Novak was the cyber culprit, Riley directed Connor to\\nobtain two more warrants—one to search Novak’s apartment and one to arrest him. The\\nwarrants said that Novak unlawfully impaired the department’s functions, in violation of Ohio\\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B). Novak responds that, other than twelve minutes of phone calls to the\\ndepartment, the police department suffered no disruption to its functions. And Novak claims the\\nofficers were unaware of the twelve minutes of call time when they obtained the warrants. But,\\nonce again, the warrants still issued, and the department arrested Novak. The case went to trial,\\nand Novak was acquitted.\\n\\n After he was acquitted of the criminal charge, Novak sued the City of Parma and Officers\\nRiley and Connor. He alleged (in over thirty claims) that the city and its officers violated his\\nconstitutional and statutory rights under federal and Ohio law. The defendants moved to dismiss\\nhis thirty-plus claims. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, with\\ntwenty-six claims left standing. On appeal, the police claim that qualified immunity shields them\\nfrom Novak’s lawsuit. We review de novo whether the officers are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with that question. Courtright, 839 F.3d at 517–\\n18, 523.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials like the Parma police officers from\\nbeing liable for money damages if their conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or\\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,\\n457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable\\nwhen they exercise power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield officials from harassment,\\ndistraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555\\nU.S. 223, 231 (2009).\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n Officers Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a\\nfederal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly\\nestablished at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). For a right to be “clearly established,” the “constitutionality of the\\nofficer’s conduct” must have been “beyond debate” in the “particular circumstances before him.”\\nId. at 589–90 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court has\\ncautioned that “clearly established” must not be defined “at a high level of generality.” Id. at\\n590. Instead, we must be sensitive to the fact that police officers work in the real world, which is\\noften messier than law books would have us believe. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725\\n(2019) (“Police officers conduct approximately 29,000 arrests every day—a dangerous task that\\nrequires making quick decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly\\nevolving.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). So when it comes to holding police\\nofficers liable for heat-of-the-moment decisions they make in the line of duty, abstract legal\\nprinciples will not do the trick.\\n\\n On both the facts and the law, specificity is our guiding light. But we must also be\\nmindful of the stage of the proceedings. This case reaches us early, after a motion to dismiss.\\nAnd while we always hope to resolve qualified immunity claims at the earliest possible point in\\nthe litigation, we cannot resolve such claims when we need more factual development to do so.\\nPhillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that an appeal of a denial of\\nqualified immunity must be “premised not on a factual dispute, but rather on ‘neat abstract issues\\nof law’” (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995))). We consider each of Novak’s\\nclaims under these standards.\\n\\n III. Retaliation\\n\\n Novak argues that the officers retaliated against him because of his protected speech.\\nThe retaliation claim turns on two issues: (1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody and\\n(2) whether the Parma police had probable cause to arrest Novak for his page. Because resolving\\nboth issues involves questions of fact, the claim survives. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898\\n(6th Cir. 2002) (“Because of the fact-intensive nature of the requisite inquiry, . . . we would be\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nusurping the role of the jury were we to attempt to [resolve it] . . . at this stage of the\\nproceeding.”).\\n\\n To allege a retaliation claim, Novak must show that: (1) he “engaged in a\\nconstitutionally protected activity,” (2) the officers’ adverse actions caused Novak “to suffer an\\ninjury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing that activity, and\\n(3) the officers were motivated, at least in part, by his exercise of his constitutional rights. Paige\\nv. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010). At this stage, the parties dispute whether Novak’s\\nFacebook page was protected speech.\\n\\n a. Parody\\n\\n Was Novak’s speech protected? The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that\\nalmost all speech is protected other than “in a few limited areas.” United States v. Stevens, 559\\nU.S. 460, 468 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). These “limited areas” include speech\\nexpressed as part of a crime, obscene expression, incitement, and fraud. See United States v.\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717, 720 (2012). It is clearly established, though, that parody does not\\nfall in one of these “limited areas.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57\\n(1988). It is protected speech. Id.\\n\\n The question, then, is whether Novak’s page was a parody. The officers claim that his\\nFacebook page was false and meant to mislead the public, not a parody. But they are wrong to\\nthink that we just look to a few confused people to determine if the page is protected parody.\\n\\n Our nation’s long-held First Amendment protection for parody does not rise and fall with\\nwhether a few people are confused. Instead, we must apply a “reasonable reader” test. Id.\\nSpeech that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts” is a parody, even\\nif “patently offensive.” Id. The test is not whether one person, or even ten people, or even one\\nhundred people were confused by Novak’s page. Indeed, the genius of parody is that it comes\\nclose enough to reality to spark a moment of doubt in the reader’s mind before she realizes the\\njoke. “The germ of parody lies in the definition of the Greek parodeia . . . as a song sung\\nalongside another.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). And masterful parody may skirt that line even closer. Benjamin\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nFranklin’s 1784 satirical essay in the Journal de Paris came so close to the truth that it\\nanticipated reality before it happened. Franklin spoke of the benefits of daylight and joked that\\nthe French should consider waking up earlier to save money on candles. In his tongue-in-cheek\\nproposal, Franklin recommended several measures for the implementation of his plan.\\nHe suggested that: “Every morning, as soon as the sun rises, let all the bells in every church be\\nset ringing; and if that is not sufficient?, let cannon be fired in every street, to wake the sluggards\\neffectually, and make them open their eyes to see their true interest.”\\nBenjamin Franklin, An Economical Project, Letter to the Editor of the Journal of Paris\\n(1784), http://www.webexhibits.org/daylightsaving/franklin3.html. Through his satire, Franklin\\npredicted the reality of daylight saving time, which would come a century and a half later.\\n\\n And a parody need not spoil its own punchline by declaring itself a parody. “Parody\\nserves its goals whether labeled or not, and there is no reason to require parody to state the\\nobvious (or even the reasonably perceived).” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 n.17. Imagine if The\\nOnion were required to disclaim that parodical headlines like the following are, in reality, false:\\nPresidential Debate Sidetracked By Booker, De Blasio Arguing About Best Place In Lower\\nManhattan To Get Tapas, or, John Bolton Urges War Against the Sun After Uncovering\\nEvidence It Has Nuclear Capabilities. News in Brief, The Onion (June\\n26, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/presidential-debate-sidetracked-by-booker-de-blasio-ar-\\n1835870332; News in Brief, The Onion (June 10, 2019), https://politics.theonion.com/john-\\nbolton-urges-war-against-the-sun-after-uncovering-1835805360. The law of parody does not\\nrequire us to strain credulity so far. And that is not because everyone always understands the\\njoke. Susanna Kim, All the Times People Were Fooled by The Onion, ABC News (June 1,\\n2015), https://abcnews.go.com/International/times-people-fooled-onion/story?id=31444478.\\n\\n Instead, the test for parody is whether a reasonable reader would have seen Novak’s\\nFacebook page and concluded that the posts stated “actual facts.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50. Our\\nnation boasts a long history of protecting parody and satire. “[F]rom the early cartoon portraying\\nGeorge Washington as an ass down to the present day, . . . satirical cartoons have played a\\nprominent role in public and political debate.” Id. at 54. And parody, like all protected speech,\\nneed not be high-minded or respectful to find safe haven under the First Amendment. “One of\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nthe prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and\\nthat means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and\\nwithout moderation.” Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (Frankfurter,\\nJ.). “The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided.”\\nHustler, 485 U.S. at 54. We uphold this right, even where parody shocks us, because “[o]ur trust\\nin the good sense of the people on deliberate reflection goes deep.” Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at\\n674.\\n\\n Whether Novak’s page was a protected parody is a question of fact that we cannot answer\\nat this stage. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (“The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to\\nbe that the ad parody was not reasonably believable, and in accordance with our custom we\\naccept this finding.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, the jury will have\\nto answer that question. At this stage, though, Novak has alleged enough facts that a reasonable\\njury could find that his page was a parody.\\n\\n b. Probable Cause\\n\\n Since we accept for now that the page was protected speech, we move to the second\\nquestion: did the Parma police have probable cause to arrest Novak? Probable cause exists\\nwhere there is a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that officers will discover evidence of\\ncriminal activity. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). To\\nanswer this question, we need more facts. We need to know whether the citizen calls to the\\npolice station gave the officers probable cause to think there was a “disruption” or “interruption”\\nof police operations under Ohio law. Thus, whether the police had probable cause to arrest\\nNovak is an issue of fact, which we do not have jurisdiction to decide. Swiecicki v. Delgado,\\n463 F.3d 489, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Probable cause is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve if\\nthere are any genuine issues of material fact that are relevant to the inquiry.”), abrogated on\\nother grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Of course, a retaliation claim is like a\\nflow chart—once you decide one issue, it leads to the next. So, we move on. In the probable\\ncause inquiry that follows, we assume that Novak’s page was protected speech.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n If the police did not have probable cause to arrest Novak, then he may bring a claim of\\nretaliation. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725. To prevail on this claim, Novak will need to show that\\nthe officers arrested him based on a “forbidden” retaliatory motive. Id. at 1722–23. But\\nretaliatory motive is often difficult to prove. After all, “protected speech is often a ‘wholly\\nlegitimate consideration’ for officers when deciding whether to make an arrest.” Id. at 1723–24\\n(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012)) (explaining that the “content and tone”\\nof a suspect’s speech may indicate whether he presents a threat). A plaintiff alleging retaliatory\\narrest must disentangle these “wholly legitimate” considerations of speech from any wholly\\nillegitimate retaliatory motives.\\n\\n To do so, the threshold question Novak must answer is whether “retaliation was a\\nsubstantial or motivating factor” for his arrest. Id. at 1725. Novak bears the burden of making\\nthat showing. If he does, the next question is whether the officers would have arrested him\\nabsent that retaliatory motive. Id. (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945,\\n1952–53 (2018)). The burden to answer that lies on the officers. Id. If they show that they\\nwould have arrested Novak even if he had not criticized the police department, his retaliatory-\\narrest claim fails. Id. So the questions will be: (1) Can Novak show that the officers were\\nmotivated by retaliatory animus, not legitimate motivations? (Novak’s burden); if yes, (2) Can\\nthe officers justify Novak’s arrest based on something other than retaliation—i.e., a mistaken but\\nhonest belief that there was probable cause? (Officers’ burden).\\n\\n If the officers did have probable cause, on the other hand, they are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity. The Supreme Court has said as much. “This Court has never recognized a First\\nAmendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.”\\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 664–65. The Supreme Court said that in 2012, and it remains true today.\\n\\n The Supreme Court decided two retaliation cases after Reichle. Neither case clearly\\nestablished Novak’s right to be free from a retaliatory arrest based on probable cause. First, the\\nSupreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach. There, the Court held that a plaintiff\\ncan bring a retaliation claim if the police had probable cause to arrest but only against official\\nmunicipal policies of retaliation. 138 S. Ct. at 1954–55. So Lozman does not apply where, as\\nhere, the plaintiff sues individual officers. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (noting that the facts in\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nLozman were “far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim” and recognizing that Lozman’s\\nholding was “limited . . . to arrests that result from official policies of retaliation”). Second, the\\nCourt held most recently in Nieves that a plaintiff generally cannot bring a retaliation claim if the\\npolice had probable cause to arrest. Id. at 1725. Though Nieves also created an exception to that\\ngeneral rule that we will discuss later, the exception does not apply here because the officers\\nwould not have been aware of it at the time of Novak’s arrest since the case was decided later.\\n\\n Nor has our circuit clearly established the law on this issue. In Sandul v. Larion, the\\nSixth Circuit denied an officer qualified immunity for a First Amendment retaliation claim and\\nheld that “protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of any of the . . . ordinances.”\\n119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1997). But in that case, the ordinance criminalized the plaintiff’s\\nspeech directly, and there was little question whether the speech was protected. Id. at 1255–56\\n(“These cases should leave little doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that the mere words\\nand gesture ‘f—k you’ are constitutionally protected speech.”). Plus, it is not clearly established\\nhow we reconcile the apparent holding in Sandul that protected speech cannot be the basis for\\nprobable cause with the rule that protected speech can be a “wholly legitimate consideration” for\\nofficers when they decide whether to arrest someone. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668. “[I]f judges thus\\ndisagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking\\nthe losing side of the controversy.” Id. at 669–70 (citation omitted). Simply put, Ohio’s statute\\nappears to punish the effects of speech (interruptions), not the speech itself, and whether\\nenforcing such a statute in these circumstances violates the First Amendment is not clearly\\nestablished. So the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n To sum up, to resolve the retaliation claim, the factfinder below will have to decide:\\n(1) whether Novak’s Facebook page was a parody, and thus protected speech, and; (2) whether\\nthe officers had probable cause to arrest Novak under the Ohio statute. If the officers did not\\nhave probable cause, they are not entitled to qualified immunity, and Novak can attempt to show\\nthe arrest was retaliatory. If the officers did have probable cause, they are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity even if Novak’s page was protected speech because the law at the time did not clearly\\nestablish that charging Novak under the statute would violate his constitutional rights.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n c. Future Issues\\n\\n At this stage, we have jurisdiction to review only whether the officers are entitled to\\nqualified immunity. But a few interesting issues remain. They do not bear on the qualified\\nimmunity analysis above because, as with most interesting legal issues, the law is not clearly\\nestablished.\\n\\n Issue 1. The Supreme Court held recently in Nieves that to bring a First Amendment\\nretaliatory arrest claim, a plaintiff must generally show that there was no probable cause for the\\narrest. 139 S. Ct. at 1727. But the Nieves Court also recognized a narrow exception to this rule\\n“where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to\\ndo so.” Id. For example, “[i]f an individual who has been vocally complaining about police\\nconduct is arrested for jaywalking . . . it would seem insufficiently protective of First\\nAmendment rights to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground that there\\nwas undoubted probable cause for the arrest.” Id. It is plausible that Novak’s arrest under Ohio\\nRev. Code § 2909.04(B), or one like it, would trigger the exception—i.e., if officers never or\\nrarely arrested someone under this statute. Unfortunately for Novak, this exception was not\\nclearly established before Nieves.\\n\\n Issue 2. Even if Novak’s case would not fall within the narrow exception of Nieves, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1727, there is good reason to believe that in the future probable cause alone may not\\nprotect the officers.\\n\\n First, this case may not be subject to the general rule of Nieves because the sole basis for\\nprobable cause was speech. Besides posting to his Facebook page, Novak committed no other\\nact that could have created probable cause. In other First Amendment retaliation cases on point,\\nby contrast, the defendant’s conduct was a mix of protected speech and unprotected conduct.\\nThat is, the defendants both said something and did something. See, e.g., id. at 1720–21\\n(defendant made remarks to police officers (protected speech) and acted aggressively toward\\nthem in an intoxicated state (unprotected conduct)); Reichle, 566 U.S. at 660–61 (defendant\\nmade political remarks (protected speech) and unlawfully touched the Vice President\\n(unprotected conduct)); Swiecki, 463 F.3d at 491–92 (defendant made comments to the officer\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n(protected speech) and engaged in disorderly conduct while intoxicated (unprotected conduct)).\\nHere, we have nothing like that. Novak did not create a Facebook page criticizing police and use\\nhis computer to hack into police servers to disrupt operations. The sole basis for probable cause\\nto arrest Novak was his speech. And there is good reason to believe that, based on the reasoning\\nunderlying the First Amendment retaliation cases, this is an important difference.\\n\\n This is important because in Nieves and its predecessors, the Court based its reasoning on\\nthe thorny causation issue that comes up in cases with both protected speech and unprotected\\nconduct. The idea is that in cases where the plaintiff both did something and said something to\\nget arrested, the factfinder will not be able to disentangle whether the officer arrested him\\nbecause of what he did or because of what he said. “[R]etaliatory arrest cases . . . present a\\ntenuous causal connection between the defendant’s alleged animus and the plaintiff’s injury.”\\nReichle, 566 U.S. at 668. For example, in Mt. Healthy, the Court held there was no retaliation “if\\nthe same decision would have been reached absent [plaintiff’s] protected speech.” Nieves, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285\\n(1977)). Here, that inquiry gets us nowhere because “absent [Novak’s] protected speech,” there\\nwould be no basis for probable cause. So, in this case, the causal connection is not so tenuous.\\nAnd the reason for requiring that plaintiff show an absence of probable cause where probable\\ncause is based only on protected speech is not so clear.\\n\\n Second, this case strikes at the heart of a problem the Court has recognized in the recent\\nretaliation cases. “[T]here is a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as a\\nmeans of suppressing speech.” Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953. The Court also recognized this risk\\nin Nieves. The jaywalking exception acknowledges that officers can use probable cause as a\\npretext for retaliation. “In such a case, . . . probable cause does little to prove or disprove the\\ncausal connection between animus and injury . . . .” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. Novak’s case is\\nprime ground for the pretext that the Supreme Court has worried about.\\n\\n For one, potential probable cause was based on protected speech alone. That is not\\ndispositive because the officers’ consideration of his protected speech may have been “wholly\\nlegitimate.” Id. at 1723–24. But the fact that the arrest was made based only on protected\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nspeech at least raises a concern that probable cause “does little to prove or disprove the causal\\nconnection” between Novak’s criticism of the police and his arrest. Id. at 1727.\\n\\n Issue 3. Finally, the vague language of the Ohio statute further heightens the concern\\nraised in Issue 2. That statute makes it a crime to “use any computer . . . or the internet so as to\\ndisrupt, interrupt, or impair the functions of any police . . . operations.” Ohio Rev. Code §\\n2909.04(B). To see how broad this statute reaches, consider an example. An activist tweets the\\nfollowing message: “The police are violating our rights #TakeAction #MakeYourVoiceHeard.”\\nPeople in the community see the tweet and begin calling the police department to share their\\nviews. A small protest even forms in the town square. Police station employees spend time\\nfielding the calls, and a couple of officers go down to monitor the protest. Under the plain text\\nof the Ohio statute, have these acts of civic engagement “interrupt[ed]” police operations?\\nTaken at face value, the Ohio law seems to criminalize speech well in the heartland of First\\nAmendment protection. This broad reach gives the police cover to retaliate against all kinds of\\nspeech under the banner of probable cause. Critical online comments, mail-in or phone bank\\ncampaigns, or even informational websites that incite others to “disrupt” or “interrupt” police\\noperations could violate the law. See id.\\n\\n Where a statute gives police broad cover to find probable cause on speech alone,\\nprobable cause does little to disentangle retaliatory motives from legitimate ones. Thus, this case\\nraises new questions under Nieves. It may be that, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in\\nthat case and others, the general rule of requiring plaintiffs to prove the absence of probable\\ncause should not apply here. We need not decide that now.\\n\\n IV. Other Claims\\n\\n Prior Restraint. Novak alleges that the Parma police imposed a prior restraint on his\\nspeech. This claim survives, for now.\\n\\n A prior restraint is an “administrative” or “judicial order[]” that forbids protected speech\\nin advance. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). An action taken after the\\nspeech is expressed, like a punishment for disfavored speech, is not a prior restraint. Id. at 554\\n(admonishing that courts not “blur the line separating prior restraints from subsequent\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\npunishments” for speech). The First Amendment guarantees “greater protection from prior\\nrestraints.” Id. Indeed, we generally presume prior restraints are unconstitutional. See Se.\\nPromotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). But the question is whether Novak has\\nalleged a prior restraint. He alleges that the police issued a press release threatening to prosecute\\nhim, sent a letter and an email to Facebook demanding the page be taken down, and confiscated\\nsome of his computer equipment. He says the letter and email to Facebook “demanded” that the\\npage be taken down with an “implicit threat of adverse governmental action” against Facebook if\\nthey refused. R. 6, Pg. ID 1257. This question turns on whether these communications were an\\nadministrative order. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550.\\n\\n First, in light of our long history of guarding against prior restraints on speech, cf.\\nRespublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); see also 4 William Blackstone,\\nCommentaries on the Laws of England *151, we should not be overly formalistic in defining\\nwhat counts as an administrative order. But courts have not always been clear about what counts\\nas an administrative order, and that poses a problem when we are talking about what is clearly\\nestablished. Take Alexander. That case held that a prior restraint must raise a “legal\\nimpediment” to speech and described the “classic examples of prior restraints” as temporary\\nrestraining orders, permanent injunctions, and court orders. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550–51. But\\nthe formality of these classic cases should be a sufficient condition for prior restraint, not a\\nnecessary one. See id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Though perhaps not in the form of a\\nclassic prior restraint, the application of the forfeiture statute here bears its censorial cast.”). A\\ngovernment official should not have to declare his order official or jump through certain\\nprocedural hoops to create a prior restraint. Such a rule would allow government officials to\\ncloak unconstitutional restraints on speech under the cover of informality. To borrow a concept,\\nwhen an officer “carr[ies] a badge of authority of the government and represent[s] it in some\\ncapacity,” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,\\ndissenting), his order to a private party to take a specific action may fairly be called an\\n“administrative order.” This is true even if the order is not on its terms binding. Bantam Books,\\nInc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (recognizing “a system of prior administrative restraints”\\neven where affected parties were free to ignore the notices). And because taking down the page\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\nwould mean Novak could no longer post critical comments about the police on his page, the\\nletter and email to Facebook could be administrative orders that constituted a prior restraint.\\n\\n Novak also plausibly alleges that the officers created a prior restraint with their press\\nrelease threatening to take legal action. In the release, the department announced that it had\\nopened a criminal investigation into Novak’s page. Under Bantam Books, a threat of\\nprosecution can trigger a prior restraint, even if the threat is non-binding. 372 U.S. at 60, 71.\\nTrue, the facts in Bantam Books were more extreme than what we have here. There, Rhode\\nIsland created an eerily titled “Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth” to investigate\\nobscene or impure literature. Id. at 59. The commission sent notices to publishers saying certain\\nbooks were too objectionable to sell and that violators may be prosecuted. Id. at 60–62. Police\\nthen visited the publishers’ book distributors to see if the objectionable books had been removed.\\nId. at 63. But the facts of Bantam Books need not be perfectly analogous for the rule to apply.\\nRather, we need more facts to determine whether the facts in this case are close enough.\\n\\n These issues were not briefed here or decided below. And the officers do not argue that\\ntheir Facebook communications were not an administrative order. So, we leave this decision in\\nthe first instance in the capable hands of the district court. The prior restraint claim goes on.\\n\\n Additional First Amendment Claims. Novak argues that when Officers Riley and Connor\\ndeleted comments on the official police Facebook page, they unlawfully censored speech in a\\npublic forum and violated his right to receive information. These claims fail because they are\\nnot based on clearly established law.\\n\\n The First Amendment no doubt applies to the wild and “vast democratic forums of the\\nInternet.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). But when it comes to\\nonline speech, the law lags behind the times. And rightly so. “The forces and directions of the\\nInternet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they\\nsay today might be obsolete tomorrow.” Id. at 1736; see also id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring in\\nthe judgment) (noting that courts should “proceed circumspectly, taking one step at a time” in\\napplying “free speech precedents” to the Internet).\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n Courts have not reached consensus on how First Amendment protections will apply to\\ncomments on social media platforms. So far, the courts that have considered the issue have\\ntaken different approaches. See Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1012–13 (E.D. Ky.\\n2018) (denying preliminary injunction regarding the deletion of Facebook and Twitter comments\\nin a case of first impression). But see Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687–88 (4th Cir. 2019)\\n(holding that a government official violated the First Amendment by banning a critical\\nconstituent from a Facebook page). No doubt, any right Novak or the commenters may have to\\npost or receive comments was not “beyond debate” at the time the officers deleted the comments.\\nal–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Riley and Connor are entitled to qualified immunity from these\\nclaims.\\n\\n Anonymity. Novak argues that the officers violated his right to speak anonymously. This\\nclaim does not survive because Novak does not allege a violation of clearly established law.\\n\\n The right to speak anonymously is deeply rooted in American political tradition and in\\nFirst Amendment doctrine. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); id.\\nat 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). From Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense”\\n(originally published anonymously during the Revolution) to the debates between Federalists and\\nAnti-Federalists during Ratification, anonymity was core at the Founding. Id. at 368 (Thomas,\\nJ., concurring in the judgment). When some Federalists encouraged newspapers to ban\\nanonymous speech, the Anti-Federalists defended their right to remain anonymous. Id. at 364–\\n66 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Free speech was originally understood to include\\nthe right to speak without being known. Consistent with this original understanding, the\\nSupreme Court has upheld the right by striking down laws banning anonymous speech. Id. at\\n357; id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65\\n(1960).\\n\\n But Novak is not contesting a law or policy that bans anonymous speech. Instead, he\\nargues that the police officers disclosed his identity as part of their criminal investigation. Yet he\\nhas pointed to no law clearly establishing that investigative actions by police can violate the right\\nto speak anonymously. Investigations are often public events. So too are criminal trials. See\\nCraig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). True, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\ncan reduce a criminal trial’s publicity, but only under the right to a fair trial, not under a right to\\nremain anonymous. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976).\\n\\n It is not clearly established that announcements made in an ongoing criminal\\ninvestigation can violate Novak’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The officers\\nare entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.\\n\\n Search and seizure and malicious prosecution. Novak alleges that the officers\\nunlawfully searched him and seized his property. He also alleges wrongful arrest and malicious\\nprosecution. These claims survive as well at this stage of the litigation. Ultimately, Novak will\\nhave to show that Officer Connor lied to get a warrant (for unlawful seizure) or lied in the course\\nof his prosecution (for malicious prosecution). And Novak will have to make this showing in\\nlight of the Ohio statute that grants broad discretion to officers.\\n\\n To prove malicious prosecution, Novak must show (1) that the officers’ “deliberate or\\nreckless falsehoods result[ed] in arrest and prosecution without probable cause” and (2) that the\\nofficers did more than passively participate in the decision to prosecute or to keep prosecuting\\nhim. Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Johnson v.\\nMoseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654–55 (6th Cir. 2015). Novak must also show the absence of probable\\ncause. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Usually, a warrant from a neutral magistrate, like the ones Connor got in this case, would\\nbe a “complete defense” to these § 1983 claims. Id. at 305, 310 & n.8; Knott v. Sullivan, 418\\nF.3d 561, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2005). Not so here. Warrants are typically a defense because they\\ndemonstrate probable cause. But warrants do not demonstrate probable cause if the officer\\n“ma[de] false statements and omissions to the judge” and if probable cause would not exist but\\nfor those false statements or omissions. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305 (quoting Vakilian v. Shaw, 335\\nF.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003)). In these limited circumstances, officers may be held liable for\\ntheir searches, seizures, and arrests even though they obtained a warrant. Id. at 308.\\n\\n Thus, these claims turn on whether Officer Connor made false statements or omissions.\\nAccording to Novak, Officer Connor falsely represented that Novak (1) “disrupted and\\nimpaired” the functioning of the Parma Police Department “by knowingly posting false\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\ninformation,” (2) “altered or affected” the department’s official page, and (3) falsely represented\\nhe was “a representative of the Parma Police Department.” R. 6, Pg. ID 1265–66. Further,\\nNovak says that Connor knew there was no interruption or disruption. As for malicious\\nprosecution, he alleges that Connor and Riley lied at trial by testifying that Novak’s page caused\\na disruption when they knew it did not. See Moseley, 790 F.3d at 655 (noting a plausible\\nallegation of malicious prosecution has been made when officers testify at trial and provide\\n“false statements [and] flagrant misrepresentations, or fail[] to disclose key items of evidence”\\n(citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 301–02, 306–07, 311–17)). For now, those allegations are enough.\\n\\n Privacy Protection Act. Novak alleges a violation of the Privacy Protection Act. This\\nclaim too depends on whether the officers lacked probable cause to search Novak’s apartment\\nand seize his property. Because Novak has alleged facts that make it plausible that the officers\\nlacked probable cause, the claim survives for now.\\n\\n The Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful for a government officer to “search for or\\nseize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to\\ndisseminate” information to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). But the statute has a “suspect\\nexception.” S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 567 (6th Cir. 2007).\\nThe Act does not apply if the officers have “probable cause to believe that the person possessing\\nsuch materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials\\nrelate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1); see S.H.A.R.K., 499 F.3d at 567. Novak has alleged that the\\nofficers lacked probable cause to search and seize the contents of his apartment, so the “suspect\\nexception” does not apply at this stage. The claim goes forward.\\n\\n Supervisory liability. Novak seeks to hold Riley, Connor’s supervisor, liable for\\nConnor’s alleged constitutional violations. But Novak sues under § 1983, and under that law, a\\nplaintiff cannot sue for vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 676 (2009). So Riley can be held responsible only for his own actions, not for his\\nsupervision of anyone else. Id. Novak must allege that Riley “encouraged the specific\\n[unconstitutional conduct] or in some other way directly participated in it.” McQueen v. Beecher\\nCmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th\\nCir. 1999)). He has so alleged, so the supervisory liability claim survives.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n Novak alleges that Officer Riley first assigned Officer Connor to investigate the\\nFacebook page and then directed Connor to take the allegedly unconstitutional actions. Novak\\nalso attaches a transcript from his criminal trial where Riley testified that he “contacted Detective\\nConnor, asked him to look into [Novak’s page], [and] assigned the case to him.” R. 6-1, Pg. ID\\n1369. At this stage, these allegations are enough. Novak may proceed against Riley for his own\\nactions and for any of Connor’s actions that Riley directed or supervised.\\n\\n Conspiracy. Novak brings a claim against Riley, Connor, and “John Doe” of the Ohio\\nInternet Crimes Against Children Task Force for conspiring to shut down his Facebook page.\\nJohn Doe allegedly told Connor how to contact Facebook and shut down the page.\\n\\n In this circuit, the test for conspiracy is simple. “All that must be shown [for conspiracy]\\nis that there was a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial\\nobjective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused\\ninjury . . . .” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985). The officers respond that\\nNovak’s allegations are conclusory. But allegations alone, even if conclusory or improbable,\\nmay suffice for this early stage of litigation. Novak names the coconspirators, suggests that they\\ncame to an agreement, and alleges that they acted against his Facebook page. These are “enough\\nfact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”\\nBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).\\n\\n But that is not the end of the conspiracy inquiry. In the time since the district court\\ndenied the officers’ motion to dismiss, our circuit has changed its law on conspiracy. We held\\nthat the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine” applies to § 1983 lawsuits like this one. Jackson v.\\nCity of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 818 (6th Cir. 2019). That doctrine holds that “members of the\\nsame legal entity cannot conspire with one another as long as their alleged acts were within the\\nscope of their employment.” Id. at 819 (citation omitted). At this time, the intracorporate\\nconspiracy doctrine does not apply here. Novak alleges that Doe is a member of a different\\nagency than Riley and Connor—the Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. So they\\nare not in the same “legal entity.” With more facts, the district court should consider whether\\nDoe does work for the Task Force and whether the Task Force is a different agency for purposes\\nof the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under Jackson.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n Municipal liability. Novak brings several claims against the City of Parma. The district\\ncourt denied Parma’s motion to dismiss on these claims, and the city now appeals. We do not\\nhave jurisdiction over these claims.\\n\\n This appeal is limited to qualified immunity and issues “inextricably intertwined” with it.\\nCourtright, 839 F.3d at 523–24. Two claims are “inextricably intertwined” if resolving one\\nclaim will “necessarily determine” the other. Id. Here, the officers’ liability depends on their\\nactions against Novak. The city’s liability, in contrast, depends on a separate analysis of “its\\nmunicipal policies, training programs, and customs.” Id. So Parma’s liability is not\\n“inextricably intertwined” with qualified immunity, and we do not have jurisdiction to consider\\nmunicipal liability at this stage. Id.\\n\\n State claims. Finally, Novak brings several state law claims. The officers raise one\\ndefense. They argue that they are protected by an Ohio statute that insulates police officers from\\nliability unless their actions were taken “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or\\nreckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The officers say that Novak has not\\nshown their conduct was in bad faith, wanton, or reckless. Here again, the stage of proceedings\\ninforms this question. As the district court rightly noted, to dismiss Novak’s complaint at this\\nstage, we must find that it is “devoid of [allegations] tending to show that the [officers] acted” as\\nNovak alleges. Irving v. Austin, 741 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see also Range v.\\nDouglas, 763 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2014). The complaint is not devoid of such allegations.\\nIndeed, it is filled to the brim with them. Novak alleges that the officers lied to Facebook to take\\ndown his page, lied to secure warrants to arrest him, and lied on the witness stand about their\\nactions. At this early motion-to-dismiss stage, that is enough to plausibly allege that the officers\\nacted with a “dishonest purpose” constituting bad faith. Cook v. Hubbard Exempted Vill. Bd. of\\nEduc., 688 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1996). Novak’s state law claims live to fight\\nanother day.\\n\\f No. 18-3373 Novak v. City of Parma, et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n Though Novak’s Facebook page mocking the Parma Police Department has since left the\\ncyber world, several of his legal claims will live on. Others will end here. We REVERSE the\\ndistrict court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss on Novak’s claims related to anonymous\\nspeech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech. We AFFIRM the district\\ncourt’s decision with respect to all other claims except municipal liability, over which we lack\\njurisdiction.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3062,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643972,"string":"4,643,972"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. James Hennessee"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-30"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-5786"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Cole, Gibbons\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889020/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889021/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0172p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5786\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JAMES HENNESSEE, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00018-1—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 19, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, R. David\\nBaker, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.\\n\\n GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BOGGS, J., joined. COLE,\\nC.J. (pp. 13–26), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. James Hennessee pled guilty to one count of\\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government\\nsought an enhanced penalty under § 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for\\nviolent felonies. Hennessee objected on the basis that the government could not prove that two\\nof his prior offenses were committed on different occasions, as required by the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that our precedent precluded its\\nreview of non-elemental facts in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions\\nanalysis. But because a sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times,\\nlocations, and victims in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions analysis,\\nwe hold that the district court erred. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established\\nin Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions\\ndifferent from one another. Thus, the government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions\\nqualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. Therefore, we vacate\\nHennessee’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing with instructions to apply\\nthe enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In August 2016, a police officer came across Hennessee in a park in Pulaski, Tennessee.\\nHennessee informed the officer that he was on state parole and consented to a search. The\\nofficer searched Hennessee’s person and items nearby on the ground. The officer arrested\\nHennessee after finding a digital scale, methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, and a loaded\\nhandgun. On November 8, 2017, the government charged Hennessee with being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hennessee pled guilty on March\\n13, 2018.\\n\\n The Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) and\\nrecommended that the district court sentence Hennessee as an armed career criminal based on his\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 3\\n\\n\\nprior criminal convictions. The PSR identified three prior convictions—one in Limestone\\nCounty, Alabama and two in Davidson County, Tennessee—that qualified as violent felonies\\nunder the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Based on these predicate\\noffenses, the PSR recommended that the district court impose the mandatory minimum sentence\\nof fifteen years for a defendant with three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA.\\n\\n The first predicate offense stemmed from Hennessee’s 2015 convictions for\\nmanufacturing a controlled substance and second-degree assault in Limestone County, Alabama.\\nEach conviction would independently qualify as an ACCA predicate, but the Probation Office\\ncould not conclusively determine whether the two offenses were “committed on occasions\\ndifferent from one another,” as required under § 924(e)(1). Consequently, the Probation Office\\ntreated the two Alabama convictions as a single predicate offense.\\n\\n The second and third ACCA predicates stemmed from Hennessee’s 2006 convictions for\\naggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery in Davidson County, Tennessee. The\\nindictment charged Hennessee with committing both offenses on March 3, 2005 in Davidson\\nCounty. Hennessee pled guilty to both, and the judgments of conviction were entered on\\nFebruary 23, 2006. Unlike in the Limestone County case, the Probation Office could discern\\nfacts in the Davidson County record that indicated Hennessee committed the offenses on\\ndifferent occasions. A review of the transcript reveals that, during Hennessee’s plea colloquy,\\nthe government proffered a factual basis for the guilty plea and described the timing and\\nlocations of the offenses as follows:\\n\\n [T]he State’s witnesses would be available and the testimony would be that in the\\n early morning hours, around five o’clock -- four-thirty or five o’clock -- in the\\n morning of March 3rd, 2005 Mr. Hennessee and his codefendant Mr. Reeves --\\n first individual approached was the gentleman in Count Two Mr. Alah Basabi\\n (ph.), who would testify that he was approached by two individuals, that he would\\n identify as Mr. Hennessee and Mr. Reeves, in the parking lot of his apartment,\\n which was here in Davidson County, Tennessee (unintelligible) 960 Edmondson\\n Pike.\\n ...\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 4\\n\\n\\n And just a few minutes later a Ms. Terry Wainwright was, actually, stopped at a\\n gas station . . . Mapco Express on Smith Springs Road, getting gas about five-\\n twenty a.m. when two individuals approached her.\\n ...\\n Both these events occurred here in Davidson County.\\n\\nDE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 94–95.1 At the end of the government’s summary,\\nthe court asked Hennessee whether the facts as described by the government were true, and\\nHennessee said yes.2 Based on Hennessee’s 2006 plea colloquy, the Probation Office concluded\\nthat the two Tennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. Thus,\\nit recommended that the district court find Hennessee had the requisite three ACCA predicate\\noffenses to qualify as an armed career criminal.\\n\\n Hennessee objected, arguing that the government could not show that he committed the\\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. Hennessee reasoned that our precedent prohibits\\nsentencing courts from considering any “features of the prior conviction” other than the\\n“elements of the prior offense,” and the times and locations on which the government relied were\\nnot elements of his prior offenses under Tennessee law. DE 18, Hennessee Sentencing Position,\\nPage ID 29. Thus, he argued that the district court could only look to the elements of his\\noffenses when conducting its different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n The district court agreed with Hennessee, concluding that Supreme Court and Sixth\\nCircuit precedent prohibited it from considering any “non-elemental facts”3 when determining\\n\\n\\n\\n 1There are some discrepancies between the victims’ names listed in the indictment and at the plea colloquy.\\nCount 1 of the indictment charged Hennessee with aggravated robbery of “Jerry Wainwright,” and Count 2 charged\\nhim with attempted aggravated robbery of “Mudhafar J. Aljashami.” DE 24-1, Davidson County Indictment, Page\\nID 81–82. We can discern that “Alah Basabi” is the phonetic spelling of Aljashami and that “Jerry” Wainwright and\\n“Terry” Wainwright are the same individual. Regardless, these spelling errors do not alter our analysis or the fact\\nthat Hennessee pled guilty to each offense charged in the indictment. We are looking at two different victims here:\\nAljashami (or Alah Basabi) in the attempted aggravated robbery and Wainwright (Terry or Jerry) in the aggravated\\nrobbery.\\n 2The court specifically asked Hennessee “Are those facts basically true?” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea\\nTr., Page ID 95. We do not read “basically” as qualifying how true the facts were or affecting Hennessee’s\\nadmission of their truth.\\n 3As defined by the Supreme Court, “non-elemental facts” are “amplifying but legally extraneous\\ncircumstances,” as distinct from the elements of a crime. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013).\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 5\\n\\n\\nwhether Hennessee’s Tennessee offenses were committed on different occasions. Because the\\nelements of Hennessee’s aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery convictions are\\nsilent as to the time and location of each offense, the district court concluded that it could not\\ndesignate Hennessee as an armed career criminal. The court perceived some tension among\\ncases in the Sixth Circuit regarding what sources and facts a court may consider when\\ndetermining whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions, stating that “at some\\npoint the Sixth Circuit’s going to have to clarify this,” because district courts “need clarification”\\non this issue. DE 28, Sentencing Tr., Page ID 128–131.\\n\\n The district court found that Hennessee was not subject to the penalty enhancement under\\nthe ACCA and sentenced him to 110 months in prison, which both parties agreed was the\\nappropriate sentence in the absence of an armed-career-criminal designation. The district court\\nentered its judgment on July 18, 2018. The government timely appealed, arguing that Hennessee\\nqualifies as an armed career criminal and that the district court erred in declining to consider\\nnon-elemental facts in conducting the different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The issues before us are twofold: (1) whether a sentencing court may consider non-\\nelemental facts in its ACCA different-occasions analysis, and (2) whether Hennessee’s prior\\nTennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. We review both\\nquestions of law de novo. United States v. Southers, 866 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We\\nreview the district court’s decision that Defendant’s offenses were committed on separate\\noccasions under the ACCA de novo.”); United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2017)\\n(“We review de novo the issue of what evidence a court may rely on when deciding whether\\nprior offenses were ‘committed on occasions different from one another’ as that phrase is used in\\nthe ACCA.”).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nElemental facts are “those constituting elements of the offense” and “the only facts the court can be sure the jury so\\nfound.” Id.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 6\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum of fifteen years for any person who, in\\nrelevant part, “violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a\\nviolent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\\nThis requires two separate inquiries: (1) whether prior convictions qualify as ACCA-predicates,\\nand (2) whether such offenses were committed on different occasions. The case before us\\nconcerns only the different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n The district court concluded that Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent prohibited it\\nfrom looking to “non-elemental facts”—here, the times and specific locations of Hennessee’s\\nTennessee offenses—when determining whether two prior felonies were committed on different\\noccasions. Under this approach, the district court refused to consider the facts as described\\nduring Hennessee’s plea colloquy. Limiting itself to only elemental facts in Shepard documents,\\nthe district court concluded that the government did not prove that Hennessee committed the\\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. The district court thus declined to apply the ACCA\\nenhancement to Hennessee’s sentence.\\n\\n The district court implored us to clarify the law of the Sixth Circuit as it pertains to\\nevidentiary-source limitations in the different-occasions analysis. And with this opinion, we do.\\nWe now clarify that King adopted the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary-source restriction for the\\ndifferent-occasions analysis and created no limitation on a sentencing court’s consideration of\\nnon-elemental facts contained within Shepard documents. See King, 853 F.3d 267. This reading\\nof King accords with the approach adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth,\\nEleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 886 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.\\n2018); Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 143, 145; United States v. Span, 789 F.3d 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2015);\\nKirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d\\n467, 471 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010); United\\nStates v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279\\n(5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2005). These courts\\nhave all previously determined that only Shepard documents may be examined when conducting\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 7\\n\\n\\na different-occasions analysis. They have not, however, imported an elemental-facts-only\\nlimitation into the different-occasions analysis, nor do we do so today.\\n\\n In United States v. King, we adopted the Taylor-Shepard source limitation and applied it\\nwith equal force to the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis. King, 853 F.3d at 269 (adopting\\nShepard’s holding that sentencing courts may review only Shepard-approved documents,\\nincluding charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, jury\\ninstructions, judgment of conviction, or other record of comparable findings of fact adopted by\\nthe defendant upon entering a guilty plea, to determine whether a defendant’s prior crimes satisfy\\nthe ACCA) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) and Taylor v. United States,\\n495 U.S. 575 (1990)). The issue before us in King was as follows: “When a federal district court\\nis tasked with determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses were ‘committed on occasions\\ndifferent from one another’ . . . , is the court restricted to using only the evidentiary sources\\napproved in Taylor and Shepard?” Id. (internal citations omitted). We answered yes and\\nreversed because the district court reviewed a non-Shepard-approved bill of particulars. Id. at\\n269, 278. In short, we held in King that a sentencing judge may “identify the who, when, and\\nwhere of the prior offenses” in its different-occasions analysis but is constrained to “the\\nevidentiary sources and information approved by the Supreme Court in Taylor and Shepard.” Id.\\nat 274–75. In reaching this conclusion, we recognized that the same “legal and policy\\nrationales” underpinning the source limitation in the ACCA-predicate analysis also applied in the\\ndifferent-occasions context. Id. By limiting a sentencing court’s repertoire to Shepard\\ndocuments, we sought to prevent the judge from finding facts not admitted by the defendant. See\\nid. at 272 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26). We recognized that, without such evidentiary\\nrestrictions, a sentencing court may “very well abridge the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth\\nAmendment rights.” Id.\\n\\n The district court interpreted King differently. The district court read King’s reliance on\\ntwo post-Shepard cases, Descamps and Mathis, as a signal that sentencing courts are not only\\nrestricted to Shepard documents in the different-occasions analysis, but also limited to elemental\\nfacts inside those documents. In Descamps v. United States, the Court refused to authorize a\\nmodified categorical approach and permit the consideration of extra-statutory evidence—\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 8\\n\\n\\nShepard documents—in the ACCA-predicate context when the statute in question is indivisible.\\n570 U.S. 254, 267–69 (2013). Otherwise, the sentencing court could make its own finding of\\nfact about the means by which the defendant committed the offense and run afoul of the Sixth\\nAmendment guarantee. See id. at 269; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Mathis v. United\\nStates, the Court counseled again that “a judge cannot go beyond identifying the crime of\\nconviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense.” 136 S. Ct.\\n2243, 2252 (2016). To comply with the Sixth Amendment, the sentencing court may not stray\\nbeyond the elements of the prior offense “to determine the means by which [a defendant]\\ncommitted his prior crimes.” Id. at 2253. But the district court’s interpretation of King’s\\nreliance on Descamps and Mathis is flawed. In King, we drew upon the reasoning in Descamps\\nand Mathis that the Shepard-Taylor source restriction quells constitutional concerns and is\\ntherefore appropriate in the different-occasions analysis. We did not, however, import\\nDescamps’s and Mathis’s elements-means distinction or elemental-facts restriction to our\\ndifferent-occasions analysis.\\n\\n Indeed, in King we recognized that, “because facts relevant to the different-occasions\\ninquiry, such as the time and location of the prior offense, are most often not elements of the\\noffense, a proceeding to answer the different-occasions question may well be more extensive\\nthan one to answer the ACCA-predicate question.” King, 853 F.3d at 273 (citing United States v.\\nDantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2014)). This is intuitive. If Congress sought to avoid\\nmini-trials on ACCA determinations—which it did, see id.—then the sentencing court must be\\nequipped to answer both the ACCA-predicate inquiry and the different-occasions inquiry.\\nA sentencing judge can still make the ACCA-predicate determination under both the Shepard-\\nTaylor source limitation and the elemental-facts-only restriction. A sentencing judge would be\\nhamstrung, however, in making most different-occasions determinations if he or she were only\\nallowed to look to elemental facts in Shepard documents which rarely involve date, time, or\\nlocation. Such a restriction would not make sense; it would render violent-felony convictions\\nadjudged together by the same court inseparable in the different-occasions context.\\n\\n To illustrate, consider a defendant with six prior convictions that qualify as ACCA-\\npredicate violent felonies: one for aggravated assault and five for aggravated robbery. The\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 9\\n\\n\\naggravated assault conviction stands alone, but the five aggravated robberies were charged in the\\nsame indictment, pled guilty to at the same time, and contained in the same judgment of\\nconviction. Even though this defendant had robbed five different businesses in different cities\\nacross a twelve-hour period, the indictment simply indicated that all five occurred on the same\\nday in the same county. Assume, however, that during the plea colloquy for the five aggravated\\nrobberies, the defendant admitted to the facts describing the separate locations and times of each\\n(non-elemental facts). Under Hennessee’s theory, the district court could not consider the\\nadmission of these facts describing locations and times. But this theory reads too many\\nrestrictions into the Shepard-Taylor source limitation and unduly hinders a district court’s ability\\nto determine whether offenses occurred on different occasions.\\n\\n Therefore, we find that the district court erred in confining itself to only elemental facts\\nwithin Shepard-approved documents when conducting its different-occasions analysis. We hold\\nthat a district court may consider both elemental and non-elemental facts contained in Shepard-\\napproved documents to determine whether prior felonies were committed on occasions different\\nfrom one another for purposes of the ACCA.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We now turn to the Shepard-approved documents from his Davidson County convictions\\nto determine whether Hennessee committed the two Tennessee offenses of attempted aggravated\\nrobbery and aggravated robbery on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. To answer\\nthis question, we employ the well-established Paige test. United States v. Pham, 872 F.3d 799,\\n802 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Paige, 634 F.3d 871, 873 (6th Cir. 2011)). Under the\\nPaige test, two offenses are committed on different occasions if:\\n\\n (1) “it is possible to discern the point at which the first offense is completed, and\\n the subsequent point at which the second offense begins”; (2) “it would have been\\n possible for the offender to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and\\n withdraw without committing the second offense”; or (3) “the offenses are\\n committed in different residences or business locations.”\\n\\nSouthers, 866 F.3d at 369 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497,\\n503 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 297–98 (6th Cir. 2006).\\nIf Hennessee’s prior Tennessee convictions satisfy any one of the three prongs, we can\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 10\\n\\n\\nconclusively say they were committed on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. See\\nJones, 673 F.3d at 503. Because the facts contained within Shepard documents—namely,\\nHennessee’s Davidson County plea colloquy transcript4—satisfy all three prongs of the Paige\\ntest, we hold that Hennessee committed these offenses “on occasions different from one\\nanother.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\\n\\n Under the first prong, we can discern the point at which the first offense—attempted\\naggravated robbery of Aljashami—was complete and the second offense—aggravated robbery of\\nWainwright—began. Hennessee attempted to rob Aljashami in his apartment parking lot at\\n960 Edmondson Pike sometime between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on March 3, 2005. When\\nHennessee realized Aljashami did not have any money, Hennessee gave up and left. At that\\npoint, Hennessee’s first offense was complete. Then, around 5:20 a.m., Hennessee approached\\nWainwright at a gas station on Smith Springs Road and robbed her at gunpoint. Hennessee’s\\ndeparture from Aljashami’s apartment parking lot marked the completion of his first offense, and\\nhis approaching Wainwright at the gas station twenty to fifty minutes later marked the beginning\\nof his second offense. Thus, we find it “possible to discern the point at which the first offense\\n[was] completed, and the subsequent point at which the second offense [began].” See Southers,\\n866 F.3d at 369. The first prong of the Paige test is satisfied.\\n\\n Under the second prong, we conclude that it would have been possible for Hennessee to\\ncease his criminal conduct after his failed attempt to rob Aljashami and withdraw without\\ncommitting the aggravated robbery of Wainwright. After the attempted robbery of Aljashami in\\nthe apartment parking lot, Hennessee could have stopped and gone home. Instead, he proceeded\\nto the gas station where he robbed Wainwright. Thus, “it would have been possible for\\n\\n\\n 4On appeal, Hennessee argues that his plea colloquy is insufficient to demonstrate that he committed the\\noffenses on different occasions because his admission to the government’s factual proffer “did not necessarily\\nestablish” the times or locations at which he committed the offenses. CA6 R. 16, Appellee Br., at 30. We find his\\nargument unpersuasive. As explained above, a plea colloquy transcript is a Shepard-approved document that the\\ncourt may examine in a different-occasions analysis. Hennessee admitted under oath that the factual basis proffered\\nby the prosecutor was true. In addition, the sentencing judge in the Davidson County case explicitly informed\\nHennessee before he admitted the facts or pled guilty that “these convictions today can be used to increase, or\\nenhance, the punishment of any future felony offenses[.]” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 91. Thus,\\nany argument that Hennessee had “no motivation to quibble” or dispute the facts is undercut by the fact that\\nHennessee knew the potential implications of that plea hearing.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 11\\n\\n\\n[Hennessee] to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and withdraw without\\ncommitting the second offense.” See id. This is enough to satisfy Paige’s second prong.\\n\\n Under the third prong, we can easily determine that Hennessee committed these offenses\\nin different residences or business locations. Hennessee committed the attempted aggravated\\nrobbery of Aljashami at 960 Edmondson Pike in the parking lot of Aljashami’s apartment\\nbuilding. Hennessee committed the aggravated robbery of Wainwright at a Mapco Express gas\\nstation on Smith Springs Road. Because the apartment parking lot and gas station are clearly\\n“different residences or business locations,” see id., Hennessee’s offenses satisfy Paige’s third\\nprong.\\n\\n We note that there is significant overlap in our analyses of all three prongs: Hennessee’s\\nfirst offense and second offense were committed against different victims, in different locations,\\nand at different times. This redundancy simply fortifies our conclusion that Hennessee\\ncommitted these offenses on different occasions. Further, that he committed the attempted\\naggravated robbery and aggravated robbery only twenty to fifty minutes apart does nothing to\\nundermine this conclusion. See United States v. Banner, 518 F. App’x 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2013)\\n(noting that “the amount of time between the individual offenses is relatively unimportant” as\\nlong as the offenses meet any of the prongs of the Paige test). Similarly, it is irrelevant that\\nHennessee committed both offenses in the same city or county when we can discern that he\\ncommitted one in an apartment parking lot and one at a gas station. See Paige, 634 F.3d at 873\\n(finding that five robberies were committed on “different occasions” despite being “close in\\nlocation”).\\n\\n Based on the facts contained within Shepard-approved documents from Hennessee’s\\nTennessee convictions, we find all three prongs of the Paige test satisfied.5 We conclude that his\\nprior offenses were committed on “occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1),\\nand that Hennessee is therefore subject to the sentence enhancement under the ACCA.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5We reiterate, of course, that the facts need only satisfy one prong of the Paige test to establish that\\noffenses were committed on different occasions.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 12\\n\\n\\n V.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Hennessee’s sentence and remand to the district\\ncourt for resentencing with instructions to apply the enhancement under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 13\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421225/\", \"author_raw\": \"JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"COLE, Chief Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"COLE, Chief Judge, dissenting. In United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2017),\\nwe placed evidentiary limitations on the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis. Consistent with\\nSupreme Court precedent, King limited the sources that courts can consider in conducting\\njudicial factfinding regarding sentencing enhancements. Id. at 273 (citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Shepard v.\\nUnited States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). King\\nestablished that “Taylor and Shepard’s limitations on the evidentiary sources and information\\nthat a federal district court may consider in determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate\\nunder the ACCA also apply when the court determines whether prior offenses were ‘committed\\non occasions different from one another’ under the ACCA.” Id.\\n\\n King explained that, under this “Taylor-Shepard approach,” sentencing courts are\\n“restricted to those facts that ‘necessarily’ underlie the prior conviction, i.e., those facts\\nnecessarily determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact or necessarily admitted by\\nthe defendant.” Id. (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21). And in applying the Taylor-Shepard\\napproach, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that “a factfinder can have ‘necessarily found’\\na non-element—that is, a fact that by definition is not necessary to support a conviction.”\\nDescamps, 570 U.S. at 266 n.3; see id. at 269–70 (“[T]he only facts the court can be sure the jury\\nso found are those constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from amplifying but legally\\nextraneous circumstances.”). But today, the majority finds that our holding in King still permits\\na sentencing court to “consider non-elemental facts such as times, locations, and victims in\\nShepard documents when conducting the different-occasions analysis.” Maj. Op. 2. Because\\nsuch a finding contradicts the Supreme Court’s application of Taylor and Shepard, as well as our\\nown holding in King, I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 14\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n To explain why I read our holding in King differently from the majority, I first address\\nthe Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent underlying the evidentiary limitations we\\nimposed in King. Supreme Court precedent prevents courts from conducting judicial factfinding\\nthat impacts a defendant’s sentence, except in limited circumstances. Apprendi v. New Jersey,\\n530 U.S. 466, 487–90 (2000); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998).\\nWe have found that one circumstance in which sentencing courts are permitted to make findings\\nof fact is in determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses took place on different occasions\\nfor the purposes of designating him as a career criminal under the ACCA. United States v.\\nBurgin, 388 F.3d 177, 186 (6th Cir. 2004). But, until King, we had not yet addressed the\\nquestion of which evidentiary sources a sentencing court can use in conducting such judicial\\nfactfinding.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has taken up that question in a different but related context:\\ndetermining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a generic violent felony under the ACCA. In\\na series of cases—Taylor, Shepard, Descamps, and Mathis—the Court placed strict limitations\\non the evidentiary sources that a sentencing court can consider in conducting judicial factfinding.\\nThe heart of the evidentiary restriction contained in Taylor and its progeny is that sentencing\\ncourts can only consider facts on which the conviction necessarily relied—those that a jury\\nnecessarily found or a defendant necessarily admitted—in enhancing a defendant’s sentence.\\nSee Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2255 (“[A]n ACCA penalty may be based only on what a jury\\n‘necessarily found’ to convict a defendant (or what he necessarily admitted),” and “elements\\nalone fit that bill; a means, or (as we have called it) ‘non-elemental fact,’ is ‘by definition[ ] not\\nnecessary to support a conviction.’”); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 270, 277 (focusing on whether\\nprior convictions “require[d] the factfinder (whether jury or judge) to make that determination,”\\nbecause sentencing courts cannot consider facts “unnecessary to the crime of conviction”);\\nShepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21, 26 (focusing on whether defendant had “necessarily admitted” the\\nelements of the generic offense such that the “plea had ‘necessarily’ rested on the fact” in\\nquestion); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (focusing on whether “jury necessarily had to find” all of the\\nfacts that would be required to convict the defendant of the generic offense). And the Court has\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 15\\n\\n\\nmade clear that “the only facts the court can be sure” are necessary to the conviction “are those\\nconstituting elements of the offense,” as opposed to “non-elemental fact[s].” Descamps,\\n570 U.S. at 269–70, 277; Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2255.\\n\\n The Court has outlined two justifications behind the elemental-facts restriction that are\\nrelevant in the case before us. The first is that such a restriction “avoids the Sixth Amendment\\nconcerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to\\njuries,” including facts that increase the defendant’s maximum penalty. Descamps, 570 U.S. at\\n265, 269. The Court has explained that the same constitutional concern is present in the plea\\ncontext: “as Shepard indicated, when a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he waives his right to\\na jury determination of only that offense’s elements; whatever he says, or fails to say, about\\nsuperfluous facts cannot license a later sentencing court to impose extra punishment.” Id. at 270\\n(citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24–26). The Court found that the elemental-facts restriction\\noutlined in Taylor and Shepard assuages this constitutional concern, because the existence of a\\nprior conviction necessitates that the jury or judge found the facts that made up the elements of\\nthat prior conviction. Id. at 269–70. Because the same cannot be said for non-elemental facts,\\nthe Court explained that, under the Taylor-Shepard approach, it is “irrelevant” whether a non-\\nelemental fact is accurate or whether the defendant ever admitted the fact in question: if the\\ncrime for which the defendant was convicted “does not require the factfinder (whether jury or\\njudge) to make that determination,” the sentencing court cannot make that determination in\\nassessing the prior conviction. Id. at 265, 277. Thus, the Descamps Court found that, in\\nenhancing a defendant’s sentence “based on his supposed acquiescence to a prosecutorial\\nstatement” in a plea colloquy, the sentencing court “did just what we have said it cannot: rely on\\nits own finding about a non-elemental fact to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence.” Id. at\\n270.\\n\\n The second justification is that the elemental-facts restriction “averts ‘the practical\\ndifficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach.’” Id. at 265. From a practical\\nstandpoint, the consideration of non-elemental facts would require sentencing courts to “expend\\nresources examining (often aged) documents for evidence that a defendant admitted in a plea\\ncolloquy . . . facts that, although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an element of the\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 16\\n\\n\\nrelevant generic offense,” and the “meaning of those documents will often be uncertain.” Id. at\\n270. And from a fairness perspective, “the statements of fact in [such documents] may be\\ndownright wrong,” especially because a defendant “often has little incentive to contest facts that\\nare not elements of the charged offense.” Id. at 270–71; see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253\\n(“Statements of ‘non-elemental fact’ in the records of prior convictions are prone to error\\nprecisely because their proof is unnecessary.”). Given these concerns, the Court concluded that\\nthe “ACCA [treats non-elemental] facts as irrelevant: Find them or not, by examining the record\\nor anything else, a court still may not use them to enhance a sentence,” even where such a\\nlimitation seems “counterintuitive.” Id. at 2251, 2253.\\n\\n In King, we first addressed the question of which evidentiary sources a sentencing court\\ncan consider for the purposes of the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis. We found that “the\\nlegislative history and constitutional concerns” animating the Court’s decisions in Taylor,\\nShepard, Descamps, and Mathis “apply with equal force when a sentencing court undertakes the\\ndifferent-occasions inquiry.” 853 F.3d at 272–73. For that reason, we reaffirmed Burgin’s rule\\nthat judges can engage in factfinding in conducting the different-occasions analysis, but we\\nfound that, “in identifying those facts, a sentencing judge is constrained to reviewing evidence\\napproved by Taylor and Shepard.” Id. at 274 (citing Burgin, 388 F.3d at 183). We noted that the\\nTaylor-Shepard approach applied in the different-occasions analysis because of the previously\\narticulated constitutional and fairness concerns posed by judicial factfinding that enhances a\\ndefendant’s sentence:\\n\\n What most convinces us, then, that Taylor and Shepard’s evidentiary restrictions\\n extend to the different-occasions question is the Supreme Court’s expressed\\n concern over a judge finding facts that become the basis of an ACCA\\n enhancement. “Under ACCA, the court’s finding of a predicate offense\\n indisputably increases the maximum penalty. Accordingly, that finding would (at\\n the least) raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns if it went beyond merely\\n identifying a prior conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288. Just so with the\\n different-occasions question: a sentencing court’s finding that prior violent\\n felonies were “committed on occasions different from one another” can be as\\n dispositive of an ACCA enhancement as finding that a conviction is a third\\n ACCA predicate. (Indeed, this is that case.) So if a sentencing judge, in\\n answering the different-occasions question, became the trier of fact regarding\\n when and where the prior offenses occurred, that procedure would raise the very\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 17\\n\\n\\n constitutional concern identified in Shepard and reaffirmed in Descamps and\\n Mathis.\\n\\n The Taylor-Shepard approach quells this constitutional concern. Under the\\n framework of those cases, a judge is restricted to those facts that “necessarily”\\n underlie the prior conviction, Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21, i.e., those facts\\n necessarily determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact or\\n necessarily admitted by the defendant, see Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288. Thus,\\n under Taylor and Shepard, a sentencing judge is not finding facts in the first\\n instance, but merely identifying findings or admissions that were previously made\\n under constitutional safeguards.\\n\\nId. (parallel citations omitted). Accordingly, King concluded that “Taylor and Shepard’s\\nlimitations on the evidentiary sources and information that a federal district court may consider\\nin determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate under the ACCA also apply when the\\ncourt determines whether prior offenses were ‘committed on occasions different from one\\nanother’ under the ACCA.” Id.\\n\\n And in importing this restriction into the different-occasions analysis, King made\\nunambiguously clear that we understood that the core of the evidentiary restriction under the\\nTaylor-Shepard framework is that sentencing courts can only consider facts on which the\\nconviction necessarily relied. Id. at 272–73 (“The Taylor-Shepard approach quells this\\nconstitutional concern. Under the framework of those cases, a judge is restricted to those facts\\nthat ‘necessarily’ underlie the prior conviction, i.e., those facts necessarily determined beyond a\\nreasonable doubt by the trier of fact or necessarily admitted by the defendant.”). Accordingly,\\nI read King to import the elemental-facts restriction into the different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Because King adopted the evidentiary limitations imposed by Taylor and its progeny into\\nthe different-occasions analysis, I would find that sentencing courts conducting the different-\\noccasions analysis can look to Shepard documents and consider facts therein that are “necessary”\\nto the conviction in determining whether the offenses were committed on different occasions, but\\nsentencing courts cannot consider any non-elemental facts in applying the ACCA enhancement.\\nInstead, the majority finds that King intended only to limit sentencing courts’ consideration to\\nany fact contained within Shepard documents, regardless of whether the fact was necessary to\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 18\\n\\n\\nthe conviction. As the Supreme Court put it in Mathis, “[e]verything this Court has ever said\\nabout ACCA runs counter to the [majority]’s position. That alone is sufficient reason to reject\\nit[.]” 136 S. Ct. at 2257.\\n\\n Taylor, Shepard, Descamps, and Mathis confine the sentencing court’s consideration to\\ncertain types of evidence, not certain types of documents. In Shepard, the Court held that, in\\ndetermining whether a defendant who pleaded guilty had “necessarily admitted” the elements of\\nthe generic offense, sentencing courts could only consider “the terms of the charging document,\\nthe terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the\\nfactual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or . . . some comparable judicial\\nrecord of this information.” Id. at 26. But these documents cannot be considered wholesale;\\nrather, they serve as shorthand for the types of permissible evidence that they frequently contain.\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (“[S]uch a ‘peek at the [record] documents’ is for ‘the sole and\\nlimited purpose of determining whether [the listed items are] element[s] of the offense.’ (Only if\\nthe answer is yes can the court make further use of the materials[.])”) (internal citation omitted).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that the evidentiary limitation in Taylor\\nand its progeny require an “elements-only approach,” because “an ACCA penalty may be based\\nonly on what a jury ‘necessarily found’ to convict a defendant (or what he necessarily\\nadmitted),” and a “‘non-elemental fact,’ is ‘by definition[ ] not necessary to support a\\nconviction.’” Id. at 2254–55 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). “Accordingly,\\nDescamps made clear that when the Court had earlier said (and said and said) ‘elements,’ it\\nmeant just that and nothing else.” Id. at 2255.\\n\\n King itself also made clear that it was looking to only those facts “necessarily admitted,”\\nnot to the charging documents as a whole. There, the government had argued that, “in limiting a\\ncourt applying the ACCA to what King necessarily admitted, we apply Shepard’s restrictions too\\nstrictly.” 853 F.3d at 276. But King noted that “Shepard made clear that the task was to identify\\nwhether a prior conviction ‘necessarily’ rested on the elements of the generic offense,” and “with\\na plea-colloquy transcript, the written plea agreement, or a comparable record, ‘a later court\\ncould generally tell whether the plea had ‘necessarily’ rested on the fact identifying the burglary\\nas generic.’” Id. at 277 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21, 26). King added:\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 19\\n\\n\\n But, one might argue, if the Supreme Court had truly wanted to limit courts\\n making the ACCA-predicate determination to those facts necessarily admitted by\\n the defendant or necessarily found by a jury, then why reference “charging\\n documents” generally, rather than the necessary facts or elements within the\\n charging documents? The answer, we think, lies in the issue presented to the\\n Court in Shepard. Insofar as a sentencing court’s task is to identify which\\n elements underlie a prior conviction, the terms of the charging document will\\n always be appropriate to consider: a conviction necessarily means the elements—\\n but not “superfluous facts,” Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2288—charged in the\\n indictment were found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.\\n\\n This understanding of Shepard is not new. We have previously read Shepard to\\n permit courts to consider only those facts that a defendant necessarily admitted in\\n pleading guilty. See United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 424 (6th\\n Cir. 2009) (“[Shepard] requires a judicial record that identifies the facts a\\n defendant ‘necessarily admitted’ in entering a guilty plea—as Shepard itself\\n demonstrates.”).\\n\\nId.\\n\\n The majority correctly notes that its interpretation of King “accords with the approach\\nadopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.” Maj. Op. 6.\\nBut these other circuits’ approaches do not conform to the restriction we set out in King. As the\\nconcurring judges explained in United States v. Perry, 908 F.3d 1126 (8th Cir. 2018), the\\nmajority rule runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s approach in Taylor and Shepard, which has\\nbeen made only more evident in more recent cases like Descamps and Mathis. Perry, 908 F.3d\\nat 1134 (Stras, J., concurring) (“Inertia may be part of the explanation. Sometimes courts just\\ncontinue along the same well-trodden path even in the face of clear signs to turn around.”); id. at\\n1137 (Kelly, J., concurring) (“[I]n most cases, properly used Shepard documents would not\\nassist the district court in its different-occasions determination, because time, place, and overall\\nsubstantive continuity are facts, not legal elements, of the prior offenses,” and judicial\\nfactfinding of non-elemental facts appears to “conflict with Supreme Court precedent.”).\\n\\n In Perry, Judge Stras explained why permitting consideration of non-elemental facts\\ncontained within Shepard documents was constitutionally problematic:\\n\\n A misunderstanding of the permissible uses of Shepard documents may also\\n account for the predominant view. Some courts claim that there is no Sixth\\n Amendment problem as long as courts limit themselves to facts taken from\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 20\\n\\n\\n charging documents, plea agreements, and comparable materials—more\\n commonly known as Shepard documents. “[R]epurpos[ing]” Taylor and Shepard\\n to justify judicial fact-finding, however, turns those decisions on their heads. . . .\\n Shepard documents . . . serve a specific and narrow function; they are not an\\n excuse for allowing courts to dig through the record to find facts. To the contrary,\\n properly used, they do not support fact-finding at all. The Court made that\\n abundantly clear in Descamps by prohibiting judges from “look[ing] to reliable\\n materials (the charging document, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and so forth) to\\n determine what facts [could] confidently be thought to underlie the defendant’s\\n conviction.” The reason, the Court explained, is that when there is no need to\\n choose between multiple possible crimes, Shepard documents simply “ha[ve] no\\n role to play.”\\n The approach the Court rejected in Descamps is not meaningfully different from\\n using Shepard documents to make the different-occasions determination. Both\\n call for sifting through record materials for evidence of what a defendant actually\\n did, either to determine whether it fits the definition of a violent felony, or to\\n determine if two or more crimes were committed on different occasions. If one\\n improperly “convert[s] [the categorical] approach into its opposite,” Descamps,\\n 570 U.S. at 274, so does the other.\\n\\nId. at 1135–36 (Stras, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Because King held that\\nsentencing courts could only consider “facts that ‘necessarily’ underlie the prior conviction, i.e.,\\nthose facts necessarily determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact or necessarily\\nadmitted by the defendant,” 853 F.3d at 273, the majority rule falls short here for the same\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421225/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLE, Chief Judge, dissenting\"}, {\"author\": \"reasons that the judges concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"reasons that the judges concurring in Perry explained.\\n\\n I also part ways with the majority’s interpretation of King regarding the very\\nconstitutional and fairness concerns that King set out to avoid in adopting the Taylor-Shepard\\napproach. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that relying on non-elemental facts that a\\ndefendant admitted in a plea colloquy is constitutionally problematic because, “as Shepard\\nindicated, when a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he waives his right to a jury determination\\nof only that offense’s elements; whatever he says, or fails to say, about superfluous facts cannot\\nlicense a later sentencing court to impose extra punishment.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 270. As\\nthe Court explained in Descamps:\\n\\n A defendant, after all, often has little incentive to contest facts that are not\\n elements of the charged offense—and may have good reason not to. [D]uring\\n plea hearings, the defendant may not wish to irk the prosecutor or court by\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 21\\n\\n\\n squabbling about superfluous factual allegations. In this case, for example,\\n Descamps may have let the prosecutor’s statement go by because it was irrelevant\\n to the proceedings. He likely was not thinking about the possibility that his\\n silence could come back to haunt him in an ACCA sentencing 30 years in the\\n future.\\n\\nId. at 270–71 (internal citations omitted). And in Mathis, the Court made a similar assessment\\nregarding the unfairness of a sentencing court’s use of non-elemental facts to enhance a\\ndefendant’s sentence:\\n\\n Statements of “non-elemental fact” in the records of prior convictions are prone to\\n error precisely because their proof is unnecessary. At trial, and still more at plea\\n hearings, a defendant may have no incentive to contest what does not matter\\n under the law; to the contrary, he “may have good reason not to”—or even be\\n precluded from doing so by the court. When that is true, a prosecutor’s or judge’s\\n mistake as to means, reflected in the record, is likely to go uncorrected. Such\\n inaccuracies should not come back to haunt the defendant many years down the\\n road by triggering a lengthy mandatory sentence.\\n\\n136 S. Ct. at 2253 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n The facts of this case illustrate just how relevant those concerns remain in the context of\\nthe different-occasions analysis. Here, the government asks us to add five years to Hennessee’s\\nsentence because, after the prosecutor recited a jumbled version of the facts that was inconsistent\\nwith the locations listed in the indictment and that left the timing of the two offenses unclear,\\nHennessee summarily agreed those facts were “basically true” in order to facilitate a plea deal.\\n(Plea Tr., R. 24-3, PageID 94–95.)\\n\\n Nor are the practical concerns we noted in King avoided by the majority’s interpretation.\\nOur decision in King noted that many of the practical concerns outlined in Mathis and Descamps\\napplied in the context of the different-occasions analysis. Id. at 272–73. For example,\\n“Congress’s desire to avoid mini-trials almost assuredly covers not only proceedings to answer\\nthe ACCA-predicate question but also proceedings to answer the different-occasions question.”\\nId. at 273. As we noted in King, the Court’s concerns regarding fact-finding are amplified in the\\ncontext of the different-occasions analysis: the majority itself acknowledges that, “because facts\\nrelevant to the different-occasions inquiry, such as the time and location of the prior offense, are\\nmost often not elements of the offense, a proceeding to answer the different-occasions question\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 22\\n\\n\\nmay well be more extensive than one to answer the ACCA-predicate question.” Maj. Op. 8\\n(quoting King, 853 F.3d at 273).\\n\\n This case provides an excellent example of the types of mini-trials that would unfold by\\npermitting district courts to look to non-elemental facts contained within Shepard documents.\\nThe government argues that the Shepard documents straightforwardly demonstrate that the\\noffenses were committed on different occasions, contending that the plea colloquy demonstrates\\nthe offenses took place at different times and locations, and Hennessee admitted to the facts in\\nthe plea colloquy. But Hennessee resists this characterization of the Shepard documents on three\\nseparate grounds.\\n\\n First, there are several discrepancies between two different Shepard documents before the\\nsentencing court—namely, the indictment and the plea colloquy. For example, as the majority\\nnotes, both victims’ names are different across the two documents: changing from “Jerry\\nWainwright” to “Ms. Terry Wainwright,” and from “Mudhafar J. Aljashami” to “Mr. Alah\\nBasabi (ph.).” (Indictment, R. 24-1, PageID 81–82; Plea Tr., R. 24-3, PageID 94). More\\ncritically, the address of the apartment where the government asserted the first robbery occurred\\ndiffers in the indictment and the plea colloquy, changing from “4960 Edmondson Pk.” to “960\\nEdmondson Pike.” (Indictment, R. 24-1, PageID 80; Plea Tr., R. 24-3, PageID 94.) The impact\\nof this discrepancy is made especially clear in conjunction with the government’s request that we\\ntake judicial notice of the fact that a Mapco Express currently located at 2827 Smith Springs\\nRoad in Nashville, Tennessee, is located roughly 13–14 miles from 960 Edmondson Pike in\\nBrentwood, Tennessee, based on a present-day Google Maps search. Hennessee opposes this\\nrequest, noting that none of the documents surrounding his conviction list an exact address on\\nSmith Springs Road, and arguing that “[w]hile the government, looking at Google Maps in 2018,\\nguesses that the incident in 2005 occurred where a Mapco gas station is located on Smith Springs\\nRoad thirteen years after the fact, that is speculation.” (Appellee Br. 37–38 n.3.) Additionally,\\nHennessee points out that the plea colloquy transcript indicated that the prosecutor seemed\\nunsure about the location of the gas station robbery, and he notes that a Mapco gas station also\\nexists on Edmondson Pike. A second Google Maps search reveals that the Mapco station\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 23\\n\\n\\nHennessee references is less than a mile from 4960 Edmondson Pike, the address listed for the\\napartment in the indictment.\\n\\n Even apart from the discrepancies across documents, the prosecutor’s recitation of the\\nfacts within the plea colloquy was muddled, representing that the offenses took place “just a few\\nminutes” apart, or perhaps twenty minutes apart (5:00 a.m. to 5:20 a.m.), or maybe fifty minutes\\napart (4:30 a.m. to 5:20 a.m.). (Plea Tr., R. 24-3, PageID 94–95.) Any of these scenarios would\\nbe a reasonable reading of the prosecutor’s recitation of the facts, yet only the final option is\\nexpressly covered by the case the government cites as support. (Appellant Br. 34 (citing United\\nStates v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 665 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (finding that “two armed robberies\\nof different victims at different locations committed approximately thirty minutes apart were\\n‘committed on occasions different from one another’”).)\\n\\n Finally, Hennessee did not present his own version of the facts, nor did he clarify the\\ntiming or location of the offenses at the plea colloquy. Hennessee’s so-called admission was\\nthat, when he was asked to confirm whether the prosecutor’s disjointed recitation of the facts was\\n“basically true,” he responded, “Yes, sir.” (Plea Tr., R. 24-3, PageID 95.) Because the court\\nadded the qualifier “basically,” a sentencing court could reasonably find that Hennessee would\\nnot have quibbled with details like times or locations, given that he agreed with the basic\\nelemental facts that he had robbed or attempted to rob each of the victims referenced in the plea\\ncolloquy, which were the only facts essential to the plea. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 265;\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253. Given that the robberies were close in both time and location, the\\ndifference between whether the facts as described were “true” or “basically true” may be\\noutcome determinative.\\n\\n I raise these disputes not to cast light on which of the parties would prevail, but to\\nhighlight that permitting sentencing courts to review non-elemental facts within Shepard\\ndocuments will require courts to resolve the very type of disputes that King and the Supreme\\nCourt sought to avoid. In contrast, the elemental-facts restriction would forbid sentencing courts\\nfrom considering these facts and avoid these time-intensive disputes altogether.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 24\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The majority rejects King’s elemental-facts restriction because limiting sentencing courts\\nto consideration of “elemental facts in Shepard documents which rarely involve date, time, or\\nlocation” would leave courts “hamstrung” in “making most different-occasions determinations,”\\ngiven that such a restriction “would render violent-felony convictions adjudged together by the\\nsame court inseparable in the different-occasions context.” Maj. Op. 8. The majority says such\\nan interpretation “would not make sense.” Id. I disagree.\\n\\n First, King’s evidentiary limitation only impacts the different-occasions analysis in a\\nspecific subset of cases: those in which the relevant prior offenses were charged or pleaded\\ntogether. If Hennessee’s prior convictions had been for three aggravated robberies in Davidson\\nCounty, Tennessee—one in 2006, one in 2010, and one in 2016—the district court would not\\nhave needed to turn to the Shepard documents to determine whether the offenses were\\ncommitted on different occasions.\\n\\n Second, even within the context of these cases, sentencing courts are only “hamstrung”\\nby King in the sense that they would not be permitted to consider evidence of non-elemental\\nfacts—they will not have to search for the evidence elsewhere; rather, their inability to consider\\nnon-elemental facts will simply result in fewer findings that offenses committed on the same day\\nqualify as separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. The majority says that this result “would\\nnot make sense,” as it places too many restrictions on district courts. Maj. Op. 8. However,\\nI would not determine the applicability of a constitutional safeguard based on whether it would\\nhamstring a district court, especially where the very purpose of the constitutional protection is to\\nlimit the types of evidence on which courts can rely. For example, a defendant’s right to\\nconfront the witnesses against him also prevents courts from considering all the available\\nevidence. Yet we would not question whether this constitutional safeguard applies even where\\nthe excluded testimony would otherwise be material to the district court’s analysis.\\n\\n Third, the majority asserts that it “would not make sense” to preclude courts from\\napplying an ACCA enhancement based upon multiple offenses committed on the same day. The\\nmajority reasons that, if the elemental-facts restriction were in place, a defendant who “robbed\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 25\\n\\n\\nfive different businesses in different cities across a twelve-hour period” would not qualify as an\\narmed career criminal if those robberies were charged in the same indictment, pled guilty to at\\nthe same time, and contained in the same judgment of conviction. Maj. Op. 9. But it has not\\nalways been a foregone conclusion that such offenses would or should suffice as separate\\npredicates. To the contrary, in the years after Congress added the requirement that the three\\npredicate offenses be “committed on occasions different from one another” to the ACCA, five\\njudges on this court dissented from that conclusion in one of our en banc decisions, arguing that\\ncounting offenses committed on the same day as separate predicate offenses would effectively\\neliminate “the concept of career in the general philosophy behind (not to mention the title of) the\\nArmed Career Criminal Act” and render the new “committed on occasions different from one\\nanother” language “utterly meaningless.” Brady, 988 F.2d at 675–77 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“In\\nessence, the majority holds that Brady has had a ‘career’ in less than an hour. It misses logic to\\nhold that a ‘career’ can comprise the events of a single evening, or more aptly put, less than one\\nhour, and thereby subject him to fifteen years of incarceration.”). To be sure, neither this court\\nnor the other circuits adopted this understanding of the different-occasions requirement. But\\nI am persuaded that such an approach, which garnered the support of five judges on this court,\\nmakes sense, especially if the constitutional concerns identified in Taylor and its progeny compel\\nsuch a result.\\n\\n Fourth, King spoke directly to the majority’s concern that forbidding sentencing courts\\nfrom “consider[ing] the admission of these facts describing locations and times . . . reads too\\nmany restrictions into the Shepard-Taylor source limitation and unduly hinders a district court’s\\nability to determine whether offenses occurred on different occasions.” Maj. Op. 9. King\\ncontains the following language regarding the continued vitality of the different-occasions\\nanalysis in conjunction with evidentiary limitations imposed by Taylor and Shepard:\\n\\n The Government also raises a practical argument. It asks, how can a district court\\n answer the different-occasions question if it is “blinded” to the evidence it needs\\n to make that determination by Taylor and Shepard’s restrictions?\\n We recognize that in some cases Taylor and Shepard evidence will not be\\n sufficient for a district court to determine that prior offenses occurred on different\\n occasions while a broader swath of evidence would permit the determination. But\\n a similar practical argument was raised and rejected in Shepard. There, it was\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 26\\n\\n\\n argued that a police report, “free from any inconsistent, competing evidence,”\\n would have reliably shown that the defendant had burglarized a building (as the\\n ACCA’s burglary predicate required), whereas, absent the report, it was (likely)\\n impossible to identify which of several alternatives was the basis of the prior\\n conviction. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17–18, 22[.] This concern, the Court\\n explained, was not “sufficient justification for upsetting precedent,” particularly\\n as Taylor’s evidentiary limitation “was the heart of [that] decision.” See id. at 23.\\n The Court further noted that “time has enhanced even the usual precedential\\n force” of Taylor because in the intervening fifteen years, Congress had made no\\n change to the statute. Id. In reaching our decision based on the same reasoning,\\n we likewise respect precedent.\\n\\n853 F.3d at 274–75 (parallel citations omitted).\\n\\n In this passage, King made clear that its decision to import the evidentiary restriction at\\nthe heart of Taylor limits the breadth of the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis, and it openly\\nacknowledged that this evidentiary restriction would prevent sentencing courts from considering\\notherwise available evidence that would demonstrate that the prior offenses occurred on different\\noccasions. Still, it found that the fact that these restrictions would hinder sentencing courts was\\nnot sufficient justification to stray from the evidentiary limitation at the heart of Taylor. Id. This\\nsame intuition is reflected in Mathis, where the Supreme Court concluded that sentencing courts\\ncannot use non-elemental facts to enhance a defendant’s sentence under the ACCA, even in\\ncases where that restriction seems impractical or “counterintuitive.” 136 S. Ct. at 2251, 2253\\n(“That rule can seem counterintuitive: In some cases, a sentencing judge knows (or can easily\\ndiscover) that the defendant carried out a ‘real’ burglary, even though the crime of conviction\\nalso extends to other conduct. No matter.”).\\n\\n We cannot, in this case, rewrite King altogether. A straightforward reading of King and\\nthe cases on which it relies makes clear that, “whether for good or for ill, the elements-based\\napproach remains the law.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421225/\", \"author_raw\": \"reasons that the judges concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GIBBONS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643972/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0172p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 18-5786\n v. │\n │\n │\n JAMES HENNESSEE, │\n Defendant-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia.\n No. 1:17-cr-00018-1—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.\n\n Argued: March 19, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\n\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville,\nTennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville,\nTennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, R. David\nBaker, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.\n\n GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BOGGS, J., joined. COLE,\nC.J. (pp. 13–26), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. James Hennessee pled guilty to one count of\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government\nsought an enhanced penalty under § 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for\nviolent felonies. Hennessee objected on the basis that the government could not prove that two\nof his prior offenses were committed on different occasions, as required by the Armed Career\nCriminal Act. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that our precedent precluded its\nreview of non-elemental facts in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions\nanalysis. But because a sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times,\nlocations, and victims in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions analysis,\nwe hold that the district court erred. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established\nin Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions\ndifferent from one another. Thus, the government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions\nqualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. Therefore, we vacate\nHennessee’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing with instructions to apply\nthe enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\n\n I.\n\n In August 2016, a police officer came across Hennessee in a park in Pulaski, Tennessee.\nHennessee informed the officer that he was on state parole and consented to a search. The\nofficer searched Hennessee’s person and items nearby on the ground. The officer arrested\nHennessee after finding a digital scale, methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, and a loaded\nhandgun. On November 8, 2017, the government charged Hennessee with being a felon in\npossession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hennessee pled guilty on March\n13, 2018.\n\n The Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) and\nrecommended that the district court sentence Hennessee as an armed career criminal based on his\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 3\n\n\nprior criminal convictions. The PSR identified three prior convictions—one in Limestone\nCounty, Alabama and two in Davidson County, Tennessee—that qualified as violent felonies\nunder the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Based on these predicate\noffenses, the PSR recommended that the district court impose the mandatory minimum sentence\nof fifteen years for a defendant with three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA.\n\n The first predicate offense stemmed from Hennessee’s 2015 convictions for\nmanufacturing a controlled substance and second-degree assault in Limestone County, Alabama.\nEach conviction would independently qualify as an ACCA predicate, but the Probation Office\ncould not conclusively determine whether the two offenses were “committed on occasions\ndifferent from one another,” as required under § 924(e)(1). Consequently, the Probation Office\ntreated the two Alabama convictions as a single predicate offense.\n\n The second and third ACCA predicates stemmed from Hennessee’s 2006 convictions for\naggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery in Davidson County, Tennessee. The\nindictment charged Hennessee with committing both offenses on March 3, 2005 in Davidson\nCounty. Hennessee pled guilty to both, and the judgments of conviction were entered on\nFebruary 23, 2006. Unlike in the Limestone County case, the Probation Office could discern\nfacts in the Davidson County record that indicated Hennessee committed the offenses on\ndifferent occasions. A review of the transcript reveals that, during Hennessee’s plea colloquy,\nthe government proffered a factual basis for the guilty plea and described the timing and\nlocations of the offenses as follows:\n\n [T]he State’s witnesses would be available and the testimony would be that in the\n early morning hours, around five o’clock -- four-thirty or five o’clock -- in the\n morning of March 3rd, 2005 Mr. Hennessee and his codefendant Mr. Reeves --\n first individual approached was the gentleman in Count Two Mr. Alah Basabi\n (ph.), who would testify that he was approached by two individuals, that he would\n identify as Mr. Hennessee and Mr. Reeves, in the parking lot of his apartment,\n which was here in Davidson County, Tennessee (unintelligible) 960 Edmondson\n Pike.\n ...\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 4\n\n\n And just a few minutes later a Ms. Terry Wainwright was, actually, stopped at a\n gas station . . . Mapco Express on Smith Springs Road, getting gas about five-\n twenty a.m. when two individuals approached her.\n ...\n Both these events occurred here in Davidson County.\n\nDE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 94–95.1 At the end of the government’s summary,\nthe court asked Hennessee whether the facts as described by the government were true, and\nHennessee said yes.2 Based on Hennessee’s 2006 plea colloquy, the Probation Office concluded\nthat the two Tennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. Thus,\nit recommended that the district court find Hennessee had the requisite three ACCA predicate\noffenses to qualify as an armed career criminal.\n\n Hennessee objected, arguing that the government could not show that he committed the\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. Hennessee reasoned that our precedent prohibits\nsentencing courts from considering any “features of the prior conviction” other than the\n“elements of the prior offense,” and the times and locations on which the government relied were\nnot elements of his prior offenses under Tennessee law. DE 18, Hennessee Sentencing Position,\nPage ID 29. Thus, he argued that the district court could only look to the elements of his\noffenses when conducting its different-occasions analysis.\n\n The district court agreed with Hennessee, concluding that Supreme Court and Sixth\nCircuit precedent prohibited it from considering any “non-elemental facts”3 when determining\n\n\n\n 1There are some discrepancies between the victims’ names listed in the indictment and at the plea colloquy.\nCount 1 of the indictment charged Hennessee with aggravated robbery of “Jerry Wainwright,” and Count 2 charged\nhim with attempted aggravated robbery of “Mudhafar J. Aljashami.” DE 24-1, Davidson County Indictment, Page\nID 81–82. We can discern that “Alah Basabi” is the phonetic spelling of Aljashami and that “Jerry” Wainwright and\n“Terry” Wainwright are the same individual. Regardless, these spelling errors do not alter our analysis or the fact\nthat Hennessee pled guilty to each offense charged in the indictment. We are looking at two different victims here:\nAljashami (or Alah Basabi) in the attempted aggravated robbery and Wainwright (Terry or Jerry) in the aggravated\nrobbery.\n 2The court specifically asked Hennessee “Are those facts basically true?” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea\nTr., Page ID 95. We do not read “basically” as qualifying how true the facts were or affecting Hennessee’s\nadmission of their truth.\n 3As defined by the Supreme Court, “non-elemental facts” are “amplifying but legally extraneous\ncircumstances,” as distinct from the elements of a crime. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013).\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 5\n\n\nwhether Hennessee’s Tennessee offenses were committed on different occasions. Because the\nelements of Hennessee’s aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery convictions are\nsilent as to the time and location of each offense, the district court concluded that it could not\ndesignate Hennessee as an armed career criminal. The court perceived some tension among\ncases in the Sixth Circuit regarding what sources and facts a court may consider when\ndetermining whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions, stating that “at some\npoint the Sixth Circuit’s going to have to clarify this,” because district courts “need clarification”\non this issue. DE 28, Sentencing Tr., Page ID 128–131.\n\n The district court found that Hennessee was not subject to the penalty enhancement under\nthe ACCA and sentenced him to 110 months in prison, which both parties agreed was the\nappropriate sentence in the absence of an armed-career-criminal designation. The district court\nentered its judgment on July 18, 2018. The government timely appealed, arguing that Hennessee\nqualifies as an armed career criminal and that the district court erred in declining to consider\nnon-elemental facts in conducting the different-occasions analysis.\n\n II.\n\n The issues before us are twofold: (1) whether a sentencing court may consider non-\nelemental facts in its ACCA different-occasions analysis, and (2) whether Hennessee’s prior\nTennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. We review both\nquestions of law de novo. United States v. Southers, 866 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We\nreview the district court’s decision that Defendant’s offenses were committed on separate\noccasions under the ACCA de novo.”); United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2017)\n(“We review de novo the issue of what evidence a court may rely on when deciding whether\nprior offenses were ‘committed on occasions different from one another’ as that phrase is used in\nthe ACCA.”).\n\n\n\n\nElemental facts are “those constituting elements of the offense” and “the only facts the court can be sure the jury so\nfound.” Id.\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 6\n\n\n III.\n\n The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum of fifteen years for any person who, in\nrelevant part, “violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a\nviolent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\nThis requires two separate inquiries: (1) whether prior convictions qualify as ACCA-predicates,\nand (2) whether such offenses were committed on different occasions. The case before us\nconcerns only the different-occasions analysis.\n\n The district court concluded that Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent prohibited it\nfrom looking to “non-elemental facts”—here, the times and specific locations of Hennessee’s\nTennessee offenses—when determining whether two prior felonies were committed on different\noccasions. Under this approach, the district court refused to consider the facts as described\nduring Hennessee’s plea colloquy. Limiting itself to only elemental facts in Shepard documents,\nthe district court concluded that the government did not prove that Hennessee committed the\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. The district court thus declined to apply the ACCA\nenhancement to Hennessee’s sentence.\n\n The district court implored us to clarify the law of the Sixth Circuit as it pertains to\nevidentiary-source limitations in the different-occasions analysis. And with this opinion, we do.\nWe now clarify that King adopted the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary-source restriction for the\ndifferent-occasions analysis and created no limitation on a sentencing court’s consideration of\nnon-elemental facts contained within Shepard documents. See King, 853 F.3d 267. This reading\nof King accords with the approach adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth,\nEleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 886 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.\n2018); Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 143, 145; United States v. Span, 789 F.3d 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2015);\nKirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d\n467, 471 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010); United\nStates v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279\n(5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2005). These courts\nhave all previously determined that only Shepard documents may be examined when conducting\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 7\n\n\na different-occasions analysis. They have not, however, imported an elemental-facts-only\nlimitation into the different-occasions analysis, nor do we do so today.\n\n In United States v. King, we adopted the Taylor-Shepard source limitation and applied it\nwith equal force to the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis. King, 853 F.3d at 269 (adopting\nShepard’s holding that sentencing courts may review only Shepard-approved documents,\nincluding charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, jury\ninstructions, judgment of conviction, or other record of comparable findings of fact adopted by\nthe defendant upon entering a guilty plea, to determine whether a defendant’s prior crimes satisfy\nthe ACCA) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) and Taylor v. United States,\n495 U.S. 575 (1990)). The issue before us in King was as follows: “When a federal district court\nis tasked with determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses were ‘committed on occasions\ndifferent from one another’ . . . , is the court restricted to using only the evidentiary sources\napproved in Taylor and Shepard?” Id. (internal citations omitted). We answered yes and\nreversed because the district court reviewed a non-Shepard-approved bill of particulars. Id. at\n269, 278. In short, we held in King that a sentencing judge may “identify the who, when, and\nwhere of the prior offenses” in its different-occasions analysis but is constrained to “the\nevidentiary sources and information approved by the Supreme Court in Taylor and Shepard.” Id.\nat 274–75. In reaching this conclusion, we recognized that the same “legal and policy\nrationales” underpinning the source limitation in the ACCA-predicate analysis also applied in the\ndifferent-occasions context. Id. By limiting a sentencing court’s repertoire to Shepard\ndocuments, we sought to prevent the judge from finding facts not admitted by the defendant. See\nid. at 272 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26). We recognized that, without such evidentiary\nrestrictions, a sentencing court may “very well abridge the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth\nAmendment rights.” Id.\n\n The district court interpreted King differently. The district court read King’s reliance on\ntwo post-Shepard cases, Descamps and Mathis, as a signal that sentencing courts are not only\nrestricted to Shepard documents in the different-occasions analysis, but also limited to elemental\nfacts inside those documents. In Descamps v. United States, the Court refused to authorize a\nmodified categorical approach and permit the consideration of extra-statutory evidence—\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 8\n\n\nShepard documents—in the ACCA-predicate context when the statute in question is indivisible.\n570 U.S. 254, 267–69 (2013). Otherwise, the sentencing court could make its own finding of\nfact about the means by which the defendant committed the offense and run afoul of the Sixth\nAmendment guarantee. See id. at 269; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Mathis v. United\nStates, the Court counseled again that “a judge cannot go beyond identifying the crime of\nconviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense.” 136 S. Ct.\n2243, 2252 (2016). To comply with the Sixth Amendment, the sentencing court may not stray\nbeyond the elements of the prior offense “to determine the means by which [a defendant]\ncommitted his prior crimes.” Id. at 2253. But the district court’s interpretation of King’s\nreliance on Descamps and Mathis is flawed. In King, we drew upon the reasoning in Descamps\nand Mathis that the Shepard-Taylor source restriction quells constitutional concerns and is\ntherefore appropriate in the different-occasions analysis. We did not, however, import\nDescamps’s and Mathis’s elements-means distinction or elemental-facts restriction to our\ndifferent-occasions analysis.\n\n Indeed, in King we recognized that, “because facts relevant to the different-occasions\ninquiry, such as the time and location of the prior offense, are most often not elements of the\noffense, a proceeding to answer the different-occasions question may well be more extensive\nthan one to answer the ACCA-predicate question.” King, 853 F.3d at 273 (citing United States v.\nDantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2014)). This is intuitive. If Congress sought to avoid\nmini-trials on ACCA determinations—which it did, see id.—then the sentencing court must be\nequipped to answer both the ACCA-predicate inquiry and the different-occasions inquiry.\nA sentencing judge can still make the ACCA-predicate determination under both the Shepard-\nTaylor source limitation and the elemental-facts-only restriction. A sentencing judge would be\nhamstrung, however, in making most different-occasions determinations if he or she were only\nallowed to look to elemental facts in Shepard documents which rarely involve date, time, or\nlocation. Such a restriction would not make sense; it would render violent-felony convictions\nadjudged together by the same court inseparable in the different-occasions context.\n\n To illustrate, consider a defendant with six prior convictions that qualify as ACCA-\npredicate violent felonies: one for aggravated assault and five for aggravated robbery. The\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 9\n\n\naggravated assault conviction stands alone, but the five aggravated robberies were charged in the\nsame indictment, pled guilty to at the same time, and contained in the same judgment of\nconviction. Even though this defendant had robbed five different businesses in different cities\nacross a twelve-hour period, the indictment simply indicated that all five occurred on the same\nday in the same county. Assume, however, that during the plea colloquy for the five aggravated\nrobberies, the defendant admitted to the facts describing the separate locations and times of each\n(non-elemental facts). Under Hennessee’s theory, the district court could not consider the\nadmission of these facts describing locations and times. But this theory reads too many\nrestrictions into the Shepard-Taylor source limitation and unduly hinders a district court’s ability\nto determine whether offenses occurred on different occasions.\n\n Therefore, we find that the district court erred in confining itself to only elemental facts\nwithin Shepard-approved documents when conducting its different-occasions analysis. We hold\nthat a district court may consider both elemental and non-elemental facts contained in Shepard-\napproved documents to determine whether prior felonies were committed on occasions different\nfrom one another for purposes of the ACCA.\n\n IV.\n\n We now turn to the Shepard-approved documents from his Davidson County convictions\nto determine whether Hennessee committed the two Tennessee offenses of attempted aggravated\nrobbery and aggravated robbery on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. To answer\nthis question, we employ the well-established Paige test. United States v. Pham, 872 F.3d 799,\n802 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Paige, 634 F.3d 871, 873 (6th Cir. 2011)). Under the\nPaige test, two offenses are committed on different occasions if:\n\n (1) “it is possible to discern the point at which the first offense is completed, and\n the subsequent point at which the second offense begins”; (2) “it would have been\n possible for the offender to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and\n withdraw without committing the second offense”; or (3) “the offenses are\n committed in different residences or business locations.”\n\nSouthers, 866 F.3d at 369 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497,\n503 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 297–98 (6th Cir. 2006).\nIf Hennessee’s prior Tennessee convictions satisfy any one of the three prongs, we can\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 10\n\n\nconclusively say they were committed on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. See\nJones, 673 F.3d at 503. Because the facts contained within Shepard documents—namely,\nHennessee’s Davidson County plea colloquy transcript4—satisfy all three prongs of the Paige\ntest, we hold that Hennessee committed these offenses “on occasions different from one\nanother.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\n\n Under the first prong, we can discern the point at which the first offense—attempted\naggravated robbery of Aljashami—was complete and the second offense—aggravated robbery of\nWainwright—began. Hennessee attempted to rob Aljashami in his apartment parking lot at\n960 Edmondson Pike sometime between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on March 3, 2005. When\nHennessee realized Aljashami did not have any money, Hennessee gave up and left. At that\npoint, Hennessee’s first offense was complete. Then, around 5:20 a.m., Hennessee approached\nWainwright at a gas station on Smith Springs Road and robbed her at gunpoint. Hennessee’s\ndeparture from Aljashami’s apartment parking lot marked the completion of his first offense, and\nhis approaching Wainwright at the gas station twenty to fifty minutes later marked the beginning\nof his second offense. Thus, we find it “possible to discern the point at which the first offense\n[was] completed, and the subsequent point at which the second offense [began].” See Southers,\n866 F.3d at 369. The first prong of the Paige test is satisfied.\n\n Under the second prong, we conclude that it would have been possible for Hennessee to\ncease his criminal conduct after his failed attempt to rob Aljashami and withdraw without\ncommitting the aggravated robbery of Wainwright. After the attempted robbery of Aljashami in\nthe apartment parking lot, Hennessee could have stopped and gone home. Instead, he proceeded\nto the gas station where he robbed Wainwright. Thus, “it would have been possible for\n\n\n 4On appeal, Hennessee argues that his plea colloquy is insufficient to demonstrate that he committed the\noffenses on different occasions because his admission to the government’s factual proffer “did not necessarily\nestablish” the times or locations at which he committed the offenses. CA6 R. 16, Appellee Br., at 30. We find his\nargument unpersuasive. As explained above, a plea colloquy transcript is a Shepard-approved document that the\ncourt may examine in a different-occasions analysis. Hennessee admitted under oath that the factual basis proffered\nby the prosecutor was true. In addition, the sentencing judge in the Davidson County case explicitly informed\nHennessee before he admitted the facts or pled guilty that “these convictions today can be used to increase, or\nenhance, the punishment of any future felony offenses[.]” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 91. Thus,\nany argument that Hennessee had “no motivation to quibble” or dispute the facts is undercut by the fact that\nHennessee knew the potential implications of that plea hearing.\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 11\n\n\n[Hennessee] to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and withdraw without\ncommitting the second offense.” See id. This is enough to satisfy Paige’s second prong.\n\n Under the third prong, we can easily determine that Hennessee committed these offenses\nin different residences or business locations. Hennessee committed the attempted aggravated\nrobbery of Aljashami at 960 Edmondson Pike in the parking lot of Aljashami’s apartment\nbuilding. Hennessee committed the aggravated robbery of Wainwright at a Mapco Express gas\nstation on Smith Springs Road. Because the apartment parking lot and gas station are clearly\n“different residences or business locations,” see id., Hennessee’s offenses satisfy Paige’s third\nprong.\n\n We note that there is significant overlap in our analyses of all three prongs: Hennessee’s\nfirst offense and second offense were committed against different victims, in different locations,\nand at different times. This redundancy simply fortifies our conclusion that Hennessee\ncommitted these offenses on different occasions. Further, that he committed the attempted\naggravated robbery and aggravated robbery only twenty to fifty minutes apart does nothing to\nundermine this conclusion. See United States v. Banner, 518 F. App’x 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2013)\n(noting that “the amount of time between the individual offenses is relatively unimportant” as\nlong as the offenses meet any of the prongs of the Paige test). Similarly, it is irrelevant that\nHennessee committed both offenses in the same city or county when we can discern that he\ncommitted one in an apartment parking lot and one at a gas station. See Paige, 634 F.3d at 873\n(finding that five robberies were committed on “different occasions” despite being “close in\nlocation”).\n\n Based on the facts contained within Shepard-approved documents from Hennessee’s\nTennessee convictions, we find all three prongs of the Paige test satisfied.5 We conclude that his\nprior offenses were committed on “occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1),\nand that Hennessee is therefore subject to the sentence enhancement under the ACCA.\n\n\n\n\n 5We reiterate, of course, that the facts need only satisfy one prong of the Paige test to establish that\noffenses were committed on different occasions.\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 12\n\n\n V.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Hennessee’s sentence and remand to the district\ncourt for resentencing with instructions to apply the enhancement under the Armed Career\nCriminal Act.\n\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 13\n\n\n _________________\n\n DISSENT\n _________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0172p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5786\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JAMES HENNESSEE, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00018-1—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 19, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, R. David\\nBaker, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.\\n\\n GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BOGGS, J., joined. COLE,\\nC.J. (pp. 13–26), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. James Hennessee pled guilty to one count of\\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government\\nsought an enhanced penalty under § 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for\\nviolent felonies. Hennessee objected on the basis that the government could not prove that two\\nof his prior offenses were committed on different occasions, as required by the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that our precedent precluded its\\nreview of non-elemental facts in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions\\nanalysis. But because a sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times,\\nlocations, and victims in Shepard documents when conducting the different-occasions analysis,\\nwe hold that the district court erred. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established\\nin Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions\\ndifferent from one another. Thus, the government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions\\nqualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. Therefore, we vacate\\nHennessee’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing with instructions to apply\\nthe enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In August 2016, a police officer came across Hennessee in a park in Pulaski, Tennessee.\\nHennessee informed the officer that he was on state parole and consented to a search. The\\nofficer searched Hennessee’s person and items nearby on the ground. The officer arrested\\nHennessee after finding a digital scale, methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, and a loaded\\nhandgun. On November 8, 2017, the government charged Hennessee with being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hennessee pled guilty on March\\n13, 2018.\\n\\n The Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) and\\nrecommended that the district court sentence Hennessee as an armed career criminal based on his\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 3\\n\\n\\nprior criminal convictions. The PSR identified three prior convictions—one in Limestone\\nCounty, Alabama and two in Davidson County, Tennessee—that qualified as violent felonies\\nunder the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Based on these predicate\\noffenses, the PSR recommended that the district court impose the mandatory minimum sentence\\nof fifteen years for a defendant with three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA.\\n\\n The first predicate offense stemmed from Hennessee’s 2015 convictions for\\nmanufacturing a controlled substance and second-degree assault in Limestone County, Alabama.\\nEach conviction would independently qualify as an ACCA predicate, but the Probation Office\\ncould not conclusively determine whether the two offenses were “committed on occasions\\ndifferent from one another,” as required under § 924(e)(1). Consequently, the Probation Office\\ntreated the two Alabama convictions as a single predicate offense.\\n\\n The second and third ACCA predicates stemmed from Hennessee’s 2006 convictions for\\naggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery in Davidson County, Tennessee. The\\nindictment charged Hennessee with committing both offenses on March 3, 2005 in Davidson\\nCounty. Hennessee pled guilty to both, and the judgments of conviction were entered on\\nFebruary 23, 2006. Unlike in the Limestone County case, the Probation Office could discern\\nfacts in the Davidson County record that indicated Hennessee committed the offenses on\\ndifferent occasions. A review of the transcript reveals that, during Hennessee’s plea colloquy,\\nthe government proffered a factual basis for the guilty plea and described the timing and\\nlocations of the offenses as follows:\\n\\n [T]he State’s witnesses would be available and the testimony would be that in the\\n early morning hours, around five o’clock -- four-thirty or five o’clock -- in the\\n morning of March 3rd, 2005 Mr. Hennessee and his codefendant Mr. Reeves --\\n first individual approached was the gentleman in Count Two Mr. Alah Basabi\\n (ph.), who would testify that he was approached by two individuals, that he would\\n identify as Mr. Hennessee and Mr. Reeves, in the parking lot of his apartment,\\n which was here in Davidson County, Tennessee (unintelligible) 960 Edmondson\\n Pike.\\n ...\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 4\\n\\n\\n And just a few minutes later a Ms. Terry Wainwright was, actually, stopped at a\\n gas station . . . Mapco Express on Smith Springs Road, getting gas about five-\\n twenty a.m. when two individuals approached her.\\n ...\\n Both these events occurred here in Davidson County.\\n\\nDE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 94–95.1 At the end of the government’s summary,\\nthe court asked Hennessee whether the facts as described by the government were true, and\\nHennessee said yes.2 Based on Hennessee’s 2006 plea colloquy, the Probation Office concluded\\nthat the two Tennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. Thus,\\nit recommended that the district court find Hennessee had the requisite three ACCA predicate\\noffenses to qualify as an armed career criminal.\\n\\n Hennessee objected, arguing that the government could not show that he committed the\\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. Hennessee reasoned that our precedent prohibits\\nsentencing courts from considering any “features of the prior conviction” other than the\\n“elements of the prior offense,” and the times and locations on which the government relied were\\nnot elements of his prior offenses under Tennessee law. DE 18, Hennessee Sentencing Position,\\nPage ID 29. Thus, he argued that the district court could only look to the elements of his\\noffenses when conducting its different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n The district court agreed with Hennessee, concluding that Supreme Court and Sixth\\nCircuit precedent prohibited it from considering any “non-elemental facts”3 when determining\\n\\n\\n\\n 1There are some discrepancies between the victims’ names listed in the indictment and at the plea colloquy.\\nCount 1 of the indictment charged Hennessee with aggravated robbery of “Jerry Wainwright,” and Count 2 charged\\nhim with attempted aggravated robbery of “Mudhafar J. Aljashami.” DE 24-1, Davidson County Indictment, Page\\nID 81–82. We can discern that “Alah Basabi” is the phonetic spelling of Aljashami and that “Jerry” Wainwright and\\n“Terry” Wainwright are the same individual. Regardless, these spelling errors do not alter our analysis or the fact\\nthat Hennessee pled guilty to each offense charged in the indictment. We are looking at two different victims here:\\nAljashami (or Alah Basabi) in the attempted aggravated robbery and Wainwright (Terry or Jerry) in the aggravated\\nrobbery.\\n 2The court specifically asked Hennessee “Are those facts basically true?” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea\\nTr., Page ID 95. We do not read “basically” as qualifying how true the facts were or affecting Hennessee’s\\nadmission of their truth.\\n 3As defined by the Supreme Court, “non-elemental facts” are “amplifying but legally extraneous\\ncircumstances,” as distinct from the elements of a crime. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013).\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 5\\n\\n\\nwhether Hennessee’s Tennessee offenses were committed on different occasions. Because the\\nelements of Hennessee’s aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery convictions are\\nsilent as to the time and location of each offense, the district court concluded that it could not\\ndesignate Hennessee as an armed career criminal. The court perceived some tension among\\ncases in the Sixth Circuit regarding what sources and facts a court may consider when\\ndetermining whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions, stating that “at some\\npoint the Sixth Circuit’s going to have to clarify this,” because district courts “need clarification”\\non this issue. DE 28, Sentencing Tr., Page ID 128–131.\\n\\n The district court found that Hennessee was not subject to the penalty enhancement under\\nthe ACCA and sentenced him to 110 months in prison, which both parties agreed was the\\nappropriate sentence in the absence of an armed-career-criminal designation. The district court\\nentered its judgment on July 18, 2018. The government timely appealed, arguing that Hennessee\\nqualifies as an armed career criminal and that the district court erred in declining to consider\\nnon-elemental facts in conducting the different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The issues before us are twofold: (1) whether a sentencing court may consider non-\\nelemental facts in its ACCA different-occasions analysis, and (2) whether Hennessee’s prior\\nTennessee offenses were committed on occasions different from one another. We review both\\nquestions of law de novo. United States v. Southers, 866 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We\\nreview the district court’s decision that Defendant’s offenses were committed on separate\\noccasions under the ACCA de novo.”); United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2017)\\n(“We review de novo the issue of what evidence a court may rely on when deciding whether\\nprior offenses were ‘committed on occasions different from one another’ as that phrase is used in\\nthe ACCA.”).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nElemental facts are “those constituting elements of the offense” and “the only facts the court can be sure the jury so\\nfound.” Id.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 6\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum of fifteen years for any person who, in\\nrelevant part, “violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a\\nviolent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\\nThis requires two separate inquiries: (1) whether prior convictions qualify as ACCA-predicates,\\nand (2) whether such offenses were committed on different occasions. The case before us\\nconcerns only the different-occasions analysis.\\n\\n The district court concluded that Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent prohibited it\\nfrom looking to “non-elemental facts”—here, the times and specific locations of Hennessee’s\\nTennessee offenses—when determining whether two prior felonies were committed on different\\noccasions. Under this approach, the district court refused to consider the facts as described\\nduring Hennessee’s plea colloquy. Limiting itself to only elemental facts in Shepard documents,\\nthe district court concluded that the government did not prove that Hennessee committed the\\nTennessee offenses on different occasions. The district court thus declined to apply the ACCA\\nenhancement to Hennessee’s sentence.\\n\\n The district court implored us to clarify the law of the Sixth Circuit as it pertains to\\nevidentiary-source limitations in the different-occasions analysis. And with this opinion, we do.\\nWe now clarify that King adopted the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary-source restriction for the\\ndifferent-occasions analysis and created no limitation on a sentencing court’s consideration of\\nnon-elemental facts contained within Shepard documents. See King, 853 F.3d 267. This reading\\nof King accords with the approach adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth,\\nEleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 886 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.\\n2018); Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 143, 145; United States v. Span, 789 F.3d 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2015);\\nKirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d\\n467, 471 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010); United\\nStates v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279\\n(5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2005). These courts\\nhave all previously determined that only Shepard documents may be examined when conducting\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 7\\n\\n\\na different-occasions analysis. They have not, however, imported an elemental-facts-only\\nlimitation into the different-occasions analysis, nor do we do so today.\\n\\n In United States v. King, we adopted the Taylor-Shepard source limitation and applied it\\nwith equal force to the ACCA’s different-occasions analysis. King, 853 F.3d at 269 (adopting\\nShepard’s holding that sentencing courts may review only Shepard-approved documents,\\nincluding charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, jury\\ninstructions, judgment of conviction, or other record of comparable findings of fact adopted by\\nthe defendant upon entering a guilty plea, to determine whether a defendant’s prior crimes satisfy\\nthe ACCA) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) and Taylor v. United States,\\n495 U.S. 575 (1990)). The issue before us in King was as follows: “When a federal district court\\nis tasked with determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses were ‘committed on occasions\\ndifferent from one another’ . . . , is the court restricted to using only the evidentiary sources\\napproved in Taylor and Shepard?” Id. (internal citations omitted). We answered yes and\\nreversed because the district court reviewed a non-Shepard-approved bill of particulars. Id. at\\n269, 278. In short, we held in King that a sentencing judge may “identify the who, when, and\\nwhere of the prior offenses” in its different-occasions analysis but is constrained to “the\\nevidentiary sources and information approved by the Supreme Court in Taylor and Shepard.” Id.\\nat 274–75. In reaching this conclusion, we recognized that the same “legal and policy\\nrationales” underpinning the source limitation in the ACCA-predicate analysis also applied in the\\ndifferent-occasions context. Id. By limiting a sentencing court’s repertoire to Shepard\\ndocuments, we sought to prevent the judge from finding facts not admitted by the defendant. See\\nid. at 272 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26). We recognized that, without such evidentiary\\nrestrictions, a sentencing court may “very well abridge the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth\\nAmendment rights.” Id.\\n\\n The district court interpreted King differently. The district court read King’s reliance on\\ntwo post-Shepard cases, Descamps and Mathis, as a signal that sentencing courts are not only\\nrestricted to Shepard documents in the different-occasions analysis, but also limited to elemental\\nfacts inside those documents. In Descamps v. United States, the Court refused to authorize a\\nmodified categorical approach and permit the consideration of extra-statutory evidence—\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 8\\n\\n\\nShepard documents—in the ACCA-predicate context when the statute in question is indivisible.\\n570 U.S. 254, 267–69 (2013). Otherwise, the sentencing court could make its own finding of\\nfact about the means by which the defendant committed the offense and run afoul of the Sixth\\nAmendment guarantee. See id. at 269; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Mathis v. United\\nStates, the Court counseled again that “a judge cannot go beyond identifying the crime of\\nconviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense.” 136 S. Ct.\\n2243, 2252 (2016). To comply with the Sixth Amendment, the sentencing court may not stray\\nbeyond the elements of the prior offense “to determine the means by which [a defendant]\\ncommitted his prior crimes.” Id. at 2253. But the district court’s interpretation of King’s\\nreliance on Descamps and Mathis is flawed. In King, we drew upon the reasoning in Descamps\\nand Mathis that the Shepard-Taylor source restriction quells constitutional concerns and is\\ntherefore appropriate in the different-occasions analysis. We did not, however, import\\nDescamps’s and Mathis’s elements-means distinction or elemental-facts restriction to our\\ndifferent-occasions analysis.\\n\\n Indeed, in King we recognized that, “because facts relevant to the different-occasions\\ninquiry, such as the time and location of the prior offense, are most often not elements of the\\noffense, a proceeding to answer the different-occasions question may well be more extensive\\nthan one to answer the ACCA-predicate question.” King, 853 F.3d at 273 (citing United States v.\\nDantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2014)). This is intuitive. If Congress sought to avoid\\nmini-trials on ACCA determinations—which it did, see id.—then the sentencing court must be\\nequipped to answer both the ACCA-predicate inquiry and the different-occasions inquiry.\\nA sentencing judge can still make the ACCA-predicate determination under both the Shepard-\\nTaylor source limitation and the elemental-facts-only restriction. A sentencing judge would be\\nhamstrung, however, in making most different-occasions determinations if he or she were only\\nallowed to look to elemental facts in Shepard documents which rarely involve date, time, or\\nlocation. Such a restriction would not make sense; it would render violent-felony convictions\\nadjudged together by the same court inseparable in the different-occasions context.\\n\\n To illustrate, consider a defendant with six prior convictions that qualify as ACCA-\\npredicate violent felonies: one for aggravated assault and five for aggravated robbery. The\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 9\\n\\n\\naggravated assault conviction stands alone, but the five aggravated robberies were charged in the\\nsame indictment, pled guilty to at the same time, and contained in the same judgment of\\nconviction. Even though this defendant had robbed five different businesses in different cities\\nacross a twelve-hour period, the indictment simply indicated that all five occurred on the same\\nday in the same county. Assume, however, that during the plea colloquy for the five aggravated\\nrobberies, the defendant admitted to the facts describing the separate locations and times of each\\n(non-elemental facts). Under Hennessee’s theory, the district court could not consider the\\nadmission of these facts describing locations and times. But this theory reads too many\\nrestrictions into the Shepard-Taylor source limitation and unduly hinders a district court’s ability\\nto determine whether offenses occurred on different occasions.\\n\\n Therefore, we find that the district court erred in confining itself to only elemental facts\\nwithin Shepard-approved documents when conducting its different-occasions analysis. We hold\\nthat a district court may consider both elemental and non-elemental facts contained in Shepard-\\napproved documents to determine whether prior felonies were committed on occasions different\\nfrom one another for purposes of the ACCA.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We now turn to the Shepard-approved documents from his Davidson County convictions\\nto determine whether Hennessee committed the two Tennessee offenses of attempted aggravated\\nrobbery and aggravated robbery on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. To answer\\nthis question, we employ the well-established Paige test. United States v. Pham, 872 F.3d 799,\\n802 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Paige, 634 F.3d 871, 873 (6th Cir. 2011)). Under the\\nPaige test, two offenses are committed on different occasions if:\\n\\n (1) “it is possible to discern the point at which the first offense is completed, and\\n the subsequent point at which the second offense begins”; (2) “it would have been\\n possible for the offender to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and\\n withdraw without committing the second offense”; or (3) “the offenses are\\n committed in different residences or business locations.”\\n\\nSouthers, 866 F.3d at 369 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497,\\n503 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 297–98 (6th Cir. 2006).\\nIf Hennessee’s prior Tennessee convictions satisfy any one of the three prongs, we can\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 10\\n\\n\\nconclusively say they were committed on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA. See\\nJones, 673 F.3d at 503. Because the facts contained within Shepard documents—namely,\\nHennessee’s Davidson County plea colloquy transcript4—satisfy all three prongs of the Paige\\ntest, we hold that Hennessee committed these offenses “on occasions different from one\\nanother.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).\\n\\n Under the first prong, we can discern the point at which the first offense—attempted\\naggravated robbery of Aljashami—was complete and the second offense—aggravated robbery of\\nWainwright—began. Hennessee attempted to rob Aljashami in his apartment parking lot at\\n960 Edmondson Pike sometime between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on March 3, 2005. When\\nHennessee realized Aljashami did not have any money, Hennessee gave up and left. At that\\npoint, Hennessee’s first offense was complete. Then, around 5:20 a.m., Hennessee approached\\nWainwright at a gas station on Smith Springs Road and robbed her at gunpoint. Hennessee’s\\ndeparture from Aljashami’s apartment parking lot marked the completion of his first offense, and\\nhis approaching Wainwright at the gas station twenty to fifty minutes later marked the beginning\\nof his second offense. Thus, we find it “possible to discern the point at which the first offense\\n[was] completed, and the subsequent point at which the second offense [began].” See Southers,\\n866 F.3d at 369. The first prong of the Paige test is satisfied.\\n\\n Under the second prong, we conclude that it would have been possible for Hennessee to\\ncease his criminal conduct after his failed attempt to rob Aljashami and withdraw without\\ncommitting the aggravated robbery of Wainwright. After the attempted robbery of Aljashami in\\nthe apartment parking lot, Hennessee could have stopped and gone home. Instead, he proceeded\\nto the gas station where he robbed Wainwright. Thus, “it would have been possible for\\n\\n\\n 4On appeal, Hennessee argues that his plea colloquy is insufficient to demonstrate that he committed the\\noffenses on different occasions because his admission to the government’s factual proffer “did not necessarily\\nestablish” the times or locations at which he committed the offenses. CA6 R. 16, Appellee Br., at 30. We find his\\nargument unpersuasive. As explained above, a plea colloquy transcript is a Shepard-approved document that the\\ncourt may examine in a different-occasions analysis. Hennessee admitted under oath that the factual basis proffered\\nby the prosecutor was true. In addition, the sentencing judge in the Davidson County case explicitly informed\\nHennessee before he admitted the facts or pled guilty that “these convictions today can be used to increase, or\\nenhance, the punishment of any future felony offenses[.]” DE 24-3, Davidson County Plea Tr., Page ID 91. Thus,\\nany argument that Hennessee had “no motivation to quibble” or dispute the facts is undercut by the fact that\\nHennessee knew the potential implications of that plea hearing.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 11\\n\\n\\n[Hennessee] to cease his criminal conduct after the first offense, and withdraw without\\ncommitting the second offense.” See id. This is enough to satisfy Paige’s second prong.\\n\\n Under the third prong, we can easily determine that Hennessee committed these offenses\\nin different residences or business locations. Hennessee committed the attempted aggravated\\nrobbery of Aljashami at 960 Edmondson Pike in the parking lot of Aljashami’s apartment\\nbuilding. Hennessee committed the aggravated robbery of Wainwright at a Mapco Express gas\\nstation on Smith Springs Road. Because the apartment parking lot and gas station are clearly\\n“different residences or business locations,” see id., Hennessee’s offenses satisfy Paige’s third\\nprong.\\n\\n We note that there is significant overlap in our analyses of all three prongs: Hennessee’s\\nfirst offense and second offense were committed against different victims, in different locations,\\nand at different times. This redundancy simply fortifies our conclusion that Hennessee\\ncommitted these offenses on different occasions. Further, that he committed the attempted\\naggravated robbery and aggravated robbery only twenty to fifty minutes apart does nothing to\\nundermine this conclusion. See United States v. Banner, 518 F. App’x 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2013)\\n(noting that “the amount of time between the individual offenses is relatively unimportant” as\\nlong as the offenses meet any of the prongs of the Paige test). Similarly, it is irrelevant that\\nHennessee committed both offenses in the same city or county when we can discern that he\\ncommitted one in an apartment parking lot and one at a gas station. See Paige, 634 F.3d at 873\\n(finding that five robberies were committed on “different occasions” despite being “close in\\nlocation”).\\n\\n Based on the facts contained within Shepard-approved documents from Hennessee’s\\nTennessee convictions, we find all three prongs of the Paige test satisfied.5 We conclude that his\\nprior offenses were committed on “occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1),\\nand that Hennessee is therefore subject to the sentence enhancement under the ACCA.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5We reiterate, of course, that the facts need only satisfy one prong of the Paige test to establish that\\noffenses were committed on different occasions.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 12\\n\\n\\n V.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Hennessee’s sentence and remand to the district\\ncourt for resentencing with instructions to apply the enhancement under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n\\n No. 18-5786 United States v. Hennessee Page 13\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3063,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643974,"string":"4,643,974"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Lonnie Lee OWENS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mike PARRIS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lonnie Owens v. Mike Parris"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-30"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-5488"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"McKeague, Kethledge, Thapar\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0171p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n LONNIE LEE OWENS, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5488\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n MIKE PARRIS, Warden, │\\n Respondent-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Winchester.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00018—Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\\n\\n Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL,\\nNashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M. Mitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE\\nTENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M.\\nMitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Lonnie Lee Owens,\\nTiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Lonnie Lee Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and\\nmouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 2\\n\\n\\ndie. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased\\nOwens’s sentence based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was\\nwarranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens now seeks federal habeas relief, arguing that the\\nSixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The district\\ncourt agreed and granted the writ. We hold that the state court’s error was harmless, and reverse.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Owens and his wife Heather separated in September 2002 and agreed to share custody of\\ntheir two young children. Soon thereafter, Owens screamed at Heather that, if she took their\\nchildren away from him, he would kill her. Owens also told one of his friends that he had made\\nthe same threat.\\n\\n On May 17, 2003, Owens was at his house with the children while Heather was at work.\\nLate that morning, Owens called Heather to ask when she would pick up the children, telling her\\nthat he had plans that evening. According to Owens, Heather hung up on him without saying\\nwhen she planned to come over. Owens then called his girlfriend, Kara, and said that he was not\\nsure when Heather would come to get the kids. Kara agreed not to go over to his house to avoid\\nrunning into Heather. Around 3:00 p.m., Heather left work and drove her truck to Owens’s\\nhouse, where the children were napping and Owens was doing laundry. Owens says he was\\nstartled when a person appeared behind him and said “F-you.” He swung at the person with all\\nhis strength. Only after he struck the person in the head, Owens claims, did he realize it was\\nHeather.\\n\\n Owens says he checked for Heather’s pulse and thought she was dead. He bound her\\narms and legs with duct tape, hogtying her limbs together behind her back—all, according to\\nOwens, to make it easier to move her dead body. He also wrapped tape around the bottom half\\nof her head, covering her nose and mouth—because, according to Owens, her face was turning\\ngray and he did not want to look at her. Then he dragged Heather to a shed behind his house and\\nleft her inside.\\n\\n Around 4:00 p.m., Owens drove Heather’s truck to a nearby parking lot, abandoned it\\nwith her keys inside, and ran back to his house. (His movements were filmed by a video camera\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 3\\n\\n\\nacross the street from the parking lot.) Owens then made a series of phone calls. First, Owens\\ncalled Kara to ask her to come over. Then he called a friend to say that Owens and Kara planned\\nto attend the friend’s party that evening. Finally, he called Heather’s cell phone and left a\\nvoicemail, asking her whether she planned to pick up the kids and saying “I love you” and\\n“[t]ake care.”\\n\\n Soon thereafter, Kara arrived at Owens’s house. According to Kara, Owens was “pacing\\nback and forth,” “sweating,” and “seemed to be nervous and upset.” He told her that some of his\\nfriends had stolen Heather’s truck as a joke, and he convinced Kara to help him to move the\\ntruck to another town. Then he and Kara went to the party. After they returned home, Owens\\nasked Kara to watch the children while he went fishing. Instead, however, Owens drove\\nHeather’s body to a nearby lake and buried her in a shallow grave on an island, where the police\\nfound Heather’s body more than two weeks later.\\n\\n A Tennessee jury thereafter convicted Owens of second-degree murder. At the time of\\nhis sentencing, Tennessee law prescribed sentencing ranges based on the category of the offense\\nand the defendant’s prior convictions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112 (2004). Within these\\nranges, the law further prescribed presumptive sentences from which the sentencing judge could\\ndepart only if the judge found certain aggravating or mitigating factors. See id. § 40-35-210(c)\\n(2005).\\n\\n Owens faced a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of 25 years for his second-\\ndegree murder conviction. See id. §§ 39-13-210(c)(1), 40-35-112(a)(1) (2005). His presumptive\\nsentence within that range was 20 years. See id. § 40-35-210(c) (2005). Over Owens’s\\nobjection, the sentencing judge found that two enhancements applied, including one for\\n“exceptional cruelty.” See id. § 40-35-114(5) (2005). Those enhancements allowed the trial\\njudge to increase Owens’s sentence to 25 years. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals\\nthereafter affirmed the application of the exceptional-cruelty enhancement, but reversed the\\napplication of the other enhancement. See State v. Owens, No. M2005-00362-CCA-R3-CD,\\n2005 WL 2653973, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2005). The court thus reduced Owens’s\\nsentence to 24 years.\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 4\\n\\n\\n Owens thereafter sought federal habeas relief, arguing among other things that his\\nsentence was increased, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, based on facts found by the judge\\nrather than the jury. The district court granted the writ. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650,\\n652 (6th Cir. 2008). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated Owens’s Sixth\\nAmendment claim on the merits, which means Owens must show that the court reached a\\ndecision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established\\nSupreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In the district court, the State did not even dispute that the state court had unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent when the court rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim.\\nOwens therefore says the State has forfeited its argument here that the state court’s decision was\\nnot “unreasonable” as that term is used in § 2254(d)(1). Yet the district court decided that issue\\non the merits, which means the State can challenge that holding now. See United States v.\\nClariot, 655 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n So we turn to question whether the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent when it rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim. Two\\nprecedents are especially important here. The first is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490\\n(2000), where the Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that\\nincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to\\na jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The second is Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.\\n296, 303 (2004), where the Court made clear that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi\\npurposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected\\nin the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Emphasis in original.) Yet the Tennessee\\ncourt regarded the statutory maximum for purposes of Owens’s sentencing as the generic 25-year\\nmaximum for second-degree murder, rather than the 20-year maximum that the judge could\\nimpose based solely on the facts reflected in the verdict or admitted in Owens’s case.\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 5\\n\\n\\nSee Owens, 2005 WL 2653973, at *6 (citing State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn.\\n2005)). That decision was inconsistent with Blakely’s plain terms. Accord Portalatin v.\\nGraham, 624 F.3d 69, 83-84 (2nd Cir. 2010); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n Yet the state argues that the issue was not so clear-cut in Owens’s case, because the\\njudge’s finding of “exceptional cruelty” merely permitted, rather than mandated, a sentence\\nabove 20 years. But in Blakely the sentencing judge had the same discretion not to impose a\\nhigher sentencing based on the judge’s own factfinding. And in Blakely the Supreme Court\\nspecifically instructed that, “[w]hether the judicially determined facts require a sentence\\nenhancement or merely allow it,” a sentence violates the Sixth Amendment when “the verdict\\nalone does not authorize the sentence.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8 (emphasis in original). The\\nSupreme Court could hardly have been clearer; and here the verdict alone did not authorize\\nOwens’s sentence. The Tennessee court’s application (or refusal to apply) Blakely was therefore\\nunreasonable.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n But Owens is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court’s error was not harmless. See\\nWashington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2006). On habeas review, an error is harmful\\nonly if it had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon Owens’s sentence, or if we have “grave\\ndoubt” as to whether the error had such an effect. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435\\n(1995).\\n\\n Owens states that, as to harmlessness, “[t]he only question is whether the jury would have\\nfound that Owens acted with exceptional cruelty if that question had been submitted to it.” Br. at\\n36. We agree with that statement of the relevant question here. In Washington v. Recuenco, the\\nCourt observed that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a\\n‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and\\njudgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding.” 548 U.S. at\\n220 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478). Thus, the Court held, “elements and sentencing factors\\nmust be treated the same for Sixth Amendment purposes.” Id. In Recuenco, that equality of\\ntreatment meant that “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 6\\n\\n\\nelement to the jury, is not structural error.” Id. at 222. Here, that equality means that, for either\\n“failure,” we ask the same question to determine harmlessness: namely, “whether the jury\\nwould have returned the same verdict absent the error[.]” Id. at 221; accord Butler, 528 F.3d at\\n648.\\n\\n That question is the dispositive one, we hold, even though in two other cases we asked\\nwhether the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence absent the Blakely error.\\nBut in the first of those cases, we simply rejected on its terms the Warden’s argument that the\\nsentencing judge would have “undoubtedly impose[d] the same sentence on remand.”\\nVillagarcia v. Warden, 599 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2010). We notably did not address the\\nantecedent question whether the Warden had asked the right question in the first place. And in\\nthe second case our discussion of what the sentencing judge might have done on remand was\\nplainly dictum—because the “State did not argue harmless error before the district court and did\\nnot argue it in [its] briefing [on] appeal[,]” and thus had “waived” the issue. Lovins v. Parker,\\n712 F.3d 283, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the question whether the court would have\\nimposed the same sentence on remand is itself incoherent in cases where—as here—the court’s\\nfactfinding liberated the court to impose the sentence that the court in fact imposed, rather than\\nmandated that sentence. What is missing in all these cases—as to elements and sentencing\\nfactors alike—is a jury finding, not a judicial one. Hence the question as to harmlessness is\\nwhether the jury would have made the necessary finding had the jury been asked to make it.\\n\\n Under Tennessee law at the time of Owens’s trial, the sentencing factor at issue—\\nnamely, an enhancement for “exceptional cruelty”—required a finding that the defendant\\ninflicted “pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom,” and not\\nsimply “pain and suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” Tenn.\\nCode Ann. § 40-35-114(5); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tenn. 2001). On this record,\\nwhether Owens’s jury would have made that finding depends on whether they thought Heather\\nwas still alive when Owens duct-taped her mouth and nose—leaving her eyes uncovered—and\\nthen dragged her to the shed and left her there. Owens’s testimony, as described above, was that\\nHeather suddenly materialized behind him, that he punched her without realizing whom he was\\npunching, and that she died more or less immediately after the punch. Owens further testified\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 7\\n\\n\\nthat he hogtied Heather not to restrain her, but (inexplicably, one might say) to move her body\\nmore easily; and that he duct-taped her airways not to suffocate her, but to cover her face, which\\ndistressed him because it was turning gray—a sensitivity notably absent the remainder of that\\nday, as he moved Heather’s truck, left her a voicemail (as she lay dead or dying in the shed),\\npartied with Kara, and buried Heather in a shallow grave, among other activities. The State’s\\ntheory, in contrast, was more simple: that Heather had suffocated from the duct tape that Owens\\nplaced over her nose and mouth.\\n\\n The judgment we need to make here is whether there is any substantial likelihood that\\nthe jury believed Owens’s testimony—in which case his actions after the punch presumably were\\nnot cruel because Heather was no longer alive to suffer from them. For the moment we set to\\none side what seems to us the patently fantastic nature of Owens’s testimony. What plagues\\nOwens’s theory from the start, rather, is that the jury did in fact convict him of second-degree\\nmurder. And that means the jury found that Owens killed Heather knowingly. See Tenn. Code\\nAnn. § 39-13-210(a)(1); State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Thus, for the jury to\\nhave believed Owens’s testimony and to have convicted him nonetheless of second-degree\\nmurder, the jury must have thought that, when Owens punched Heather (without knowing who\\nshe was, no less), he was reasonably certain that the punch would kill her. Nothing in the record\\nor in common sense supports that hypothesis. Moreover, the State’s medical examiner testified\\nthat Heather’s body bore no signs of blunt force trauma, and that her cause of death was\\nasphyxiation. Add in the other fantastic aspects of Owens’s testimony, and one doubts that any\\nsentient juror would have believed any of it. Suffice it to say that we are confident that the jury\\nrejected Owens’s account of the murder and accepted the State’s.\\n\\n But that leaves the question whether the jury, if asked, would have found that Owens\\nacted with exceptional cruelty. The duct-taping cannot support that finding, because it was “the\\nmeans of accomplishing the crime charged.” Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 258. But other circumstances\\nstrongly support a finding of exceptional cruelty. Owens did not simply suffocate Heather; he\\nleft her alone in a shed, struggling to breathe with her limbs bound behind her back and her\\nchildren nearby in the house. Those actions amount to “psychological abuse or torture,” which\\nsupports a finding of exceptional cruelty. See id. Moreover, Owens’s actions after duct-taping\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 8\\n\\n\\nHeather and leaving her to die—e.g., partying with his girlfriend and later burying Heather’s\\nbody in a shallow grave—reflect his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering,” which\\nlikewise supports the necessary finding. See State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 311 (Tenn. 2002).\\n\\n We have little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding. The\\nBlakely error was therefore harmless.\\n\\n * * * * *\\n The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to\\ndeny the petition.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421227/\", \"author_raw\": \"KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MCKEAGUE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KETHLEDGE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643974/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lonnie Lee OWENS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mike PARRIS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0171p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n LONNIE LEE OWENS, ┐\n Petitioner-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 17-5488\n v. │\n │\n │\n MIKE PARRIS, Warden, │\n Respondent-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Winchester.\n No. 4:14-cv-00018—Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.\n\n Argued: March 20, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\n\n Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL,\nNashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M. Mitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE\nTENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M.\nMitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Lonnie Lee Owens,\nTiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Lonnie Lee Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and\nmouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 2\n\n\ndie. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased\nOwens’s sentence based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was\nwarranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens now seeks federal habeas relief, arguing that the\nSixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The district\ncourt agreed and granted the writ. We hold that the state court’s error was harmless, and reverse.\n\n I.\n\n Owens and his wife Heather separated in September 2002 and agreed to share custody of\ntheir two young children. Soon thereafter, Owens screamed at Heather that, if she took their\nchildren away from him, he would kill her. Owens also told one of his friends that he had made\nthe same threat.\n\n On May 17, 2003, Owens was at his house with the children while Heather was at work.\nLate that morning, Owens called Heather to ask when she would pick up the children, telling her\nthat he had plans that evening. According to Owens, Heather hung up on him without saying\nwhen she planned to come over. Owens then called his girlfriend, Kara, and said that he was not\nsure when Heather would come to get the kids. Kara agreed not to go over to his house to avoid\nrunning into Heather. Around 3:00 p.m., Heather left work and drove her truck to Owens’s\nhouse, where the children were napping and Owens was doing laundry. Owens says he was\nstartled when a person appeared behind him and said “F-you.” He swung at the person with all\nhis strength. Only after he struck the person in the head, Owens claims, did he realize it was\nHeather.\n\n Owens says he checked for Heather’s pulse and thought she was dead. He bound her\narms and legs with duct tape, hogtying her limbs together behind her back—all, according to\nOwens, to make it easier to move her dead body. He also wrapped tape around the bottom half\nof her head, covering her nose and mouth—because, according to Owens, her face was turning\ngray and he did not want to look at her. Then he dragged Heather to a shed behind his house and\nleft her inside.\n\n Around 4:00 p.m., Owens drove Heather’s truck to a nearby parking lot, abandoned it\nwith her keys inside, and ran back to his house. (His movements were filmed by a video camera\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 3\n\n\nacross the street from the parking lot.) Owens then made a series of phone calls. First, Owens\ncalled Kara to ask her to come over. Then he called a friend to say that Owens and Kara planned\nto attend the friend’s party that evening. Finally, he called Heather’s cell phone and left a\nvoicemail, asking her whether she planned to pick up the kids and saying “I love you” and\n“[t]ake care.”\n\n Soon thereafter, Kara arrived at Owens’s house. According to Kara, Owens was “pacing\nback and forth,” “sweating,” and “seemed to be nervous and upset.” He told her that some of his\nfriends had stolen Heather’s truck as a joke, and he convinced Kara to help him to move the\ntruck to another town. Then he and Kara went to the party. After they returned home, Owens\nasked Kara to watch the children while he went fishing. Instead, however, Owens drove\nHeather’s body to a nearby lake and buried her in a shallow grave on an island, where the police\nfound Heather’s body more than two weeks later.\n\n A Tennessee jury thereafter convicted Owens of second-degree murder. At the time of\nhis sentencing, Tennessee law prescribed sentencing ranges based on the category of the offense\nand the defendant’s prior convictions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112 (2004). Within these\nranges, the law further prescribed presumptive sentences from which the sentencing judge could\ndepart only if the judge found certain aggravating or mitigating factors. See id. § 40-35-210(c)\n(2005).\n\n Owens faced a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of 25 years for his second-\ndegree murder conviction. See id. §§ 39-13-210(c)(1), 40-35-112(a)(1) (2005). His presumptive\nsentence within that range was 20 years. See id. § 40-35-210(c) (2005). Over Owens’s\nobjection, the sentencing judge found that two enhancements applied, including one for\n“exceptional cruelty.” See id. § 40-35-114(5) (2005). Those enhancements allowed the trial\njudge to increase Owens’s sentence to 25 years. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals\nthereafter affirmed the application of the exceptional-cruelty enhancement, but reversed the\napplication of the other enhancement. See State v. Owens, No. M2005-00362-CCA-R3-CD,\n2005 WL 2653973, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2005). The court thus reduced Owens’s\nsentence to 24 years.\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 4\n\n\n Owens thereafter sought federal habeas relief, arguing among other things that his\nsentence was increased, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, based on facts found by the judge\nrather than the jury. The district court granted the writ. This appeal followed.\n\n II.\n\n We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650,\n652 (6th Cir. 2008). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated Owens’s Sixth\nAmendment claim on the merits, which means Owens must show that the court reached a\ndecision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established\nSupreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).\n\n A.\n\n In the district court, the State did not even dispute that the state court had unreasonably\napplied Supreme Court precedent when the court rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim.\nOwens therefore says the State has forfeited its argument here that the state court’s decision was\nnot “unreasonable” as that term is used in § 2254(d)(1). Yet the district court decided that issue\non the merits, which means the State can challenge that holding now. See United States v.\nClariot, 655 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 2011).\n\n So we turn to question whether the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably\napplied Supreme Court precedent when it rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim. Two\nprecedents are especially important here. The first is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490\n(2000), where the Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that\nincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to\na jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The second is Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.\n296, 303 (2004), where the Court made clear that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi\npurposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected\nin the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Emphasis in original.) Yet the Tennessee\ncourt regarded the statutory maximum for purposes of Owens’s sentencing as the generic 25-year\nmaximum for second-degree murder, rather than the 20-year maximum that the judge could\nimpose based solely on the facts reflected in the verdict or admitted in Owens’s case.\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 5\n\n\nSee Owens, 2005 WL 2653973, at *6 (citing State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn.\n2005)). That decision was inconsistent with Blakely’s plain terms. Accord Portalatin v.\nGraham, 624 F.3d 69, 83-84 (2nd Cir. 2010); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir. 2008).\n\n Yet the state argues that the issue was not so clear-cut in Owens’s case, because the\njudge’s finding of “exceptional cruelty” merely permitted, rather than mandated, a sentence\nabove 20 years. But in Blakely the sentencing judge had the same discretion not to impose a\nhigher sentencing based on the judge’s own factfinding. And in Blakely the Supreme Court\nspecifically instructed that, “[w]hether the judicially determined facts require a sentence\nenhancement or merely allow it,” a sentence violates the Sixth Amendment when “the verdict\nalone does not authorize the sentence.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8 (emphasis in original). The\nSupreme Court could hardly have been clearer; and here the verdict alone did not authorize\nOwens’s sentence. The Tennessee court’s application (or refusal to apply) Blakely was therefore\nunreasonable.\n\n B.\n\n But Owens is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court’s error was not harmless. See\nWashington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2006). On habeas review, an error is harmful\nonly if it had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon Owens’s sentence, or if we have “grave\ndoubt” as to whether the error had such an effect. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435\n(1995).\n\n Owens states that, as to harmlessness, “[t]he only question is whether the jury would have\nfound that Owens acted with exceptional cruelty if that question had been submitted to it.” Br. at\n36. We agree with that statement of the relevant question here. In Washington v. Recuenco, the\nCourt observed that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a\n‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and\njudgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding.” 548 U.S. at\n220 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478). Thus, the Court held, “elements and sentencing factors\nmust be treated the same for Sixth Amendment purposes.” Id. In Recuenco, that equality of\ntreatment meant that “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 6\n\n\nelement to the jury, is not structural error.” Id. at 222. Here, that equality means that, for either\n“failure,” we ask the same question to determine harmlessness: namely, “whether the jury\nwould have returned the same verdict absent the error[.]” Id. at 221; accord Butler, 528 F.3d at\n648.\n\n That question is the dispositive one, we hold, even though in two other cases we asked\nwhether the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence absent the Blakely error.\nBut in the first of those cases, we simply rejected on its terms the Warden’s argument that the\nsentencing judge would have “undoubtedly impose[d] the same sentence on remand.”\nVillagarcia v. Warden, 599 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2010). We notably did not address the\nantecedent question whether the Warden had asked the right question in the first place. And in\nthe second case our discussion of what the sentencing judge might have done on remand was\nplainly dictum—because the “State did not argue harmless error before the district court and did\nnot argue it in [its] briefing [on] appeal[,]” and thus had “waived” the issue. Lovins v. Parker,\n712 F.3d 283, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the question whether the court would have\nimposed the same sentence on remand is itself incoherent in cases where—as here—the court’s\nfactfinding liberated the court to impose the sentence that the court in fact imposed, rather than\nmandated that sentence. What is missing in all these cases—as to elements and sentencing\nfactors alike—is a jury finding, not a judicial one. Hence the question as to harmlessness is\nwhether the jury would have made the necessary finding had the jury been asked to make it.\n\n Under Tennessee law at the time of Owens’s trial, the sentencing factor at issue—\nnamely, an enhancement for “exceptional cruelty”—required a finding that the defendant\ninflicted “pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom,” and not\nsimply “pain and suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” Tenn.\nCode Ann. § 40-35-114(5); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tenn. 2001). On this record,\nwhether Owens’s jury would have made that finding depends on whether they thought Heather\nwas still alive when Owens duct-taped her mouth and nose—leaving her eyes uncovered—and\nthen dragged her to the shed and left her there. Owens’s testimony, as described above, was that\nHeather suddenly materialized behind him, that he punched her without realizing whom he was\npunching, and that she died more or less immediately after the punch. Owens further testified\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 7\n\n\nthat he hogtied Heather not to restrain her, but (inexplicably, one might say) to move her body\nmore easily; and that he duct-taped her airways not to suffocate her, but to cover her face, which\ndistressed him because it was turning gray—a sensitivity notably absent the remainder of that\nday, as he moved Heather’s truck, left her a voicemail (as she lay dead or dying in the shed),\npartied with Kara, and buried Heather in a shallow grave, among other activities. The State’s\ntheory, in contrast, was more simple: that Heather had suffocated from the duct tape that Owens\nplaced over her nose and mouth.\n\n The judgment we need to make here is whether there is any substantial likelihood that\nthe jury believed Owens’s testimony—in which case his actions after the punch presumably were\nnot cruel because Heather was no longer alive to suffer from them. For the moment we set to\none side what seems to us the patently fantastic nature of Owens’s testimony. What plagues\nOwens’s theory from the start, rather, is that the jury did in fact convict him of second-degree\nmurder. And that means the jury found that Owens killed Heather knowingly. See Tenn. Code\nAnn. § 39-13-210(a)(1); State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Thus, for the jury to\nhave believed Owens’s testimony and to have convicted him nonetheless of second-degree\nmurder, the jury must have thought that, when Owens punched Heather (without knowing who\nshe was, no less), he was reasonably certain that the punch would kill her. Nothing in the record\nor in common sense supports that hypothesis. Moreover, the State’s medical examiner testified\nthat Heather’s body bore no signs of blunt force trauma, and that her cause of death was\nasphyxiation. Add in the other fantastic aspects of Owens’s testimony, and one doubts that any\nsentient juror would have believed any of it. Suffice it to say that we are confident that the jury\nrejected Owens’s account of the murder and accepted the State’s.\n\n But that leaves the question whether the jury, if asked, would have found that Owens\nacted with exceptional cruelty. The duct-taping cannot support that finding, because it was “the\nmeans of accomplishing the crime charged.” Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 258. But other circumstances\nstrongly support a finding of exceptional cruelty. Owens did not simply suffocate Heather; he\nleft her alone in a shed, struggling to breathe with her limbs bound behind her back and her\nchildren nearby in the house. Those actions amount to “psychological abuse or torture,” which\nsupports a finding of exceptional cruelty. See id. Moreover, Owens’s actions after duct-taping\n\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 8\n\n\nHeather and leaving her to die—e.g., partying with his girlfriend and later burying Heather’s\nbody in a shallow grave—reflect his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering,” which\nlikewise supports the necessary finding. See State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 311 (Tenn. 2002).\n\n We have little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding. The\nBlakely error was therefore harmless.\n\n * * * * *\n The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to\ndeny the petition.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lonnie Lee OWENS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mike PARRIS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0171p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n LONNIE LEE OWENS, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5488\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n MIKE PARRIS, Warden, │\\n Respondent-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Winchester.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00018—Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 30, 2019\\n\\n Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL,\\nNashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M. Mitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE\\nTENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kasdin M.\\nMitchell, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Lonnie Lee Owens,\\nTiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Lonnie Lee Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and\\nmouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 2\\n\\n\\ndie. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased\\nOwens’s sentence based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was\\nwarranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens now seeks federal habeas relief, arguing that the\\nSixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The district\\ncourt agreed and granted the writ. We hold that the state court’s error was harmless, and reverse.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Owens and his wife Heather separated in September 2002 and agreed to share custody of\\ntheir two young children. Soon thereafter, Owens screamed at Heather that, if she took their\\nchildren away from him, he would kill her. Owens also told one of his friends that he had made\\nthe same threat.\\n\\n On May 17, 2003, Owens was at his house with the children while Heather was at work.\\nLate that morning, Owens called Heather to ask when she would pick up the children, telling her\\nthat he had plans that evening. According to Owens, Heather hung up on him without saying\\nwhen she planned to come over. Owens then called his girlfriend, Kara, and said that he was not\\nsure when Heather would come to get the kids. Kara agreed not to go over to his house to avoid\\nrunning into Heather. Around 3:00 p.m., Heather left work and drove her truck to Owens’s\\nhouse, where the children were napping and Owens was doing laundry. Owens says he was\\nstartled when a person appeared behind him and said “F-you.” He swung at the person with all\\nhis strength. Only after he struck the person in the head, Owens claims, did he realize it was\\nHeather.\\n\\n Owens says he checked for Heather’s pulse and thought she was dead. He bound her\\narms and legs with duct tape, hogtying her limbs together behind her back—all, according to\\nOwens, to make it easier to move her dead body. He also wrapped tape around the bottom half\\nof her head, covering her nose and mouth—because, according to Owens, her face was turning\\ngray and he did not want to look at her. Then he dragged Heather to a shed behind his house and\\nleft her inside.\\n\\n Around 4:00 p.m., Owens drove Heather’s truck to a nearby parking lot, abandoned it\\nwith her keys inside, and ran back to his house. (His movements were filmed by a video camera\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 3\\n\\n\\nacross the street from the parking lot.) Owens then made a series of phone calls. First, Owens\\ncalled Kara to ask her to come over. Then he called a friend to say that Owens and Kara planned\\nto attend the friend’s party that evening. Finally, he called Heather’s cell phone and left a\\nvoicemail, asking her whether she planned to pick up the kids and saying “I love you” and\\n“[t]ake care.”\\n\\n Soon thereafter, Kara arrived at Owens’s house. According to Kara, Owens was “pacing\\nback and forth,” “sweating,” and “seemed to be nervous and upset.” He told her that some of his\\nfriends had stolen Heather’s truck as a joke, and he convinced Kara to help him to move the\\ntruck to another town. Then he and Kara went to the party. After they returned home, Owens\\nasked Kara to watch the children while he went fishing. Instead, however, Owens drove\\nHeather’s body to a nearby lake and buried her in a shallow grave on an island, where the police\\nfound Heather’s body more than two weeks later.\\n\\n A Tennessee jury thereafter convicted Owens of second-degree murder. At the time of\\nhis sentencing, Tennessee law prescribed sentencing ranges based on the category of the offense\\nand the defendant’s prior convictions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112 (2004). Within these\\nranges, the law further prescribed presumptive sentences from which the sentencing judge could\\ndepart only if the judge found certain aggravating or mitigating factors. See id. § 40-35-210(c)\\n(2005).\\n\\n Owens faced a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of 25 years for his second-\\ndegree murder conviction. See id. §§ 39-13-210(c)(1), 40-35-112(a)(1) (2005). His presumptive\\nsentence within that range was 20 years. See id. § 40-35-210(c) (2005). Over Owens’s\\nobjection, the sentencing judge found that two enhancements applied, including one for\\n“exceptional cruelty.” See id. § 40-35-114(5) (2005). Those enhancements allowed the trial\\njudge to increase Owens’s sentence to 25 years. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals\\nthereafter affirmed the application of the exceptional-cruelty enhancement, but reversed the\\napplication of the other enhancement. See State v. Owens, No. M2005-00362-CCA-R3-CD,\\n2005 WL 2653973, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2005). The court thus reduced Owens’s\\nsentence to 24 years.\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 4\\n\\n\\n Owens thereafter sought federal habeas relief, arguing among other things that his\\nsentence was increased, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, based on facts found by the judge\\nrather than the jury. The district court granted the writ. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650,\\n652 (6th Cir. 2008). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated Owens’s Sixth\\nAmendment claim on the merits, which means Owens must show that the court reached a\\ndecision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established\\nSupreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In the district court, the State did not even dispute that the state court had unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent when the court rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim.\\nOwens therefore says the State has forfeited its argument here that the state court’s decision was\\nnot “unreasonable” as that term is used in § 2254(d)(1). Yet the district court decided that issue\\non the merits, which means the State can challenge that holding now. See United States v.\\nClariot, 655 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n So we turn to question whether the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent when it rejected Owens’s Sixth Amendment claim. Two\\nprecedents are especially important here. The first is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490\\n(2000), where the Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that\\nincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to\\na jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The second is Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.\\n296, 303 (2004), where the Court made clear that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi\\npurposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected\\nin the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Emphasis in original.) Yet the Tennessee\\ncourt regarded the statutory maximum for purposes of Owens’s sentencing as the generic 25-year\\nmaximum for second-degree murder, rather than the 20-year maximum that the judge could\\nimpose based solely on the facts reflected in the verdict or admitted in Owens’s case.\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 5\\n\\n\\nSee Owens, 2005 WL 2653973, at *6 (citing State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn.\\n2005)). That decision was inconsistent with Blakely’s plain terms. Accord Portalatin v.\\nGraham, 624 F.3d 69, 83-84 (2nd Cir. 2010); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n Yet the state argues that the issue was not so clear-cut in Owens’s case, because the\\njudge’s finding of “exceptional cruelty” merely permitted, rather than mandated, a sentence\\nabove 20 years. But in Blakely the sentencing judge had the same discretion not to impose a\\nhigher sentencing based on the judge’s own factfinding. And in Blakely the Supreme Court\\nspecifically instructed that, “[w]hether the judicially determined facts require a sentence\\nenhancement or merely allow it,” a sentence violates the Sixth Amendment when “the verdict\\nalone does not authorize the sentence.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8 (emphasis in original). The\\nSupreme Court could hardly have been clearer; and here the verdict alone did not authorize\\nOwens’s sentence. The Tennessee court’s application (or refusal to apply) Blakely was therefore\\nunreasonable.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n But Owens is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court’s error was not harmless. See\\nWashington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2006). On habeas review, an error is harmful\\nonly if it had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon Owens’s sentence, or if we have “grave\\ndoubt” as to whether the error had such an effect. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435\\n(1995).\\n\\n Owens states that, as to harmlessness, “[t]he only question is whether the jury would have\\nfound that Owens acted with exceptional cruelty if that question had been submitted to it.” Br. at\\n36. We agree with that statement of the relevant question here. In Washington v. Recuenco, the\\nCourt observed that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a\\n‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and\\njudgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding.” 548 U.S. at\\n220 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478). Thus, the Court held, “elements and sentencing factors\\nmust be treated the same for Sixth Amendment purposes.” Id. In Recuenco, that equality of\\ntreatment meant that “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 6\\n\\n\\nelement to the jury, is not structural error.” Id. at 222. Here, that equality means that, for either\\n“failure,” we ask the same question to determine harmlessness: namely, “whether the jury\\nwould have returned the same verdict absent the error[.]” Id. at 221; accord Butler, 528 F.3d at\\n648.\\n\\n That question is the dispositive one, we hold, even though in two other cases we asked\\nwhether the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence absent the Blakely error.\\nBut in the first of those cases, we simply rejected on its terms the Warden’s argument that the\\nsentencing judge would have “undoubtedly impose[d] the same sentence on remand.”\\nVillagarcia v. Warden, 599 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2010). We notably did not address the\\nantecedent question whether the Warden had asked the right question in the first place. And in\\nthe second case our discussion of what the sentencing judge might have done on remand was\\nplainly dictum—because the “State did not argue harmless error before the district court and did\\nnot argue it in [its] briefing [on] appeal[,]” and thus had “waived” the issue. Lovins v. Parker,\\n712 F.3d 283, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the question whether the court would have\\nimposed the same sentence on remand is itself incoherent in cases where—as here—the court’s\\nfactfinding liberated the court to impose the sentence that the court in fact imposed, rather than\\nmandated that sentence. What is missing in all these cases—as to elements and sentencing\\nfactors alike—is a jury finding, not a judicial one. Hence the question as to harmlessness is\\nwhether the jury would have made the necessary finding had the jury been asked to make it.\\n\\n Under Tennessee law at the time of Owens’s trial, the sentencing factor at issue—\\nnamely, an enhancement for “exceptional cruelty”—required a finding that the defendant\\ninflicted “pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom,” and not\\nsimply “pain and suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” Tenn.\\nCode Ann. § 40-35-114(5); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tenn. 2001). On this record,\\nwhether Owens’s jury would have made that finding depends on whether they thought Heather\\nwas still alive when Owens duct-taped her mouth and nose—leaving her eyes uncovered—and\\nthen dragged her to the shed and left her there. Owens’s testimony, as described above, was that\\nHeather suddenly materialized behind him, that he punched her without realizing whom he was\\npunching, and that she died more or less immediately after the punch. Owens further testified\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 7\\n\\n\\nthat he hogtied Heather not to restrain her, but (inexplicably, one might say) to move her body\\nmore easily; and that he duct-taped her airways not to suffocate her, but to cover her face, which\\ndistressed him because it was turning gray—a sensitivity notably absent the remainder of that\\nday, as he moved Heather’s truck, left her a voicemail (as she lay dead or dying in the shed),\\npartied with Kara, and buried Heather in a shallow grave, among other activities. The State’s\\ntheory, in contrast, was more simple: that Heather had suffocated from the duct tape that Owens\\nplaced over her nose and mouth.\\n\\n The judgment we need to make here is whether there is any substantial likelihood that\\nthe jury believed Owens’s testimony—in which case his actions after the punch presumably were\\nnot cruel because Heather was no longer alive to suffer from them. For the moment we set to\\none side what seems to us the patently fantastic nature of Owens’s testimony. What plagues\\nOwens’s theory from the start, rather, is that the jury did in fact convict him of second-degree\\nmurder. And that means the jury found that Owens killed Heather knowingly. See Tenn. Code\\nAnn. § 39-13-210(a)(1); State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Thus, for the jury to\\nhave believed Owens’s testimony and to have convicted him nonetheless of second-degree\\nmurder, the jury must have thought that, when Owens punched Heather (without knowing who\\nshe was, no less), he was reasonably certain that the punch would kill her. Nothing in the record\\nor in common sense supports that hypothesis. Moreover, the State’s medical examiner testified\\nthat Heather’s body bore no signs of blunt force trauma, and that her cause of death was\\nasphyxiation. Add in the other fantastic aspects of Owens’s testimony, and one doubts that any\\nsentient juror would have believed any of it. Suffice it to say that we are confident that the jury\\nrejected Owens’s account of the murder and accepted the State’s.\\n\\n But that leaves the question whether the jury, if asked, would have found that Owens\\nacted with exceptional cruelty. The duct-taping cannot support that finding, because it was “the\\nmeans of accomplishing the crime charged.” Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 258. But other circumstances\\nstrongly support a finding of exceptional cruelty. Owens did not simply suffocate Heather; he\\nleft her alone in a shed, struggling to breathe with her limbs bound behind her back and her\\nchildren nearby in the house. Those actions amount to “psychological abuse or torture,” which\\nsupports a finding of exceptional cruelty. See id. Moreover, Owens’s actions after duct-taping\\n\\f No. 17-5488 Owens v. Parris Page 8\\n\\n\\nHeather and leaving her to die—e.g., partying with his girlfriend and later burying Heather’s\\nbody in a shallow grave—reflect his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering,” which\\nlikewise supports the necessary finding. See State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 311 (Tenn. 2002).\\n\\n We have little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding. The\\nBlakely error was therefore harmless.\\n\\n * * * * *\\n The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to\\ndeny the petition.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3064,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4644294,"string":"4,644,294"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reynaldo PINEDA-DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-31"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-6118"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Moore, Cook, Readler\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0175p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-6118\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n REYNALDO PINEDA-DUARTE, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\\n No. 5:17-cr-00105-1—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and READLER, Circuit Judges\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Cathryn R. Armistead, ARMISTEAD LAW GROUP, PLLC, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Lauren Tanner Bradley, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Suppose an individual approached by a police\\nofficer for a suspected drug offense swings a shovel at the officer—but misses. Has the\\nindividual “used violence,” thereby triggering the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 2\\n\\n\\n While the district court did apply the § 2D1.1(b)(2) enhancement, the court did not\\nexpressly find that the defendant “used violence.” Rather, given the somewhat unique nature of\\nthe conduct at issue—swinging a shovel but missing the intended target—the district court\\ncharacterized the defendant as either having threatened to use violence, or, alternatively, having\\nattempted to use violence. But neither characterization fits the Guideline provision. Section\\n2D1.1(b)(2) applies where a defendant (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” The conduct here plainly is not directing the use\\nof violence. And the conduct was more than a threat—the defendant did not threaten to swing a\\nshovel, he in fact appears to have done so. The remaining clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2), by its terms,\\napplies only where the defendant “used violence.” It does not independently allow for an\\nenhancement where an act is characterized only as an attempt to use violence.\\n\\n Given the unusual facts of this case, the district court’s characterization of the events at\\nissue was understandable. Nonetheless, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND\\nthe case to the district court for resentencing after application of the correct legal standard\\nregarding the use of violence.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte is a citizen of Mexico. Previously, he had twice been detained\\nand removed by federal officers, once in California, and once in Texas, for entering the United\\nStates without authorization. He returned again, this time making his way to Clark County,\\nKentucky, a small farming community not far from Lexington.\\n\\n One Clark County farm in particular had captured the attention of the Kentucky State\\nPolice. The farm was suspected of containing over 2,000 marijuana plants, and the State Police\\naccordingly had the area under surveillance. In the course of servicing equipment used to\\nmonitor the area, the officers saw Pineda cultivating what appeared to be marijuana plants. The\\nofficers headed in Pineda’s direction, strategically surrounded him, announced their presence,\\nand ordered Pineda to “get on the ground.” But Pineda did not get on the ground, nor did he\\nsurrender. Instead, he apparently swung a shovel he was holding. He then dropped the shovel\\nand attempted to flee. After a struggle, the officers detained Pineda and took him into custody.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 3\\n\\n\\n Pineda was charged with manufacturing more than 1,000 marijuana plants, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was also charged with reentering the United States after having been\\ndeported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Pursuant to an agreement with the government,\\nPineda pleaded guilty to the manufacturing charge in exchange for having his illegal reentry\\ncharge dismissed.\\n\\n The probation office prepared a pre-sentence report. In the PSR, the probation\\noffice recommended that Pineda receive a two-step offense-level enhancement pursuant to\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. That provision requires that a sentence be enhanced\\nwhere a “defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of\\nviolence” in conjunction with a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). The probation office\\nconcluded that Pineda’s swinging a shovel at an officer was a “use[ of] violence, [. . .] a credible\\nthreat to use violence, or direct[ing] the use of violence,” thereby triggering the enhancement.\\n\\n Pineda disagreed with the probation office’s conclusion that his conduct triggered\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2). The parties took up that disagreement at Pineda’s subsequent sentencing hearing.\\nThere, the parties discussed the police report, which detailed Pineda’s conduct, and argued\\nwhether the enhancement was applicable. Defense counsel acknowledged that Pineda had a\\nshovel, that he was approached by officers, that the shovel moved in some respect towards an\\nofficer, and that Pineda then “almost immediately” dropped the shovel and ran. See Sentencing\\nTranscript at 2–6, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal\\ndocketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (defense counsel acknowledging that Pineda\\neither “swung the shovel” or “turned and swung the shovel as extension of his being.”).\\n\\n Defense counsel framed Pineda’s movement of the shovel as a reflexive action rather\\nthan an attempt to injure the officer—merely swinging a shovel rather than swinging a shovel at\\na police officer. Pineda also disputed whether the conduct at issue constituted “violence,” the\\ntouchstone in § 2D1.1(b)(2), because the shovel did not make contact with the officer, let alone\\ninjure him. In response to a question from the district court, Pineda’s counsel explained that had\\nPineda hit the officer with the shovel, Pineda “would be [in] a different position” as to\\nsentencing. But, counsel emphasized, Pineda did not hit the officer and, counsel accordingly\\ncharacterized the conduct as non-violent.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 4\\n\\n\\n At the close of argument, the district court posed and answered two questions. One, did\\nPineda swing the shovel at an officer? He did, said the court. See Sentencing Transcript at 8,\\nUnited States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No.\\n18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (“[H]e did attempt to hit [the officer with the shovel]”); see also\\nid. at 10 (“Had [Pineda] just dropped his shovel . . . , this would be a much different situation.\\nBut unfortunately that’s not what happened”). Two, did that conduct trigger the violence\\nenhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2)? Yes it did, said the court. Such conduct, the district court\\nexplained, “falls within the definition of . . . [§] 2D1.1(b)(2)” because swinging a shovel\\n“qualifies as a threat or attempted use of violence.” Id. at 8. The district court accordingly\\napplied the two-level enhancement. For the same reason, the district court rejected Pineda’s\\nargument that he qualified for the safety-valve sentence reduction set forth in § 5C1.2(a)(2).\\nThat was so because the violence-enhancement provision and the safety-valve reduction are\\nopposite sides of the same coin: The reduction applies only where “the defendant did not use\\nviolence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or\\ninduce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.” § 5C1.2(a)(2) (emphasis\\nadded).\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\n Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(2) instructs that a defendant’s base offense level be enhanced by\\ntwo levels where a defendant, in the course of committing a drug-related offense, engaged in one\\nof three types of “violence”: Where he (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” As there is no allegation that Pineda “directed\\nthe use of violence,” today’s case turns on the first two categories of conduct.\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding Guidelines calculations,\\nincluding whether to apply a sentencing enhancement. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417,\\n431 (6th Cir. 2011). With respect to “the findings of fact of the district court,” we will accept\\nthose findings “unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539–40\\n(6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 5\\n\\n\\n A. Pineda Did Not Make A Credible Threat To Use Violence.\\n\\n Whether the “credible threat” clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here is relatively\\nstraightforward, and so we address it first. Through its use of the phrase “made a credible threat\\nto use violence,” the Sentencing Commission sought to enhance the sentence of one who, with\\nthe intent to injure another, credibly communicates that intent, without acting on it—for\\nexample, when one credibly threatens to hit someone with a shovel, but has not yet swung the\\nshovel. Numerous circuit court decisions have interpreted this aspect of this Guideline\\nprovision, in each instance finding it applicable where the defendant credibly threatens a violent\\nact, but where that act has not yet come to fruition. See Appendix.\\n\\n No threat was made here. Indeed, there is no reading of the district court’s factual\\nfindings that could lead us to conclude that Pineda vocalized or otherwise expressed his intent to\\ninjure the officer, but then did not act upon that intent. To the contrary, there is little dispute that\\nPineda acted in some manner, swinging the shovel either reflexively or with the intent to injure\\nan officer. We can safely say, then, that Pineda’s conduct does not constitute a threat to use\\nviolence.\\n\\n B. The “Used Violence” Clause In § 2D1.1(b)(2) Means To Exert Physical Force\\n With The Intent To Injure Another Person.\\n\\n 1. Whether Pineda “used violence” is a more difficult question. Had Pineda’s decision\\nto swing a shovel harmed the officer, Pineda seemingly would concede his actions were violent\\nin nature. See Sentencing Transcript at 7, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105\\n(E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (Pineda noting he\\n“would be [in] a different position” had he injured the officer); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nFernandez, 636 F. App’x 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (defendant used violence as term is used in\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) when he shot a person); United States v. Walker, 578 F. App’x 812, 820 (11th Cir.\\n2014) (holding the same for a defendant who punched his co-conspirator). But what about a\\nswing and miss? The government says the act still constitutes the use of violence. Pineda says\\nhis conduct was at most an attempted use of violence, but not violence itself.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 6\\n\\n\\n Traditional canons of statutory construction guide our interpretation of the Guidelines.\\nSee United States v. Babcock, 753 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Jackson,\\n635 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2011)). “The language of the statute,” or, as here, the Guideline\\nprovision at issue, “is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point\\nif the plain meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 870 (6th\\nCir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In considering that plain language, we might ordinarily\\nstart by looking to the definition of “violence” assigned by the Sentencing Commission. But the\\nCommission chose not to include a definition of “violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\\n\\n Dictionaries can help fill this interpretive gap. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,\\n559 U.S. 133, 138–39 (2010) (citing to Webster’s New International Dictionary for a definition\\nof the word “physical” and Black’s Dictionary for a definition for the word “force”). As defined\\nin contemporary dictionaries, “violence” means “[t]he use of physical force, [usually]\\naccompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage; [especially] physical force unlawfully exercised\\nwith the intent to harm,” violence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), or “the use of\\nphysical force so as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy,” violence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,\\nhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence (last visited June 24, 2019).\\n\\n Case law ordinarily might help fill the gap as well. But although the enhancement for\\n“us[ing] violence” was added to § 2D1.1 eight years ago, in 2011, neither party has cited to a\\nsubsequent judicial interpretation of that aspect of the Guideline section. Compare U.S.\\nSentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1 (2011), with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\\n§ 2D1.1 (2010).\\n\\n While the precedential backdrop is not robust, the definition of “violence” does not seem\\nto be in dispute. As used in § 2D1.1(b)(2), “violence” encompasses acts where one uses physical\\nforce with the intent to injure, regardless whether an injury actually occurs. See violence,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent\\nto harm”). That interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of “violence” as reflected in\\ndictionaries of contemporary vintage. It is likewise consistent with the common-sense\\nunderstanding that the word “violent” typically describes an act and the accompanying intent, not\\nthe result.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 7\\n\\n\\n Defining “violence” in this manner also leads to a consistent reading of the entire\\nGuideline provision. In interpreting a Guideline term, we are informed by the company that term\\nkeeps in the Guideline section. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 222 (2007)\\n(“which of various possible meanings a word should be given must be determined in a manner\\nthat makes it ‘fit’ with the words with which it is closely associated.”). Reading “violence” to\\ninclude intentional acts of force designed to cause harm, regardless whether they in fact cause\\nharm, makes the term fit with its accompanying language. We know the phrase “made a credible\\nthreat to use violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies when a defendant credibly communicates the\\nintent to injure a person but has not yet acted upon that intent—for example, when one credibly\\nthreatens to hit someone with a shovel but has not yet swung that shovel. And we know the\\ncompanion phrase “used violence” applies when a defendant formed the intent to injure a person\\nand did injure that person—for example, when one hits another with a shovel. It would be\\nunusual to nonetheless hold that one who forms the intent to injure a person with a shovel and\\nthen exerts physical force to act upon that intent has not similarly engaged in violence simply\\nbecause the shovel misses the mark.\\n\\n On this point, we find support in United States v. Sikes, 705 F. App’x 257, 258 (5th Cir.\\n2017). There, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2) where\\nthe defendant, feuding with a co-conspirator over a drug crime, shot at (but missed) the\\nco-conspirator. While the court seemingly was not faced with any dispute over the shooter’s\\nintent, application of the enhancement there, where the act at issue did not cause harm, is\\nconsistent with our reasoning here.\\n\\n Pineda has not much to say in response. Primarily, he asks us to turn away from the\\nactual words of this Guideline provision. For instance, he emphasizes the common law,\\nsuggesting that Pineda’s conduct would not constitute violence under the common law\\nunderstanding of the terms “assault” or “battery,” which he says ordinarily require actual harm.\\nBut the Commission chose the term “violence,” not “assault” or “battery,” and we give that\\nchoice meaning.\\n\\n 2. The district court at times described Pineda’s conduct as an “attempt” to use violence.\\nThat characterization, while understandable, raises both legal and factual questions, given the\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 8\\n\\n\\nGuideline provision at issue. Simply put, while a “swing and a miss” could constitute the use of\\nviolence under § 2D1.1(b)(2), we do not know whether the district court meant to say that\\nPineda’s conduct, both in law and fact, was violent, or something short of it.\\n\\n First the law. As already explained, force and intent to injure are the quintessential\\nelements of violence. Could a failed attempt to harm ever satisfy that definition? Yes and no.\\nStart with the intent to injure aspect of violence. Where one acts forcefully with intent to harm,\\nbut the attempt to harm fails, that act would likely be deemed violent. But now think about the\\nforce aspect of a violent act. Where one attempts to act forcefully, but fails to engage in a\\nforceful act, the act is likely not violent. Take, for example, a defendant who reaches for a\\nshovel with the intent to swing it in a forceful manner, but is stopped by officers before he could\\ntake possession of the shovel. That scenario raises substantial doubt whether the defendant\\nexerted the necessary physical force to have engaged in violence. A failed attempt to create the\\nopportunity to cause injury, in other words, is distinct from a completed act that attempts (but\\nfails) to cause injury. The former would likely not satisfy the definition of violence, the latter\\nlikely would.\\n\\n To be sure, as Pineda notes, the Sentencing Commission omitted the phrase “attempted\\nviolence” from § 2D1.1(b)(2). That omission, he suggests, must mean that only acts that in fact\\ncause harm can be deemed violent. We do not think the Sentencing Commission, by relying\\nsolely on the phrase “used violence,” in § 2D1.1(b)(2), meant to exclude from that phrase acts\\nthat did not cause harm. Had the Sentencing Commission used the phrase “caused injury,” one\\ncould fairly argue that omitting the phrase “attempted to cause injury” was meaningful. But the\\nCommission chose a different phrase—“used violence”—one that encompasses an exertion of\\nphysical force with the intent to injure another, even if the exertion of force does not successfully\\ncause an injury. In that sense, adding the phrase “attempted violence” would do little more than\\ntempt tautology.\\n\\n And now the facts. Pineda, the district court observed, “attempted” to use violence. Did\\nthe district court mean to say that Pineda’s act was an attempted one because the shovel did not\\nhit anyone, but that the conduct was nonetheless violent, triggering the enhancement? Or did the\\ndistrict court mean that violence was lacking, differentiating between true violence on the one\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 9\\n\\n\\nhand and acts that lack force or intent on the other? We do not ask a district court to “recite any\\n‘magic words’” when passing a sentence. See United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310\\n(6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Tye, 47 F. App’x 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2002). But the\\ncourt must “articulate at least enough of its reasoning to permit an informed appellate review.”\\nMcClellan, 164 F.3d at 310. As explained next, we would benefit from additional consideration\\nby the district court before passing judgment on Pineda’s sentence.\\n\\n C. The District Court Must Make A Finding Regarding Pineda’s Intent Before\\n Applying The Enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\\n\\n In part due to the parties’ somewhat abbreviated presentations below, the district court\\ndid not make a finding regarding whether Pineda formed the requisite intent to deem him as\\nhaving “used violence.” § 2D1.1(b)(2). Accordingly, we think the best course is to remand the\\ncase for the district court to resolve that issue with the benefit of briefing, presentation of\\nevidence, and argument based upon the standards articulated here. See United States v. Oliver,\\n919 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2019) (after clarifying the legal standard, remanding for resentencing\\nto permit each party “to submit and identify additional evidence to assist the district court in\\ndetermining whether § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) applies to [defendant’s] conduct.”).\\n\\n In many respects, as Pineda’s counsel acknowledged below, the underlying facts are\\nlargely undisputed. All agree that Pineda moved the shovel he was holding toward an officer\\nwhen police announced their presence. Pineda, however, says he moved the shovel without\\npurpose, as opposed to swinging it with intent to injure an officer. He asserted that he was\\n“startled and confused” and “simply reacted in a surprised manner” when he first encountered\\nthe officers. And, Pineda notes, he speaks Spanish, not English, which, although the point was\\nnot developed in the record, may have contributed to his confusion. The police report, however,\\nindicated that Pineda swung the shovel “at” the officer.\\n\\n This dispute goes to the crucial determination of Pineda’s intent. And how that question\\nis resolved, in turn, is crucial to determining whether Pineda “used violence.” A person could,\\nfor example, swing a shovel reflexively in the direction of another with no intent to cause any\\ninjury. But one could just as easily swing that shovel with the intent to harm. To be sure, intent\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 10\\n\\n\\nmay be inferred from conduct. See United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 780 (6th Cir. 2017).\\nBut determining intent is a task better suited for the district court.\\n\\n On remand, the district court may (or may not) change its bottom-line. Either way, we\\nare confident the district court, after measuring the facts against the legal backdrop articulated\\nabove, will fairly articulate whether the sentencing enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND to the district\\ncourt for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 Appendix to United States v. Pineda-Duarte Page 11\\n\\n APPENDIX\\n\\nCircuit court cases addressing when a defendant has made a credible threat to use violence under\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) include United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2018) (credible\\nthreat of violence when defendant intimidated witness through third person, referenced driving car\\nover witness, predicted impending death of two witnesses); United States v. Lewis-Zubkin,\\n903 F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 2018) (credible threat of violence when defendant stated two people\\nshould be assaulted, paid co-conspirator to carry out assaults); United States v. Cantu, 765 F.\\nApp’x 111, 111 (5th Cir. 2019) (credible threat of violence when defendant told arresting officer\\nTexas Mexikan Mafia knew personal information, officer should cover his face when executing\\nwarrants, asked why officer was still in law enforcement when TMM knew him); United States v.\\nOverstreet, 693 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\\nbrandished a gun during drug transaction, accused person of attempting to rob him); United States\\nv. Torres, 694 F. App’x 937, 942 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\\nthreatened drug debtor, held him at gunpoint); United States v. Barrera, 697 F. App’x 373, 374\\n(5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant made death threat to informant); United\\nStates v. Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant,\\nwhile in possession of a gun, stated he would find and shoot person who stole cocaine base from\\ncustomer); United States v. Bonilla, 670 F. App’x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2016) (credible threat of\\nviolence when defendant pointed gun at customer, threatened to harm her if she did not pay drug\\ndebt); United States v. Medrano-Rodriguez, 606 F. App’x 759, 762 (5th Cir. 2015) (credible threat\\nof violence when defendant threatened fellow immigration detainee); United States v. White,\\n621 F. App’x 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2015) (credible threat of violence when defendant urged gang\\nmembers to use violence).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421547/\", \"author_raw\": \"CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MOORE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"READLER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644294/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reynaldo PINEDA-DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0175p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-6118\n v. │\n │\n │\n REYNALDO PINEDA-DUARTE, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\n No. 5:17-cr-00105-1—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\n\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and READLER, Circuit Judges\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Cathryn R. Armistead, ARMISTEAD LAW GROUP, PLLC, Nashville,\nTennessee, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Lauren Tanner Bradley, UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Suppose an individual approached by a police\nofficer for a suspected drug offense swings a shovel at the officer—but misses. Has the\nindividual “used violence,” thereby triggering the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G.\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 2\n\n\n While the district court did apply the § 2D1.1(b)(2) enhancement, the court did not\nexpressly find that the defendant “used violence.” Rather, given the somewhat unique nature of\nthe conduct at issue—swinging a shovel but missing the intended target—the district court\ncharacterized the defendant as either having threatened to use violence, or, alternatively, having\nattempted to use violence. But neither characterization fits the Guideline provision. Section\n2D1.1(b)(2) applies where a defendant (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” The conduct here plainly is not directing the use\nof violence. And the conduct was more than a threat—the defendant did not threaten to swing a\nshovel, he in fact appears to have done so. The remaining clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2), by its terms,\napplies only where the defendant “used violence.” It does not independently allow for an\nenhancement where an act is characterized only as an attempt to use violence.\n\n Given the unusual facts of this case, the district court’s characterization of the events at\nissue was understandable. Nonetheless, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND\nthe case to the district court for resentencing after application of the correct legal standard\nregarding the use of violence.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte is a citizen of Mexico. Previously, he had twice been detained\nand removed by federal officers, once in California, and once in Texas, for entering the United\nStates without authorization. He returned again, this time making his way to Clark County,\nKentucky, a small farming community not far from Lexington.\n\n One Clark County farm in particular had captured the attention of the Kentucky State\nPolice. The farm was suspected of containing over 2,000 marijuana plants, and the State Police\naccordingly had the area under surveillance. In the course of servicing equipment used to\nmonitor the area, the officers saw Pineda cultivating what appeared to be marijuana plants. The\nofficers headed in Pineda’s direction, strategically surrounded him, announced their presence,\nand ordered Pineda to “get on the ground.” But Pineda did not get on the ground, nor did he\nsurrender. Instead, he apparently swung a shovel he was holding. He then dropped the shovel\nand attempted to flee. After a struggle, the officers detained Pineda and took him into custody.\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 3\n\n\n Pineda was charged with manufacturing more than 1,000 marijuana plants, in violation of\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was also charged with reentering the United States after having been\ndeported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Pursuant to an agreement with the government,\nPineda pleaded guilty to the manufacturing charge in exchange for having his illegal reentry\ncharge dismissed.\n\n The probation office prepared a pre-sentence report. In the PSR, the probation\noffice recommended that Pineda receive a two-step offense-level enhancement pursuant to\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. That provision requires that a sentence be enhanced\nwhere a “defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of\nviolence” in conjunction with a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). The probation office\nconcluded that Pineda’s swinging a shovel at an officer was a “use[ of] violence, [. . .] a credible\nthreat to use violence, or direct[ing] the use of violence,” thereby triggering the enhancement.\n\n Pineda disagreed with the probation office’s conclusion that his conduct triggered\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2). The parties took up that disagreement at Pineda’s subsequent sentencing hearing.\nThere, the parties discussed the police report, which detailed Pineda’s conduct, and argued\nwhether the enhancement was applicable. Defense counsel acknowledged that Pineda had a\nshovel, that he was approached by officers, that the shovel moved in some respect towards an\nofficer, and that Pineda then “almost immediately” dropped the shovel and ran. See Sentencing\nTranscript at 2–6, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal\ndocketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (defense counsel acknowledging that Pineda\neither “swung the shovel” or “turned and swung the shovel as extension of his being.”).\n\n Defense counsel framed Pineda’s movement of the shovel as a reflexive action rather\nthan an attempt to injure the officer—merely swinging a shovel rather than swinging a shovel at\na police officer. Pineda also disputed whether the conduct at issue constituted “violence,” the\ntouchstone in § 2D1.1(b)(2), because the shovel did not make contact with the officer, let alone\ninjure him. In response to a question from the district court, Pineda’s counsel explained that had\nPineda hit the officer with the shovel, Pineda “would be [in] a different position” as to\nsentencing. But, counsel emphasized, Pineda did not hit the officer and, counsel accordingly\ncharacterized the conduct as non-violent.\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 4\n\n\n At the close of argument, the district court posed and answered two questions. One, did\nPineda swing the shovel at an officer? He did, said the court. See Sentencing Transcript at 8,\nUnited States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No.\n18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (“[H]e did attempt to hit [the officer with the shovel]”); see also\nid. at 10 (“Had [Pineda] just dropped his shovel . . . , this would be a much different situation.\nBut unfortunately that’s not what happened”). Two, did that conduct trigger the violence\nenhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2)? Yes it did, said the court. Such conduct, the district court\nexplained, “falls within the definition of . . . [§] 2D1.1(b)(2)” because swinging a shovel\n“qualifies as a threat or attempted use of violence.” Id. at 8. The district court accordingly\napplied the two-level enhancement. For the same reason, the district court rejected Pineda’s\nargument that he qualified for the safety-valve sentence reduction set forth in § 5C1.2(a)(2).\nThat was so because the violence-enhancement provision and the safety-valve reduction are\nopposite sides of the same coin: The reduction applies only where “the defendant did not use\nviolence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or\ninduce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.” § 5C1.2(a)(2) (emphasis\nadded).\n\n II. ANALYSIS\n\n Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(2) instructs that a defendant’s base offense level be enhanced by\ntwo levels where a defendant, in the course of committing a drug-related offense, engaged in one\nof three types of “violence”: Where he (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” As there is no allegation that Pineda “directed\nthe use of violence,” today’s case turns on the first two categories of conduct.\n\n We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding Guidelines calculations,\nincluding whether to apply a sentencing enhancement. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417,\n431 (6th Cir. 2011). With respect to “the findings of fact of the district court,” we will accept\nthose findings “unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539–40\n(6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 5\n\n\n A. Pineda Did Not Make A Credible Threat To Use Violence.\n\n Whether the “credible threat” clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here is relatively\nstraightforward, and so we address it first. Through its use of the phrase “made a credible threat\nto use violence,” the Sentencing Commission sought to enhance the sentence of one who, with\nthe intent to injure another, credibly communicates that intent, without acting on it—for\nexample, when one credibly threatens to hit someone with a shovel, but has not yet swung the\nshovel. Numerous circuit court decisions have interpreted this aspect of this Guideline\nprovision, in each instance finding it applicable where the defendant credibly threatens a violent\nact, but where that act has not yet come to fruition. See Appendix.\n\n No threat was made here. Indeed, there is no reading of the district court’s factual\nfindings that could lead us to conclude that Pineda vocalized or otherwise expressed his intent to\ninjure the officer, but then did not act upon that intent. To the contrary, there is little dispute that\nPineda acted in some manner, swinging the shovel either reflexively or with the intent to injure\nan officer. We can safely say, then, that Pineda’s conduct does not constitute a threat to use\nviolence.\n\n B. The “Used Violence” Clause In § 2D1.1(b)(2) Means To Exert Physical Force\n With The Intent To Injure Another Person.\n\n 1. Whether Pineda “used violence” is a more difficult question. Had Pineda’s decision\nto swing a shovel harmed the officer, Pineda seemingly would concede his actions were violent\nin nature. See Sentencing Transcript at 7, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105\n(E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (Pineda noting he\n“would be [in] a different position” had he injured the officer); see also, e.g., United States v.\nFernandez, 636 F. App’x 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (defendant used violence as term is used in\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) when he shot a person); United States v. Walker, 578 F. App’x 812, 820 (11th Cir.\n2014) (holding the same for a defendant who punched his co-conspirator). But what about a\nswing and miss? The government says the act still constitutes the use of violence. Pineda says\nhis conduct was at most an attempted use of violence, but not violence itself.\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 6\n\n\n Traditional canons of statutory construction guide our interpretation of the Guidelines.\nSee United States v. Babcock, 753 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Jackson,\n635 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2011)). “The language of the statute,” or, as here, the Guideline\nprovision at issue, “is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point\nif the plain meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 870 (6th\nCir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In considering that plain language, we might ordinarily\nstart by looking to the definition of “violence” assigned by the Sentencing Commission. But the\nCommission chose not to include a definition of “violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\n\n Dictionaries can help fill this interpretive gap. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,\n559 U.S. 133, 138–39 (2010) (citing to Webster’s New International Dictionary for a definition\nof the word “physical” and Black’s Dictionary for a definition for the word “force”). As defined\nin contemporary dictionaries, “violence” means “[t]he use of physical force, [usually]\naccompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage; [especially] physical force unlawfully exercised\nwith the intent to harm,” violence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), or “the use of\nphysical force so as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy,” violence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,\nhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence (last visited June 24, 2019).\n\n Case law ordinarily might help fill the gap as well. But although the enhancement for\n“us[ing] violence” was added to § 2D1.1 eight years ago, in 2011, neither party has cited to a\nsubsequent judicial interpretation of that aspect of the Guideline section. Compare U.S.\nSentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1 (2011), with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\n§ 2D1.1 (2010).\n\n While the precedential backdrop is not robust, the definition of “violence” does not seem\nto be in dispute. As used in § 2D1.1(b)(2), “violence” encompasses acts where one uses physical\nforce with the intent to injure, regardless whether an injury actually occurs. See violence,\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent\nto harm”). That interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of “violence” as reflected in\ndictionaries of contemporary vintage. It is likewise consistent with the common-sense\nunderstanding that the word “violent” typically describes an act and the accompanying intent, not\nthe result.\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 7\n\n\n Defining “violence” in this manner also leads to a consistent reading of the entire\nGuideline provision. In interpreting a Guideline term, we are informed by the company that term\nkeeps in the Guideline section. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 222 (2007)\n(“which of various possible meanings a word should be given must be determined in a manner\nthat makes it ‘fit’ with the words with which it is closely associated.”). Reading “violence” to\ninclude intentional acts of force designed to cause harm, regardless whether they in fact cause\nharm, makes the term fit with its accompanying language. We know the phrase “made a credible\nthreat to use violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies when a defendant credibly communicates the\nintent to injure a person but has not yet acted upon that intent—for example, when one credibly\nthreatens to hit someone with a shovel but has not yet swung that shovel. And we know the\ncompanion phrase “used violence” applies when a defendant formed the intent to injure a person\nand did injure that person—for example, when one hits another with a shovel. It would be\nunusual to nonetheless hold that one who forms the intent to injure a person with a shovel and\nthen exerts physical force to act upon that intent has not similarly engaged in violence simply\nbecause the shovel misses the mark.\n\n On this point, we find support in United States v. Sikes, 705 F. App’x 257, 258 (5th Cir.\n2017). There, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2) where\nthe defendant, feuding with a co-conspirator over a drug crime, shot at (but missed) the\nco-conspirator. While the court seemingly was not faced with any dispute over the shooter’s\nintent, application of the enhancement there, where the act at issue did not cause harm, is\nconsistent with our reasoning here.\n\n Pineda has not much to say in response. Primarily, he asks us to turn away from the\nactual words of this Guideline provision. For instance, he emphasizes the common law,\nsuggesting that Pineda’s conduct would not constitute violence under the common law\nunderstanding of the terms “assault” or “battery,” which he says ordinarily require actual harm.\nBut the Commission chose the term “violence,” not “assault” or “battery,” and we give that\nchoice meaning.\n\n 2. The district court at times described Pineda’s conduct as an “attempt” to use violence.\nThat characterization, while understandable, raises both legal and factual questions, given the\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 8\n\n\nGuideline provision at issue. Simply put, while a “swing and a miss” could constitute the use of\nviolence under § 2D1.1(b)(2), we do not know whether the district court meant to say that\nPineda’s conduct, both in law and fact, was violent, or something short of it.\n\n First the law. As already explained, force and intent to injure are the quintessential\nelements of violence. Could a failed attempt to harm ever satisfy that definition? Yes and no.\nStart with the intent to injure aspect of violence. Where one acts forcefully with intent to harm,\nbut the attempt to harm fails, that act would likely be deemed violent. But now think about the\nforce aspect of a violent act. Where one attempts to act forcefully, but fails to engage in a\nforceful act, the act is likely not violent. Take, for example, a defendant who reaches for a\nshovel with the intent to swing it in a forceful manner, but is stopped by officers before he could\ntake possession of the shovel. That scenario raises substantial doubt whether the defendant\nexerted the necessary physical force to have engaged in violence. A failed attempt to create the\nopportunity to cause injury, in other words, is distinct from a completed act that attempts (but\nfails) to cause injury. The former would likely not satisfy the definition of violence, the latter\nlikely would.\n\n To be sure, as Pineda notes, the Sentencing Commission omitted the phrase “attempted\nviolence” from § 2D1.1(b)(2). That omission, he suggests, must mean that only acts that in fact\ncause harm can be deemed violent. We do not think the Sentencing Commission, by relying\nsolely on the phrase “used violence,” in § 2D1.1(b)(2), meant to exclude from that phrase acts\nthat did not cause harm. Had the Sentencing Commission used the phrase “caused injury,” one\ncould fairly argue that omitting the phrase “attempted to cause injury” was meaningful. But the\nCommission chose a different phrase—“used violence”—one that encompasses an exertion of\nphysical force with the intent to injure another, even if the exertion of force does not successfully\ncause an injury. In that sense, adding the phrase “attempted violence” would do little more than\ntempt tautology.\n\n And now the facts. Pineda, the district court observed, “attempted” to use violence. Did\nthe district court mean to say that Pineda’s act was an attempted one because the shovel did not\nhit anyone, but that the conduct was nonetheless violent, triggering the enhancement? Or did the\ndistrict court mean that violence was lacking, differentiating between true violence on the one\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 9\n\n\nhand and acts that lack force or intent on the other? We do not ask a district court to “recite any\n‘magic words’” when passing a sentence. See United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310\n(6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Tye, 47 F. App’x 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2002). But the\ncourt must “articulate at least enough of its reasoning to permit an informed appellate review.”\nMcClellan, 164 F.3d at 310. As explained next, we would benefit from additional consideration\nby the district court before passing judgment on Pineda’s sentence.\n\n C. The District Court Must Make A Finding Regarding Pineda’s Intent Before\n Applying The Enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\n\n In part due to the parties’ somewhat abbreviated presentations below, the district court\ndid not make a finding regarding whether Pineda formed the requisite intent to deem him as\nhaving “used violence.” § 2D1.1(b)(2). Accordingly, we think the best course is to remand the\ncase for the district court to resolve that issue with the benefit of briefing, presentation of\nevidence, and argument based upon the standards articulated here. See United States v. Oliver,\n919 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2019) (after clarifying the legal standard, remanding for resentencing\nto permit each party “to submit and identify additional evidence to assist the district court in\ndetermining whether § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) applies to [defendant’s] conduct.”).\n\n In many respects, as Pineda’s counsel acknowledged below, the underlying facts are\nlargely undisputed. All agree that Pineda moved the shovel he was holding toward an officer\nwhen police announced their presence. Pineda, however, says he moved the shovel without\npurpose, as opposed to swinging it with intent to injure an officer. He asserted that he was\n“startled and confused” and “simply reacted in a surprised manner” when he first encountered\nthe officers. And, Pineda notes, he speaks Spanish, not English, which, although the point was\nnot developed in the record, may have contributed to his confusion. The police report, however,\nindicated that Pineda swung the shovel “at” the officer.\n\n This dispute goes to the crucial determination of Pineda’s intent. And how that question\nis resolved, in turn, is crucial to determining whether Pineda “used violence.” A person could,\nfor example, swing a shovel reflexively in the direction of another with no intent to cause any\ninjury. But one could just as easily swing that shovel with the intent to harm. To be sure, intent\n\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 10\n\n\nmay be inferred from conduct. See United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 780 (6th Cir. 2017).\nBut determining intent is a task better suited for the district court.\n\n On remand, the district court may (or may not) change its bottom-line. Either way, we\nare confident the district court, after measuring the facts against the legal backdrop articulated\nabove, will fairly articulate whether the sentencing enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For these reasons, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND to the district\ncourt for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\f No. 18-6118 Appendix to United States v. Pineda-Duarte Page 11\n\n APPENDIX\n\nCircuit court cases addressing when a defendant has made a credible threat to use violence under\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) include United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2018) (credible\nthreat of violence when defendant intimidated witness through third person, referenced driving car\nover witness, predicted impending death of two witnesses); United States v. Lewis-Zubkin,\n903 F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 2018) (credible threat of violence when defendant stated two people\nshould be assaulted, paid co-conspirator to carry out assaults); United States v. Cantu, 765 F.\nApp’x 111, 111 (5th Cir. 2019) (credible threat of violence when defendant told arresting officer\nTexas Mexikan Mafia knew personal information, officer should cover his face when executing\nwarrants, asked why officer was still in law enforcement when TMM knew him); United States v.\nOverstreet, 693 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\nbrandished a gun during drug transaction, accused person of attempting to rob him); United States\nv. Torres, 694 F. App’x 937, 942 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\nthreatened drug debtor, held him at gunpoint); United States v. Barrera, 697 F. App’x 373, 374\n(5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant made death threat to informant); United\nStates v. Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant,\nwhile in possession of a gun, stated he would find and shoot person who stole cocaine base from\ncustomer); United States v. Bonilla, 670 F. App’x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2016) (credible threat of\nviolence when defendant pointed gun at customer, threatened to harm her if she did not pay drug\ndebt); United States v. Medrano-Rodriguez, 606 F. App’x 759, 762 (5th Cir. 2015) (credible threat\nof violence when defendant threatened fellow immigration detainee); United States v. White,\n621 F. App’x 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2015) (credible threat of violence when defendant urged gang\nmembers to use violence).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reynaldo PINEDA-DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0175p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-6118\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n REYNALDO PINEDA-DUARTE, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\\n No. 5:17-cr-00105-1—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: MOORE, COOK, and READLER, Circuit Judges\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Cathryn R. Armistead, ARMISTEAD LAW GROUP, PLLC, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Lauren Tanner Bradley, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Suppose an individual approached by a police\\nofficer for a suspected drug offense swings a shovel at the officer—but misses. Has the\\nindividual “used violence,” thereby triggering the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 2\\n\\n\\n While the district court did apply the § 2D1.1(b)(2) enhancement, the court did not\\nexpressly find that the defendant “used violence.” Rather, given the somewhat unique nature of\\nthe conduct at issue—swinging a shovel but missing the intended target—the district court\\ncharacterized the defendant as either having threatened to use violence, or, alternatively, having\\nattempted to use violence. But neither characterization fits the Guideline provision. Section\\n2D1.1(b)(2) applies where a defendant (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” The conduct here plainly is not directing the use\\nof violence. And the conduct was more than a threat—the defendant did not threaten to swing a\\nshovel, he in fact appears to have done so. The remaining clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2), by its terms,\\napplies only where the defendant “used violence.” It does not independently allow for an\\nenhancement where an act is characterized only as an attempt to use violence.\\n\\n Given the unusual facts of this case, the district court’s characterization of the events at\\nissue was understandable. Nonetheless, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND\\nthe case to the district court for resentencing after application of the correct legal standard\\nregarding the use of violence.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte is a citizen of Mexico. Previously, he had twice been detained\\nand removed by federal officers, once in California, and once in Texas, for entering the United\\nStates without authorization. He returned again, this time making his way to Clark County,\\nKentucky, a small farming community not far from Lexington.\\n\\n One Clark County farm in particular had captured the attention of the Kentucky State\\nPolice. The farm was suspected of containing over 2,000 marijuana plants, and the State Police\\naccordingly had the area under surveillance. In the course of servicing equipment used to\\nmonitor the area, the officers saw Pineda cultivating what appeared to be marijuana plants. The\\nofficers headed in Pineda’s direction, strategically surrounded him, announced their presence,\\nand ordered Pineda to “get on the ground.” But Pineda did not get on the ground, nor did he\\nsurrender. Instead, he apparently swung a shovel he was holding. He then dropped the shovel\\nand attempted to flee. After a struggle, the officers detained Pineda and took him into custody.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 3\\n\\n\\n Pineda was charged with manufacturing more than 1,000 marijuana plants, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was also charged with reentering the United States after having been\\ndeported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Pursuant to an agreement with the government,\\nPineda pleaded guilty to the manufacturing charge in exchange for having his illegal reentry\\ncharge dismissed.\\n\\n The probation office prepared a pre-sentence report. In the PSR, the probation\\noffice recommended that Pineda receive a two-step offense-level enhancement pursuant to\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. That provision requires that a sentence be enhanced\\nwhere a “defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of\\nviolence” in conjunction with a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). The probation office\\nconcluded that Pineda’s swinging a shovel at an officer was a “use[ of] violence, [. . .] a credible\\nthreat to use violence, or direct[ing] the use of violence,” thereby triggering the enhancement.\\n\\n Pineda disagreed with the probation office’s conclusion that his conduct triggered\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2). The parties took up that disagreement at Pineda’s subsequent sentencing hearing.\\nThere, the parties discussed the police report, which detailed Pineda’s conduct, and argued\\nwhether the enhancement was applicable. Defense counsel acknowledged that Pineda had a\\nshovel, that he was approached by officers, that the shovel moved in some respect towards an\\nofficer, and that Pineda then “almost immediately” dropped the shovel and ran. See Sentencing\\nTranscript at 2–6, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal\\ndocketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (defense counsel acknowledging that Pineda\\neither “swung the shovel” or “turned and swung the shovel as extension of his being.”).\\n\\n Defense counsel framed Pineda’s movement of the shovel as a reflexive action rather\\nthan an attempt to injure the officer—merely swinging a shovel rather than swinging a shovel at\\na police officer. Pineda also disputed whether the conduct at issue constituted “violence,” the\\ntouchstone in § 2D1.1(b)(2), because the shovel did not make contact with the officer, let alone\\ninjure him. In response to a question from the district court, Pineda’s counsel explained that had\\nPineda hit the officer with the shovel, Pineda “would be [in] a different position” as to\\nsentencing. But, counsel emphasized, Pineda did not hit the officer and, counsel accordingly\\ncharacterized the conduct as non-violent.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 4\\n\\n\\n At the close of argument, the district court posed and answered two questions. One, did\\nPineda swing the shovel at an officer? He did, said the court. See Sentencing Transcript at 8,\\nUnited States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105 (E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No.\\n18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (“[H]e did attempt to hit [the officer with the shovel]”); see also\\nid. at 10 (“Had [Pineda] just dropped his shovel . . . , this would be a much different situation.\\nBut unfortunately that’s not what happened”). Two, did that conduct trigger the violence\\nenhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2)? Yes it did, said the court. Such conduct, the district court\\nexplained, “falls within the definition of . . . [§] 2D1.1(b)(2)” because swinging a shovel\\n“qualifies as a threat or attempted use of violence.” Id. at 8. The district court accordingly\\napplied the two-level enhancement. For the same reason, the district court rejected Pineda’s\\nargument that he qualified for the safety-valve sentence reduction set forth in § 5C1.2(a)(2).\\nThat was so because the violence-enhancement provision and the safety-valve reduction are\\nopposite sides of the same coin: The reduction applies only where “the defendant did not use\\nviolence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or\\ninduce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.” § 5C1.2(a)(2) (emphasis\\nadded).\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\n Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(2) instructs that a defendant’s base offense level be enhanced by\\ntwo levels where a defendant, in the course of committing a drug-related offense, engaged in one\\nof three types of “violence”: Where he (1) “used violence,” (2) “made a credible threat to use\\nviolence,” or (3) “directed the use of violence.” As there is no allegation that Pineda “directed\\nthe use of violence,” today’s case turns on the first two categories of conduct.\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding Guidelines calculations,\\nincluding whether to apply a sentencing enhancement. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417,\\n431 (6th Cir. 2011). With respect to “the findings of fact of the district court,” we will accept\\nthose findings “unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539–40\\n(6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 5\\n\\n\\n A. Pineda Did Not Make A Credible Threat To Use Violence.\\n\\n Whether the “credible threat” clause of § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here is relatively\\nstraightforward, and so we address it first. Through its use of the phrase “made a credible threat\\nto use violence,” the Sentencing Commission sought to enhance the sentence of one who, with\\nthe intent to injure another, credibly communicates that intent, without acting on it—for\\nexample, when one credibly threatens to hit someone with a shovel, but has not yet swung the\\nshovel. Numerous circuit court decisions have interpreted this aspect of this Guideline\\nprovision, in each instance finding it applicable where the defendant credibly threatens a violent\\nact, but where that act has not yet come to fruition. See Appendix.\\n\\n No threat was made here. Indeed, there is no reading of the district court’s factual\\nfindings that could lead us to conclude that Pineda vocalized or otherwise expressed his intent to\\ninjure the officer, but then did not act upon that intent. To the contrary, there is little dispute that\\nPineda acted in some manner, swinging the shovel either reflexively or with the intent to injure\\nan officer. We can safely say, then, that Pineda’s conduct does not constitute a threat to use\\nviolence.\\n\\n B. The “Used Violence” Clause In § 2D1.1(b)(2) Means To Exert Physical Force\\n With The Intent To Injure Another Person.\\n\\n 1. Whether Pineda “used violence” is a more difficult question. Had Pineda’s decision\\nto swing a shovel harmed the officer, Pineda seemingly would concede his actions were violent\\nin nature. See Sentencing Transcript at 7, United States v. Pineda-Duarte, No. 5:17-cr-00105\\n(E.D. Ky. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-6118 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (Pineda noting he\\n“would be [in] a different position” had he injured the officer); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nFernandez, 636 F. App’x 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (defendant used violence as term is used in\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) when he shot a person); United States v. Walker, 578 F. App’x 812, 820 (11th Cir.\\n2014) (holding the same for a defendant who punched his co-conspirator). But what about a\\nswing and miss? The government says the act still constitutes the use of violence. Pineda says\\nhis conduct was at most an attempted use of violence, but not violence itself.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 6\\n\\n\\n Traditional canons of statutory construction guide our interpretation of the Guidelines.\\nSee United States v. Babcock, 753 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Jackson,\\n635 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2011)). “The language of the statute,” or, as here, the Guideline\\nprovision at issue, “is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point\\nif the plain meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 870 (6th\\nCir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In considering that plain language, we might ordinarily\\nstart by looking to the definition of “violence” assigned by the Sentencing Commission. But the\\nCommission chose not to include a definition of “violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\\n\\n Dictionaries can help fill this interpretive gap. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,\\n559 U.S. 133, 138–39 (2010) (citing to Webster’s New International Dictionary for a definition\\nof the word “physical” and Black’s Dictionary for a definition for the word “force”). As defined\\nin contemporary dictionaries, “violence” means “[t]he use of physical force, [usually]\\naccompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage; [especially] physical force unlawfully exercised\\nwith the intent to harm,” violence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), or “the use of\\nphysical force so as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy,” violence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,\\nhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence (last visited June 24, 2019).\\n\\n Case law ordinarily might help fill the gap as well. But although the enhancement for\\n“us[ing] violence” was added to § 2D1.1 eight years ago, in 2011, neither party has cited to a\\nsubsequent judicial interpretation of that aspect of the Guideline section. Compare U.S.\\nSentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1 (2011), with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\\n§ 2D1.1 (2010).\\n\\n While the precedential backdrop is not robust, the definition of “violence” does not seem\\nto be in dispute. As used in § 2D1.1(b)(2), “violence” encompasses acts where one uses physical\\nforce with the intent to injure, regardless whether an injury actually occurs. See violence,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent\\nto harm”). That interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of “violence” as reflected in\\ndictionaries of contemporary vintage. It is likewise consistent with the common-sense\\nunderstanding that the word “violent” typically describes an act and the accompanying intent, not\\nthe result.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 7\\n\\n\\n Defining “violence” in this manner also leads to a consistent reading of the entire\\nGuideline provision. In interpreting a Guideline term, we are informed by the company that term\\nkeeps in the Guideline section. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 222 (2007)\\n(“which of various possible meanings a word should be given must be determined in a manner\\nthat makes it ‘fit’ with the words with which it is closely associated.”). Reading “violence” to\\ninclude intentional acts of force designed to cause harm, regardless whether they in fact cause\\nharm, makes the term fit with its accompanying language. We know the phrase “made a credible\\nthreat to use violence” in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies when a defendant credibly communicates the\\nintent to injure a person but has not yet acted upon that intent—for example, when one credibly\\nthreatens to hit someone with a shovel but has not yet swung that shovel. And we know the\\ncompanion phrase “used violence” applies when a defendant formed the intent to injure a person\\nand did injure that person—for example, when one hits another with a shovel. It would be\\nunusual to nonetheless hold that one who forms the intent to injure a person with a shovel and\\nthen exerts physical force to act upon that intent has not similarly engaged in violence simply\\nbecause the shovel misses the mark.\\n\\n On this point, we find support in United States v. Sikes, 705 F. App’x 257, 258 (5th Cir.\\n2017). There, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2) where\\nthe defendant, feuding with a co-conspirator over a drug crime, shot at (but missed) the\\nco-conspirator. While the court seemingly was not faced with any dispute over the shooter’s\\nintent, application of the enhancement there, where the act at issue did not cause harm, is\\nconsistent with our reasoning here.\\n\\n Pineda has not much to say in response. Primarily, he asks us to turn away from the\\nactual words of this Guideline provision. For instance, he emphasizes the common law,\\nsuggesting that Pineda’s conduct would not constitute violence under the common law\\nunderstanding of the terms “assault” or “battery,” which he says ordinarily require actual harm.\\nBut the Commission chose the term “violence,” not “assault” or “battery,” and we give that\\nchoice meaning.\\n\\n 2. The district court at times described Pineda’s conduct as an “attempt” to use violence.\\nThat characterization, while understandable, raises both legal and factual questions, given the\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 8\\n\\n\\nGuideline provision at issue. Simply put, while a “swing and a miss” could constitute the use of\\nviolence under § 2D1.1(b)(2), we do not know whether the district court meant to say that\\nPineda’s conduct, both in law and fact, was violent, or something short of it.\\n\\n First the law. As already explained, force and intent to injure are the quintessential\\nelements of violence. Could a failed attempt to harm ever satisfy that definition? Yes and no.\\nStart with the intent to injure aspect of violence. Where one acts forcefully with intent to harm,\\nbut the attempt to harm fails, that act would likely be deemed violent. But now think about the\\nforce aspect of a violent act. Where one attempts to act forcefully, but fails to engage in a\\nforceful act, the act is likely not violent. Take, for example, a defendant who reaches for a\\nshovel with the intent to swing it in a forceful manner, but is stopped by officers before he could\\ntake possession of the shovel. That scenario raises substantial doubt whether the defendant\\nexerted the necessary physical force to have engaged in violence. A failed attempt to create the\\nopportunity to cause injury, in other words, is distinct from a completed act that attempts (but\\nfails) to cause injury. The former would likely not satisfy the definition of violence, the latter\\nlikely would.\\n\\n To be sure, as Pineda notes, the Sentencing Commission omitted the phrase “attempted\\nviolence” from § 2D1.1(b)(2). That omission, he suggests, must mean that only acts that in fact\\ncause harm can be deemed violent. We do not think the Sentencing Commission, by relying\\nsolely on the phrase “used violence,” in § 2D1.1(b)(2), meant to exclude from that phrase acts\\nthat did not cause harm. Had the Sentencing Commission used the phrase “caused injury,” one\\ncould fairly argue that omitting the phrase “attempted to cause injury” was meaningful. But the\\nCommission chose a different phrase—“used violence”—one that encompasses an exertion of\\nphysical force with the intent to injure another, even if the exertion of force does not successfully\\ncause an injury. In that sense, adding the phrase “attempted violence” would do little more than\\ntempt tautology.\\n\\n And now the facts. Pineda, the district court observed, “attempted” to use violence. Did\\nthe district court mean to say that Pineda’s act was an attempted one because the shovel did not\\nhit anyone, but that the conduct was nonetheless violent, triggering the enhancement? Or did the\\ndistrict court mean that violence was lacking, differentiating between true violence on the one\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 9\\n\\n\\nhand and acts that lack force or intent on the other? We do not ask a district court to “recite any\\n‘magic words’” when passing a sentence. See United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310\\n(6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Tye, 47 F. App’x 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2002). But the\\ncourt must “articulate at least enough of its reasoning to permit an informed appellate review.”\\nMcClellan, 164 F.3d at 310. As explained next, we would benefit from additional consideration\\nby the district court before passing judgment on Pineda’s sentence.\\n\\n C. The District Court Must Make A Finding Regarding Pineda’s Intent Before\\n Applying The Enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2).\\n\\n In part due to the parties’ somewhat abbreviated presentations below, the district court\\ndid not make a finding regarding whether Pineda formed the requisite intent to deem him as\\nhaving “used violence.” § 2D1.1(b)(2). Accordingly, we think the best course is to remand the\\ncase for the district court to resolve that issue with the benefit of briefing, presentation of\\nevidence, and argument based upon the standards articulated here. See United States v. Oliver,\\n919 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2019) (after clarifying the legal standard, remanding for resentencing\\nto permit each party “to submit and identify additional evidence to assist the district court in\\ndetermining whether § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) applies to [defendant’s] conduct.”).\\n\\n In many respects, as Pineda’s counsel acknowledged below, the underlying facts are\\nlargely undisputed. All agree that Pineda moved the shovel he was holding toward an officer\\nwhen police announced their presence. Pineda, however, says he moved the shovel without\\npurpose, as opposed to swinging it with intent to injure an officer. He asserted that he was\\n“startled and confused” and “simply reacted in a surprised manner” when he first encountered\\nthe officers. And, Pineda notes, he speaks Spanish, not English, which, although the point was\\nnot developed in the record, may have contributed to his confusion. The police report, however,\\nindicated that Pineda swung the shovel “at” the officer.\\n\\n This dispute goes to the crucial determination of Pineda’s intent. And how that question\\nis resolved, in turn, is crucial to determining whether Pineda “used violence.” A person could,\\nfor example, swing a shovel reflexively in the direction of another with no intent to cause any\\ninjury. But one could just as easily swing that shovel with the intent to harm. To be sure, intent\\n\\f No. 18-6118 United States v. Pineda Duarte Page 10\\n\\n\\nmay be inferred from conduct. See United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 780 (6th Cir. 2017).\\nBut determining intent is a task better suited for the district court.\\n\\n On remand, the district court may (or may not) change its bottom-line. Either way, we\\nare confident the district court, after measuring the facts against the legal backdrop articulated\\nabove, will fairly articulate whether the sentencing enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2) applies here.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we VACATE the defendant’s sentence and REMAND to the district\\ncourt for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\f No. 18-6118 Appendix to United States v. Pineda-Duarte Page 11\\n\\n APPENDIX\\n\\nCircuit court cases addressing when a defendant has made a credible threat to use violence under\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(2) include United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2018) (credible\\nthreat of violence when defendant intimidated witness through third person, referenced driving car\\nover witness, predicted impending death of two witnesses); United States v. Lewis-Zubkin,\\n903 F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 2018) (credible threat of violence when defendant stated two people\\nshould be assaulted, paid co-conspirator to carry out assaults); United States v. Cantu, 765 F.\\nApp’x 111, 111 (5th Cir. 2019) (credible threat of violence when defendant told arresting officer\\nTexas Mexikan Mafia knew personal information, officer should cover his face when executing\\nwarrants, asked why officer was still in law enforcement when TMM knew him); United States v.\\nOverstreet, 693 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\\nbrandished a gun during drug transaction, accused person of attempting to rob him); United States\\nv. Torres, 694 F. App’x 937, 942 (5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant\\nthreatened drug debtor, held him at gunpoint); United States v. Barrera, 697 F. App’x 373, 374\\n(5th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant made death threat to informant); United\\nStates v. Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant,\\nwhile in possession of a gun, stated he would find and shoot person who stole cocaine base from\\ncustomer); United States v. Bonilla, 670 F. App’x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2016) (credible threat of\\nviolence when defendant pointed gun at customer, threatened to harm her if she did not pay drug\\ndebt); United States v. Medrano-Rodriguez, 606 F. App’x 759, 762 (5th Cir. 2015) (credible threat\\nof violence when defendant threatened fellow immigration detainee); United States v. White,\\n621 F. App’x 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2015) (credible threat of violence when defendant urged gang\\nmembers to use violence).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3065,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4644295,"string":"4,644,295"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kitroy Brian BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Kitroy Buchanan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-31"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3667"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Sutton, Bush, Larsen\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0173p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3667\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n KITROY BRIAN BUCHANAN, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:18-cr-00008-1—James S. Gwin, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: June 25, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: SUTTON, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: David Graham, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor,\\nMichigan, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,\\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David Graham, Melissa M. Salinas,\\nUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nMatthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After a jury trial, Kitroy Brian Buchanan was convicted\\nof one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and one count of conspiracy to\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 2\\n\\n\\ndistribute marijuana. The district court sentenced him to 50 months’ imprisonment followed by\\nthree years of supervised release. Buchanan now appeals his conviction and sentence, and he\\nmakes four arguments. We find merit in one of his arguments—a challenge to a two-level\\nincrease in his offense level for committing a crime “as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\\nengaged in as a livelihood” under USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) and 4B1.3. Therefore, we\\nAFFIRM the district court’s judgment of conviction but VACATE Buchanan’s sentence and\\nREMAND for the district court to reconsider, under the proper legal standard, whether the\\nenhancement applies.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\nA. Factual Background\\n\\n In 2015, Buchanan, who was already involved in the marijuana trade, met a United States\\npostal worker named Dominique Hobbs in South Euclid, Ohio. Buchanan asked Hobbs if he\\nwould like to “do some business,” which Hobbs understood to mean that Buchanan wanted\\nHobbs to help him deliver illegal drugs. R. 73, PageID 544. Hobbs said he was interested, and\\nthe two men exchanged phone numbers. However, Hobbs was not able to help Buchanan\\nimmediately; he explained to Buchanan that he did not have a consistent postal route but was a\\n“U-person,” or utility carrier, who substituted for those with regular routes when they had to\\nmiss work. Id. at PageID 547–48.\\n\\n In November 2017, Hobbs let Buchanan know that he had obtained a regular postal route,\\nand the two began working together. Buchanan promised to pay Hobbs $200 in exchange for\\neach package Hobbs would deliver. Hobbs also supplied Buchanan with lists of addresses on\\nHobbs’s postal route so Buchanan would know where Hobbs, in conjunction with his mail\\ndeliveries, could deliver packages of marijuana.\\n\\n One day late in November 2017, Buchanan informed Hobbs that a package of marijuana\\nwas due to arrive in South Euclid soon, but Buchanan was not sure of the exact arrival date.\\nHobbs told Buchanan that he would not be able to deliver the package if it happened to arrive in\\ntown that coming Monday, because Hobbs was not working that day. As it turned out, however,\\nthe package arrived at the South Euclid post office that Monday. Buchanan had been tracking\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 3\\n\\n\\nthe package through the United States Postal Service’s website and alerted Hobbs. Although\\nHobbs reminded Buchanan that he was off duty, he agreed to help Buchanan try to lay hands on\\nthe package.\\n\\n Buchanan and Hobbs both drove to the post office. Hobbs asked his supervisor, who was\\ncovering Hobbs’s route that day, whether he had Buchanan’s package; the supervisor had not\\nseen it. Hobbs told Buchanan.\\n\\n Buchanan became enraged and began shouting at Hobbs, accusing him of stealing the\\npackage, which Hobbs denied. After Hobbs and Buchanan unsuccessfully made another attempt\\nto find the package at the post office, Buchanan cornered Hobbs, searched his car for the\\npackage, and then ordered him to chauffeur Buchanan around other postal carriers’ routes to ask\\nthe other carriers if they had the package. While he and Hobbs were in the car, Buchanan made\\n“[a]t least ten” phone calls to someone whom he told that Hobbs “had the package” and was\\n“hiding it from” Buchanan. Id. at PageID 585, 589.\\n\\n After a long and fruitless search along other carriers’ postal routes, Hobbs and Buchanan\\nhad not located the package. Buchanan let Hobbs go home, but he continued to call and send\\ntext messages to Hobbs, reiterating that he believed Hobbs had stolen the package and\\nsuggesting that for Hobbs’s own safety, he had better return the package to Buchanan.\\n\\n Fearing for his safety, Hobbs went to the police and made a complaint of kidnapping\\nagainst Buchanan, telling the police select details of his interactions with Buchanan without\\nadmitting that he had been complicit in any drug activity. Because Hobbs was a postal worker,\\nthe police communicated Hobbs’s accusation to the Postal Inspection Service, a law-enforcement\\narm of the United States Postal Service. Hobbs reiterated his story to the postal inspectors.\\nHaving learned from Hobbs some details about the kind of car Buchanan drove, law-enforcement\\nofficers then used database information to identify suspect vehicles; this investigation eventually\\nled them to Buchanan’s car and home. On December 8, 2017, officers conducted a drug sniff of\\nBuchanan’s car, and the dog alerted to the smell of narcotics from the car.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 4\\n\\n\\n Buchanan was arrested on a charge of kidnapping. Law-enforcement officers also\\nobtained and executed search warrants for Buchanan’s home, his car, and his cellphone.\\nThe search of Buchanan’s home revealed over 150 grams of marijuana, a vacuum sealer, and\\nplastic food-storage bags, among other evidence of marijuana trafficking. The search of the\\ncellphone revealed that Buchanan was tracking another package. Following the tracking\\ninformation from Buchanan’s cellphone, postal inspectors determined that the package was\\nheaded to an address on Hobbs’s route; the inspectors intercepted the package, obtained a search\\nwarrant, and opened the package to find 4.8 kilograms of marijuana. In addition, the inspectors\\ndetermined that the return address on the package—which purported to have come from\\nCalifornia—was fake.\\n\\n Because Hobbs’s complaint had led to Buchanan’s arrest, law-enforcement officers\\nquestioned Hobbs further and learned that Hobbs had concocted a false kidnapping complaint to\\nget Buchanan off his back without at the same time implicating himself in a marijuana-\\ndistribution scheme. After admitting that he had made up the kidnapping story, Hobbs also\\nadmitted to his agreement and cooperation with Buchanan. Hobbs eventually pled guilty to\\ncharges of lying to law enforcement and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to testify\\nagainst Buchanan.\\n\\nB. The Trial\\n\\n On January 4, 2018, Buchanan was indicted for one count of conspiracy to distribute a\\ncontrolled substance, one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,\\nand three counts of communicating threats in interstate commerce. Because Hobbs had admitted\\nthat Buchanan did not really kidnap him, the government dropped the kidnapping charge.\\n\\n At trial, Hobbs testified about his association with Buchanan, leading up to the day that\\nthe package went missing. Among other evidence, the government also presented testimony by\\ntwo postal inspectors, Michael Adams and Lauren Cajuste. Adams had participated in the search\\nof Buchanan’s home, and Cajuste had investigated the information found on Buchanan’s\\ncellphone.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 5\\n\\n\\n Adams testified that he had extensive experience and training in narcotics investigations\\nand had served eight years as a narcotics agent before becoming a postal inspector. He testified\\nthat, based on his experience, the amount of marijuana found in Buchanan’s home was a\\n“dealer/supplier amount” and that some of the food-packaging supplies found there were of the\\nsort commonly used by drug traffickers. Adams also testified that drug traffickers often use fake\\nreturn addresses when sending packages through the mail and that they often use express or\\npriority mail to reduce the risk that law enforcement will seize and search packages. Hobbs had\\ntestified, and the government’s exhibits at trial showed, that Buchanan had used priority mail to\\nship packages. Adams also testified that some of the messages Buchanan had sent to alleged co-\\nconspirators contained drug-traffickers’ jargon. Among other testimony, Adams also testified\\nthat ten pounds of marijuana—an amount comparable to that found in the intercepted package—\\nwas worth roughly $30,000 to $50,000 on the “street” in Cleveland. Id. at PageID 482.\\n\\n Cajuste stated that she had worked on financial investigations for the first six years of her\\ntime as a postal inspector before broadening her focus to include workplace violence as well as\\nfinancial investigations. She then testified at length about what the analysis of Buchanan’s\\ncellphone and financial records had revealed. Buchanan had communicated extensively with\\nsomeone in California about the delivery of packages, and he had sent the delivery addresses he\\nreceived from Hobbs to the California phone number. Buchanan’s contact in California would\\nsend Buchanan tracking information for each package, and Buchanan would track each package\\non the Postal Service’s website until it was delivered. According to Buchanan’s financial\\nrecords, Buchanan sent payments to accounts given to him by the California contact. In addition\\nto Cajuste’s testimony on these matters, the government presented numerous exhibits showing\\nBuchanan’s phone and tracking activity.\\n\\n Testimony and exhibits also established that, besides the California contact, Buchanan\\nregularly communicated with an individual located in or near Erie, Pennsylvania about\\ndelivering packages. Buchanan’s text messages with the Erie contact demonstrated that\\nBuchanan and the contact appeared to take turns driving to meet each other, and one would text\\nthe other when he was twenty minutes away from the meeting place. Buchanan’s financial\\nrecords showed that he frequently deposited money into his bank account after Erie trips.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 6\\n\\n\\n In addition to testifying about what she had learned through the investigation of\\nBuchanan’s cellphone and financial records, Cajuste testified about the implications of these\\nfindings based on her experience as a postal inspector. Specifically, Cajuste testified (on cross-\\nexamination) that one of the individuals with whom Buchanan had communicated about drug\\ndeliveries had used a “burner phone” that was not registered with any phone company. R. 74,\\nPageID 700. She continued, “You buy a burner phone, typically in most drug conspiracies most\\nindividuals use burner phones so they can avoid detection.” Id. at PageID 700–701. Cajuste also\\ntestified that Buchanan had sent and received messages via an application called WhatsApp, and\\nshe stated that “WhatsApp is a messaging system that is generally used because it has a heavy\\nencryption system.” R. 73, PageID 663.\\n\\n Buchanan did not call any witnesses and did not testify. Once the government’s case had\\nconcluded, the court went over the proposed jury instructions with the parties. Both parties had\\nsubmitted proposed instructions on “expert” or “opinion” testimony. In addition, the government\\nhad submitted a proposed instruction to address witnesses who gave mixed fact and opinion\\ntestimony, as Adams and Cajuste had done. However, when the prosecutor raised these\\ninstructions to the district court, the district court responded, “I don’t know that we had any\\nopinion testimony.” R. 74, PageID 735. The prosecutor began to explain that he viewed Adams\\nas having given both fact testimony based on his role in investigating Buchanan and opinion\\ntestimony based on his experience and training in narcotics investigations. The district court\\nreiterated, “Unless there’s some need, I didn’t think that would qualify as opinion testimony.”\\nId. Defense counsel agreed, “No, Your Honor.” Id. When it charged the jury, the district court\\ndid not give any instruction on opinion testimony or mixed fact and opinion testimony.\\n\\n The jury convicted Buchanan of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 846. He was acquitted of the threat counts.\\n\\nC. The Sentencing\\n\\n Before sentencing, Buchanan and the government stipulated that Buchanan was\\nresponsible for 79.2 kilograms of marijuana. Using this figure to obtain a base offense level of\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 7\\n\\n\\n20 and adding four two-level enhancements, Buchanan’s presentence report (“PSR”) calculated\\nhis total offense level as 28. At the sentencing hearing, the district court decided to apply only\\nthree of the enhancements and sentenced Buchanan based on a total offense level of 26.\\nRelevant to this appeal, Buchanan’s counsel objected to a two-level enhancement under USSG\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E)1 for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\\nengaged in as a livelihood.” After hearing argument from both sides, the district court overruled\\nthe objection and applied the enhancement.\\n\\n Considering Buchanan’s criminal history category of I together with Buchanan’s total\\noffense level of 26, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. The\\ndistrict court then considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and decided to vary downward and\\nimpose a sentence of 50 months on each count. Finally, the district court decided to run the\\nsentences concurrently and to impose a three-year term of supervised release following the\\nprison term. Thus, Buchanan received a sentence of 50 months of imprisonment followed by\\nthree years of supervised release.\\n\\nD. The Appeal\\n\\n The district court entered judgment against Buchanan on July 9, 2018, and Buchanan\\ntimely appealed to this court. On appeal, Buchanan makes one challenge to his conviction and\\nthree challenges to his sentencing. First, he asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence\\nand remand for a new trial because, he argues, the district court erred in failing to instruct the\\njury properly on how to weigh the mixed fact and opinion testimony of Adams and Cajuste, and\\nthis failure prejudiced him.\\n\\n Second, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in sentencing him without\\nconsidering the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months on each of the counts of which he was\\nconvicted. Defense counsel did not raise this issue to the district court. Therefore, Buchanan’s\\nthird argument is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel did not\\nobject to the district court’s alleged failure to consider the statutory maximum sentence.\\n\\n 1The sentencing documents and the parties’ briefs refer to § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E). After Buchanan was\\nsentenced, however, the Guidelines were amended, and the relevant enhancement now appears in § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E).\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 8\\n\\n\\n Finally, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in imposing the two-level\\nenhancement for engaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood. He asks this court to remand for\\nresentencing on the basis of these asserted errors.\\n\\n We will address each of Buchanan’s arguments in turn.\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\nA. Instruction on Opinion Testimony\\n\\n Because defense counsel did not object to the district court’s lack of an instruction on\\nmixed fact and opinion testimony, this court would ordinarily review for plain error. See\\nJohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). Under that standard, this court may\\nreverse for “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights” if “(4) the error\\nseriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\\nStates v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 299 (6th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).\\nHowever, the government argues that this issue is not reviewable at all because Buchanan\\nwaived it by expressly agreeing with the district court that no instruction was needed. See\\nUnited States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An attorney cannot agree in open\\ncourt with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following\\nthat course.”); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is\\nthe failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\\nabandonment of a known right.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n Buchanan responds that even if he invited the district court’s error, this court should\\noverlook the waiver “because the interests of justice demand it.” Reply Br. at 14 (citing United\\nStates v. Savoires, 430 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 491\\n(6th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, Buchanan argues, he was no more at fault for inviting the error\\nthan was the government: both parties initially submitted proposed instructions on opinion\\ntestimony, but both parties later agreed with the district court that no such instruction was\\nnecessary.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 9\\n\\n\\n Although both the government and Buchanan have some case law on their sides, we need\\nnot declare a winner on the standard-of-review point: Buchanan’s claim fails even on plain-error\\nreview.\\n\\n Both parties agree that the district court should have given an instruction on how to\\nweigh mixed fact and opinion testimony. As we recognized in United States v. Lopez-Medina,\\n461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006), when law-enforcement officers testify both as to the facts of a\\ncase and as to their interpretation of those facts based on their experience, the district court must\\ngive a cautionary instruction. The instruction generally should inform the jury about the\\ndifference between fact and opinion testimony and let the jury know that it does not have to\\naccept opinion testimony. See id. at 743–44. In addition, the instruction should tell the jury to\\nconsider the witnesses’ qualifications and experience in deciding whether their testimony is\\ncredible. See id. In Lopez-Medina, as here, there was no “clear demarcation between [the] fact\\ntestimony and expert opinion testimony” given by certain government witnesses, and this court\\nfound “that the district court committed an error that was plain or obvious” in allowing the\\ntestimony of those witnesses without a cautionary instruction. Id. at 745. Lopez-Medina’s\\napplicability to this case is clear, and thus the first two elements of plain error have been met.\\n\\n However, the parties disagree over whether the district court’s failure to give the\\ninstruction here affected Buchanan’s substantial rights. “In the context of challenges to jury\\ninstructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so\\nclearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Semrau,\\n693 F.3d 510, 528 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Such a finding is proper “‘if the\\ninstructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial,’ and ‘the error\\nseriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” Id.\\n(citations omitted).\\n\\n Buchanan does not appear to argue that the jury instructions given by the district court\\nwere confusing or misleading, but he does argue that he was prejudiced by the missed\\ninstruction. According to Buchanan, he was prejudiced because Adams’s testimony that items\\nfound in Buchanan’s home were indicative of drug trafficking “essentially amounted to an expert\\nopinion that the items . . . demonstrated a conspiracy to distribute” marijuana. Appellant Br. at\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 10\\n\\n\\n26 (quoting Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745). And Buchanan argues that both Adams’s and\\nCajuste’s testimony was “critical to demonstrating . . . the requisite intent to distribute\\nmarijuana.” Appellant Br. at 28.\\n\\n The government makes three arguments in response. First, it points out that the Lopez-\\nMedina court reversed for plain error not solely on the basis of the missed instructions but,\\ninstead, on the cumulative basis of that error plus several additional errors at the defendant’s\\ntrial. See 461 F.3d at 745 (“We discuss the issue of prejudice as it pertains to all of the\\nevidentiary issues raised . . . .” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the government argues that the\\nmissed instructions alone do not entitle Buchanan to a new trial. Second, the government\\ncontends that all of the opinion testimony tended to show Buchanan’s involvement in marijuana\\ntrafficking, which he conceded at trial, and did not support the conspiracy count in particular,\\nwhich Buchanan contested. Finally, the government argues that other evidence so thoroughly\\nincriminated Buchanan that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony—even if improperly considered as\\nauthoritative by the jury—did not affect the verdict.\\n\\n Although the government is correct that this court reversed in Lopez-Medina on the basis\\nof more than just the missed instructions, we could still reverse in this case if the failure to give\\nthe instructions was prejudicial and “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public\\nreputation of the judicial proceedings.” See Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528. However, as discussed\\nbelow, we agree with the government that the error was not prejudicial because Buchanan\\nconceded most of the issues that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported. Furthermore, even\\nto the extent that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported the conspiracy conviction as\\nopposed to only the conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the government presented\\nsufficient additional evidence supporting the conspiracy conviction that the opinion testimony\\nwas cumulative and unlikely to have influenced the verdict.\\n\\n The elements of a drug distribution conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to violate drug\\nlaws . . . ; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the\\nconspiracy.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). On\\nthe other hand, the elements of possession with intent to distribute are “(1) knowingly or\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 11\\n\\n\\nintentionally, (2) possessing, (3) with the intent to distribute, (4) a controlled substance.” United\\nStates v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 576 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999).\\n\\n Defense counsel apparently made a strategic choice not to contest whether Buchanan\\npossessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it, or even whether Buchanan was involved in\\nactually trafficking marijuana. In his opening statement, defense counsel announced that “one\\nthing that [the prosecutor] and I will agree on, and we may not agree about much in this case, is\\nthat Kitroy Buchanan was a marijuana trafficker. He had marijuana in his apartment for sale.\\nHe received packages of marijuana from California for sale.” R. 73, PageID 436. Defense\\ncounsel then explained that he intended to contest whether Buchanan was involved in a\\nconspiracy and whether he had communicated threats in interstate commerce. Then, during\\nclosing argument, defense counsel repeated: “[Buchanan] possessed the marijuana, I’m not\\ndenying that. He was going to sell the marijuana, I’m not denying that, but the rest of this case\\nthe government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. 74, PageID 763.\\n\\n It is difficult to see which parts of Adams’s testimony tended to prove more than\\nBuchanan admitted. Much of the testimony that Buchanan now argues was prejudicial supported\\nthe propositions that Buchanan possessed commercial quantities of marijuana, intended to sell it,\\nor shipped and received packages of marijuana to and from various buyers and sellers. For\\nexample, Adams testified that the food-packaging materials found in Buchanan’s home were of a\\ntype commonly used by drug traffickers. But Buchanan admitted that he was a drug trafficker\\nand had intended to sell the marijuana found in his house. As another example, Adams testified\\nthat drug traffickers like to use priority or express mail, and the government presented evidence\\nthat Buchanan used priority mail. Again, however, Buchanan admitted that he both received\\nshipments of marijuana and intended to sell that which he had in his home.\\n\\n Furthermore, Adams’s testimony was cumulative. Hobbs’s testimony and the\\ngovernment’s exhibits amply corroborated it. For example, Hobbs testified that during the time\\nhe was in the car with Buchanan driving around and searching for the missing package,\\nBuchanan repeatedly spoke with someone on the phone about the package. That testimony\\nsupported the theory that Buchanan was conspiring with at least one person to distribute\\nmarijuana. Hobbs also testified that he sent Buchanan lists of addresses to which Buchanan then\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 12\\n\\n\\nhad packages delivered. This testimony supported the same factual findings that Adams’s\\ntestimony supported: Buchanan bought and sold marijuana and had it shipped through the mail.\\n\\n Similarly, most of Cajuste’s testimony simply duplicated what other evidence showed.\\nTrue, Cajuste did give some opinion testimony that was not cumulative: she testified that\\nWhatsApp and burner phones are used to avoid detection, and she did so in terms that suggested\\nBuchanan was involved in a drug conspiracy. However, this testimony added little to the dozens\\nof exhibits presented by the government showing messages and phone calls between Buchanan\\nand individuals in California and Pennsylvania; financial records demonstrating payments\\ncorresponding with some of those communications; and Hobbs’s testimony about hearing\\nBuchanan discussing the missing package on the phone, among other evidence. Had Cajuste not\\ntestified about her experience with the use of WhatsApp and burner phones, it is very unlikely\\nthe jury would have reached a different conclusion about whether Buchanan conspired with\\nothers to distribute marijuana.\\n\\n In sum, Buchanan has not demonstrated that the lack of a jury instruction on mixed fact\\nand opinion testimony affected his substantial rights. Therefore, Buchanan cannot meet his\\nburden on plain-error review, and we affirm Buchanan’s conviction of the two drug counts.\\n\\nB. The District Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider the Statutory Maximum Sentence\\n\\n Next, Buchanan argues that the district court sentenced him based on the wrong\\nGuidelines range because it did not take into account the statutory maximum sentence of 60\\nmonths on each of his counts of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Buchanan did not\\nraise this argument to the district court, so we review for plain error. See United States v.\\nRosenbaum, 585 F.3d 259, 266–67 (6th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n As discussed above, the district court found that Buchanan’s total offense level and\\ncriminal history category produced an advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months of\\nimprisonment. The district court then sentenced Buchanan while assuming that this Guidelines\\nrange applied. But Buchanan argues that the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months should\\nhave replaced the 63-to-78-month range as his Guidelines range under USSG § 5G1.1(a).\\nSection 5G1.1(a) provides: “Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 13\\n\\n\\nminimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall\\nbe the guideline sentence.”\\n\\n However, § 5G1.1(a) applies only to single-count convictions. For convictions on\\nmultiple counts, the Guidelines range is not replaced by the statutory maximum on any count.\\nInstead, § 5G1.2(b) provides that the district court “shall determine the total punishment and\\nshall impose that total punishment on each . . . count, except to the extent otherwise required by\\nlaw.” Next, § 5G1.2(c) provides that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the\\nhighest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all\\ncounts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.” Here, the district\\ncourt calculated Buchanan’s Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and departed\\ndownward to impose a total punishment of 50 months of imprisonment. The district court then\\nimposed a sentence of 50 months on each count. Each count of conviction had the same\\nstatutory maximum, so either of the two 50-month sentences qualified as the sentence imposed\\non the count with the “highest” statutory maximum under § 5G1.2(c). Thus, the sentence\\nimposed on the count with the highest statutory maximum was adequate to achieve the total\\npunishment of 50 months. The district court correctly decided to run the two 50-month\\nsentences concurrently. See USSG § 5G1.2(c).\\n\\n Buchanan cites Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) for the\\nproposition that on plain-error review, “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect\\nGuidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of\\na different outcome absent the error.” However, because Buchanan has not demonstrated that\\nthe district court calculated his Guidelines range incorrectly in light of the statutory maximum,\\nhe has not shown that the district court erred at all. Therefore, we need not address Buchanan’s\\nargument based on Molina-Martinez, which presupposes error and addresses only how a\\ndefendant can show that the error was plain.\\n\\n One final argument deserves attention. In his reply brief, Buchanan acknowledges that\\n“the government correctly asserts that the district court could have sentenced [him] to\\nconsecutive terms if it made findings in support of that sentence.” Reply Br. at 10. With that\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 14\\n\\n\\nstatement, Buchanan appears to admit that the district court was not bound to treat the statutory\\nmaximum as his Guidelines sentence. Nevertheless, Buchanan argues, the district court still\\nshould have considered the statutory maximum because “awareness of the statutory limits would\\nhave assisted the court in rendering a just sentence.” Id. at 11. In other words, Buchanan argues\\nthat because the statutory maximum sentence has an “anchoring effect” on the district court’s\\nsentencing decisions, the district court’s failure to consider the statutory maximum may have\\nresulted in a higher sentence for Buchanan. Id. (quoting United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960,\\n966 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n It is not clear whether Buchanan intends to abandon his Molina-Martinez argument—in\\nother words, that his sentence was based on an incorrect Guidelines range—and rely solely on\\nthe “anchoring effect” argument. Regardless, his “anchoring effect” argument lacks merit. The\\nsentence from the Seventh Circuit case Buchanan cites reads in full: “Statutory minima and\\nmaxima have an obvious anchoring effect on the judge’s determination of a reasonable sentence\\nin the sense that they demarcate the range within which the judge may impose a sentence.”\\nCurrie, 739 F.3d at 966. In Currie, the district court mistakenly identified the statutory\\nminimum as ten years when, in fact, it was five years. Id. at 964. Here, by contrast, there is no\\nevidence that the district court mistook the relevant statutory maximum. Buchanan’s PSR\\naccurately listed the statutory maximum sentence on each of his counts of conviction as five\\nyears. Cf. id. (“[I]n sentencing [Currie] to a 121-month term, [the district court] remarked that it\\nwas bound by the ten-year minimum . . . .”). And as explained above, the district court’s\\nsentencing decision comported both with the relevant statutory maximum and with USSG\\n§ 5G1.2. Because the district court did not rely on an incorrect statutory maximum or minimum\\nsentence, Buchanan’s sentence was not erroneously “anchored” in the sense Currie addresses.\\n\\n Most importantly, Buchanan’s argument focuses on prejudice: he claims his substantial\\nrights were affected because the district court was not aware of a factor—the statutory\\nmaximum—that might have led it to sentence him to a shorter term of imprisonment. To pass\\nthe plain-error barrier, however, Buchanan must first show an error at sentencing. And without\\nhis argument that the statutory maximum should have become his Guidelines sentence,\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 15\\n\\n\\nBuchanan makes no argument that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range.\\nTherefore, he fails to show plain error.\\n\\nC. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\\n\\n Buchanan next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense\\ncounsel failed to raise the statutory maximum in the district court. Ordinarily, we do not review\\non direct appeal ineffective-assistance claims that were not raised in the district court. See\\nUnited States v. Hughes, 733 F. App’x 299, 299 (6th Cir. 2018). Although we may review such\\na claim if it “depend[s] entirely upon facts within the record or . . . present[s] purely legal\\nquestions,” United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), that\\nexception is a narrow one; as a general rule, ineffective-assistance claims “are best brought by a\\ndefendant in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 so that the parties can develop\\nan adequate record on the issue,” United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1997)\\n(citation omitted). Here, we will follow the general rule and decline to review Buchanan’s\\nineffective-assistance claim.\\n\\nD. Enhancement for a Pattern of Criminal Conduct Engaged in as a Livelihood\\n\\n Finally, we come to the issue that requires a remand for resentencing. Buchanan argues,\\nand we agree, that the district court erred in adding a two-level enhancement to his total offense\\nlevel under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of\\ncriminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.”\\n\\n Because Buchanan objected at sentencing to the livelihood enhancement, we review the\\ndistrict court’s decision to apply the enhancement for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that “significant procedural error[s]” amounting to an\\nabuse of discretion include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines\\nrange”). In assessing the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decisions,\\nwe review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Cole,\\n359 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2004).\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 16\\n\\n\\n Applying de novo review to the district court’s legal conclusions, as we must, we\\nconclude that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines when it applied the livelihood\\nenhancement to Buchanan. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by calculating\\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range under the wrong legal standard, and Buchanan is entitled to\\nresentencing because the error was not harmless.\\n\\n Buchanan does not dispute that his activities constituted “a pattern of criminal conduct.”\\nHe does dispute that this conduct was “engaged in as a livelihood.” To define “engaged in as a\\nlivelihood,” § 2D1.1 cross-references § 4B1.3. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.20(C)). In turn,\\nthe relevant application note to § 4B1.3 states that the district court must make two findings to\\ndetermine that the defendant’s criminal conduct was engaged in as a livelihood. See id. § 4B1.3,\\ncomment. (n.2).2 First, the district court must find that “the defendant derived income from the\\npattern of criminal conduct that in any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then\\nexisting hourly minimum wage under federal law.” Id. Second, the district court must find that\\n“the totality of circumstances shows that such criminal conduct was the defendant’s primary\\noccupation in that twelve-month period (e.g., the defendant engaged in criminal conduct rather\\nthan regular, legitimate employment; or the defendant’s legitimate employment was merely a\\nfront for the defendant’s criminal conduct).” Id.\\n\\n However, the district court sentenced Buchanan based on the understanding that § 4B1.3\\nrequired only one finding: that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum\\nwage in a twelve-month period. At sentencing, events transpired as follows.\\n\\n\\n 2In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “[c]ommentary which\\nfunctions to interpret a guideline or explain how it is to be applied . . . controls, and if failure to follow, or a\\nmisreading of, such commentary results in a sentence selected from the wrong guideline range . . . , that sentence\\nwould constitute an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” (cleaned up). Therefore, federal courts are\\nto treat commentary to a particular Guidelines provision as an authoritative interpretation of that provision as long as\\nthe interpretation “does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute” and is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent\\nwith” the provision’s text. Id. at 45 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th\\nCir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that because the list of controlled substance offenses in USSG § 4B1.2(b) does not\\ncontain attempt crimes, the gloss on “controlled substance offense” in the commentary, which includes attempts, is\\nnot a permissible “interpretation” of the Guidelines provision). Havis stated that “[c]ommentary binds courts only\\n‘if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction.’” Havis, 927 F.3d at 386 (quoting\\nStinson, 508 U.S. at 46). Because application note 2 to § 4B1.3 explains the meaning of “engaged in as a\\nlivelihood” in a way that the text of the Guidelines provision will bear, rather than adding to a list or definition given\\nin the text of the Guidelines provision, the application note is binding on federal courts under Stinson and Havis.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 17\\n\\n\\n The prosecutor presented evidence that Buchanan had earned over $14,500, or 2,000\\ntimes the relevant minimum wage of $7.25, in less than a twelve-month period. Specifically, the\\ngovernment had estimated that Buchanan’s net income from marijuana sales, over a period of\\neight months for which the government had data, was $384,000. The government arrived at this\\nnumber by first subtracting $6,000 (a high-end estimate—based on evidence of wire transfers\\nBuchanan had made that corresponded with package shipments—of how much he paid for each\\npackage of marijuana) from $30,000 (the low end of Adams’s estimate of the value of the\\npackage of marijuana intercepted by law enforcement) to reach an estimated profit per package\\nof $24,000. Then, the government multiplied $24,000 by 16—an estimate of the number of\\npackages Buchanan was responsible for, based on his stipulation to responsibility for 79.2\\nkilograms of marijuana—to arrive at the $384,000 figure.\\n\\n When the prosecutor presented this estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income to the\\ndistrict court in support of the livelihood enhancement, the district court pointed out that\\nBuchanan’s PSR stated that he had been employed by his father’s trucking company since 2008\\nand claimed to have earned $400 per week in that capacity. The district court then inquired,\\n“Doesn’t [the phrase “engaged in as a livelihood”] suggest that that’s aimed at a Defendant who\\ndoes nothing but criminal conduct?” R. 75, PageID 795. The prosecutor responded that the\\ncommentary to § 2D1.1 “says that you look then to 4B1.3 Note 2 for the definition of a\\nlivelihood. Not definition of a livelihood is simply—is not necessarily this totality, but it means\\n2000 times the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.”3 Id. at PageID 795–96. After the\\ndistrict court inquired more about how the government had arrived at its estimate of Buchanan’s\\ncriminal income, the district court asked defense counsel if he had any comment.\\n\\n Defense counsel admitted that Buchanan had stipulated to the 79.2-kilogram figure but\\nargued that he had not stipulated “to the value of any package.” Id. at PageID 798. Thus,\\ndefense counsel argued that because the income attributed to Buchanan was based on an\\nestimate, “I don’t believe the Government can sustain a burden, even by a preponderance, that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3The government’s sentencing memorandum also represented that the livelihood enhancement required\\nonly an amount-of-income finding and said nothing about the “primary occupation” prong.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 18\\n\\n\\nthere was a criminal livelihood here.” Id. at PageID 798–99. Defense counsel did not make any\\narguments about the second element of the § 4B1.3 livelihood test, “primary occupation.”\\n\\n After asking more questions about the proper estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income,\\nthe district court overruled Buchanan’s objection to the livelihood enhancement. However, the\\ndistrict court stated that it believed the application of the enhancement was “a very close\\nquestion” and that “the Government[] [had] very little evidence.” Id. at PageID 804. Explaining\\nits reasoning, the district court continued:\\n\\n I think that the Defendant had long time significant employment for more—\\n approaching ten years of time. And so I think it’s difficult to make a generalized\\n claim that this drug dealing was engaged in as a livelihood, which the phrase from\\n the Guidelines suggest[s] to me that livelihood refers to an almost independent\\n occupation. But, under the Guideline you’ve pointed out and the commentary,\\n I think there is sufficient evidence that he meets this minimum wage times 2000\\n hours requirement.\\n\\nId. at PageID 805. Later, in announcing Buchanan’s sentence, the district court explained the\\nfactors it had considered under § 3553(a). On the subject of Buchanan’s “history and\\nbackground,” the district court stated, “He has had a—what appears to be a good work record,\\nworking for his father. He earns a moderately reasonable amount of income in that [position].”\\nId. at PageID 831.\\n\\n Based on this record, Buchanan argues that the district court made a factual finding that\\nhe had an extensive record of working at a company that paid him regularly. Buchanan does not\\nnow contest the district court’s finding that he made criminal income of more than 2,000 times\\nthe minimum wage in a twelve-month period; instead, he argues that the district court improperly\\nignored the need to make a “primary occupation” finding and that such a finding would be at\\nodds with the district court’s statements about Buchanan’s legitimate work history.\\n\\n As the transcript portions quoted above show, the district court did make a factual\\nfinding—which we should not disturb except on a finding of clear error—about Buchanan’s\\nlegitimate work history. The district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the\\npresentence report as a finding of fact.” United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.\\n2013) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)). Here, the government never objected to the\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 19\\n\\n\\nparagraph in Buchanan’s PSR stating that he had worked at his father’s company since 2008 and\\nthat “[a]ccording to the defendant and his father, the defendant earned $400 weekly.” R. 49,\\nPageID 296. Therefore, the district court did not err in accepting the information in that\\nparagraph as fact and in crediting Buchanan’s and his father’s claims about his legitimate\\nincome.4\\n\\n The transcript of the sentencing hearing also shows that the district court applied the\\nenhancement under the impression that § 4B1.3 required only a finding of how much money the\\ndefendant had made from criminal activity. Because the commentary to § 4B1.3 makes clear\\nthat the district court must make two findings for the enhancement to apply, the district court\\nerred in basing its application of the enhancement on only one of those findings.\\n\\n Furthermore, the district court’s error in interpreting the Guidelines was not harmless.\\n\\n There can be no harmless error unless the appellate court can determine from the\\n record that the same sentence would be imposed on remand. For the government\\n to carry its burden, it must demonstrate to the [c]ourt with certainty that the error\\n at sentencing did not cause the defendant to receive a more severe sentence.\\n\\nUnited States v. Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks\\nomitted); see also United States v. Salyers, 592 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a\\nfour-level error in calculating the defendant’s base offense level was not harmless because “[t]he\\ndistrict court did not indicate that it would have imposed the same 120-month sentence even if\\ndefendant’s base offense level was 24”).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4The government attempts to cast doubt on whether Buchanan really earned $400 per week working for his\\nfather’s company by alluding to evidence that it learned of post-sentencing. See Appellee Br. at 37 n.6. However,\\nthe time for challenging the district court’s factual finding on this matter has passed for the purposes of our appellate\\nreview. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1) (“Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties must state\\nin writing any objections, including objections to material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy\\nstatements contained in or omitted from the report.”); see also Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569,\\n571 (6th Cir. 1982) (“A party may not by-pass the fact-finding process of the lower court and introduce new facts in\\nits brief on appeal.”). Although the prosecutor mentioned in passing at the sentencing hearing that Buchanan’s\\n“bank records don’t seem to show any pay checks coming in” that would corroborate Buchanan’s claim of\\nlegitimate employment, the government did not object to the PSR on this basis. R. 75, PageID 795. Based on the\\nun-objected-to statements in the PSR, the district court made a factual finding about Buchanan’s legitimate\\nemployment that was not clearly erroneous.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 20\\n\\n\\n Here, the enhancement resulted in a two-level addition to Buchanan’s offense level, and\\nthe district court gave no indication that it would have given Buchanan the same sentence had his\\ntotal offense level been calculated as 24 instead of 26. With a total offense level of 24,\\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range would have been only 51 to 63 months. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt.A.\\nIndeed, the district court repeatedly referenced Buchanan’s total offense level while announcing\\nhis sentence, and the district court noted that Buchanan’s PSR listed the average sentence for a\\ndrug-trafficking defendant in criminal history category I as 55 months. Apparently assuming\\nthat that number applied to defendants with a total offense level of 28—two levels higher than\\nBuchanan’s—the district court mused that the average sentence was probably lower than 55\\nmonths for someone with a total offense level of 26. The district court then sentenced Buchanan\\nto 50 months, a term of imprisonment thirteen months below the bottom of his Guidelines range\\nand five months below the average sentence for what the district court believed to be a\\ncomparable defendant. In sum, the record demonstrates that the district court took Buchanan’s\\ntotal offense level very seriously in calculating his sentence and may well have sentenced him to\\na shorter term of imprisonment had it calculated his Guidelines range differently.\\n\\n The government, however, urges us to affirm because Buchanan’s purported criminal\\nincome of $384,000 (based on Adams’s testimony) dwarfs his claimed legitimate income of less\\nthan $21,000. Crime was Buchanan’s primary occupation, goes the government’s argument,\\nbecause it accounted for the vast majority of his income.\\n\\n We decline to adopt the government’s logic because it would require us to make two\\nfactual findings in the first instance. First, that crime was a defendant’s “primary occupation” is\\na factual finding requiring a totality-of-circumstances approach. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment.\\n(n.2). The district court did not make any such finding because it was unaware of the\\nrequirement. Second, to accept the government’s position, we would also need to accept as a\\nmatter of fact that Buchanan’s criminal income for the relevant period was $384,000. But there\\nare reasons to doubt this estimate (for example, it was based not on evidence of Buchanan’s\\nactual sales but on one witness’s opinion about the average value of a given quantity of\\nmarijuana in Cleveland). More importantly, the district court never made a factual finding on the\\nrecord of exactly how much Buchanan’s criminal activity profited him. Instead, the district court\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 21\\n\\n\\nmerely found that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum wage\\nduring the relevant time period. At the same time, the district court reiterated that it found the\\napplication of the enhancement was “a close question” but that “a preponderance of the\\nevidence” supported the government’s position that Buchanan surpassed the threshold level of\\ncriminal income. R. 75, PageID 805. In fact, the district court may have credited only\\n$14,500.01 of the government’s estimate: that finding, on the district court’s erroneous reading\\nof § 4B1.3, would have triggered the livelihood enhancement.\\n\\n As a reviewing court, we have no principled basis for accepting in total the government’s\\nevidence of Buchanan’s criminal income when the district court did not. Instead, we are to\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error, see Cole, 359 F.3d at 425; if the district\\ncourt failed to make a factual finding on a required element, we have no facts to review, and\\nremand is the appropriate course of action, see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–93\\n(1982).\\n\\n On remand, therefore, the district court must analyze whether, under the “totality of\\ncircumstances,” Buchanan’s crimes were his “primary occupation.” Relevant factors in this\\nanalysis may include an estimate of hours worked in each capacity as well as the amount of\\nincome earned in each capacity. No particular ratio of, or difference between, illegitimate and\\nlegitimate income automatically satisfies the “primary occupation” prong; to hold otherwise\\nwould ignore § 4B1.3’s “totality of circumstances” language.5 Of course, if the district court\\nfinds that Buchanan fits the description in either of the application note’s two non-exhaustive\\nexamples—that of a defendant who “engaged in criminal conduct rather than regular, legitimate\\nemployment” or whose “legitimate employment was merely a front for the defendant’s criminal\\n\\n 5United States v. Kellams, 26 F.3d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Reed, 951 F.2d 97, 101–02\\n(6th Cir. 1991) do not affect our conclusion. In Kellams, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a\\ndefendant who had net legitimate income of, at most, $4,268 and illegitimate income of $15,917.41 in the relevant\\ntime period. See 26 F.3d at 649. In Reed, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a defendant who had\\nlegitimate income of $350 and illegitimate income of more than $17,000. See 951 F.2d at 101–02. In neither case\\ndid the defendant argue that the district court had failed to make the “primary occupation” finding. Unlike here, in\\neach case we were reviewing a district court that had applied the correct legal standard and made factual findings\\nthereunder. Reviewing these factual findings, both opinions noted the “totality of circumstances” language in the\\napplication note to § 4B1.3 and held that the district court had not erred in applying the enhancement. See Kellams,\\n26 F.3d at 649; Reed, 951 F.2d at 101–02. Appropriately, neither opinion announced a hard-and-fast rule for\\ndetermining what proportion of illegitimate income triggers the enhancement.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 22\\n\\n\\nconduct”—the district court may apply the enhancement, given that it has already found the\\n2,000-times-minimum-wage prong is satisfied. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment. (n.2).\\n\\n Finally, both the government and Buchanan may present new evidence on remand\\nregarding whether crime was Buchanan’s “primary occupation.” See United States v. Doutt,\\n926 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2019) (“When a district court applies the wrong legal standard at\\nsentencing, the government may introduce additional evidence on remand that comports with the\\nappropriate legal standard.” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 455\\n& n.10 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that on remand, the government was entitled to present new\\nevidence in support of the defendant’s designation as a career offender because the case\\nannouncing the relevant standard had not yet been decided at the time of sentencing).\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Buchanan’s conviction but VACATE his\\nsentence and REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the district court is instructed to revisit\\nthe applicability of the livelihood enhancement under the correct legal standard.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421548/\", \"author_raw\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SUTTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BUSH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"LARSEN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644295/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kitroy Brian BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0173p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-3667\n v. │\n │\n │\n KITROY BRIAN BUCHANAN, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\n No. 1:18-cr-00008-1—James S. Gwin, District Judge.\n\n Argued: June 25, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\n\n Before: SUTTON, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: David Graham, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor,\nMichigan, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David Graham, Melissa M. Salinas,\nUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant.\nMatthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After a jury trial, Kitroy Brian Buchanan was convicted\nof one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and one count of conspiracy to\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 2\n\n\ndistribute marijuana. The district court sentenced him to 50 months’ imprisonment followed by\nthree years of supervised release. Buchanan now appeals his conviction and sentence, and he\nmakes four arguments. We find merit in one of his arguments—a challenge to a two-level\nincrease in his offense level for committing a crime “as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\nengaged in as a livelihood” under USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) and 4B1.3. Therefore, we\nAFFIRM the district court’s judgment of conviction but VACATE Buchanan’s sentence and\nREMAND for the district court to reconsider, under the proper legal standard, whether the\nenhancement applies.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\nA. Factual Background\n\n In 2015, Buchanan, who was already involved in the marijuana trade, met a United States\npostal worker named Dominique Hobbs in South Euclid, Ohio. Buchanan asked Hobbs if he\nwould like to “do some business,” which Hobbs understood to mean that Buchanan wanted\nHobbs to help him deliver illegal drugs. R. 73, PageID 544. Hobbs said he was interested, and\nthe two men exchanged phone numbers. However, Hobbs was not able to help Buchanan\nimmediately; he explained to Buchanan that he did not have a consistent postal route but was a\n“U-person,” or utility carrier, who substituted for those with regular routes when they had to\nmiss work. Id. at PageID 547–48.\n\n In November 2017, Hobbs let Buchanan know that he had obtained a regular postal route,\nand the two began working together. Buchanan promised to pay Hobbs $200 in exchange for\neach package Hobbs would deliver. Hobbs also supplied Buchanan with lists of addresses on\nHobbs’s postal route so Buchanan would know where Hobbs, in conjunction with his mail\ndeliveries, could deliver packages of marijuana.\n\n One day late in November 2017, Buchanan informed Hobbs that a package of marijuana\nwas due to arrive in South Euclid soon, but Buchanan was not sure of the exact arrival date.\nHobbs told Buchanan that he would not be able to deliver the package if it happened to arrive in\ntown that coming Monday, because Hobbs was not working that day. As it turned out, however,\nthe package arrived at the South Euclid post office that Monday. Buchanan had been tracking\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 3\n\n\nthe package through the United States Postal Service’s website and alerted Hobbs. Although\nHobbs reminded Buchanan that he was off duty, he agreed to help Buchanan try to lay hands on\nthe package.\n\n Buchanan and Hobbs both drove to the post office. Hobbs asked his supervisor, who was\ncovering Hobbs’s route that day, whether he had Buchanan’s package; the supervisor had not\nseen it. Hobbs told Buchanan.\n\n Buchanan became enraged and began shouting at Hobbs, accusing him of stealing the\npackage, which Hobbs denied. After Hobbs and Buchanan unsuccessfully made another attempt\nto find the package at the post office, Buchanan cornered Hobbs, searched his car for the\npackage, and then ordered him to chauffeur Buchanan around other postal carriers’ routes to ask\nthe other carriers if they had the package. While he and Hobbs were in the car, Buchanan made\n“[a]t least ten” phone calls to someone whom he told that Hobbs “had the package” and was\n“hiding it from” Buchanan. Id. at PageID 585, 589.\n\n After a long and fruitless search along other carriers’ postal routes, Hobbs and Buchanan\nhad not located the package. Buchanan let Hobbs go home, but he continued to call and send\ntext messages to Hobbs, reiterating that he believed Hobbs had stolen the package and\nsuggesting that for Hobbs’s own safety, he had better return the package to Buchanan.\n\n Fearing for his safety, Hobbs went to the police and made a complaint of kidnapping\nagainst Buchanan, telling the police select details of his interactions with Buchanan without\nadmitting that he had been complicit in any drug activity. Because Hobbs was a postal worker,\nthe police communicated Hobbs’s accusation to the Postal Inspection Service, a law-enforcement\narm of the United States Postal Service. Hobbs reiterated his story to the postal inspectors.\nHaving learned from Hobbs some details about the kind of car Buchanan drove, law-enforcement\nofficers then used database information to identify suspect vehicles; this investigation eventually\nled them to Buchanan’s car and home. On December 8, 2017, officers conducted a drug sniff of\nBuchanan’s car, and the dog alerted to the smell of narcotics from the car.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 4\n\n\n Buchanan was arrested on a charge of kidnapping. Law-enforcement officers also\nobtained and executed search warrants for Buchanan’s home, his car, and his cellphone.\nThe search of Buchanan’s home revealed over 150 grams of marijuana, a vacuum sealer, and\nplastic food-storage bags, among other evidence of marijuana trafficking. The search of the\ncellphone revealed that Buchanan was tracking another package. Following the tracking\ninformation from Buchanan’s cellphone, postal inspectors determined that the package was\nheaded to an address on Hobbs’s route; the inspectors intercepted the package, obtained a search\nwarrant, and opened the package to find 4.8 kilograms of marijuana. In addition, the inspectors\ndetermined that the return address on the package—which purported to have come from\nCalifornia—was fake.\n\n Because Hobbs’s complaint had led to Buchanan’s arrest, law-enforcement officers\nquestioned Hobbs further and learned that Hobbs had concocted a false kidnapping complaint to\nget Buchanan off his back without at the same time implicating himself in a marijuana-\ndistribution scheme. After admitting that he had made up the kidnapping story, Hobbs also\nadmitted to his agreement and cooperation with Buchanan. Hobbs eventually pled guilty to\ncharges of lying to law enforcement and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to testify\nagainst Buchanan.\n\nB. The Trial\n\n On January 4, 2018, Buchanan was indicted for one count of conspiracy to distribute a\ncontrolled substance, one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,\nand three counts of communicating threats in interstate commerce. Because Hobbs had admitted\nthat Buchanan did not really kidnap him, the government dropped the kidnapping charge.\n\n At trial, Hobbs testified about his association with Buchanan, leading up to the day that\nthe package went missing. Among other evidence, the government also presented testimony by\ntwo postal inspectors, Michael Adams and Lauren Cajuste. Adams had participated in the search\nof Buchanan’s home, and Cajuste had investigated the information found on Buchanan’s\ncellphone.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 5\n\n\n Adams testified that he had extensive experience and training in narcotics investigations\nand had served eight years as a narcotics agent before becoming a postal inspector. He testified\nthat, based on his experience, the amount of marijuana found in Buchanan’s home was a\n“dealer/supplier amount” and that some of the food-packaging supplies found there were of the\nsort commonly used by drug traffickers. Adams also testified that drug traffickers often use fake\nreturn addresses when sending packages through the mail and that they often use express or\npriority mail to reduce the risk that law enforcement will seize and search packages. Hobbs had\ntestified, and the government’s exhibits at trial showed, that Buchanan had used priority mail to\nship packages. Adams also testified that some of the messages Buchanan had sent to alleged co-\nconspirators contained drug-traffickers’ jargon. Among other testimony, Adams also testified\nthat ten pounds of marijuana—an amount comparable to that found in the intercepted package—\nwas worth roughly $30,000 to $50,000 on the “street” in Cleveland. Id. at PageID 482.\n\n Cajuste stated that she had worked on financial investigations for the first six years of her\ntime as a postal inspector before broadening her focus to include workplace violence as well as\nfinancial investigations. She then testified at length about what the analysis of Buchanan’s\ncellphone and financial records had revealed. Buchanan had communicated extensively with\nsomeone in California about the delivery of packages, and he had sent the delivery addresses he\nreceived from Hobbs to the California phone number. Buchanan’s contact in California would\nsend Buchanan tracking information for each package, and Buchanan would track each package\non the Postal Service’s website until it was delivered. According to Buchanan’s financial\nrecords, Buchanan sent payments to accounts given to him by the California contact. In addition\nto Cajuste’s testimony on these matters, the government presented numerous exhibits showing\nBuchanan’s phone and tracking activity.\n\n Testimony and exhibits also established that, besides the California contact, Buchanan\nregularly communicated with an individual located in or near Erie, Pennsylvania about\ndelivering packages. Buchanan’s text messages with the Erie contact demonstrated that\nBuchanan and the contact appeared to take turns driving to meet each other, and one would text\nthe other when he was twenty minutes away from the meeting place. Buchanan’s financial\nrecords showed that he frequently deposited money into his bank account after Erie trips.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 6\n\n\n In addition to testifying about what she had learned through the investigation of\nBuchanan’s cellphone and financial records, Cajuste testified about the implications of these\nfindings based on her experience as a postal inspector. Specifically, Cajuste testified (on cross-\nexamination) that one of the individuals with whom Buchanan had communicated about drug\ndeliveries had used a “burner phone” that was not registered with any phone company. R. 74,\nPageID 700. She continued, “You buy a burner phone, typically in most drug conspiracies most\nindividuals use burner phones so they can avoid detection.” Id. at PageID 700–701. Cajuste also\ntestified that Buchanan had sent and received messages via an application called WhatsApp, and\nshe stated that “WhatsApp is a messaging system that is generally used because it has a heavy\nencryption system.” R. 73, PageID 663.\n\n Buchanan did not call any witnesses and did not testify. Once the government’s case had\nconcluded, the court went over the proposed jury instructions with the parties. Both parties had\nsubmitted proposed instructions on “expert” or “opinion” testimony. In addition, the government\nhad submitted a proposed instruction to address witnesses who gave mixed fact and opinion\ntestimony, as Adams and Cajuste had done. However, when the prosecutor raised these\ninstructions to the district court, the district court responded, “I don’t know that we had any\nopinion testimony.” R. 74, PageID 735. The prosecutor began to explain that he viewed Adams\nas having given both fact testimony based on his role in investigating Buchanan and opinion\ntestimony based on his experience and training in narcotics investigations. The district court\nreiterated, “Unless there’s some need, I didn’t think that would qualify as opinion testimony.”\nId. Defense counsel agreed, “No, Your Honor.” Id. When it charged the jury, the district court\ndid not give any instruction on opinion testimony or mixed fact and opinion testimony.\n\n The jury convicted Buchanan of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of\n21 U.S.C. § 846. He was acquitted of the threat counts.\n\nC. The Sentencing\n\n Before sentencing, Buchanan and the government stipulated that Buchanan was\nresponsible for 79.2 kilograms of marijuana. Using this figure to obtain a base offense level of\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 7\n\n\n20 and adding four two-level enhancements, Buchanan’s presentence report (“PSR”) calculated\nhis total offense level as 28. At the sentencing hearing, the district court decided to apply only\nthree of the enhancements and sentenced Buchanan based on a total offense level of 26.\nRelevant to this appeal, Buchanan’s counsel objected to a two-level enhancement under USSG\n§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E)1 for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\nengaged in as a livelihood.” After hearing argument from both sides, the district court overruled\nthe objection and applied the enhancement.\n\n Considering Buchanan’s criminal history category of I together with Buchanan’s total\noffense level of 26, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. The\ndistrict court then considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and decided to vary downward and\nimpose a sentence of 50 months on each count. Finally, the district court decided to run the\nsentences concurrently and to impose a three-year term of supervised release following the\nprison term. Thus, Buchanan received a sentence of 50 months of imprisonment followed by\nthree years of supervised release.\n\nD. The Appeal\n\n The district court entered judgment against Buchanan on July 9, 2018, and Buchanan\ntimely appealed to this court. On appeal, Buchanan makes one challenge to his conviction and\nthree challenges to his sentencing. First, he asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence\nand remand for a new trial because, he argues, the district court erred in failing to instruct the\njury properly on how to weigh the mixed fact and opinion testimony of Adams and Cajuste, and\nthis failure prejudiced him.\n\n Second, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in sentencing him without\nconsidering the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months on each of the counts of which he was\nconvicted. Defense counsel did not raise this issue to the district court. Therefore, Buchanan’s\nthird argument is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel did not\nobject to the district court’s alleged failure to consider the statutory maximum sentence.\n\n 1The sentencing documents and the parties’ briefs refer to § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E). After Buchanan was\nsentenced, however, the Guidelines were amended, and the relevant enhancement now appears in § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E).\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 8\n\n\n Finally, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in imposing the two-level\nenhancement for engaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood. He asks this court to remand for\nresentencing on the basis of these asserted errors.\n\n We will address each of Buchanan’s arguments in turn.\n\n II. DISCUSSION\n\nA. Instruction on Opinion Testimony\n\n Because defense counsel did not object to the district court’s lack of an instruction on\nmixed fact and opinion testimony, this court would ordinarily review for plain error. See\nJohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). Under that standard, this court may\nreverse for “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights” if “(4) the error\nseriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\nStates v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 299 (6th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).\nHowever, the government argues that this issue is not reviewable at all because Buchanan\nwaived it by expressly agreeing with the district court that no instruction was needed. See\nUnited States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An attorney cannot agree in open\ncourt with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following\nthat course.”); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is\nthe failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\nabandonment of a known right.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n Buchanan responds that even if he invited the district court’s error, this court should\noverlook the waiver “because the interests of justice demand it.” Reply Br. at 14 (citing United\nStates v. Savoires, 430 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 491\n(6th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, Buchanan argues, he was no more at fault for inviting the error\nthan was the government: both parties initially submitted proposed instructions on opinion\ntestimony, but both parties later agreed with the district court that no such instruction was\nnecessary.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 9\n\n\n Although both the government and Buchanan have some case law on their sides, we need\nnot declare a winner on the standard-of-review point: Buchanan’s claim fails even on plain-error\nreview.\n\n Both parties agree that the district court should have given an instruction on how to\nweigh mixed fact and opinion testimony. As we recognized in United States v. Lopez-Medina,\n461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006), when law-enforcement officers testify both as to the facts of a\ncase and as to their interpretation of those facts based on their experience, the district court must\ngive a cautionary instruction. The instruction generally should inform the jury about the\ndifference between fact and opinion testimony and let the jury know that it does not have to\naccept opinion testimony. See id. at 743–44. In addition, the instruction should tell the jury to\nconsider the witnesses’ qualifications and experience in deciding whether their testimony is\ncredible. See id. In Lopez-Medina, as here, there was no “clear demarcation between [the] fact\ntestimony and expert opinion testimony” given by certain government witnesses, and this court\nfound “that the district court committed an error that was plain or obvious” in allowing the\ntestimony of those witnesses without a cautionary instruction. Id. at 745. Lopez-Medina’s\napplicability to this case is clear, and thus the first two elements of plain error have been met.\n\n However, the parties disagree over whether the district court’s failure to give the\ninstruction here affected Buchanan’s substantial rights. “In the context of challenges to jury\ninstructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so\nclearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Semrau,\n693 F.3d 510, 528 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Such a finding is proper “‘if the\ninstructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial,’ and ‘the error\nseriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” Id.\n(citations omitted).\n\n Buchanan does not appear to argue that the jury instructions given by the district court\nwere confusing or misleading, but he does argue that he was prejudiced by the missed\ninstruction. According to Buchanan, he was prejudiced because Adams’s testimony that items\nfound in Buchanan’s home were indicative of drug trafficking “essentially amounted to an expert\nopinion that the items . . . demonstrated a conspiracy to distribute” marijuana. Appellant Br. at\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 10\n\n\n26 (quoting Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745). And Buchanan argues that both Adams’s and\nCajuste’s testimony was “critical to demonstrating . . . the requisite intent to distribute\nmarijuana.” Appellant Br. at 28.\n\n The government makes three arguments in response. First, it points out that the Lopez-\nMedina court reversed for plain error not solely on the basis of the missed instructions but,\ninstead, on the cumulative basis of that error plus several additional errors at the defendant’s\ntrial. See 461 F.3d at 745 (“We discuss the issue of prejudice as it pertains to all of the\nevidentiary issues raised . . . .” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the government argues that the\nmissed instructions alone do not entitle Buchanan to a new trial. Second, the government\ncontends that all of the opinion testimony tended to show Buchanan’s involvement in marijuana\ntrafficking, which he conceded at trial, and did not support the conspiracy count in particular,\nwhich Buchanan contested. Finally, the government argues that other evidence so thoroughly\nincriminated Buchanan that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony—even if improperly considered as\nauthoritative by the jury—did not affect the verdict.\n\n Although the government is correct that this court reversed in Lopez-Medina on the basis\nof more than just the missed instructions, we could still reverse in this case if the failure to give\nthe instructions was prejudicial and “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public\nreputation of the judicial proceedings.” See Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528. However, as discussed\nbelow, we agree with the government that the error was not prejudicial because Buchanan\nconceded most of the issues that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported. Furthermore, even\nto the extent that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported the conspiracy conviction as\nopposed to only the conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the government presented\nsufficient additional evidence supporting the conspiracy conviction that the opinion testimony\nwas cumulative and unlikely to have influenced the verdict.\n\n The elements of a drug distribution conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to violate drug\nlaws . . . ; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the\nconspiracy.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). On\nthe other hand, the elements of possession with intent to distribute are “(1) knowingly or\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 11\n\n\nintentionally, (2) possessing, (3) with the intent to distribute, (4) a controlled substance.” United\nStates v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 576 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999).\n\n Defense counsel apparently made a strategic choice not to contest whether Buchanan\npossessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it, or even whether Buchanan was involved in\nactually trafficking marijuana. In his opening statement, defense counsel announced that “one\nthing that [the prosecutor] and I will agree on, and we may not agree about much in this case, is\nthat Kitroy Buchanan was a marijuana trafficker. He had marijuana in his apartment for sale.\nHe received packages of marijuana from California for sale.” R. 73, PageID 436. Defense\ncounsel then explained that he intended to contest whether Buchanan was involved in a\nconspiracy and whether he had communicated threats in interstate commerce. Then, during\nclosing argument, defense counsel repeated: “[Buchanan] possessed the marijuana, I’m not\ndenying that. He was going to sell the marijuana, I’m not denying that, but the rest of this case\nthe government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. 74, PageID 763.\n\n It is difficult to see which parts of Adams’s testimony tended to prove more than\nBuchanan admitted. Much of the testimony that Buchanan now argues was prejudicial supported\nthe propositions that Buchanan possessed commercial quantities of marijuana, intended to sell it,\nor shipped and received packages of marijuana to and from various buyers and sellers. For\nexample, Adams testified that the food-packaging materials found in Buchanan’s home were of a\ntype commonly used by drug traffickers. But Buchanan admitted that he was a drug trafficker\nand had intended to sell the marijuana found in his house. As another example, Adams testified\nthat drug traffickers like to use priority or express mail, and the government presented evidence\nthat Buchanan used priority mail. Again, however, Buchanan admitted that he both received\nshipments of marijuana and intended to sell that which he had in his home.\n\n Furthermore, Adams’s testimony was cumulative. Hobbs’s testimony and the\ngovernment’s exhibits amply corroborated it. For example, Hobbs testified that during the time\nhe was in the car with Buchanan driving around and searching for the missing package,\nBuchanan repeatedly spoke with someone on the phone about the package. That testimony\nsupported the theory that Buchanan was conspiring with at least one person to distribute\nmarijuana. Hobbs also testified that he sent Buchanan lists of addresses to which Buchanan then\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 12\n\n\nhad packages delivered. This testimony supported the same factual findings that Adams’s\ntestimony supported: Buchanan bought and sold marijuana and had it shipped through the mail.\n\n Similarly, most of Cajuste’s testimony simply duplicated what other evidence showed.\nTrue, Cajuste did give some opinion testimony that was not cumulative: she testified that\nWhatsApp and burner phones are used to avoid detection, and she did so in terms that suggested\nBuchanan was involved in a drug conspiracy. However, this testimony added little to the dozens\nof exhibits presented by the government showing messages and phone calls between Buchanan\nand individuals in California and Pennsylvania; financial records demonstrating payments\ncorresponding with some of those communications; and Hobbs’s testimony about hearing\nBuchanan discussing the missing package on the phone, among other evidence. Had Cajuste not\ntestified about her experience with the use of WhatsApp and burner phones, it is very unlikely\nthe jury would have reached a different conclusion about whether Buchanan conspired with\nothers to distribute marijuana.\n\n In sum, Buchanan has not demonstrated that the lack of a jury instruction on mixed fact\nand opinion testimony affected his substantial rights. Therefore, Buchanan cannot meet his\nburden on plain-error review, and we affirm Buchanan’s conviction of the two drug counts.\n\nB. The District Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider the Statutory Maximum Sentence\n\n Next, Buchanan argues that the district court sentenced him based on the wrong\nGuidelines range because it did not take into account the statutory maximum sentence of 60\nmonths on each of his counts of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Buchanan did not\nraise this argument to the district court, so we review for plain error. See United States v.\nRosenbaum, 585 F.3d 259, 266–67 (6th Cir. 2009).\n\n As discussed above, the district court found that Buchanan’s total offense level and\ncriminal history category produced an advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months of\nimprisonment. The district court then sentenced Buchanan while assuming that this Guidelines\nrange applied. But Buchanan argues that the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months should\nhave replaced the 63-to-78-month range as his Guidelines range under USSG § 5G1.1(a).\nSection 5G1.1(a) provides: “Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 13\n\n\nminimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall\nbe the guideline sentence.”\n\n However, § 5G1.1(a) applies only to single-count convictions. For convictions on\nmultiple counts, the Guidelines range is not replaced by the statutory maximum on any count.\nInstead, § 5G1.2(b) provides that the district court “shall determine the total punishment and\nshall impose that total punishment on each . . . count, except to the extent otherwise required by\nlaw.” Next, § 5G1.2(c) provides that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the\nhighest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all\ncounts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.” Here, the district\ncourt calculated Buchanan’s Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and departed\ndownward to impose a total punishment of 50 months of imprisonment. The district court then\nimposed a sentence of 50 months on each count. Each count of conviction had the same\nstatutory maximum, so either of the two 50-month sentences qualified as the sentence imposed\non the count with the “highest” statutory maximum under § 5G1.2(c). Thus, the sentence\nimposed on the count with the highest statutory maximum was adequate to achieve the total\npunishment of 50 months. The district court correctly decided to run the two 50-month\nsentences concurrently. See USSG § 5G1.2(c).\n\n Buchanan cites Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) for the\nproposition that on plain-error review, “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect\nGuidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of\na different outcome absent the error.” However, because Buchanan has not demonstrated that\nthe district court calculated his Guidelines range incorrectly in light of the statutory maximum,\nhe has not shown that the district court erred at all. Therefore, we need not address Buchanan’s\nargument based on Molina-Martinez, which presupposes error and addresses only how a\ndefendant can show that the error was plain.\n\n One final argument deserves attention. In his reply brief, Buchanan acknowledges that\n“the government correctly asserts that the district court could have sentenced [him] to\nconsecutive terms if it made findings in support of that sentence.” Reply Br. at 10. With that\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 14\n\n\nstatement, Buchanan appears to admit that the district court was not bound to treat the statutory\nmaximum as his Guidelines sentence. Nevertheless, Buchanan argues, the district court still\nshould have considered the statutory maximum because “awareness of the statutory limits would\nhave assisted the court in rendering a just sentence.” Id. at 11. In other words, Buchanan argues\nthat because the statutory maximum sentence has an “anchoring effect” on the district court’s\nsentencing decisions, the district court’s failure to consider the statutory maximum may have\nresulted in a higher sentence for Buchanan. Id. (quoting United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960,\n966 (7th Cir. 2014)).\n\n It is not clear whether Buchanan intends to abandon his Molina-Martinez argument—in\nother words, that his sentence was based on an incorrect Guidelines range—and rely solely on\nthe “anchoring effect” argument. Regardless, his “anchoring effect” argument lacks merit. The\nsentence from the Seventh Circuit case Buchanan cites reads in full: “Statutory minima and\nmaxima have an obvious anchoring effect on the judge’s determination of a reasonable sentence\nin the sense that they demarcate the range within which the judge may impose a sentence.”\nCurrie, 739 F.3d at 966. In Currie, the district court mistakenly identified the statutory\nminimum as ten years when, in fact, it was five years. Id. at 964. Here, by contrast, there is no\nevidence that the district court mistook the relevant statutory maximum. Buchanan’s PSR\naccurately listed the statutory maximum sentence on each of his counts of conviction as five\nyears. Cf. id. (“[I]n sentencing [Currie] to a 121-month term, [the district court] remarked that it\nwas bound by the ten-year minimum . . . .”). And as explained above, the district court’s\nsentencing decision comported both with the relevant statutory maximum and with USSG\n§ 5G1.2. Because the district court did not rely on an incorrect statutory maximum or minimum\nsentence, Buchanan’s sentence was not erroneously “anchored” in the sense Currie addresses.\n\n Most importantly, Buchanan’s argument focuses on prejudice: he claims his substantial\nrights were affected because the district court was not aware of a factor—the statutory\nmaximum—that might have led it to sentence him to a shorter term of imprisonment. To pass\nthe plain-error barrier, however, Buchanan must first show an error at sentencing. And without\nhis argument that the statutory maximum should have become his Guidelines sentence,\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 15\n\n\nBuchanan makes no argument that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range.\nTherefore, he fails to show plain error.\n\nC. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\n\n Buchanan next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense\ncounsel failed to raise the statutory maximum in the district court. Ordinarily, we do not review\non direct appeal ineffective-assistance claims that were not raised in the district court. See\nUnited States v. Hughes, 733 F. App’x 299, 299 (6th Cir. 2018). Although we may review such\na claim if it “depend[s] entirely upon facts within the record or . . . present[s] purely legal\nquestions,” United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), that\nexception is a narrow one; as a general rule, ineffective-assistance claims “are best brought by a\ndefendant in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 so that the parties can develop\nan adequate record on the issue,” United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1997)\n(citation omitted). Here, we will follow the general rule and decline to review Buchanan’s\nineffective-assistance claim.\n\nD. Enhancement for a Pattern of Criminal Conduct Engaged in as a Livelihood\n\n Finally, we come to the issue that requires a remand for resentencing. Buchanan argues,\nand we agree, that the district court erred in adding a two-level enhancement to his total offense\nlevel under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of\ncriminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.”\n\n Because Buchanan objected at sentencing to the livelihood enhancement, we review the\ndistrict court’s decision to apply the enhancement for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that “significant procedural error[s]” amounting to an\nabuse of discretion include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines\nrange”). In assessing the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decisions,\nwe review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Cole,\n359 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2004).\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 16\n\n\n Applying de novo review to the district court’s legal conclusions, as we must, we\nconclude that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines when it applied the livelihood\nenhancement to Buchanan. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by calculating\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range under the wrong legal standard, and Buchanan is entitled to\nresentencing because the error was not harmless.\n\n Buchanan does not dispute that his activities constituted “a pattern of criminal conduct.”\nHe does dispute that this conduct was “engaged in as a livelihood.” To define “engaged in as a\nlivelihood,” § 2D1.1 cross-references § 4B1.3. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.20(C)). In turn,\nthe relevant application note to § 4B1.3 states that the district court must make two findings to\ndetermine that the defendant’s criminal conduct was engaged in as a livelihood. See id. § 4B1.3,\ncomment. (n.2).2 First, the district court must find that “the defendant derived income from the\npattern of criminal conduct that in any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then\nexisting hourly minimum wage under federal law.” Id. Second, the district court must find that\n“the totality of circumstances shows that such criminal conduct was the defendant’s primary\noccupation in that twelve-month period (e.g., the defendant engaged in criminal conduct rather\nthan regular, legitimate employment; or the defendant’s legitimate employment was merely a\nfront for the defendant’s criminal conduct).” Id.\n\n However, the district court sentenced Buchanan based on the understanding that § 4B1.3\nrequired only one finding: that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum\nwage in a twelve-month period. At sentencing, events transpired as follows.\n\n\n 2In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “[c]ommentary which\nfunctions to interpret a guideline or explain how it is to be applied . . . controls, and if failure to follow, or a\nmisreading of, such commentary results in a sentence selected from the wrong guideline range . . . , that sentence\nwould constitute an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” (cleaned up). Therefore, federal courts are\nto treat commentary to a particular Guidelines provision as an authoritative interpretation of that provision as long as\nthe interpretation “does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute” and is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent\nwith” the provision’s text. Id. at 45 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th\nCir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that because the list of controlled substance offenses in USSG § 4B1.2(b) does not\ncontain attempt crimes, the gloss on “controlled substance offense” in the commentary, which includes attempts, is\nnot a permissible “interpretation” of the Guidelines provision). Havis stated that “[c]ommentary binds courts only\n‘if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction.’” Havis, 927 F.3d at 386 (quoting\nStinson, 508 U.S. at 46). Because application note 2 to § 4B1.3 explains the meaning of “engaged in as a\nlivelihood” in a way that the text of the Guidelines provision will bear, rather than adding to a list or definition given\nin the text of the Guidelines provision, the application note is binding on federal courts under Stinson and Havis.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 17\n\n\n The prosecutor presented evidence that Buchanan had earned over $14,500, or 2,000\ntimes the relevant minimum wage of $7.25, in less than a twelve-month period. Specifically, the\ngovernment had estimated that Buchanan’s net income from marijuana sales, over a period of\neight months for which the government had data, was $384,000. The government arrived at this\nnumber by first subtracting $6,000 (a high-end estimate—based on evidence of wire transfers\nBuchanan had made that corresponded with package shipments—of how much he paid for each\npackage of marijuana) from $30,000 (the low end of Adams’s estimate of the value of the\npackage of marijuana intercepted by law enforcement) to reach an estimated profit per package\nof $24,000. Then, the government multiplied $24,000 by 16—an estimate of the number of\npackages Buchanan was responsible for, based on his stipulation to responsibility for 79.2\nkilograms of marijuana—to arrive at the $384,000 figure.\n\n When the prosecutor presented this estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income to the\ndistrict court in support of the livelihood enhancement, the district court pointed out that\nBuchanan’s PSR stated that he had been employed by his father’s trucking company since 2008\nand claimed to have earned $400 per week in that capacity. The district court then inquired,\n“Doesn’t [the phrase “engaged in as a livelihood”] suggest that that’s aimed at a Defendant who\ndoes nothing but criminal conduct?” R. 75, PageID 795. The prosecutor responded that the\ncommentary to § 2D1.1 “says that you look then to 4B1.3 Note 2 for the definition of a\nlivelihood. Not definition of a livelihood is simply—is not necessarily this totality, but it means\n2000 times the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.”3 Id. at PageID 795–96. After the\ndistrict court inquired more about how the government had arrived at its estimate of Buchanan’s\ncriminal income, the district court asked defense counsel if he had any comment.\n\n Defense counsel admitted that Buchanan had stipulated to the 79.2-kilogram figure but\nargued that he had not stipulated “to the value of any package.” Id. at PageID 798. Thus,\ndefense counsel argued that because the income attributed to Buchanan was based on an\nestimate, “I don’t believe the Government can sustain a burden, even by a preponderance, that\n\n\n\n 3The government’s sentencing memorandum also represented that the livelihood enhancement required\nonly an amount-of-income finding and said nothing about the “primary occupation” prong.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 18\n\n\nthere was a criminal livelihood here.” Id. at PageID 798–99. Defense counsel did not make any\narguments about the second element of the § 4B1.3 livelihood test, “primary occupation.”\n\n After asking more questions about the proper estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income,\nthe district court overruled Buchanan’s objection to the livelihood enhancement. However, the\ndistrict court stated that it believed the application of the enhancement was “a very close\nquestion” and that “the Government[] [had] very little evidence.” Id. at PageID 804. Explaining\nits reasoning, the district court continued:\n\n I think that the Defendant had long time significant employment for more—\n approaching ten years of time. And so I think it’s difficult to make a generalized\n claim that this drug dealing was engaged in as a livelihood, which the phrase from\n the Guidelines suggest[s] to me that livelihood refers to an almost independent\n occupation. But, under the Guideline you’ve pointed out and the commentary,\n I think there is sufficient evidence that he meets this minimum wage times 2000\n hours requirement.\n\nId. at PageID 805. Later, in announcing Buchanan’s sentence, the district court explained the\nfactors it had considered under § 3553(a). On the subject of Buchanan’s “history and\nbackground,” the district court stated, “He has had a—what appears to be a good work record,\nworking for his father. He earns a moderately reasonable amount of income in that [position].”\nId. at PageID 831.\n\n Based on this record, Buchanan argues that the district court made a factual finding that\nhe had an extensive record of working at a company that paid him regularly. Buchanan does not\nnow contest the district court’s finding that he made criminal income of more than 2,000 times\nthe minimum wage in a twelve-month period; instead, he argues that the district court improperly\nignored the need to make a “primary occupation” finding and that such a finding would be at\nodds with the district court’s statements about Buchanan’s legitimate work history.\n\n As the transcript portions quoted above show, the district court did make a factual\nfinding—which we should not disturb except on a finding of clear error—about Buchanan’s\nlegitimate work history. The district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the\npresentence report as a finding of fact.” United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.\n2013) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)). Here, the government never objected to the\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 19\n\n\nparagraph in Buchanan’s PSR stating that he had worked at his father’s company since 2008 and\nthat “[a]ccording to the defendant and his father, the defendant earned $400 weekly.” R. 49,\nPageID 296. Therefore, the district court did not err in accepting the information in that\nparagraph as fact and in crediting Buchanan’s and his father’s claims about his legitimate\nincome.4\n\n The transcript of the sentencing hearing also shows that the district court applied the\nenhancement under the impression that § 4B1.3 required only a finding of how much money the\ndefendant had made from criminal activity. Because the commentary to § 4B1.3 makes clear\nthat the district court must make two findings for the enhancement to apply, the district court\nerred in basing its application of the enhancement on only one of those findings.\n\n Furthermore, the district court’s error in interpreting the Guidelines was not harmless.\n\n There can be no harmless error unless the appellate court can determine from the\n record that the same sentence would be imposed on remand. For the government\n to carry its burden, it must demonstrate to the [c]ourt with certainty that the error\n at sentencing did not cause the defendant to receive a more severe sentence.\n\nUnited States v. Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks\nomitted); see also United States v. Salyers, 592 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a\nfour-level error in calculating the defendant’s base offense level was not harmless because “[t]he\ndistrict court did not indicate that it would have imposed the same 120-month sentence even if\ndefendant’s base offense level was 24”).\n\n\n\n\n 4The government attempts to cast doubt on whether Buchanan really earned $400 per week working for his\nfather’s company by alluding to evidence that it learned of post-sentencing. See Appellee Br. at 37 n.6. However,\nthe time for challenging the district court’s factual finding on this matter has passed for the purposes of our appellate\nreview. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1) (“Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties must state\nin writing any objections, including objections to material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy\nstatements contained in or omitted from the report.”); see also Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569,\n571 (6th Cir. 1982) (“A party may not by-pass the fact-finding process of the lower court and introduce new facts in\nits brief on appeal.”). Although the prosecutor mentioned in passing at the sentencing hearing that Buchanan’s\n“bank records don’t seem to show any pay checks coming in” that would corroborate Buchanan’s claim of\nlegitimate employment, the government did not object to the PSR on this basis. R. 75, PageID 795. Based on the\nun-objected-to statements in the PSR, the district court made a factual finding about Buchanan’s legitimate\nemployment that was not clearly erroneous.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 20\n\n\n Here, the enhancement resulted in a two-level addition to Buchanan’s offense level, and\nthe district court gave no indication that it would have given Buchanan the same sentence had his\ntotal offense level been calculated as 24 instead of 26. With a total offense level of 24,\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range would have been only 51 to 63 months. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt.A.\nIndeed, the district court repeatedly referenced Buchanan’s total offense level while announcing\nhis sentence, and the district court noted that Buchanan’s PSR listed the average sentence for a\ndrug-trafficking defendant in criminal history category I as 55 months. Apparently assuming\nthat that number applied to defendants with a total offense level of 28—two levels higher than\nBuchanan’s—the district court mused that the average sentence was probably lower than 55\nmonths for someone with a total offense level of 26. The district court then sentenced Buchanan\nto 50 months, a term of imprisonment thirteen months below the bottom of his Guidelines range\nand five months below the average sentence for what the district court believed to be a\ncomparable defendant. In sum, the record demonstrates that the district court took Buchanan’s\ntotal offense level very seriously in calculating his sentence and may well have sentenced him to\na shorter term of imprisonment had it calculated his Guidelines range differently.\n\n The government, however, urges us to affirm because Buchanan’s purported criminal\nincome of $384,000 (based on Adams’s testimony) dwarfs his claimed legitimate income of less\nthan $21,000. Crime was Buchanan’s primary occupation, goes the government’s argument,\nbecause it accounted for the vast majority of his income.\n\n We decline to adopt the government’s logic because it would require us to make two\nfactual findings in the first instance. First, that crime was a defendant’s “primary occupation” is\na factual finding requiring a totality-of-circumstances approach. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment.\n(n.2). The district court did not make any such finding because it was unaware of the\nrequirement. Second, to accept the government’s position, we would also need to accept as a\nmatter of fact that Buchanan’s criminal income for the relevant period was $384,000. But there\nare reasons to doubt this estimate (for example, it was based not on evidence of Buchanan’s\nactual sales but on one witness’s opinion about the average value of a given quantity of\nmarijuana in Cleveland). More importantly, the district court never made a factual finding on the\nrecord of exactly how much Buchanan’s criminal activity profited him. Instead, the district court\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 21\n\n\nmerely found that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum wage\nduring the relevant time period. At the same time, the district court reiterated that it found the\napplication of the enhancement was “a close question” but that “a preponderance of the\nevidence” supported the government’s position that Buchanan surpassed the threshold level of\ncriminal income. R. 75, PageID 805. In fact, the district court may have credited only\n$14,500.01 of the government’s estimate: that finding, on the district court’s erroneous reading\nof § 4B1.3, would have triggered the livelihood enhancement.\n\n As a reviewing court, we have no principled basis for accepting in total the government’s\nevidence of Buchanan’s criminal income when the district court did not. Instead, we are to\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error, see Cole, 359 F.3d at 425; if the district\ncourt failed to make a factual finding on a required element, we have no facts to review, and\nremand is the appropriate course of action, see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–93\n(1982).\n\n On remand, therefore, the district court must analyze whether, under the “totality of\ncircumstances,” Buchanan’s crimes were his “primary occupation.” Relevant factors in this\nanalysis may include an estimate of hours worked in each capacity as well as the amount of\nincome earned in each capacity. No particular ratio of, or difference between, illegitimate and\nlegitimate income automatically satisfies the “primary occupation” prong; to hold otherwise\nwould ignore § 4B1.3’s “totality of circumstances” language.5 Of course, if the district court\nfinds that Buchanan fits the description in either of the application note’s two non-exhaustive\nexamples—that of a defendant who “engaged in criminal conduct rather than regular, legitimate\nemployment” or whose “legitimate employment was merely a front for the defendant’s criminal\n\n 5United States v. Kellams, 26 F.3d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Reed, 951 F.2d 97, 101–02\n(6th Cir. 1991) do not affect our conclusion. In Kellams, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a\ndefendant who had net legitimate income of, at most, $4,268 and illegitimate income of $15,917.41 in the relevant\ntime period. See 26 F.3d at 649. In Reed, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a defendant who had\nlegitimate income of $350 and illegitimate income of more than $17,000. See 951 F.2d at 101–02. In neither case\ndid the defendant argue that the district court had failed to make the “primary occupation” finding. Unlike here, in\neach case we were reviewing a district court that had applied the correct legal standard and made factual findings\nthereunder. Reviewing these factual findings, both opinions noted the “totality of circumstances” language in the\napplication note to § 4B1.3 and held that the district court had not erred in applying the enhancement. See Kellams,\n26 F.3d at 649; Reed, 951 F.2d at 101–02. Appropriately, neither opinion announced a hard-and-fast rule for\ndetermining what proportion of illegitimate income triggers the enhancement.\n\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 22\n\n\nconduct”—the district court may apply the enhancement, given that it has already found the\n2,000-times-minimum-wage prong is satisfied. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment. (n.2).\n\n Finally, both the government and Buchanan may present new evidence on remand\nregarding whether crime was Buchanan’s “primary occupation.” See United States v. Doutt,\n926 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2019) (“When a district court applies the wrong legal standard at\nsentencing, the government may introduce additional evidence on remand that comports with the\nappropriate legal standard.” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 455\n& n.10 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that on remand, the government was entitled to present new\nevidence in support of the defendant’s designation as a career offender because the case\nannouncing the relevant standard had not yet been decided at the time of sentencing).\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Buchanan’s conviction but VACATE his\nsentence and REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the district court is instructed to revisit\nthe applicability of the livelihood enhancement under the correct legal standard.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kitroy Brian BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0173p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3667\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n KITROY BRIAN BUCHANAN, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.\\n No. 1:18-cr-00008-1—James S. Gwin, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: June 25, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: SUTTON, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: David Graham, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor,\\nMichigan, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,\\nCleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David Graham, Melissa M. Salinas,\\nUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nMatthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After a jury trial, Kitroy Brian Buchanan was convicted\\nof one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and one count of conspiracy to\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 2\\n\\n\\ndistribute marijuana. The district court sentenced him to 50 months’ imprisonment followed by\\nthree years of supervised release. Buchanan now appeals his conviction and sentence, and he\\nmakes four arguments. We find merit in one of his arguments—a challenge to a two-level\\nincrease in his offense level for committing a crime “as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\\nengaged in as a livelihood” under USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) and 4B1.3. Therefore, we\\nAFFIRM the district court’s judgment of conviction but VACATE Buchanan’s sentence and\\nREMAND for the district court to reconsider, under the proper legal standard, whether the\\nenhancement applies.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\nA. Factual Background\\n\\n In 2015, Buchanan, who was already involved in the marijuana trade, met a United States\\npostal worker named Dominique Hobbs in South Euclid, Ohio. Buchanan asked Hobbs if he\\nwould like to “do some business,” which Hobbs understood to mean that Buchanan wanted\\nHobbs to help him deliver illegal drugs. R. 73, PageID 544. Hobbs said he was interested, and\\nthe two men exchanged phone numbers. However, Hobbs was not able to help Buchanan\\nimmediately; he explained to Buchanan that he did not have a consistent postal route but was a\\n“U-person,” or utility carrier, who substituted for those with regular routes when they had to\\nmiss work. Id. at PageID 547–48.\\n\\n In November 2017, Hobbs let Buchanan know that he had obtained a regular postal route,\\nand the two began working together. Buchanan promised to pay Hobbs $200 in exchange for\\neach package Hobbs would deliver. Hobbs also supplied Buchanan with lists of addresses on\\nHobbs’s postal route so Buchanan would know where Hobbs, in conjunction with his mail\\ndeliveries, could deliver packages of marijuana.\\n\\n One day late in November 2017, Buchanan informed Hobbs that a package of marijuana\\nwas due to arrive in South Euclid soon, but Buchanan was not sure of the exact arrival date.\\nHobbs told Buchanan that he would not be able to deliver the package if it happened to arrive in\\ntown that coming Monday, because Hobbs was not working that day. As it turned out, however,\\nthe package arrived at the South Euclid post office that Monday. Buchanan had been tracking\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 3\\n\\n\\nthe package through the United States Postal Service’s website and alerted Hobbs. Although\\nHobbs reminded Buchanan that he was off duty, he agreed to help Buchanan try to lay hands on\\nthe package.\\n\\n Buchanan and Hobbs both drove to the post office. Hobbs asked his supervisor, who was\\ncovering Hobbs’s route that day, whether he had Buchanan’s package; the supervisor had not\\nseen it. Hobbs told Buchanan.\\n\\n Buchanan became enraged and began shouting at Hobbs, accusing him of stealing the\\npackage, which Hobbs denied. After Hobbs and Buchanan unsuccessfully made another attempt\\nto find the package at the post office, Buchanan cornered Hobbs, searched his car for the\\npackage, and then ordered him to chauffeur Buchanan around other postal carriers’ routes to ask\\nthe other carriers if they had the package. While he and Hobbs were in the car, Buchanan made\\n“[a]t least ten” phone calls to someone whom he told that Hobbs “had the package” and was\\n“hiding it from” Buchanan. Id. at PageID 585, 589.\\n\\n After a long and fruitless search along other carriers’ postal routes, Hobbs and Buchanan\\nhad not located the package. Buchanan let Hobbs go home, but he continued to call and send\\ntext messages to Hobbs, reiterating that he believed Hobbs had stolen the package and\\nsuggesting that for Hobbs’s own safety, he had better return the package to Buchanan.\\n\\n Fearing for his safety, Hobbs went to the police and made a complaint of kidnapping\\nagainst Buchanan, telling the police select details of his interactions with Buchanan without\\nadmitting that he had been complicit in any drug activity. Because Hobbs was a postal worker,\\nthe police communicated Hobbs’s accusation to the Postal Inspection Service, a law-enforcement\\narm of the United States Postal Service. Hobbs reiterated his story to the postal inspectors.\\nHaving learned from Hobbs some details about the kind of car Buchanan drove, law-enforcement\\nofficers then used database information to identify suspect vehicles; this investigation eventually\\nled them to Buchanan’s car and home. On December 8, 2017, officers conducted a drug sniff of\\nBuchanan’s car, and the dog alerted to the smell of narcotics from the car.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 4\\n\\n\\n Buchanan was arrested on a charge of kidnapping. Law-enforcement officers also\\nobtained and executed search warrants for Buchanan’s home, his car, and his cellphone.\\nThe search of Buchanan’s home revealed over 150 grams of marijuana, a vacuum sealer, and\\nplastic food-storage bags, among other evidence of marijuana trafficking. The search of the\\ncellphone revealed that Buchanan was tracking another package. Following the tracking\\ninformation from Buchanan’s cellphone, postal inspectors determined that the package was\\nheaded to an address on Hobbs’s route; the inspectors intercepted the package, obtained a search\\nwarrant, and opened the package to find 4.8 kilograms of marijuana. In addition, the inspectors\\ndetermined that the return address on the package—which purported to have come from\\nCalifornia—was fake.\\n\\n Because Hobbs’s complaint had led to Buchanan’s arrest, law-enforcement officers\\nquestioned Hobbs further and learned that Hobbs had concocted a false kidnapping complaint to\\nget Buchanan off his back without at the same time implicating himself in a marijuana-\\ndistribution scheme. After admitting that he had made up the kidnapping story, Hobbs also\\nadmitted to his agreement and cooperation with Buchanan. Hobbs eventually pled guilty to\\ncharges of lying to law enforcement and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to testify\\nagainst Buchanan.\\n\\nB. The Trial\\n\\n On January 4, 2018, Buchanan was indicted for one count of conspiracy to distribute a\\ncontrolled substance, one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,\\nand three counts of communicating threats in interstate commerce. Because Hobbs had admitted\\nthat Buchanan did not really kidnap him, the government dropped the kidnapping charge.\\n\\n At trial, Hobbs testified about his association with Buchanan, leading up to the day that\\nthe package went missing. Among other evidence, the government also presented testimony by\\ntwo postal inspectors, Michael Adams and Lauren Cajuste. Adams had participated in the search\\nof Buchanan’s home, and Cajuste had investigated the information found on Buchanan’s\\ncellphone.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 5\\n\\n\\n Adams testified that he had extensive experience and training in narcotics investigations\\nand had served eight years as a narcotics agent before becoming a postal inspector. He testified\\nthat, based on his experience, the amount of marijuana found in Buchanan’s home was a\\n“dealer/supplier amount” and that some of the food-packaging supplies found there were of the\\nsort commonly used by drug traffickers. Adams also testified that drug traffickers often use fake\\nreturn addresses when sending packages through the mail and that they often use express or\\npriority mail to reduce the risk that law enforcement will seize and search packages. Hobbs had\\ntestified, and the government’s exhibits at trial showed, that Buchanan had used priority mail to\\nship packages. Adams also testified that some of the messages Buchanan had sent to alleged co-\\nconspirators contained drug-traffickers’ jargon. Among other testimony, Adams also testified\\nthat ten pounds of marijuana—an amount comparable to that found in the intercepted package—\\nwas worth roughly $30,000 to $50,000 on the “street” in Cleveland. Id. at PageID 482.\\n\\n Cajuste stated that she had worked on financial investigations for the first six years of her\\ntime as a postal inspector before broadening her focus to include workplace violence as well as\\nfinancial investigations. She then testified at length about what the analysis of Buchanan’s\\ncellphone and financial records had revealed. Buchanan had communicated extensively with\\nsomeone in California about the delivery of packages, and he had sent the delivery addresses he\\nreceived from Hobbs to the California phone number. Buchanan’s contact in California would\\nsend Buchanan tracking information for each package, and Buchanan would track each package\\non the Postal Service’s website until it was delivered. According to Buchanan’s financial\\nrecords, Buchanan sent payments to accounts given to him by the California contact. In addition\\nto Cajuste’s testimony on these matters, the government presented numerous exhibits showing\\nBuchanan’s phone and tracking activity.\\n\\n Testimony and exhibits also established that, besides the California contact, Buchanan\\nregularly communicated with an individual located in or near Erie, Pennsylvania about\\ndelivering packages. Buchanan’s text messages with the Erie contact demonstrated that\\nBuchanan and the contact appeared to take turns driving to meet each other, and one would text\\nthe other when he was twenty minutes away from the meeting place. Buchanan’s financial\\nrecords showed that he frequently deposited money into his bank account after Erie trips.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 6\\n\\n\\n In addition to testifying about what she had learned through the investigation of\\nBuchanan’s cellphone and financial records, Cajuste testified about the implications of these\\nfindings based on her experience as a postal inspector. Specifically, Cajuste testified (on cross-\\nexamination) that one of the individuals with whom Buchanan had communicated about drug\\ndeliveries had used a “burner phone” that was not registered with any phone company. R. 74,\\nPageID 700. She continued, “You buy a burner phone, typically in most drug conspiracies most\\nindividuals use burner phones so they can avoid detection.” Id. at PageID 700–701. Cajuste also\\ntestified that Buchanan had sent and received messages via an application called WhatsApp, and\\nshe stated that “WhatsApp is a messaging system that is generally used because it has a heavy\\nencryption system.” R. 73, PageID 663.\\n\\n Buchanan did not call any witnesses and did not testify. Once the government’s case had\\nconcluded, the court went over the proposed jury instructions with the parties. Both parties had\\nsubmitted proposed instructions on “expert” or “opinion” testimony. In addition, the government\\nhad submitted a proposed instruction to address witnesses who gave mixed fact and opinion\\ntestimony, as Adams and Cajuste had done. However, when the prosecutor raised these\\ninstructions to the district court, the district court responded, “I don’t know that we had any\\nopinion testimony.” R. 74, PageID 735. The prosecutor began to explain that he viewed Adams\\nas having given both fact testimony based on his role in investigating Buchanan and opinion\\ntestimony based on his experience and training in narcotics investigations. The district court\\nreiterated, “Unless there’s some need, I didn’t think that would qualify as opinion testimony.”\\nId. Defense counsel agreed, “No, Your Honor.” Id. When it charged the jury, the district court\\ndid not give any instruction on opinion testimony or mixed fact and opinion testimony.\\n\\n The jury convicted Buchanan of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 846. He was acquitted of the threat counts.\\n\\nC. The Sentencing\\n\\n Before sentencing, Buchanan and the government stipulated that Buchanan was\\nresponsible for 79.2 kilograms of marijuana. Using this figure to obtain a base offense level of\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 7\\n\\n\\n20 and adding four two-level enhancements, Buchanan’s presentence report (“PSR”) calculated\\nhis total offense level as 28. At the sentencing hearing, the district court decided to apply only\\nthree of the enhancements and sentenced Buchanan based on a total offense level of 26.\\nRelevant to this appeal, Buchanan’s counsel objected to a two-level enhancement under USSG\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E)1 for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct\\nengaged in as a livelihood.” After hearing argument from both sides, the district court overruled\\nthe objection and applied the enhancement.\\n\\n Considering Buchanan’s criminal history category of I together with Buchanan’s total\\noffense level of 26, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. The\\ndistrict court then considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and decided to vary downward and\\nimpose a sentence of 50 months on each count. Finally, the district court decided to run the\\nsentences concurrently and to impose a three-year term of supervised release following the\\nprison term. Thus, Buchanan received a sentence of 50 months of imprisonment followed by\\nthree years of supervised release.\\n\\nD. The Appeal\\n\\n The district court entered judgment against Buchanan on July 9, 2018, and Buchanan\\ntimely appealed to this court. On appeal, Buchanan makes one challenge to his conviction and\\nthree challenges to his sentencing. First, he asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence\\nand remand for a new trial because, he argues, the district court erred in failing to instruct the\\njury properly on how to weigh the mixed fact and opinion testimony of Adams and Cajuste, and\\nthis failure prejudiced him.\\n\\n Second, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in sentencing him without\\nconsidering the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months on each of the counts of which he was\\nconvicted. Defense counsel did not raise this issue to the district court. Therefore, Buchanan’s\\nthird argument is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel did not\\nobject to the district court’s alleged failure to consider the statutory maximum sentence.\\n\\n 1The sentencing documents and the parties’ briefs refer to § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E). After Buchanan was\\nsentenced, however, the Guidelines were amended, and the relevant enhancement now appears in § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E).\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 8\\n\\n\\n Finally, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in imposing the two-level\\nenhancement for engaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood. He asks this court to remand for\\nresentencing on the basis of these asserted errors.\\n\\n We will address each of Buchanan’s arguments in turn.\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\nA. Instruction on Opinion Testimony\\n\\n Because defense counsel did not object to the district court’s lack of an instruction on\\nmixed fact and opinion testimony, this court would ordinarily review for plain error. See\\nJohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). Under that standard, this court may\\nreverse for “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights” if “(4) the error\\nseriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\\nStates v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 299 (6th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).\\nHowever, the government argues that this issue is not reviewable at all because Buchanan\\nwaived it by expressly agreeing with the district court that no instruction was needed. See\\nUnited States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An attorney cannot agree in open\\ncourt with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following\\nthat course.”); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is\\nthe failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\\nabandonment of a known right.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n Buchanan responds that even if he invited the district court’s error, this court should\\noverlook the waiver “because the interests of justice demand it.” Reply Br. at 14 (citing United\\nStates v. Savoires, 430 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 491\\n(6th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, Buchanan argues, he was no more at fault for inviting the error\\nthan was the government: both parties initially submitted proposed instructions on opinion\\ntestimony, but both parties later agreed with the district court that no such instruction was\\nnecessary.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 9\\n\\n\\n Although both the government and Buchanan have some case law on their sides, we need\\nnot declare a winner on the standard-of-review point: Buchanan’s claim fails even on plain-error\\nreview.\\n\\n Both parties agree that the district court should have given an instruction on how to\\nweigh mixed fact and opinion testimony. As we recognized in United States v. Lopez-Medina,\\n461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006), when law-enforcement officers testify both as to the facts of a\\ncase and as to their interpretation of those facts based on their experience, the district court must\\ngive a cautionary instruction. The instruction generally should inform the jury about the\\ndifference between fact and opinion testimony and let the jury know that it does not have to\\naccept opinion testimony. See id. at 743–44. In addition, the instruction should tell the jury to\\nconsider the witnesses’ qualifications and experience in deciding whether their testimony is\\ncredible. See id. In Lopez-Medina, as here, there was no “clear demarcation between [the] fact\\ntestimony and expert opinion testimony” given by certain government witnesses, and this court\\nfound “that the district court committed an error that was plain or obvious” in allowing the\\ntestimony of those witnesses without a cautionary instruction. Id. at 745. Lopez-Medina’s\\napplicability to this case is clear, and thus the first two elements of plain error have been met.\\n\\n However, the parties disagree over whether the district court’s failure to give the\\ninstruction here affected Buchanan’s substantial rights. “In the context of challenges to jury\\ninstructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so\\nclearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Semrau,\\n693 F.3d 510, 528 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Such a finding is proper “‘if the\\ninstructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial,’ and ‘the error\\nseriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” Id.\\n(citations omitted).\\n\\n Buchanan does not appear to argue that the jury instructions given by the district court\\nwere confusing or misleading, but he does argue that he was prejudiced by the missed\\ninstruction. According to Buchanan, he was prejudiced because Adams’s testimony that items\\nfound in Buchanan’s home were indicative of drug trafficking “essentially amounted to an expert\\nopinion that the items . . . demonstrated a conspiracy to distribute” marijuana. Appellant Br. at\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 10\\n\\n\\n26 (quoting Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745). And Buchanan argues that both Adams’s and\\nCajuste’s testimony was “critical to demonstrating . . . the requisite intent to distribute\\nmarijuana.” Appellant Br. at 28.\\n\\n The government makes three arguments in response. First, it points out that the Lopez-\\nMedina court reversed for plain error not solely on the basis of the missed instructions but,\\ninstead, on the cumulative basis of that error plus several additional errors at the defendant’s\\ntrial. See 461 F.3d at 745 (“We discuss the issue of prejudice as it pertains to all of the\\nevidentiary issues raised . . . .” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the government argues that the\\nmissed instructions alone do not entitle Buchanan to a new trial. Second, the government\\ncontends that all of the opinion testimony tended to show Buchanan’s involvement in marijuana\\ntrafficking, which he conceded at trial, and did not support the conspiracy count in particular,\\nwhich Buchanan contested. Finally, the government argues that other evidence so thoroughly\\nincriminated Buchanan that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony—even if improperly considered as\\nauthoritative by the jury—did not affect the verdict.\\n\\n Although the government is correct that this court reversed in Lopez-Medina on the basis\\nof more than just the missed instructions, we could still reverse in this case if the failure to give\\nthe instructions was prejudicial and “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public\\nreputation of the judicial proceedings.” See Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528. However, as discussed\\nbelow, we agree with the government that the error was not prejudicial because Buchanan\\nconceded most of the issues that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported. Furthermore, even\\nto the extent that Adams’s and Cajuste’s testimony supported the conspiracy conviction as\\nopposed to only the conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the government presented\\nsufficient additional evidence supporting the conspiracy conviction that the opinion testimony\\nwas cumulative and unlikely to have influenced the verdict.\\n\\n The elements of a drug distribution conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to violate drug\\nlaws . . . ; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the\\nconspiracy.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). On\\nthe other hand, the elements of possession with intent to distribute are “(1) knowingly or\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 11\\n\\n\\nintentionally, (2) possessing, (3) with the intent to distribute, (4) a controlled substance.” United\\nStates v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 576 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999).\\n\\n Defense counsel apparently made a strategic choice not to contest whether Buchanan\\npossessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it, or even whether Buchanan was involved in\\nactually trafficking marijuana. In his opening statement, defense counsel announced that “one\\nthing that [the prosecutor] and I will agree on, and we may not agree about much in this case, is\\nthat Kitroy Buchanan was a marijuana trafficker. He had marijuana in his apartment for sale.\\nHe received packages of marijuana from California for sale.” R. 73, PageID 436. Defense\\ncounsel then explained that he intended to contest whether Buchanan was involved in a\\nconspiracy and whether he had communicated threats in interstate commerce. Then, during\\nclosing argument, defense counsel repeated: “[Buchanan] possessed the marijuana, I’m not\\ndenying that. He was going to sell the marijuana, I’m not denying that, but the rest of this case\\nthe government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. 74, PageID 763.\\n\\n It is difficult to see which parts of Adams’s testimony tended to prove more than\\nBuchanan admitted. Much of the testimony that Buchanan now argues was prejudicial supported\\nthe propositions that Buchanan possessed commercial quantities of marijuana, intended to sell it,\\nor shipped and received packages of marijuana to and from various buyers and sellers. For\\nexample, Adams testified that the food-packaging materials found in Buchanan’s home were of a\\ntype commonly used by drug traffickers. But Buchanan admitted that he was a drug trafficker\\nand had intended to sell the marijuana found in his house. As another example, Adams testified\\nthat drug traffickers like to use priority or express mail, and the government presented evidence\\nthat Buchanan used priority mail. Again, however, Buchanan admitted that he both received\\nshipments of marijuana and intended to sell that which he had in his home.\\n\\n Furthermore, Adams’s testimony was cumulative. Hobbs’s testimony and the\\ngovernment’s exhibits amply corroborated it. For example, Hobbs testified that during the time\\nhe was in the car with Buchanan driving around and searching for the missing package,\\nBuchanan repeatedly spoke with someone on the phone about the package. That testimony\\nsupported the theory that Buchanan was conspiring with at least one person to distribute\\nmarijuana. Hobbs also testified that he sent Buchanan lists of addresses to which Buchanan then\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 12\\n\\n\\nhad packages delivered. This testimony supported the same factual findings that Adams’s\\ntestimony supported: Buchanan bought and sold marijuana and had it shipped through the mail.\\n\\n Similarly, most of Cajuste’s testimony simply duplicated what other evidence showed.\\nTrue, Cajuste did give some opinion testimony that was not cumulative: she testified that\\nWhatsApp and burner phones are used to avoid detection, and she did so in terms that suggested\\nBuchanan was involved in a drug conspiracy. However, this testimony added little to the dozens\\nof exhibits presented by the government showing messages and phone calls between Buchanan\\nand individuals in California and Pennsylvania; financial records demonstrating payments\\ncorresponding with some of those communications; and Hobbs’s testimony about hearing\\nBuchanan discussing the missing package on the phone, among other evidence. Had Cajuste not\\ntestified about her experience with the use of WhatsApp and burner phones, it is very unlikely\\nthe jury would have reached a different conclusion about whether Buchanan conspired with\\nothers to distribute marijuana.\\n\\n In sum, Buchanan has not demonstrated that the lack of a jury instruction on mixed fact\\nand opinion testimony affected his substantial rights. Therefore, Buchanan cannot meet his\\nburden on plain-error review, and we affirm Buchanan’s conviction of the two drug counts.\\n\\nB. The District Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider the Statutory Maximum Sentence\\n\\n Next, Buchanan argues that the district court sentenced him based on the wrong\\nGuidelines range because it did not take into account the statutory maximum sentence of 60\\nmonths on each of his counts of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Buchanan did not\\nraise this argument to the district court, so we review for plain error. See United States v.\\nRosenbaum, 585 F.3d 259, 266–67 (6th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n As discussed above, the district court found that Buchanan’s total offense level and\\ncriminal history category produced an advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months of\\nimprisonment. The district court then sentenced Buchanan while assuming that this Guidelines\\nrange applied. But Buchanan argues that the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months should\\nhave replaced the 63-to-78-month range as his Guidelines range under USSG § 5G1.1(a).\\nSection 5G1.1(a) provides: “Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 13\\n\\n\\nminimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall\\nbe the guideline sentence.”\\n\\n However, § 5G1.1(a) applies only to single-count convictions. For convictions on\\nmultiple counts, the Guidelines range is not replaced by the statutory maximum on any count.\\nInstead, § 5G1.2(b) provides that the district court “shall determine the total punishment and\\nshall impose that total punishment on each . . . count, except to the extent otherwise required by\\nlaw.” Next, § 5G1.2(c) provides that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the\\nhighest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all\\ncounts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.” Here, the district\\ncourt calculated Buchanan’s Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and departed\\ndownward to impose a total punishment of 50 months of imprisonment. The district court then\\nimposed a sentence of 50 months on each count. Each count of conviction had the same\\nstatutory maximum, so either of the two 50-month sentences qualified as the sentence imposed\\non the count with the “highest” statutory maximum under § 5G1.2(c). Thus, the sentence\\nimposed on the count with the highest statutory maximum was adequate to achieve the total\\npunishment of 50 months. The district court correctly decided to run the two 50-month\\nsentences concurrently. See USSG § 5G1.2(c).\\n\\n Buchanan cites Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) for the\\nproposition that on plain-error review, “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect\\nGuidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of\\na different outcome absent the error.” However, because Buchanan has not demonstrated that\\nthe district court calculated his Guidelines range incorrectly in light of the statutory maximum,\\nhe has not shown that the district court erred at all. Therefore, we need not address Buchanan’s\\nargument based on Molina-Martinez, which presupposes error and addresses only how a\\ndefendant can show that the error was plain.\\n\\n One final argument deserves attention. In his reply brief, Buchanan acknowledges that\\n“the government correctly asserts that the district court could have sentenced [him] to\\nconsecutive terms if it made findings in support of that sentence.” Reply Br. at 10. With that\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 14\\n\\n\\nstatement, Buchanan appears to admit that the district court was not bound to treat the statutory\\nmaximum as his Guidelines sentence. Nevertheless, Buchanan argues, the district court still\\nshould have considered the statutory maximum because “awareness of the statutory limits would\\nhave assisted the court in rendering a just sentence.” Id. at 11. In other words, Buchanan argues\\nthat because the statutory maximum sentence has an “anchoring effect” on the district court’s\\nsentencing decisions, the district court’s failure to consider the statutory maximum may have\\nresulted in a higher sentence for Buchanan. Id. (quoting United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960,\\n966 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n It is not clear whether Buchanan intends to abandon his Molina-Martinez argument—in\\nother words, that his sentence was based on an incorrect Guidelines range—and rely solely on\\nthe “anchoring effect” argument. Regardless, his “anchoring effect” argument lacks merit. The\\nsentence from the Seventh Circuit case Buchanan cites reads in full: “Statutory minima and\\nmaxima have an obvious anchoring effect on the judge’s determination of a reasonable sentence\\nin the sense that they demarcate the range within which the judge may impose a sentence.”\\nCurrie, 739 F.3d at 966. In Currie, the district court mistakenly identified the statutory\\nminimum as ten years when, in fact, it was five years. Id. at 964. Here, by contrast, there is no\\nevidence that the district court mistook the relevant statutory maximum. Buchanan’s PSR\\naccurately listed the statutory maximum sentence on each of his counts of conviction as five\\nyears. Cf. id. (“[I]n sentencing [Currie] to a 121-month term, [the district court] remarked that it\\nwas bound by the ten-year minimum . . . .”). And as explained above, the district court’s\\nsentencing decision comported both with the relevant statutory maximum and with USSG\\n§ 5G1.2. Because the district court did not rely on an incorrect statutory maximum or minimum\\nsentence, Buchanan’s sentence was not erroneously “anchored” in the sense Currie addresses.\\n\\n Most importantly, Buchanan’s argument focuses on prejudice: he claims his substantial\\nrights were affected because the district court was not aware of a factor—the statutory\\nmaximum—that might have led it to sentence him to a shorter term of imprisonment. To pass\\nthe plain-error barrier, however, Buchanan must first show an error at sentencing. And without\\nhis argument that the statutory maximum should have become his Guidelines sentence,\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 15\\n\\n\\nBuchanan makes no argument that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range.\\nTherefore, he fails to show plain error.\\n\\nC. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\\n\\n Buchanan next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense\\ncounsel failed to raise the statutory maximum in the district court. Ordinarily, we do not review\\non direct appeal ineffective-assistance claims that were not raised in the district court. See\\nUnited States v. Hughes, 733 F. App’x 299, 299 (6th Cir. 2018). Although we may review such\\na claim if it “depend[s] entirely upon facts within the record or . . . present[s] purely legal\\nquestions,” United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), that\\nexception is a narrow one; as a general rule, ineffective-assistance claims “are best brought by a\\ndefendant in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 so that the parties can develop\\nan adequate record on the issue,” United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1997)\\n(citation omitted). Here, we will follow the general rule and decline to review Buchanan’s\\nineffective-assistance claim.\\n\\nD. Enhancement for a Pattern of Criminal Conduct Engaged in as a Livelihood\\n\\n Finally, we come to the issue that requires a remand for resentencing. Buchanan argues,\\nand we agree, that the district court erred in adding a two-level enhancement to his total offense\\nlevel under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) for “committ[ing] the offense as part of a pattern of\\ncriminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.”\\n\\n Because Buchanan objected at sentencing to the livelihood enhancement, we review the\\ndistrict court’s decision to apply the enhancement for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that “significant procedural error[s]” amounting to an\\nabuse of discretion include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines\\nrange”). In assessing the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decisions,\\nwe review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Cole,\\n359 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2004).\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 16\\n\\n\\n Applying de novo review to the district court’s legal conclusions, as we must, we\\nconclude that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines when it applied the livelihood\\nenhancement to Buchanan. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by calculating\\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range under the wrong legal standard, and Buchanan is entitled to\\nresentencing because the error was not harmless.\\n\\n Buchanan does not dispute that his activities constituted “a pattern of criminal conduct.”\\nHe does dispute that this conduct was “engaged in as a livelihood.” To define “engaged in as a\\nlivelihood,” § 2D1.1 cross-references § 4B1.3. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.20(C)). In turn,\\nthe relevant application note to § 4B1.3 states that the district court must make two findings to\\ndetermine that the defendant’s criminal conduct was engaged in as a livelihood. See id. § 4B1.3,\\ncomment. (n.2).2 First, the district court must find that “the defendant derived income from the\\npattern of criminal conduct that in any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then\\nexisting hourly minimum wage under federal law.” Id. Second, the district court must find that\\n“the totality of circumstances shows that such criminal conduct was the defendant’s primary\\noccupation in that twelve-month period (e.g., the defendant engaged in criminal conduct rather\\nthan regular, legitimate employment; or the defendant’s legitimate employment was merely a\\nfront for the defendant’s criminal conduct).” Id.\\n\\n However, the district court sentenced Buchanan based on the understanding that § 4B1.3\\nrequired only one finding: that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum\\nwage in a twelve-month period. At sentencing, events transpired as follows.\\n\\n\\n 2In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “[c]ommentary which\\nfunctions to interpret a guideline or explain how it is to be applied . . . controls, and if failure to follow, or a\\nmisreading of, such commentary results in a sentence selected from the wrong guideline range . . . , that sentence\\nwould constitute an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” (cleaned up). Therefore, federal courts are\\nto treat commentary to a particular Guidelines provision as an authoritative interpretation of that provision as long as\\nthe interpretation “does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute” and is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent\\nwith” the provision’s text. Id. at 45 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th\\nCir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that because the list of controlled substance offenses in USSG § 4B1.2(b) does not\\ncontain attempt crimes, the gloss on “controlled substance offense” in the commentary, which includes attempts, is\\nnot a permissible “interpretation” of the Guidelines provision). Havis stated that “[c]ommentary binds courts only\\n‘if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction.’” Havis, 927 F.3d at 386 (quoting\\nStinson, 508 U.S. at 46). Because application note 2 to § 4B1.3 explains the meaning of “engaged in as a\\nlivelihood” in a way that the text of the Guidelines provision will bear, rather than adding to a list or definition given\\nin the text of the Guidelines provision, the application note is binding on federal courts under Stinson and Havis.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 17\\n\\n\\n The prosecutor presented evidence that Buchanan had earned over $14,500, or 2,000\\ntimes the relevant minimum wage of $7.25, in less than a twelve-month period. Specifically, the\\ngovernment had estimated that Buchanan’s net income from marijuana sales, over a period of\\neight months for which the government had data, was $384,000. The government arrived at this\\nnumber by first subtracting $6,000 (a high-end estimate—based on evidence of wire transfers\\nBuchanan had made that corresponded with package shipments—of how much he paid for each\\npackage of marijuana) from $30,000 (the low end of Adams’s estimate of the value of the\\npackage of marijuana intercepted by law enforcement) to reach an estimated profit per package\\nof $24,000. Then, the government multiplied $24,000 by 16—an estimate of the number of\\npackages Buchanan was responsible for, based on his stipulation to responsibility for 79.2\\nkilograms of marijuana—to arrive at the $384,000 figure.\\n\\n When the prosecutor presented this estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income to the\\ndistrict court in support of the livelihood enhancement, the district court pointed out that\\nBuchanan’s PSR stated that he had been employed by his father’s trucking company since 2008\\nand claimed to have earned $400 per week in that capacity. The district court then inquired,\\n“Doesn’t [the phrase “engaged in as a livelihood”] suggest that that’s aimed at a Defendant who\\ndoes nothing but criminal conduct?” R. 75, PageID 795. The prosecutor responded that the\\ncommentary to § 2D1.1 “says that you look then to 4B1.3 Note 2 for the definition of a\\nlivelihood. Not definition of a livelihood is simply—is not necessarily this totality, but it means\\n2000 times the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.”3 Id. at PageID 795–96. After the\\ndistrict court inquired more about how the government had arrived at its estimate of Buchanan’s\\ncriminal income, the district court asked defense counsel if he had any comment.\\n\\n Defense counsel admitted that Buchanan had stipulated to the 79.2-kilogram figure but\\nargued that he had not stipulated “to the value of any package.” Id. at PageID 798. Thus,\\ndefense counsel argued that because the income attributed to Buchanan was based on an\\nestimate, “I don’t believe the Government can sustain a burden, even by a preponderance, that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3The government’s sentencing memorandum also represented that the livelihood enhancement required\\nonly an amount-of-income finding and said nothing about the “primary occupation” prong.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 18\\n\\n\\nthere was a criminal livelihood here.” Id. at PageID 798–99. Defense counsel did not make any\\narguments about the second element of the § 4B1.3 livelihood test, “primary occupation.”\\n\\n After asking more questions about the proper estimate of Buchanan’s criminal income,\\nthe district court overruled Buchanan’s objection to the livelihood enhancement. However, the\\ndistrict court stated that it believed the application of the enhancement was “a very close\\nquestion” and that “the Government[] [had] very little evidence.” Id. at PageID 804. Explaining\\nits reasoning, the district court continued:\\n\\n I think that the Defendant had long time significant employment for more—\\n approaching ten years of time. And so I think it’s difficult to make a generalized\\n claim that this drug dealing was engaged in as a livelihood, which the phrase from\\n the Guidelines suggest[s] to me that livelihood refers to an almost independent\\n occupation. But, under the Guideline you’ve pointed out and the commentary,\\n I think there is sufficient evidence that he meets this minimum wage times 2000\\n hours requirement.\\n\\nId. at PageID 805. Later, in announcing Buchanan’s sentence, the district court explained the\\nfactors it had considered under § 3553(a). On the subject of Buchanan’s “history and\\nbackground,” the district court stated, “He has had a—what appears to be a good work record,\\nworking for his father. He earns a moderately reasonable amount of income in that [position].”\\nId. at PageID 831.\\n\\n Based on this record, Buchanan argues that the district court made a factual finding that\\nhe had an extensive record of working at a company that paid him regularly. Buchanan does not\\nnow contest the district court’s finding that he made criminal income of more than 2,000 times\\nthe minimum wage in a twelve-month period; instead, he argues that the district court improperly\\nignored the need to make a “primary occupation” finding and that such a finding would be at\\nodds with the district court’s statements about Buchanan’s legitimate work history.\\n\\n As the transcript portions quoted above show, the district court did make a factual\\nfinding—which we should not disturb except on a finding of clear error—about Buchanan’s\\nlegitimate work history. The district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the\\npresentence report as a finding of fact.” United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.\\n2013) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)). Here, the government never objected to the\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 19\\n\\n\\nparagraph in Buchanan’s PSR stating that he had worked at his father’s company since 2008 and\\nthat “[a]ccording to the defendant and his father, the defendant earned $400 weekly.” R. 49,\\nPageID 296. Therefore, the district court did not err in accepting the information in that\\nparagraph as fact and in crediting Buchanan’s and his father’s claims about his legitimate\\nincome.4\\n\\n The transcript of the sentencing hearing also shows that the district court applied the\\nenhancement under the impression that § 4B1.3 required only a finding of how much money the\\ndefendant had made from criminal activity. Because the commentary to § 4B1.3 makes clear\\nthat the district court must make two findings for the enhancement to apply, the district court\\nerred in basing its application of the enhancement on only one of those findings.\\n\\n Furthermore, the district court’s error in interpreting the Guidelines was not harmless.\\n\\n There can be no harmless error unless the appellate court can determine from the\\n record that the same sentence would be imposed on remand. For the government\\n to carry its burden, it must demonstrate to the [c]ourt with certainty that the error\\n at sentencing did not cause the defendant to receive a more severe sentence.\\n\\nUnited States v. Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks\\nomitted); see also United States v. Salyers, 592 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a\\nfour-level error in calculating the defendant’s base offense level was not harmless because “[t]he\\ndistrict court did not indicate that it would have imposed the same 120-month sentence even if\\ndefendant’s base offense level was 24”).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4The government attempts to cast doubt on whether Buchanan really earned $400 per week working for his\\nfather’s company by alluding to evidence that it learned of post-sentencing. See Appellee Br. at 37 n.6. However,\\nthe time for challenging the district court’s factual finding on this matter has passed for the purposes of our appellate\\nreview. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1) (“Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties must state\\nin writing any objections, including objections to material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy\\nstatements contained in or omitted from the report.”); see also Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569,\\n571 (6th Cir. 1982) (“A party may not by-pass the fact-finding process of the lower court and introduce new facts in\\nits brief on appeal.”). Although the prosecutor mentioned in passing at the sentencing hearing that Buchanan’s\\n“bank records don’t seem to show any pay checks coming in” that would corroborate Buchanan’s claim of\\nlegitimate employment, the government did not object to the PSR on this basis. R. 75, PageID 795. Based on the\\nun-objected-to statements in the PSR, the district court made a factual finding about Buchanan’s legitimate\\nemployment that was not clearly erroneous.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 20\\n\\n\\n Here, the enhancement resulted in a two-level addition to Buchanan’s offense level, and\\nthe district court gave no indication that it would have given Buchanan the same sentence had his\\ntotal offense level been calculated as 24 instead of 26. With a total offense level of 24,\\nBuchanan’s Guidelines range would have been only 51 to 63 months. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt.A.\\nIndeed, the district court repeatedly referenced Buchanan’s total offense level while announcing\\nhis sentence, and the district court noted that Buchanan’s PSR listed the average sentence for a\\ndrug-trafficking defendant in criminal history category I as 55 months. Apparently assuming\\nthat that number applied to defendants with a total offense level of 28—two levels higher than\\nBuchanan’s—the district court mused that the average sentence was probably lower than 55\\nmonths for someone with a total offense level of 26. The district court then sentenced Buchanan\\nto 50 months, a term of imprisonment thirteen months below the bottom of his Guidelines range\\nand five months below the average sentence for what the district court believed to be a\\ncomparable defendant. In sum, the record demonstrates that the district court took Buchanan’s\\ntotal offense level very seriously in calculating his sentence and may well have sentenced him to\\na shorter term of imprisonment had it calculated his Guidelines range differently.\\n\\n The government, however, urges us to affirm because Buchanan’s purported criminal\\nincome of $384,000 (based on Adams’s testimony) dwarfs his claimed legitimate income of less\\nthan $21,000. Crime was Buchanan’s primary occupation, goes the government’s argument,\\nbecause it accounted for the vast majority of his income.\\n\\n We decline to adopt the government’s logic because it would require us to make two\\nfactual findings in the first instance. First, that crime was a defendant’s “primary occupation” is\\na factual finding requiring a totality-of-circumstances approach. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment.\\n(n.2). The district court did not make any such finding because it was unaware of the\\nrequirement. Second, to accept the government’s position, we would also need to accept as a\\nmatter of fact that Buchanan’s criminal income for the relevant period was $384,000. But there\\nare reasons to doubt this estimate (for example, it was based not on evidence of Buchanan’s\\nactual sales but on one witness’s opinion about the average value of a given quantity of\\nmarijuana in Cleveland). More importantly, the district court never made a factual finding on the\\nrecord of exactly how much Buchanan’s criminal activity profited him. Instead, the district court\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 21\\n\\n\\nmerely found that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum wage\\nduring the relevant time period. At the same time, the district court reiterated that it found the\\napplication of the enhancement was “a close question” but that “a preponderance of the\\nevidence” supported the government’s position that Buchanan surpassed the threshold level of\\ncriminal income. R. 75, PageID 805. In fact, the district court may have credited only\\n$14,500.01 of the government’s estimate: that finding, on the district court’s erroneous reading\\nof § 4B1.3, would have triggered the livelihood enhancement.\\n\\n As a reviewing court, we have no principled basis for accepting in total the government’s\\nevidence of Buchanan’s criminal income when the district court did not. Instead, we are to\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error, see Cole, 359 F.3d at 425; if the district\\ncourt failed to make a factual finding on a required element, we have no facts to review, and\\nremand is the appropriate course of action, see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–93\\n(1982).\\n\\n On remand, therefore, the district court must analyze whether, under the “totality of\\ncircumstances,” Buchanan’s crimes were his “primary occupation.” Relevant factors in this\\nanalysis may include an estimate of hours worked in each capacity as well as the amount of\\nincome earned in each capacity. No particular ratio of, or difference between, illegitimate and\\nlegitimate income automatically satisfies the “primary occupation” prong; to hold otherwise\\nwould ignore § 4B1.3’s “totality of circumstances” language.5 Of course, if the district court\\nfinds that Buchanan fits the description in either of the application note’s two non-exhaustive\\nexamples—that of a defendant who “engaged in criminal conduct rather than regular, legitimate\\nemployment” or whose “legitimate employment was merely a front for the defendant’s criminal\\n\\n 5United States v. Kellams, 26 F.3d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Reed, 951 F.2d 97, 101–02\\n(6th Cir. 1991) do not affect our conclusion. In Kellams, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a\\ndefendant who had net legitimate income of, at most, $4,268 and illegitimate income of $15,917.41 in the relevant\\ntime period. See 26 F.3d at 649. In Reed, we affirmed the application of the enhancement to a defendant who had\\nlegitimate income of $350 and illegitimate income of more than $17,000. See 951 F.2d at 101–02. In neither case\\ndid the defendant argue that the district court had failed to make the “primary occupation” finding. Unlike here, in\\neach case we were reviewing a district court that had applied the correct legal standard and made factual findings\\nthereunder. Reviewing these factual findings, both opinions noted the “totality of circumstances” language in the\\napplication note to § 4B1.3 and held that the district court had not erred in applying the enhancement. See Kellams,\\n26 F.3d at 649; Reed, 951 F.2d at 101–02. Appropriately, neither opinion announced a hard-and-fast rule for\\ndetermining what proportion of illegitimate income triggers the enhancement.\\n\\f No. 18-3667 United States v. Buchanan Page 22\\n\\n\\nconduct”—the district court may apply the enhancement, given that it has already found the\\n2,000-times-minimum-wage prong is satisfied. See USSG § 4B1.3, comment. (n.2).\\n\\n Finally, both the government and Buchanan may present new evidence on remand\\nregarding whether crime was Buchanan’s “primary occupation.” See United States v. Doutt,\\n926 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2019) (“When a district court applies the wrong legal standard at\\nsentencing, the government may introduce additional evidence on remand that comports with the\\nappropriate legal standard.” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 455\\n& n.10 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that on remand, the government was entitled to present new\\nevidence in support of the defendant’s designation as a career offender because the case\\nannouncing the relevant standard had not yet been decided at the time of sentencing).\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Buchanan’s conviction but VACATE his\\nsentence and REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the district court is instructed to revisit\\nthe applicability of the livelihood enhancement under the correct legal standard.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3066,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4644298,"string":"4,644,298"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jorge MORENO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jorge Moreno-Martinez v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-31"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3798"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Cole, Griffin, Bush\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0174p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JORGE MORENO-MARTINEZ, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3798\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from a Final Order of the Department of Homeland Security;\\n No. A 099 996 338.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Sufen Hilf, HILF & HILF, PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Petitioner. Justin R. Markel,\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Jorge Moreno-Martinez petitions for review of the order\\nof the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstating Moreno-Martinez’s order of\\nremoval. Moreno-Martinez argues that he was denied due process because he and his counsel\\ndid not receive a copy of the reinstatement order and did not have the opportunity to argue\\nagainst the validity of his underlying removal order. Moreno-Martinez’s constitutional challenge\\nto the reinstatement order has no merit because, even assuming a due-process violation occurred,\\nhe has not demonstrated prejudice from that violation. In fact, there can be no prejudice because\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\nwe have no jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order, given that Petitioner failed to\\nchallenge that order within thirty days of its issuance, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\\nWe therefore DENY the petition for review.\\n\\n Moreno-Martinez is a native and citizen of Honduras. He arrived in the United States in\\n1999, returned to Honduras in 2003, and then reentered the United States in 2004. On January 3,\\n2007, DHS issued a notice of removal. In a document titled “Notice to Appear,” DHS charged\\nPetitioner with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he is “[a]n alien present in the\\nUnited States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time\\nor place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” That document also ordered\\nMoreno-Martinez to appear on “a date to be set” at “a time to be set.” Almost two months later,\\non February 28, 2007, the immigration court sent Petitioner a “Notice of Hearing in Removal\\nProceedings.” The Notice of Hearing set June 26, 2007, as the initial hearing date for his\\nremoval proceedings.\\n\\n Petitioner then entered removal proceedings, during which he conceded his charges of\\nremovability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for asylum,\\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the CAT, but granted his additional request for\\nvoluntary removal upon payment of a $500 bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)\\naffirmed the immigration judge’s decision, denied reinstating the voluntary removal period\\nbecause of lack of proof that Petitioner paid the bond, and ordered Petitioner to be removed from\\nthe United States. Moreno-Martinez did not petition this court for review of the removal order at\\nthat time.\\n\\n Pursuant to the removal order, Moreno-Martinez left the United States on February 24,\\n2012. He later returned to the United States, and on August 1, 2018, Immigration and Customs\\nEnforcement detained him. On that same day, DHS filed a Notice of Intent to reinstate its\\nprevious removal order dated June 17, 2011. This timely petition for review of the reinstatement\\norder followed.\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\n We “treat[] reinstatement orders like removal orders for purposes of our review of them.”\\nVillegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly,\\nwe review legal questions de novo. Id. at 655 (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th\\nCir. 2009)). “[A]dministrative findings of fact,” by contrast, “are conclusive unless\\nany reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1252(b)(4)(B).\\n\\n Moreno-Martinez contends that “DHS violated its own procedures which resulted in\\nsevere violation of the Petitioner’s right to due process” because “DHS did not provide Petitioner\\nor his counsel a copy of the reinstatement order, nor did they allow him to make a statement\\ncontesting the reinstatement determination.” Pet’r Br. at 5. According to Petitioner, had DHS\\ngiven him “the notice of reinstatement and allowed [him] to make a statement, he would have\\nbeen able to present an argument as to why his underlying removal order was invalid” in light of\\nPereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pet’r Br. at 5–6. Under his theory, the immigration\\ncourt never had jurisdiction to issue the underlying removal order because his notice to appear\\nlacked specific time-and-date information. As a result, the removal order was void ab initio.\\n\\n Before turning to the crux of Petitioner’s argument, however, we address the\\ngovernment’s assertion that this court “lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s collateral\\nchallenge to his prior order of removal.” Resp’t Br. at 4. The government’s argument, given the\\nunderlying statutory framework, actually presents us with a two-fold inquiry. First, we must\\naddress whether we have jurisdiction to review a reinstatement order in light of 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1231(a)(5), 1252(a)(2)(D). And second, if we have such jurisdiction to review the\\nreinstatement order, we must determine whether Moreno-Martinez is entitled to the relief he\\nrequests, which in turn would require that this court have jurisdiction to reopen the removal\\norder. As explained below, we have jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s due-process\\nchallenge to the reinstatement order because it presents a constitutional issue that we may review\\nunder the jurisdictional grant in § 1252(a)(2)(D). We may not, however, grant the relief that\\nMoreno-Martinez seeks because we lack jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order.\\nThe petition cannot be granted because it is an untimely collateral attack on the validity of the\\nremoval order, which is time-barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\n Our inquiry begins with the two principal statutory provisions relating to our jurisdiction\\nover petitions for review of reinstatement of removal orders: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(5) and\\n1252(a)(2)(D). Ordinarily, if DHS “finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally\\nafter having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior\\norder of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or\\nreviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In Villegas, however, we joined our sister circuits in holding\\nthat 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) “re-vests the circuit courts with jurisdiction over constitutional\\nclaims or questions of law raised in the context of reinstatement proceedings.” 640 F.3d at 656.\\n(citations omitted) (listing cases). We therefore have jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s due-process\\nchallenge to the reinstatement order. That we have jurisdiction to review the petition, however,\\ndoes not mean that Petitioner’s due-process challenge entitles him to the relief he seeks—that is,\\nthe reopening of the underlying removal order. Assuming that a due-process violation occurred,\\nMoreno-Martinez still must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. See id.; Graham v.\\nMukasey, 519 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e need not address the merits of a claim if\\nthere is no demonstration of prejudice.” (citation omitted)). This in turn requires showing that\\nthe alleged error “led to a substantially different outcome from that which would have occurred\\nin the absence of [the] violation[].” Graham, 519 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The sole basis for Moreno-Martinez’s prejudice argument is that he was denied the\\nopportunity to argue that the immigration judge and the BIA were without jurisdiction to enter\\nthe underlying removal order because the Notice to Appear did not include the date and time for\\nthe initial hearing date.1 However, because (as explained below) we lack jurisdiction to review\\nthe validity of the removal order, Petitioner’s claim must fail; he cannot have been prejudiced by\\nan inability to make arguments to us that we do not have jurisdiction to hear. Cf. Casillas v.\\nHolder, 656 F.3d 273, 275 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n\\n 1To be sure, we would have jurisdiction to review a constitutional claim or question of law relating to his\\nreinstatement proceedings or reinstatement order. See Ovalle-Ruiz v. Holder, 591 F. App’x 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2014)\\n(holding there was jurisdiction to review challenge that DHS abused its discretion because it reinstated the removal\\norder without considering all the relevant favorable and unfavorable factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion).\\nBut Moreno-Martinez’s challenge is different. Moreno-Martinez has framed a question of law that would require us\\nto review the validity of his underlying removal order and thus his challenge ultimately amounts to a collateral\\nattack on the underlying removal order. Indeed, he asks us to “vacate[] the Petitioner’s reinstatement order as well\\nas his underlying removal order.” Pet’r Br. at 10.\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\n We lack jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s assertion that “the Immigration Court\\nnever ‘vested’ jurisdiction over these proceedings,” Pet’r Br. at 8, and vacate the removal order,\\nbecause that challenge is time-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). All petitions for review of\\nfinal orders of removal “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of\\nremoval.” Id.; Prekaj v. INS, 384 F.3d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that this deadline is\\n“both mandatory and jurisdictional” (quotation marks omitted)); accord Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d\\n180, 185 (6th Cir. 2010). When DHS reinstates “a prior removal order in illegal reentry cases,\\nDHS does not reissue the prior order (which would restart the 30-day period within which the\\nalien may file a petition for review) but reinstates the prior order ‘from its original date.’”\\nJuarez-Chavez v. Holder, 515 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).\\nThus, any challenge (collateral or otherwise) filed 30 days after the removal order was filed is\\nuntimely and we have no jurisdictional basis to entertain the challenge. 2 Because this collateral\\nchallenge to the removal order was filed well after the 30-day deadline passed, we lack\\njurisdiction to grant Petitioner’s proposed remedy—i.e., to reopen the underlying removal\\norder—and therefore his due-process challenge to the reinstatement order lacks merit.3\\n\\n For all these reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2We recognize that this court in Villegas, 640 F.3d at 656–57, reached the merits of an alien’s due-process\\nchallenge in the context of a petition for review of a reinstatement order. However, Villegas does not control with\\nrespect to this jurisdictional issue because it did not address the jurisdictional relationship between the scope of\\nreview outlined in § 1252(a)(2)(D) and the 30-day deadline in § 1252(b)(1), which is also mandatory and\\njurisdictional. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[T]he existence of unaddressed jurisdictional\\ndefects has no precedential effect.” (citations omitted)); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91\\n(1988).\\n 3As this court has explained previously, “we do not preclude the possibility that an alien could raise a\\nSuspension Clause challenge to § 1252(b)(1) ‘where the provision forecloses judicial review of an underlying\\nremoval order in a reinstatement proceeding; and where, either due to ineffective assistance of counsel or\\nmisconduct by government officials, the alien was prevented from challenging that underlying order and now is\\nbarred from reopening his removal proceedings (as a means to challenge that underlying order) because he is subject\\nto reinstatement under § 1231(a)(5).’” Ovalle-Ruiz, 591 F. App’x at 400 n.1 (quoting Juarez-Chavez, 515 F. App’x\\nat 467); see also Casillas, 656 F.3d at 276 (observing that this court reached the merits of the underlying removal\\norder in Villegas “given that the government caused the delay”); cf. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir.\\n2018) (“Congress does not suspend the writ [of habeas corpus] when it strips the courts of habeas jurisdiction so\\nlong as it provides a substitute that is adequate and effective to test the legality of the person’s detention.” (citations\\nomitted)). We reserve judgment on this issue for another day as Moreno-Martinez did not raise it here.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4421551/\", \"author_raw\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRIFFIN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BUSH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644298/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jorge MORENO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0174p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n JORGE MORENO-MARTINEZ, ┐\n Petitioner, │\n │\n > No. 18-3798\n v. │\n │\n │\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\n Respondent. │\n ┘\n\n On Petition for Review from a Final Order of the Department of Homeland Security;\n No. A 099 996 338.\n\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\n\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Sufen Hilf, HILF & HILF, PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Petitioner. Justin R. Markel,\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Jorge Moreno-Martinez petitions for review of the order\nof the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstating Moreno-Martinez’s order of\nremoval. Moreno-Martinez argues that he was denied due process because he and his counsel\ndid not receive a copy of the reinstatement order and did not have the opportunity to argue\nagainst the validity of his underlying removal order. Moreno-Martinez’s constitutional challenge\nto the reinstatement order has no merit because, even assuming a due-process violation occurred,\nhe has not demonstrated prejudice from that violation. In fact, there can be no prejudice because\n\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 2\n\n\nwe have no jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order, given that Petitioner failed to\nchallenge that order within thirty days of its issuance, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\nWe therefore DENY the petition for review.\n\n Moreno-Martinez is a native and citizen of Honduras. He arrived in the United States in\n1999, returned to Honduras in 2003, and then reentered the United States in 2004. On January 3,\n2007, DHS issued a notice of removal. In a document titled “Notice to Appear,” DHS charged\nPetitioner with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he is “[a]n alien present in the\nUnited States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time\nor place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” That document also ordered\nMoreno-Martinez to appear on “a date to be set” at “a time to be set.” Almost two months later,\non February 28, 2007, the immigration court sent Petitioner a “Notice of Hearing in Removal\nProceedings.” The Notice of Hearing set June 26, 2007, as the initial hearing date for his\nremoval proceedings.\n\n Petitioner then entered removal proceedings, during which he conceded his charges of\nremovability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for asylum,\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the CAT, but granted his additional request for\nvoluntary removal upon payment of a $500 bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)\naffirmed the immigration judge’s decision, denied reinstating the voluntary removal period\nbecause of lack of proof that Petitioner paid the bond, and ordered Petitioner to be removed from\nthe United States. Moreno-Martinez did not petition this court for review of the removal order at\nthat time.\n\n Pursuant to the removal order, Moreno-Martinez left the United States on February 24,\n2012. He later returned to the United States, and on August 1, 2018, Immigration and Customs\nEnforcement detained him. On that same day, DHS filed a Notice of Intent to reinstate its\nprevious removal order dated June 17, 2011. This timely petition for review of the reinstatement\norder followed.\n\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 3\n\n\n We “treat[] reinstatement orders like removal orders for purposes of our review of them.”\nVillegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly,\nwe review legal questions de novo. Id. at 655 (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th\nCir. 2009)). “[A]dministrative findings of fact,” by contrast, “are conclusive unless\nany reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1252(b)(4)(B).\n\n Moreno-Martinez contends that “DHS violated its own procedures which resulted in\nsevere violation of the Petitioner’s right to due process” because “DHS did not provide Petitioner\nor his counsel a copy of the reinstatement order, nor did they allow him to make a statement\ncontesting the reinstatement determination.” Pet’r Br. at 5. According to Petitioner, had DHS\ngiven him “the notice of reinstatement and allowed [him] to make a statement, he would have\nbeen able to present an argument as to why his underlying removal order was invalid” in light of\nPereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pet’r Br. at 5–6. Under his theory, the immigration\ncourt never had jurisdiction to issue the underlying removal order because his notice to appear\nlacked specific time-and-date information. As a result, the removal order was void ab initio.\n\n Before turning to the crux of Petitioner’s argument, however, we address the\ngovernment’s assertion that this court “lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s collateral\nchallenge to his prior order of removal.” Resp’t Br. at 4. The government’s argument, given the\nunderlying statutory framework, actually presents us with a two-fold inquiry. First, we must\naddress whether we have jurisdiction to review a reinstatement order in light of 8 U.S.C.\n§§ 1231(a)(5), 1252(a)(2)(D). And second, if we have such jurisdiction to review the\nreinstatement order, we must determine whether Moreno-Martinez is entitled to the relief he\nrequests, which in turn would require that this court have jurisdiction to reopen the removal\norder. As explained below, we have jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s due-process\nchallenge to the reinstatement order because it presents a constitutional issue that we may review\nunder the jurisdictional grant in § 1252(a)(2)(D). We may not, however, grant the relief that\nMoreno-Martinez seeks because we lack jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order.\nThe petition cannot be granted because it is an untimely collateral attack on the validity of the\nremoval order, which is time-barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\n\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 4\n\n\n Our inquiry begins with the two principal statutory provisions relating to our jurisdiction\nover petitions for review of reinstatement of removal orders: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(5) and\n1252(a)(2)(D). Ordinarily, if DHS “finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally\nafter having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior\norder of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or\nreviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In Villegas, however, we joined our sister circuits in holding\nthat 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) “re-vests the circuit courts with jurisdiction over constitutional\nclaims or questions of law raised in the context of reinstatement proceedings.” 640 F.3d at 656.\n(citations omitted) (listing cases). We therefore have jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s due-process\nchallenge to the reinstatement order. That we have jurisdiction to review the petition, however,\ndoes not mean that Petitioner’s due-process challenge entitles him to the relief he seeks—that is,\nthe reopening of the underlying removal order. Assuming that a due-process violation occurred,\nMoreno-Martinez still must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. See id.; Graham v.\nMukasey, 519 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e need not address the merits of a claim if\nthere is no demonstration of prejudice.” (citation omitted)). This in turn requires showing that\nthe alleged error “led to a substantially different outcome from that which would have occurred\nin the absence of [the] violation[].” Graham, 519 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted).\n\n The sole basis for Moreno-Martinez’s prejudice argument is that he was denied the\nopportunity to argue that the immigration judge and the BIA were without jurisdiction to enter\nthe underlying removal order because the Notice to Appear did not include the date and time for\nthe initial hearing date.1 However, because (as explained below) we lack jurisdiction to review\nthe validity of the removal order, Petitioner’s claim must fail; he cannot have been prejudiced by\nan inability to make arguments to us that we do not have jurisdiction to hear. Cf. Casillas v.\nHolder, 656 F.3d 273, 275 (6th Cir. 2011).\n\n\n 1To be sure, we would have jurisdiction to review a constitutional claim or question of law relating to his\nreinstatement proceedings or reinstatement order. See Ovalle-Ruiz v. Holder, 591 F. App’x 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2014)\n(holding there was jurisdiction to review challenge that DHS abused its discretion because it reinstated the removal\norder without considering all the relevant favorable and unfavorable factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion).\nBut Moreno-Martinez’s challenge is different. Moreno-Martinez has framed a question of law that would require us\nto review the validity of his underlying removal order and thus his challenge ultimately amounts to a collateral\nattack on the underlying removal order. Indeed, he asks us to “vacate[] the Petitioner’s reinstatement order as well\nas his underlying removal order.” Pet’r Br. at 10.\n\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 5\n\n\n We lack jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s assertion that “the Immigration Court\nnever ‘vested’ jurisdiction over these proceedings,” Pet’r Br. at 8, and vacate the removal order,\nbecause that challenge is time-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). All petitions for review of\nfinal orders of removal “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of\nremoval.” Id.; Prekaj v. INS, 384 F.3d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that this deadline is\n“both mandatory and jurisdictional” (quotation marks omitted)); accord Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d\n180, 185 (6th Cir. 2010). When DHS reinstates “a prior removal order in illegal reentry cases,\nDHS does not reissue the prior order (which would restart the 30-day period within which the\nalien may file a petition for review) but reinstates the prior order ‘from its original date.’”\nJuarez-Chavez v. Holder, 515 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).\nThus, any challenge (collateral or otherwise) filed 30 days after the removal order was filed is\nuntimely and we have no jurisdictional basis to entertain the challenge. 2 Because this collateral\nchallenge to the removal order was filed well after the 30-day deadline passed, we lack\njurisdiction to grant Petitioner’s proposed remedy—i.e., to reopen the underlying removal\norder—and therefore his due-process challenge to the reinstatement order lacks merit.3\n\n For all these reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.\n\n\n\n\n 2We recognize that this court in Villegas, 640 F.3d at 656–57, reached the merits of an alien’s due-process\nchallenge in the context of a petition for review of a reinstatement order. However, Villegas does not control with\nrespect to this jurisdictional issue because it did not address the jurisdictional relationship between the scope of\nreview outlined in § 1252(a)(2)(D) and the 30-day deadline in § 1252(b)(1), which is also mandatory and\njurisdictional. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[T]he existence of unaddressed jurisdictional\ndefects has no precedential effect.” (citations omitted)); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91\n(1988).\n 3As this court has explained previously, “we do not preclude the possibility that an alien could raise a\nSuspension Clause challenge to § 1252(b)(1) ‘where the provision forecloses judicial review of an underlying\nremoval order in a reinstatement proceeding; and where, either due to ineffective assistance of counsel or\nmisconduct by government officials, the alien was prevented from challenging that underlying order and now is\nbarred from reopening his removal proceedings (as a means to challenge that underlying order) because he is subject\nto reinstatement under § 1231(a)(5).’” Ovalle-Ruiz, 591 F. App’x at 400 n.1 (quoting Juarez-Chavez, 515 F. App’x\nat 467); see also Casillas, 656 F.3d at 276 (observing that this court reached the merits of the underlying removal\norder in Villegas “given that the government caused the delay”); cf. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir.\n2018) (“Congress does not suspend the writ [of habeas corpus] when it strips the courts of habeas jurisdiction so\nlong as it provides a substitute that is adequate and effective to test the legality of the person’s detention.” (citations\nomitted)). We reserve judgment on this issue for another day as Moreno-Martinez did not raise it here.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jorge MORENO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-31\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0174p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JORGE MORENO-MARTINEZ, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3798\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from a Final Order of the Department of Homeland Security;\\n No. A 099 996 338.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: July 31, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Sufen Hilf, HILF & HILF, PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Petitioner. Justin R. Markel,\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Jorge Moreno-Martinez petitions for review of the order\\nof the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstating Moreno-Martinez’s order of\\nremoval. Moreno-Martinez argues that he was denied due process because he and his counsel\\ndid not receive a copy of the reinstatement order and did not have the opportunity to argue\\nagainst the validity of his underlying removal order. Moreno-Martinez’s constitutional challenge\\nto the reinstatement order has no merit because, even assuming a due-process violation occurred,\\nhe has not demonstrated prejudice from that violation. In fact, there can be no prejudice because\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\nwe have no jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order, given that Petitioner failed to\\nchallenge that order within thirty days of its issuance, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\\nWe therefore DENY the petition for review.\\n\\n Moreno-Martinez is a native and citizen of Honduras. He arrived in the United States in\\n1999, returned to Honduras in 2003, and then reentered the United States in 2004. On January 3,\\n2007, DHS issued a notice of removal. In a document titled “Notice to Appear,” DHS charged\\nPetitioner with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he is “[a]n alien present in the\\nUnited States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time\\nor place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” That document also ordered\\nMoreno-Martinez to appear on “a date to be set” at “a time to be set.” Almost two months later,\\non February 28, 2007, the immigration court sent Petitioner a “Notice of Hearing in Removal\\nProceedings.” The Notice of Hearing set June 26, 2007, as the initial hearing date for his\\nremoval proceedings.\\n\\n Petitioner then entered removal proceedings, during which he conceded his charges of\\nremovability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for asylum,\\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the CAT, but granted his additional request for\\nvoluntary removal upon payment of a $500 bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)\\naffirmed the immigration judge’s decision, denied reinstating the voluntary removal period\\nbecause of lack of proof that Petitioner paid the bond, and ordered Petitioner to be removed from\\nthe United States. Moreno-Martinez did not petition this court for review of the removal order at\\nthat time.\\n\\n Pursuant to the removal order, Moreno-Martinez left the United States on February 24,\\n2012. He later returned to the United States, and on August 1, 2018, Immigration and Customs\\nEnforcement detained him. On that same day, DHS filed a Notice of Intent to reinstate its\\nprevious removal order dated June 17, 2011. This timely petition for review of the reinstatement\\norder followed.\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\n We “treat[] reinstatement orders like removal orders for purposes of our review of them.”\\nVillegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly,\\nwe review legal questions de novo. Id. at 655 (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th\\nCir. 2009)). “[A]dministrative findings of fact,” by contrast, “are conclusive unless\\nany reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1252(b)(4)(B).\\n\\n Moreno-Martinez contends that “DHS violated its own procedures which resulted in\\nsevere violation of the Petitioner’s right to due process” because “DHS did not provide Petitioner\\nor his counsel a copy of the reinstatement order, nor did they allow him to make a statement\\ncontesting the reinstatement determination.” Pet’r Br. at 5. According to Petitioner, had DHS\\ngiven him “the notice of reinstatement and allowed [him] to make a statement, he would have\\nbeen able to present an argument as to why his underlying removal order was invalid” in light of\\nPereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pet’r Br. at 5–6. Under his theory, the immigration\\ncourt never had jurisdiction to issue the underlying removal order because his notice to appear\\nlacked specific time-and-date information. As a result, the removal order was void ab initio.\\n\\n Before turning to the crux of Petitioner’s argument, however, we address the\\ngovernment’s assertion that this court “lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s collateral\\nchallenge to his prior order of removal.” Resp’t Br. at 4. The government’s argument, given the\\nunderlying statutory framework, actually presents us with a two-fold inquiry. First, we must\\naddress whether we have jurisdiction to review a reinstatement order in light of 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1231(a)(5), 1252(a)(2)(D). And second, if we have such jurisdiction to review the\\nreinstatement order, we must determine whether Moreno-Martinez is entitled to the relief he\\nrequests, which in turn would require that this court have jurisdiction to reopen the removal\\norder. As explained below, we have jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s due-process\\nchallenge to the reinstatement order because it presents a constitutional issue that we may review\\nunder the jurisdictional grant in § 1252(a)(2)(D). We may not, however, grant the relief that\\nMoreno-Martinez seeks because we lack jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order.\\nThe petition cannot be granted because it is an untimely collateral attack on the validity of the\\nremoval order, which is time-barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\n Our inquiry begins with the two principal statutory provisions relating to our jurisdiction\\nover petitions for review of reinstatement of removal orders: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(5) and\\n1252(a)(2)(D). Ordinarily, if DHS “finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally\\nafter having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior\\norder of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or\\nreviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In Villegas, however, we joined our sister circuits in holding\\nthat 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) “re-vests the circuit courts with jurisdiction over constitutional\\nclaims or questions of law raised in the context of reinstatement proceedings.” 640 F.3d at 656.\\n(citations omitted) (listing cases). We therefore have jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s due-process\\nchallenge to the reinstatement order. That we have jurisdiction to review the petition, however,\\ndoes not mean that Petitioner’s due-process challenge entitles him to the relief he seeks—that is,\\nthe reopening of the underlying removal order. Assuming that a due-process violation occurred,\\nMoreno-Martinez still must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. See id.; Graham v.\\nMukasey, 519 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e need not address the merits of a claim if\\nthere is no demonstration of prejudice.” (citation omitted)). This in turn requires showing that\\nthe alleged error “led to a substantially different outcome from that which would have occurred\\nin the absence of [the] violation[].” Graham, 519 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The sole basis for Moreno-Martinez’s prejudice argument is that he was denied the\\nopportunity to argue that the immigration judge and the BIA were without jurisdiction to enter\\nthe underlying removal order because the Notice to Appear did not include the date and time for\\nthe initial hearing date.1 However, because (as explained below) we lack jurisdiction to review\\nthe validity of the removal order, Petitioner’s claim must fail; he cannot have been prejudiced by\\nan inability to make arguments to us that we do not have jurisdiction to hear. Cf. Casillas v.\\nHolder, 656 F.3d 273, 275 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n\\n 1To be sure, we would have jurisdiction to review a constitutional claim or question of law relating to his\\nreinstatement proceedings or reinstatement order. See Ovalle-Ruiz v. Holder, 591 F. App’x 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2014)\\n(holding there was jurisdiction to review challenge that DHS abused its discretion because it reinstated the removal\\norder without considering all the relevant favorable and unfavorable factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion).\\nBut Moreno-Martinez’s challenge is different. Moreno-Martinez has framed a question of law that would require us\\nto review the validity of his underlying removal order and thus his challenge ultimately amounts to a collateral\\nattack on the underlying removal order. Indeed, he asks us to “vacate[] the Petitioner’s reinstatement order as well\\nas his underlying removal order.” Pet’r Br. at 10.\\n\\f No. 18-3798 Moreno-Martinez v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\n We lack jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s assertion that “the Immigration Court\\nnever ‘vested’ jurisdiction over these proceedings,” Pet’r Br. at 8, and vacate the removal order,\\nbecause that challenge is time-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). All petitions for review of\\nfinal orders of removal “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of\\nremoval.” Id.; Prekaj v. INS, 384 F.3d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that this deadline is\\n“both mandatory and jurisdictional” (quotation marks omitted)); accord Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d\\n180, 185 (6th Cir. 2010). When DHS reinstates “a prior removal order in illegal reentry cases,\\nDHS does not reissue the prior order (which would restart the 30-day period within which the\\nalien may file a petition for review) but reinstates the prior order ‘from its original date.’”\\nJuarez-Chavez v. Holder, 515 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).\\nThus, any challenge (collateral or otherwise) filed 30 days after the removal order was filed is\\nuntimely and we have no jurisdictional basis to entertain the challenge. 2 Because this collateral\\nchallenge to the removal order was filed well after the 30-day deadline passed, we lack\\njurisdiction to grant Petitioner’s proposed remedy—i.e., to reopen the underlying removal\\norder—and therefore his due-process challenge to the reinstatement order lacks merit.3\\n\\n For all these reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2We recognize that this court in Villegas, 640 F.3d at 656–57, reached the merits of an alien’s due-process\\nchallenge in the context of a petition for review of a reinstatement order. However, Villegas does not control with\\nrespect to this jurisdictional issue because it did not address the jurisdictional relationship between the scope of\\nreview outlined in § 1252(a)(2)(D) and the 30-day deadline in § 1252(b)(1), which is also mandatory and\\njurisdictional. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[T]he existence of unaddressed jurisdictional\\ndefects has no precedential effect.” (citations omitted)); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91\\n(1988).\\n 3As this court has explained previously, “we do not preclude the possibility that an alien could raise a\\nSuspension Clause challenge to § 1252(b)(1) ‘where the provision forecloses judicial review of an underlying\\nremoval order in a reinstatement proceeding; and where, either due to ineffective assistance of counsel or\\nmisconduct by government officials, the alien was prevented from challenging that underlying order and now is\\nbarred from reopening his removal proceedings (as a means to challenge that underlying order) because he is subject\\nto reinstatement under § 1231(a)(5).’” Ovalle-Ruiz, 591 F. App’x at 400 n.1 (quoting Juarez-Chavez, 515 F. App’x\\nat 467); see also Casillas, 656 F.3d at 276 (observing that this court reached the merits of the underlying removal\\norder in Villegas “given that the government caused the delay”); cf. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir.\\n2018) (“Congress does not suspend the writ [of habeas corpus] when it strips the courts of habeas jurisdiction so\\nlong as it provides a substitute that is adequate and effective to test the legality of the person’s detention.” (citations\\nomitted)). We reserve judgment on this issue for another day as Moreno-Martinez did not raise it here.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3067,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4635670,"string":"4,635,670"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kent MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Kent Morgan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2751"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Ripple, Rovner, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2751\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKENT MORGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\\n\\f2 No. 18-2751\\n\\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 3\\n\\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\\nmethamphetamine.\\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\\n\\f4 No. 18-2751\\n\\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\\nverdict forms were not numbered):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\\n leged in the Indictment.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\\n decision on 2nd charge.\\nR. 47 at 1.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\\n131 at 6–9.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 5\\n\\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\\nis ours):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment.\\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\\n in the Indictment.\\nR. 46 at 1–4.\\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\\ncourt which stated:\\n\\f6 No. 18-2751\\n\\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\\nthird question:\\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 7\\n\\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\\n6.\\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\\n\\f8 No. 18-2751\\n\\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\\nhis conundrum:\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 9\\n\\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\\n going to do it again.\\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\\nceeding. The court concluded:\\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\\n to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2751\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\\n\\n\\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 11\\n\\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\\nR. 128 at 77.\\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\\n\\f12 No. 18-2751\\n\\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\\nMorgan’s arrest.\\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 13\\n\\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\\nper ounce.\\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\\n deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\\n\\f14 No. 18-2751\\n\\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\\nliver methamphetamine.\\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\\nment and ten years of supervised release.\\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\\n II.\\nA. Double Jeopardy\\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 15\\n\\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\\nclause.\\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\\ntried for simple possession.\\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2751\\n\\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\\n to agree.\\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 17\\n\\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\\non the greater charge.”).\\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\\ndownhill.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2751\\n\\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 19\\n\\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\\n\\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2751\\n\\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\\nU.S. at 152.\\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 21\\n\\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\\n As the Supreme Court explained:\\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\\n must participate personally in the waiver;\\n whether certain procedures are required for\\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\\n\\f22 No. 18-2751\\n\\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\\n ters is the last.\\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\\n not only upon what is permissible under the\\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 23\\n\\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\\n\\n\\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\\nobvious to elaborate upon.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2751\\n\\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\\nMorgan.\\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\\n ing to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 25\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\\ncution.”).\\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\\n\\f26 No. 18-2751\\n\\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\\nhave been violated.\\nB. Propensity evidence\\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 27\\n\\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\\n person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\\n ance with the character.\\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\\n of accident. …\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\\nwould do such a thing.”\\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2751\\n\\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\\nproving the required intent.\\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 29\\n\\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\\nment at the second trial. 6\\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\\n\\n\\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2751\\n\\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39.\\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 31\\n\\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\\n tion 13.\\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\\n\\f32 No. 18-2751\\n\\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\\n 57. committed the crime[s]\\n charged in the indict-\\n ment. The reason is\\n that the defendant is\\n not on trial for these\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 33\\n\\n other acts. Rather, he\\n is on trial for [list\\n charges alleged in\\n the indictment]. The\\n government has the\\n burden to prove be-\\n yond a reasonable\\n doubt the elements of\\n the crime[s] charged in\\n the indictment. This\\n burden cannot be met\\n with an inference that\\n the defendant is a per-\\n son whose past acts\\n suggest bad character\\n or a willingness or ten-\\n dency to commit\\n crimes.\\n Pattern Criminal\\n Jury Instructions of\\n the Seventh Circuit\\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\\n 2015-2017 and 2018\\n changes), §3.11.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\\nF.3d at 860.\\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\\n\\f34 No. 18-2751\\n\\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\\nerror.\\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\\n ever that its being offered.\\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\\n which, of course, is not permitted.\\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 35\\n\\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\\n\\n\\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2751\\n\\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\\nror.” Id.\\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\\n character” in the present case because it does\\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\\n committed the particular crime charged in the\\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\\n crimes.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 37\\n\\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\\nas submitted.\\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\\n\\f38 No. 18-2751\\n\\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\\nefficient administration of justice.”).\\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 39\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\\nspects.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4412923/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635670/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kent MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2751\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nKENT MORGAN,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\n\f2 No. 18-2751\n\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\ntrict court.\n I.\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\n\fNo. 18-2751 3\n\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\nmethamphetamine.\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\n\f4 No. 18-2751\n\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\nverdict forms were not numbered):\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\n leged in the Indictment.\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\n decision on 2nd charge.\nR. 47 at 1.\n\n\n\n\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\n131 at 6–9.\n\fNo. 18-2751 5\n\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\nis ours):\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine.\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine.\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\n alleged in the Indictment.\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\n in the Indictment.\nR. 46 at 1–4.\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\ncourt which stated:\n\f6 No. 18-2751\n\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\nthird question:\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\n\fNo. 18-2751 7\n\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\n6.\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\n\f8 No. 18-2751\n\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\nhis conundrum:\n\fNo. 18-2751 9\n\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\n going to do it again.\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\nceeding. The court concluded:\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\n to be sentenced twice.\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\n\f10 No. 18-2751\n\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\n purposes here?\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\nR. 133 at 5–6.\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\n\n\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\n\fNo. 18-2751 11\n\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\nR. 128 at 77.\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\n\f12 No. 18-2751\n\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\nMorgan’s arrest.\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\n\fNo. 18-2751 13\n\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\nper ounce.\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\n deliver.\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\n\f14 No. 18-2751\n\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\nliver methamphetamine.\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\nment and ten years of supervised release.\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\n II.\nA. Double Jeopardy\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\n\fNo. 18-2751 15\n\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\nclause.\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\ntried for simple possession.\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\n\f16 No. 18-2751\n\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\n to agree.\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\n\fNo. 18-2751 17\n\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\non the greater charge.”).\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\ndownhill.\n\f18 No. 18-2751\n\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\n\fNo. 18-2751 19\n\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\n\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\n\f20 No. 18-2751\n\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\nU.S. at 152.\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\n\fNo. 18-2751 21\n\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\n As the Supreme Court explained:\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\n must participate personally in the waiver;\n whether certain procedures are required for\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\n\f22 No. 18-2751\n\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\n ters is the last.\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\n not only upon what is permissible under the\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\n\fNo. 18-2751 23\n\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\n\n\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\nobvious to elaborate upon.\n\f24 No. 18-2751\n\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\nMorgan.\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\n ing to be sentenced twice.\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\n\fNo. 18-2751 25\n\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\n purposes here?\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\nR. 133 at 5–6.\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\ncution.”).\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\n\f26 No. 18-2751\n\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\nhave been violated.\nB. Propensity evidence\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\n\fNo. 18-2751 27\n\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\n person’s character in order to show that on a\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\n ance with the character.\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\n of accident. …\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\nwould do such a thing.”\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\n\f28 No. 18-2751\n\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\nproving the required intent.\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\n\fNo. 18-2751 29\n\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\nment at the second trial. 6\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\n\n\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\n\f30 No. 18-2751\n\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\nR. 133 at 39.\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\n\fNo. 18-2751 31\n\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\n tion 13.\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\n\f32 No. 18-2751\n\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\n 57. committed the crime[s]\n charged in the indict-\n ment. The reason is\n that the defendant is\n not on trial for these\n\fNo. 18-2751 33\n\n other acts. Rather, he\n is on trial for [list\n charges alleged in\n the indictment]. The\n government has the\n burden to prove be-\n yond a reasonable\n doubt the elements of\n the crime[s] charged in\n the indictment. This\n burden cannot be met\n with an inference that\n the defendant is a per-\n son whose past acts\n suggest bad character\n or a willingness or ten-\n dency to commit\n crimes.\n Pattern Criminal\n Jury Instructions of\n the Seventh Circuit\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\n 2015-2017 and 2018\n changes), §3.11.\n\n\n\n\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\nF.3d at 860.\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\n\f34 No. 18-2751\n\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\nerror.\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\n ever that its being offered.\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\n which, of course, is not permitted.\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\n\fNo. 18-2751 35\n\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\n\n\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\n\f36 No. 18-2751\n\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\nror.” Id.\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\n character” in the present case because it does\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\n committed the particular crime charged in the\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\n crimes.\n\fNo. 18-2751 37\n\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\nas submitted.\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\n\f38 No. 18-2751\n\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\nefficient administration of justice.”).\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\n\fNo. 18-2751 39\n\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\nspects.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kent MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2751\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKENT MORGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\\n\\f2 No. 18-2751\\n\\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 3\\n\\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\\nmethamphetamine.\\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\\n\\f4 No. 18-2751\\n\\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\\nverdict forms were not numbered):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\\n leged in the Indictment.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\\n decision on 2nd charge.\\nR. 47 at 1.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\\n131 at 6–9.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 5\\n\\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\\nis ours):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment.\\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\\n in the Indictment.\\nR. 46 at 1–4.\\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\\ncourt which stated:\\n\\f6 No. 18-2751\\n\\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\\nthird question:\\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 7\\n\\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\\n6.\\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\\n\\f8 No. 18-2751\\n\\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\\nhis conundrum:\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 9\\n\\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\\n going to do it again.\\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\\nceeding. The court concluded:\\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\\n to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2751\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\\n\\n\\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 11\\n\\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\\nR. 128 at 77.\\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\\n\\f12 No. 18-2751\\n\\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\\nMorgan’s arrest.\\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 13\\n\\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\\nper ounce.\\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\\n deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\\n\\f14 No. 18-2751\\n\\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\\nliver methamphetamine.\\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\\nment and ten years of supervised release.\\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\\n II.\\nA. Double Jeopardy\\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 15\\n\\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\\nclause.\\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\\ntried for simple possession.\\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2751\\n\\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\\n to agree.\\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 17\\n\\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\\non the greater charge.”).\\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\\ndownhill.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2751\\n\\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 19\\n\\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\\n\\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2751\\n\\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\\nU.S. at 152.\\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 21\\n\\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\\n As the Supreme Court explained:\\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\\n must participate personally in the waiver;\\n whether certain procedures are required for\\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\\n\\f22 No. 18-2751\\n\\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\\n ters is the last.\\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\\n not only upon what is permissible under the\\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 23\\n\\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\\n\\n\\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\\nobvious to elaborate upon.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2751\\n\\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\\nMorgan.\\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\\n ing to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 25\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\\ncution.”).\\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\\n\\f26 No. 18-2751\\n\\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\\nhave been violated.\\nB. Propensity evidence\\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 27\\n\\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\\n person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\\n ance with the character.\\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\\n of accident. …\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\\nwould do such a thing.”\\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2751\\n\\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\\nproving the required intent.\\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 29\\n\\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\\nment at the second trial. 6\\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\\n\\n\\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2751\\n\\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39.\\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 31\\n\\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\\n tion 13.\\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\\n\\f32 No. 18-2751\\n\\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\\n 57. committed the crime[s]\\n charged in the indict-\\n ment. The reason is\\n that the defendant is\\n not on trial for these\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 33\\n\\n other acts. Rather, he\\n is on trial for [list\\n charges alleged in\\n the indictment]. The\\n government has the\\n burden to prove be-\\n yond a reasonable\\n doubt the elements of\\n the crime[s] charged in\\n the indictment. This\\n burden cannot be met\\n with an inference that\\n the defendant is a per-\\n son whose past acts\\n suggest bad character\\n or a willingness or ten-\\n dency to commit\\n crimes.\\n Pattern Criminal\\n Jury Instructions of\\n the Seventh Circuit\\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\\n 2015-2017 and 2018\\n changes), §3.11.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\\nF.3d at 860.\\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\\n\\f34 No. 18-2751\\n\\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\\nerror.\\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\\n ever that its being offered.\\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\\n which, of course, is not permitted.\\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 35\\n\\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\\n\\n\\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2751\\n\\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\\nror.” Id.\\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\\n character” in the present case because it does\\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\\n committed the particular crime charged in the\\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\\n crimes.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 37\\n\\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\\nas submitted.\\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\\n\\f38 No. 18-2751\\n\\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\\nefficient administration of justice.”).\\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 39\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\\nspects.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3068,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4635799,"string":"4,635,799"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Kent Morgan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2751"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2751\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKENT MORGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\\n\\f2 No. 18-2751\\n\\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 3\\n\\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\\nmethamphetamine.\\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\\n\\f4 No. 18-2751\\n\\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\\nverdict forms were not numbered):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\\n leged in the Indictment.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\\n decision on 2nd charge.\\nR. 47 at 1.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\\n131 at 6–9.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 5\\n\\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\\nis ours):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment.\\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\\n in the Indictment.\\nR. 46 at 1–4.\\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\\ncourt which stated:\\n\\f6 No. 18-2751\\n\\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\\nthird question:\\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 7\\n\\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\\n6.\\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\\n\\f8 No. 18-2751\\n\\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\\nhis conundrum:\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 9\\n\\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\\n going to do it again.\\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\\nceeding. The court concluded:\\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\\n to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2751\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\\n\\n\\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 11\\n\\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\\nR. 128 at 77.\\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\\n\\f12 No. 18-2751\\n\\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\\nMorgan’s arrest.\\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 13\\n\\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\\nper ounce.\\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\\n deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\\n\\f14 No. 18-2751\\n\\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\\nliver methamphetamine.\\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\\nment and ten years of supervised release.\\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\\n II.\\nA. Double Jeopardy\\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 15\\n\\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\\nclause.\\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\\ntried for simple possession.\\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2751\\n\\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\\n to agree.\\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 17\\n\\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\\non the greater charge.”).\\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\\ndownhill.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2751\\n\\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 19\\n\\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\\n\\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2751\\n\\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\\nU.S. at 152.\\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 21\\n\\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\\n As the Supreme Court explained:\\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\\n must participate personally in the waiver;\\n whether certain procedures are required for\\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\\n\\f22 No. 18-2751\\n\\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\\n ters is the last.\\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\\n not only upon what is permissible under the\\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 23\\n\\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\\n\\n\\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\\nobvious to elaborate upon.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2751\\n\\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\\nMorgan.\\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\\n ing to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 25\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\\ncution.”).\\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\\n\\f26 No. 18-2751\\n\\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\\nhave been violated.\\nB. Propensity evidence\\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 27\\n\\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\\n person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\\n ance with the character.\\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\\n of accident. …\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\\nwould do such a thing.”\\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2751\\n\\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\\nproving the required intent.\\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 29\\n\\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\\nment at the second trial. 6\\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\\n\\n\\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2751\\n\\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39.\\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 31\\n\\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\\n tion 13.\\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\\n\\f32 No. 18-2751\\n\\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\\n 57. committed the crime[s]\\n charged in the indict-\\n ment. The reason is\\n that the defendant is\\n not on trial for these\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 33\\n\\n other acts. Rather, he\\n is on trial for [list\\n charges alleged in\\n the indictment]. The\\n government has the\\n burden to prove be-\\n yond a reasonable\\n doubt the elements of\\n the crime[s] charged in\\n the indictment. This\\n burden cannot be met\\n with an inference that\\n the defendant is a per-\\n son whose past acts\\n suggest bad character\\n or a willingness or ten-\\n dency to commit\\n crimes.\\n Pattern Criminal\\n Jury Instructions of\\n the Seventh Circuit\\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\\n 2015-2017 and 2018\\n changes), §3.11.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\\nF.3d at 860.\\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\\n\\f34 No. 18-2751\\n\\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\\nerror.\\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\\n ever that its being offered.\\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\\n which, of course, is not permitted.\\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 35\\n\\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\\n\\n\\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2751\\n\\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\\nror.” Id.\\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\\n character” in the present case because it does\\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\\n committed the particular crime charged in the\\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\\n crimes.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 37\\n\\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\\nas submitted.\\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\\n\\f38 No. 18-2751\\n\\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\\nefficient administration of justice.”).\\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 39\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\\nspects.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413052/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635799/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Kent Morgan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2751\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nKENT MORGAN,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\n\f2 No. 18-2751\n\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\ntrict court.\n I.\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\n\fNo. 18-2751 3\n\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\nmethamphetamine.\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\n\f4 No. 18-2751\n\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\nverdict forms were not numbered):\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\n leged in the Indictment.\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\n decision on 2nd charge.\nR. 47 at 1.\n\n\n\n\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\n131 at 6–9.\n\fNo. 18-2751 5\n\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\nis ours):\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine.\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\n amphetamine.\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\n alleged in the Indictment.\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\n in the Indictment.\nR. 46 at 1–4.\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\ncourt which stated:\n\f6 No. 18-2751\n\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\nthird question:\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\n\fNo. 18-2751 7\n\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\n6.\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\n\f8 No. 18-2751\n\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\nhis conundrum:\n\fNo. 18-2751 9\n\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\n going to do it again.\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\nceeding. The court concluded:\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\n to be sentenced twice.\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\n\f10 No. 18-2751\n\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\n purposes here?\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\nR. 133 at 5–6.\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\n\n\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\n\fNo. 18-2751 11\n\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\nR. 128 at 77.\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\n\f12 No. 18-2751\n\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\nMorgan’s arrest.\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\n\fNo. 18-2751 13\n\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\nper ounce.\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\n deliver.\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\n\f14 No. 18-2751\n\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\nliver methamphetamine.\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\nment and ten years of supervised release.\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\n II.\nA. Double Jeopardy\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\n\fNo. 18-2751 15\n\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\nclause.\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\ntried for simple possession.\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\n\f16 No. 18-2751\n\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\n to agree.\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\n\fNo. 18-2751 17\n\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\non the greater charge.”).\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\ndownhill.\n\f18 No. 18-2751\n\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\n\fNo. 18-2751 19\n\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\n\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\n\f20 No. 18-2751\n\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\nU.S. at 152.\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\n\fNo. 18-2751 21\n\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\n As the Supreme Court explained:\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\n must participate personally in the waiver;\n whether certain procedures are required for\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\n\f22 No. 18-2751\n\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\n ters is the last.\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\n not only upon what is permissible under the\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\n\fNo. 18-2751 23\n\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\n\n\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\nobvious to elaborate upon.\n\f24 No. 18-2751\n\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\nMorgan.\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\n ing to be sentenced twice.\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\n\fNo. 18-2751 25\n\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\n purposes here?\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\nR. 133 at 5–6.\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\ncution.”).\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\n\f26 No. 18-2751\n\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\nhave been violated.\nB. Propensity evidence\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\n\fNo. 18-2751 27\n\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\n person’s character in order to show that on a\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\n ance with the character.\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\n of accident. …\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\nwould do such a thing.”\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\n\f28 No. 18-2751\n\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\nproving the required intent.\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\n\fNo. 18-2751 29\n\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\nment at the second trial. 6\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\n\n\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\n\f30 No. 18-2751\n\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\nR. 133 at 39.\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\n\fNo. 18-2751 31\n\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\n tion 13.\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\n\f32 No. 18-2751\n\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\n 57. committed the crime[s]\n charged in the indict-\n ment. The reason is\n that the defendant is\n not on trial for these\n\fNo. 18-2751 33\n\n other acts. Rather, he\n is on trial for [list\n charges alleged in\n the indictment]. The\n government has the\n burden to prove be-\n yond a reasonable\n doubt the elements of\n the crime[s] charged in\n the indictment. This\n burden cannot be met\n with an inference that\n the defendant is a per-\n son whose past acts\n suggest bad character\n or a willingness or ten-\n dency to commit\n crimes.\n Pattern Criminal\n Jury Instructions of\n the Seventh Circuit\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\n 2015-2017 and 2018\n changes), §3.11.\n\n\n\n\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\nF.3d at 860.\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\n\f34 No. 18-2751\n\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\nerror.\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\n ever that its being offered.\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\n which, of course, is not permitted.\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\n\fNo. 18-2751 35\n\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\n\n\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\n\f36 No. 18-2751\n\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\nror.” Id.\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\n character” in the present case because it does\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\n committed the particular crime charged in the\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\n crimes.\n\fNo. 18-2751 37\n\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\nas submitted.\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\n\f38 No. 18-2751\n\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\nefficient administration of justice.”).\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\n\fNo. 18-2751 39\n\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\nspects.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Kent Morgan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2751\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKENT MORGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10031-MMM-JEH-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The jury deciding Kent Morgan’s\\nfate had no trouble concluding that he had possessed the 86.5\\ngrams of methamphetamine that he conceded he tossed over\\nthe heads of inquisitive law enforcement officers in the Peoria\\nairport on January 7, 2016. But the jury could not come to an\\nagreement as to whether the government proved that he pos-\\nsessed that methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.\\nThey declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one\\n\\f2 No. 18-2751\\n\\nactually charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of\\nthe lesser included offense of possession of methampheta-\\nmine. Morgan now argues that his Fifth Amendment right to\\nbe free from double jeopardy was violated by the govern-\\nment’s second attempt to convict him of possession with in-\\ntent to deliver. In the course of making that claim, he also as-\\nserts other improprieties in his trial. In the end we find only\\nharmless errors and no violation of double jeopardy resulting\\nafter the deadlocked jury could not come to a conclusion on\\nthe indicted count. We therefore affirm the decision of the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Kent Morgan has struggled with methamphetamine ad-\\ndiction since 2006. It was no surprise then that he would con-\\ntinue to feed his habit while caring for his elderly father and\\ntransitioning him from his family home in Galesburg, Illinois,\\nto an assisted living facility nearby. During that transition,\\nMorgan brought his father to live with him in St. George, Utah\\nfor eight months while his father’s health improved. Morgan\\nwas in the process of returning his father to Galesburg when\\nlaw enforcement officers stopped him at the Peoria airport\\nand, in the course of asking him some questions, caught him\\nthrowing a medical glove, stuffed to approximately the size\\nof a softball with 86.5 grams of pure methamphetamine, over\\nthe heads of the officers. He was arrested and charged with\\none count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50\\ngrams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He went to trial on that single\\ncharge on August 15, 2016.\\n During this first trial, Morgan chose to testify and con-\\nceded that he possessed the methamphetamine and that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 3\\n\\nattempted to throw it to avoid arrest but denied that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to anyone else. To convince the jury, he\\ntestified that he had not lived in Galesburg since 2003, he did\\nnot return often, and he knew no one in Galesburg other than\\nhis parents and an adult son who frequently travelled for his\\njob with the railroad. As a result, he testified, all of the meth-\\namphetamine was for his personal use only. Morgan hoped\\nto convince the jury that he was just a long-standing metham-\\nphetamine addict with a hearty appetite and tolerance for\\nmethamphetamine. His counsel followed this tack by arguing\\nin closing that Morgan had been gone from Galesburg for\\nyears and that “there was no evidence of any kind that he\\neven knows anybody back here.” R. 131 at 32. Given Morgan’s\\nconcession that he possessed the methamphetamine, the gov-\\nernment’s sole task was to convince the jury that Morgan did\\nnot simply possess the methamphetamine for his personal\\nuse, but that he intended to distribute it. It did this largely by\\nrelying on the quantity of methamphetamine that he pos-\\nsessed. The government’s witnesses included the Drug En-\\nforcement Administration (DEA) agent who established the\\nchain of custody for the methamphetamine, three local police\\nofficers who were involved in the arrest, a senior forensic\\nchemist for the DEA who confirmed the contents of the drug-\\nstuffed glove, and a special agent with the DEA who provided\\nbackground information on methamphetamine as well as ex-\\npert testimony on the price, means, and manner of trafficking\\nmethamphetamine.\\n At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on\\nthe indicted charge of possession with intent to distribute. In\\naddition, the court instructed the jury on the lesser included\\noffense of possession of a controlled substance. The judge sent\\nthe jury to deliberate with a verdict form that gave the jury\\n\\f4 No. 18-2751\\n\\ntwo choices for its conclusions (The numbers are ours. The\\nverdict forms were not numbered):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine with Intent to Distribute as al-\\n leged in the Indictment.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment, but Guilty of the of-\\n fense of Possession of Methamphetamine.\\nR. 45 at 24, 26. 1\\n During the course of deliberations, the jury sent three\\nquestions out to the judge. The first of these read:\\n We all agree Kent Morgan is guilty of posses-\\n sion of meth. However, we are not in agreement\\n on the charge of intent to deliver. Asking for\\n clarification, if we are not in agreement on 2nd\\n charge, what becomes of the case? Does it be-\\n come hung jury on all counts or is there a way\\n to convict him of posession [sic] + have a non\\n decision on 2nd charge.\\nR. 47 at 1.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The jury verdict form which would have allowed the jury to find\\nMorgan not guilty of either crime was removed from the instructions at\\nMorgan’s request once he decided to testify and concede possession. R.\\n131 at 6–9.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 5\\n\\n The judge conferred with counsel for both sides and all\\nagreed that given the language of the verdict forms, there was\\nno way for the jury to convict Morgan of possession and give\\nno decision on the issue of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The judge and counsel agreed to modify the verdict forms\\nto separate guilt or acquittal on distribution from guilt or ac-\\nquittal on simple possession. Morgan’s counsel stated that\\nthis was “his first federal jury trial,” and that he was “learning\\nall kinds of different things.” R. 127 at 195. As a result of the\\nagreement, the judge collected the old forms and sent the jury\\nback to deliberate with a new set of verdict forms which gave\\nthem the following four choices (once again, the numbering\\nis ours):\\n (1) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (2) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Not guilty of the charge of Possession of Meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n (3) We the jury find the defendant, Kent Mor-\\n gan, Not Guilty of the charge of Possession of\\n Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute as\\n alleged in the Indictment.\\n (4) We the jury find the defendant Kent Morgan,\\n Guilty of the charge of Possession of Metham-\\n phetamine with Intent to Distribute as alleged\\n in the Indictment.\\nR. 46 at 1–4.\\n Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another question to the\\ncourt which stated:\\n\\f6 No. 18-2751\\n\\n We are split on the decision of the intent to de-\\n liver charge. We have discussed case for a cou-\\n ple hours + no one has changed their decision of\\n guilty or not guilty + not likely to change. How\\n much longer should we deliberate before we ar-\\n rive at a hung jury? We have arrived at a deci-\\n sion on the posession [sic] charge.\\nR. 127 at 200–01; R. 47 at 4. The judge and counsel for the par-\\nties discussed the jury’s second question, and the judge sug-\\ngested two options. He could simply tell the jury to keep de-\\nliberating, or, he proposed, he could bring them out and ask:\\n“Is there any one of the 12 of you who believes that there is\\nany possibility of reaching a verdict on the question of—on\\nthe charge of possession with intent? If anyone says yes, then\\nI send them back in. If they all say no, then I would declare a\\nhung jury on the possession with intent and take the other\\nverdict.” R. 127 at 201. Morgan’s counsel asked the court to\\ninstruct the jury to continue deliberating. The judge and both\\ncounsel agreed that if they did not have a verdict by 4:00 p.m.,\\nthe judge would ask: “Do you wish to continue deliberating,\\nor do you believe you are … hopelessly deadlocked?” R. 127\\nat 204–05; R. 47 at 6.\\n A very short while later, the judge received the following\\nthird question:\\n As in the indictment, does over posession [sic]\\n 50 grams of methamphetamine determine a\\n user versus a seller? Or does it reflect more into\\n the sentencing of Kent Morgan.\\nR. 127 at 205; R. 47 at 2.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 7\\n\\n Again, the judge discussed the matter with the respective\\ncounsel, noting that he believed that “it’s a big mistake if we\\nstart trying to make distinctions between using and selling be-\\nyond what they’ve already been told.” R. 127 at 207. The court\\nconcluded that the proper response would be to re-submit the\\nfollowing instruction to the jury:\\n In deciding your verdict, you should not con-\\n sider the possible punishment for the defendant\\n who is on trial. If you decide that the govern-\\n ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a\\n reasonable doubt, then it will be my job to de-\\n cide on an appropriate punishment.\\nR. 127 at 207; R. 47 at 3.\\n At 4:00 p.m., as the parties and the court had previously\\nagreed, the judge sent the note to the jury asking whether they\\nwished to continue deliberating or were deadlocked. The jury\\nreturned the note stating “unanimously deadlocked.” R. 47 at\\n6.\\n The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of possession of\\nmethamphetamine without reaching any verdict on the\\ncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute meth-\\namphetamine. The district court did not expressly declare a\\n“mistrial”—using that word—on the intent to distribute\\ncharge. Nevertheless, after dismissing the jury, the judge did\\nall of the things a judge would do had he just declared a mis-\\ntrial: he stated that he would schedule a sentencing hearing\\non the possession verdict and asked the government “[h]ow\\nmuch time will you need to decide whether you’re going to\\nretry the possession with intent?” R. 127 at 213–14. The court\\nagreed to the government’s request for sixty days. In the\\n\\f8 No. 18-2751\\n\\nmeantime, the court set a tentative trial date for the retrial to\\nwhich Morgan’s counsel agreed without further comment.\\n The United States Attorney eventually decided to retry\\nMorgan for possessing methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute, but this time, having heard Morgan’s defense that he\\nhad no contacts in Galesburg, the government came prepared\\nto defeat it. The government subpoenaed Morgan’s cell phone\\nrecords and through these, prosecutors were able to track\\ndown five witnesses who were willing to testify that they had\\nshared Morgan’s methamphetamine supply with him while\\nMorgan was visiting his father in Galesburg on previous oc-\\ncasions. One witness, in fact, was waiting in a car outside of\\nthe Peoria airport to give Morgan and his father a ride on the\\nday he was arrested. Prior to trial, the government filed a no-\\ntice of intent to offer these witnesses to demonstrate Morgan’s\\nintent as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object to the motion other than to\\nexpress concern that some of the prior acts were “very remote\\nin time.” R. 128 at 8. The judge dismissed this time concern\\nbut expressed his own uncertainty about the need for five wit-\\nnesses. Ultimately the government agreed that it would call\\nonly three witnesses and reserve the other two for rebuttal, if\\nnecessary. Morgan’s counsel had no further objections.\\n During a pre-trial discussion before the second trial, the\\nparties also discussed the issue of double jeopardy. The court\\nnoted that the jury had failed to come to a verdict on the\\ncharge of possession with intent to distribute, and therefore\\nMorgan would be tried on this count of the indictment again.\\nThe government filed a motion asking the court to prohibit\\nreference to the prior trial. Morgan’s counsel objected noting\\nhis conundrum:\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 9\\n\\n We are in a situation where if there is no prior—\\n unless, of course, the judge is going to allow an\\n instruction on mere possession, we’re going to\\n be stuck in a situation where the only verdict the\\n jury has is possession with intent to deliver, and\\n that basically cuts the trial strategy in half. … I\\n think the jury needs to know somehow that this\\n defendant has been convicted in this case be-\\n fore, but they are seeking to retry him. That’s a\\n double-edged sword because a possible impli-\\n cation is that he’s such a bad guy that they’re\\n going to do it again.\\nR. 128 at 12–13. Consequently, when it became time to hash\\nout the jury instructions, the judge asked the government to\\npropose an instruction on the lesser included offense of pos-\\nsession. Morgan’s counsel argued that he was entitled to ei-\\nther that instruction or to have the court instruct the jury that\\nMorgan had been found guilty of possession in a prior pro-\\nceeding. The court concluded:\\n THE COURT: Right. I’ve ruled that I’m not go-\\n ing to do that [reference the prior proceeding],\\n but because of that, I think that you’re entitled\\n to that instruction. But we’re all aware of the\\n fact that he’s previously been convicted of that,\\n which would normally raise double jeopardy is-\\n sues. I assume for purposes of this trial you’re\\n waiving any double jeopardy issue? If he\\n were—for example, if he’s convicted only of\\n possession in this trial, obviously he’s not going\\n to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2751\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n In other words, the court decided that it would present to\\nthe jury the issue of simple possession, but that the jury’s find-\\ning would have no impact on Morgan. If the jury acquitted\\nMorgan of simple possession, he would still face sentencing\\nfrom the previous trial. If the jury found Morgan guilty of\\nsimple possession, the judge would not sentence him again\\nfor that conduct. 2 This allowed the jury to pick a middle\\nground rather than having to choose to find him guilty of the\\nquite serious crime of intending to distribute methampheta-\\nmine or letting him off the hook entirely.\\n Having waived any issue of double jeopardy, the second\\ntrial advanced. 3 Part of the government’s case proceeded as it\\nhad in the first trial with several law enforcement officers,\\nDEA agents, and a forensic chemist. But the rest of the case\\n\\n\\n 2 We need not decide for purposes of this case the propriety of pre-\\nsenting an issue to the jury upon which the court has no intention to act.\\nExperts have debated the ethics of other (and more serious) types of\\n“sham proceedings” brought before a court. See for example, a discussion\\nof the Greylord cases in which the government brought sham cases before\\nthe Cook County courts to ensnare dishonest judges on charges including\\nracketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and extortion. See E.R. Shipp, What's\\nProper In Policing The Judiciary?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984.\\n 3 Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known right. Forfeiture occurs\\nwhen a party fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect.\\nSansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 11\\n\\nfollowed a far different path. The government offered the tes-\\ntimony of a law enforcement officer with training in conduct-\\ning forensic examination of cell phones who testified about\\ndownloading contacts from Morgan’s phone. Those contacts\\nled the government to the three witnesses who would ulti-\\nmately testify at trial about prior drug use and distribution.\\n Before each of those witnesses testified, the court read the\\njury the limiting instruction below. It was presented to the\\njury again when the judge instructed the jury just before de-\\nliberation. The limiting instruction stated:\\n With this witness, you’re going to hear testi-\\n mony that the defendant committed a wrong\\n other than the one charged in the indictment.\\n Before using this evidence, you must decide\\n whether it’s more likely than not that the de-\\n fendant committed the wrong that is not\\n charged in the indictment. If you decide that he\\n did, then you may consider this evidence to\\n help you decide whether the defendant in-\\n tended to distribute methamphetamine; that is,\\n if on January 7, 2016, he possessed methamphet-\\n amine with intent to distribute. You may not\\n consider it for any other purpose. Keep in mind\\n that the defendant is on trial here for possessing\\n methamphetamine with the intent to distribute\\n on January 7, 2016, not for the other wrong.\\nR. 128 at 77.\\n The first witness, Emily Philbee, testified that she had\\nknown Morgan all of his life, and that while he was visiting\\nGalesburg in October, 2015 through January, 2016, she\\n\\f12 No. 18-2751\\n\\nsmoked methamphetamine with him approximately thirteen\\ntimes, and, on a handful of occasions, she took methamphet-\\namine from Morgan to use later. She testified that he never set\\na specific price for the methamphetamine that he gave her,\\nbut she knew the price and would leave money under his key-\\nboard, buy him groceries and household goods, or provide\\nhelp around Morgan’s father’s house. Philbee had agreed to\\npick Morgan and his father up from the airport on the day of\\nMorgan’s arrest.\\n The court reminded the jury of the limiting instruction\\nonce again before the second witness, Emily Hackwith, testi-\\nfied. Hackwith testified that she was in state custody awaiting\\ncharges for the state crimes of forgery and possessing meth-\\namphetamine manufacturing material. Hackwith met Mor-\\ngan in September 2015, when she bought methamphetamine\\nfrom him and after that helped him clean his father’s attic.\\nHackwith ultimately testified that she smoked Morgan’s\\nmethamphetamine with him three to four times a week for\\nfour months, for a total of about one hundred times. Morgan\\ntold Hackwith that he was charging $100 per gram for meth-\\namphetamine to make “money to help his mom and dad,”\\nwho were elderly and infirm. R. 128 at 128.\\n The judge reminded the jury of the limiting instruction a\\nthird time before the testimony of Sue McIntire. McIntire’s\\ntestimony echoed much of the other two. She was a childhood\\nfriend, she helped Morgan clean his parent’s attic, and began\\nusing methamphetamine with him, and did so on about four\\noccasions, with Morgan providing the methamphetamine\\neach of those times. McIntire also testified that Morgan told\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 13\\n\\nher he generally could buy the methamphetamine in Las Ve-\\ngas for $500 per ounce and could sell it in Galesburg for $3,000\\nper ounce.\\n Morgan elected not to take the stand at this second trial\\nand did not call any witnesses. During closing arguments,\\nMorgan’s counsel emphasized that the jury should focus on\\nMorgan’s intent on the day he was arrested.\\n First thing I want to clear the air about is posses-\\n sion. Kent admits he possessed that crystal\\n meth, that amount at the Peoria County airport.\\n There’s no doubt. He admits that it was 98 per-\\n cent pure. That’s a serious offense; he knows\\n he’s going to be punished big time for that, but\\n that’s what he did. The reason we’re at trial to-\\n day is not because he didn’t—he doesn’t admit\\n that; it’s because he did not have the intent to\\n distribute that—all of that at the Peoria County\\n airport. This case is all about the intent, posses-\\n sion with intent to deliver. The [government]\\n must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n Kent possessed the ice at the Peoria County air-\\n port, and at that time—not before in Galesburg,\\n not afterwards —but at that time he intended to\\n deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39. The defense’s argument was that Morgan was a\\nserious addict who used quite a bit of methamphetamine, and\\nthat he had no intention of distributing it to anyone else. The\\ngovernment argued that on the day he was arrested carrying\\ndrugs, the people to whom he had recently given and sold\\nmethamphetamine were calling him on his phone. The jury\\ndeliberated for just over an hour before reaching a unanimous\\n\\f14 No. 18-2751\\n\\nverdict finding Morgan guilty of possession with intent to de-\\nliver methamphetamine.\\n A few weeks later, Morgan filed a pro se motion for an\\nacquittal or new trial, arguing that his counsel had provided\\nconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to\\nfile a motion in limine to exclude the government’s three wit-\\nnesses to prior bad acts. After appointing new counsel, the\\ncourt held a hearing on the motion. Morgan’s initial counsel\\ntestified that he did not object to the witnesses because “Well,\\nfrom the statements that I read and the research that I did, I\\nthought that [the government’s notice of intent to offer evi-\\ndence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] was an\\nappropriate motion because it was very limited to that issue\\nof intent, and very narrowly tailored to that issue only.” R.\\n121 at 19–20. The government argued that the prior-act wit-\\nnesses presented classic evidence of intent which was exactly\\nthe focus of the trial. The court denied the post-trial motions,\\nand ultimately sentenced Morgan to 240 months’ imprison-\\nment and ten years of supervised release.\\n On appeal, Morgan argues (1) that the retrial violated his\\nFifth Amendment right to not be placed in jeopardy for the\\nsame crime twice, (2) that the introduction of evidence of\\nprior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rules of Ev-\\nidence 404(b) and 403, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to raise objections based on either of these alleged\\nerrors. We address each of these concerns in turn.\\n II.\\nA. Double Jeopardy\\n The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no\\nperson shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 15\\n\\nin jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Morgan al-\\nleges that the government indicted him on one offense (one\\ncount of possession with intent to distribute), he was con-\\nvicted on that indictment (although for the lesser included of-\\nfense of possession) and was then retried and reconvicted on\\nthat same indictment in violation of the double jeopardy\\nclause.\\n Morgan concedes that his trial counsel did not raise an ob-\\njection to Morgan’s retrial and assert a violation of double\\njeopardy, and that we must therefore review his claim under\\nthe plain error standard. To reverse for plain error, we must\\nfirst find an error; the error must be plain; and third, it must\\naffect the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).\\n Morgan appears to object to the entire trial on double jeop-\\nardy grounds without distinguishing between the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute and the retrial on simple\\npossession. We think it more useful to evaluate his claim with\\na finer tooth comb—that is to look and see whether there were\\nany violations of double jeopardy when he was retried for the\\npossession with intent to distribute and/or when he was re-\\ntried for simple possession.\\n We begin with some basic premises around the concept of\\ndouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects a defendant\\nagainst (1) a second prosecution for the same offense follow-\\ning an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense\\nfollowing a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the\\nsame offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Double\\njeopardy only applies, however, if there has been a resolution\\nof the case, such as an acquittal or verdict.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2751\\n\\n [A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial follow-\\n ing a hung jury is not an event that terminates\\n the original jeopardy to which petitioner was\\n subjected. The Government, like the defendant,\\n is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict\\n from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate\\n when the jury is discharged because it is unable\\n to agree.\\nRichardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984); see also\\nYeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121 (2009) (noting that a\\njury speaks only through its verdict and thus a hung count is\\nnot a relevant part of the record of the prior proceeding);\\nGreen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (“At the same\\ntime jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as\\nto bar a second trial in those cases where unforeseeable cir-\\ncumstances arise during the first trial making its completion\\nimpossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”)\\n(internal citation omitted); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270,\\n280 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a hung jury does not trig-\\nger issue preclusion, and “[t]he powerful double jeopardy\\nprotections that attach to acquitted counts should not be out-\\nweighed by the inconclusiveness inherent in hung counts.”).\\n In this case, we have an additional layer to consider. The\\njury deadlocked and came to no conclusion on the indicted\\ncharge of “possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-\\ntribute,” but was able to come to a verdict of guilty on the\\nlesser included offense of possession. In addition to the Su-\\npreme Court holding that “a retrial following a ‘hung jury’\\ndoes not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,” (Richardson,\\n468 U.S. at 324), there are two other key Supreme Court hold-\\nings that guide our consideration. First, if the jury convicts on\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 17\\n\\nthe lesser included offense and acquits on the greater offense,\\nthe defendant cannot be tried again on the greater offense.\\n“Historically, courts have treated greater and lesser-included\\noffenses as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, so\\na conviction on one normally precludes a later trial on the\\nother.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018); See also\\nJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1977); Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 168–69. Second, if the jury convicts on the lesser in-\\ncluded offense and is silent on the greater offense, then a court\\nwill construe that silence as an acquittal and the defendant\\ncannot be retried on the greater offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 191\\n(“we believe this case can be treated no differently, for pur-\\nposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a ver-\\ndict which expressly read: ‘We find the defendant not guilty\\nof murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the sec-\\nond degree.’”); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (“this\\nCourt has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an of-\\nfense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is ex-\\npress or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense\\nwhen the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict\\non the greater charge.”).\\n Because an offense and its lesser included offense are the\\nsame offense for double jeopardy purposes, it is clear that\\nMorgan could not have been convicted and sentenced for\\nboth possession and possession with intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,\\n297 (1996); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).\\nConsequently, giving the jury verdict forms that would have\\nallowed the jury to find Morgan guilty of both crimes was an\\nerror and started a snowball of confusion that grew as it rolled\\ndownhill.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2751\\n\\n The confusion was compounded because the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charge of possession with intent to deliver\\nmethamphetamine. This was not a conviction, an acquittal, or\\nan acquittal by implication on the charge of possession with\\nintent to distribute. We cannot say what the jury thought\\nabout Morgan’s intent to distribute, and ordinarily, the gov-\\nernment is entitled to one full and fair conclusion with a ver-\\ndict of guilt or not. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. It is clear that\\nif the jury had acquitted or been silent, the government could\\nnot have retried Morgan for possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. The jury, however, clearly stated on the record that it was\\ndeadlocked and could not come to a conclusion on the distri-\\nbution charge. Because the jury was deadlocked and not silent\\non the greater charge, Morgan’s reliance on cases like Green v.\\nUnited States, Price v. Georgia, and Brown v. Ohio is misplaced.\\nIn Green and Price, the jury was silent (as opposed to expressly\\ndeadlocked, as is the case here) as to the indicted charge, and\\nthus the courts interpreted the silence as an implicit acquittal.\\nGreen, 355 U.S. at 191; Price, 398 U.S. at 324. As we noted, it is\\nunequivocally true that a defendant may not be re-tried after\\nan acquittal, either implicit or expressed. Green, 355 U.S. at\\n191; Price, 398 U.S. at 329. And in Brown, the Court held that\\nthe government could not hold a second trial for a greater of-\\nfense after it has already prosecuted a defendant for the lesser\\nincluded offense. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169–70. But the facts in\\nBrown did not include an earlier mistrial, and ordinarily “a\\nretrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double\\nJeopardy Clause.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109\\n(2003) (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317 at 324). Our circuit has\\nheld that cases barring retrial for greater and lesser included\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 19\\n\\noffenses, “do not apply to retrials after mistrials because mis-\\ntrials do not terminate the original jeopardy.” United States v.\\nBailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In this situation, the district court could have either de-\\nclared a mistrial and allowed the government to retry the\\nwhole case, or accepted the guilty plea of possession and\\nended the prosecution of Morgan’s crimes. Instead it struck a\\nlegally erroneous middle ground—accepting a guilty verdict\\non the lesser included offense of possession and allowing re-\\ntrial on the greater offense of possession with intent to distrib-\\nute. This error created the confusing tension between the rule\\nthat states that conviction on a lesser included offense nor-\\nmally precludes a later trial on the greater offense, on the one\\nhand, and the rule that states that double jeopardy does not\\npreclude retrial after a hung jury, on the other. The Supreme\\nCourt’s current state of flux about issue preclusion in criminal\\ncases, adds to these muddied waters. See Currier, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2149–50 & Id., 138 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)\\n(majority and dissent struggling with Ashe v. Swenson, 397\\nU.S. 436 (1970), and issue preclusion in the criminal context).\\nLuckily we need not wade into these murky areas of double\\njeopardy and issue preclusion. Thankfully, the very case that\\nstirs up the muck, has given us a bridge to resolve this case\\nwithout wading into it. Id. 4\\n In Currier, a divided court struggled with the question of\\nwhether issue preclusion applies in criminal cases and how\\nissue preclusion intersects with concepts of double jeopardy.\\nId. at 2149–50, 2157–63. A majority of the court could not agree\\non the issue preclusion question, which is not, in any event,\\n\\n 4 Curiously, neither party pointed us to this case.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2751\\n\\nrelevant in Morgan’s case. What the Currier court did make\\ninarguably clear, however, is that once a defendant consents\\nto a second trial, he no longer may object to the retrial on dou-\\nble jeopardy grounds. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. “[T]he Dou-\\nble Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government op-\\npression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences\\nof his voluntary choice” to participate in a retrial. Id. (citing\\nUnited States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)); see also Jeffers, 432\\nU.S. at 152.\\n Moreover, the defendant’s consent to a new trial need not\\nbe explicit. An implicit agreement to a second trial “is enough\\nto foreclose any double jeopardy complaint about it.” Currier,\\n138 S. Ct. at 2151. In other words, consent to a new trial, im-\\nplicit or otherwise, forecloses any later objection to double\\njeopardy. And this waiver or forfeiture of a double jeopardy\\ndefense need not be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.\\n(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) (col-\\nlecting cases)). Double jeopardy, therefore, is a defense that\\ncan be forfeited by silence—that is, if it is not affirmatively\\nraised before or at trial. United States v. Parker, 368 F.3d 963,\\n969 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626\\n(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th\\nCir. 1971). And, consequently, it can be waived by counsel.\\nDinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11.\\n The Supreme Court has held that some choices, like the\\nchoice to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury, testify in one’s\\nown behalf, or take an appeal can only be waived by the de-\\nfendant himself. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The\\ncourt has never expanded on these four rights that require the\\ndefendant’s personal waiver. And if that were not evidence\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 21\\n\\nenough, the court in Dinitz, specifically declared that the de-\\nfendant’s claim that a waiver of double jeopardy must be\\nknowing, intelligent, and voluntary ”erroneously treats the\\ndefendant’s interest in going forward before the first jury as a\\nconstitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.” Di-\\nnitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.11. See also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(2018) (noting that the Supreme Court has “expressly rejected\\nthe contention that the permissibility of a retrial depends on\\na knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of a double\\njeopardy defense when a second trial is the result of that de-\\nfendant’s voluntary choices); Escobar v. O'Leary, 943 F.2d 711,\\n715 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[a] defendant can forfeit double jeop-\\nardy rights without making a knowing, voluntary, and intel-\\nligent waiver of those rights.”)\\n As the Supreme Court explained:\\n What suffices for waiver depends on the nature\\n of the right at issue. Whether the defendant\\n must participate personally in the waiver;\\n whether certain procedures are required for\\n waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice\\n must be particularly informed or voluntary, all\\n depend on the right at stake. For certain funda-\\n mental rights, the defendant must personally\\n make an informed waiver. For other rights,\\n however, waiver may be effected by action of\\n counsel. Although there are basic rights that the\\n attorney cannot waive without the fully in-\\n formed and publicly acknowledged consent of\\n the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full au-\\n thority to manage the conduct of the trial. As to\\n many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the\\n\\f22 No. 18-2751\\n\\n trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts\\n of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have\\n notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged\\n upon the attorney. … Absent a demonstration\\n of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such mat-\\n ters is the last.\\nNew York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000) (internal citations\\nomitted). This assumption protects defendants in a complex\\nlegal system where decisions and arguments often must be\\nmade quickly or lost. As the Supreme Court explained,\\n Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,\\n including the objections to make, the witnesses\\n to call, and the arguments to advance, depend\\n not only upon what is permissible under the\\n rules of evidence and procedure but also upon\\n tactical considerations of the moment and the\\n larger strategic plan for the trial. … In most in-\\n stances the attorney will have a better under-\\n standing of the procedural choices than the cli-\\n ent; or at least the law should so assume.\\nGonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008). For this\\nreason, a lawyer is not required to “obtain the defendant’s\\nconsent to ‘every tactical decision.’” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (cit-\\ning Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).\\n Morgan’s counsel did not object when, after the jury dead-\\nlocked on the charged offense at the first trial, the court asked\\nthe government how long it would need to decide on a retrial.\\nMorgan’s counsel did not object when the court scheduled the\\nretrial. Morgan’s counsel did not object at the start of the sec-\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 23\\n\\nond trial or at any time therein. 5 “[A] defendant’s consent dis-\\npels any specter of double jeopardy abuse that holding two\\ntrials might otherwise present. This Court’s teachings are con-\\nsistent and plain: the ‘Clause, which guards against Govern-\\nment oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the con-\\nsequences of his voluntary choice.’” Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151\\n(citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 99). Morgan’s consent “dispels any\\nspecter of double jeopardy abuse that holding the two trials\\nmight otherwise present.” Id.\\n There is one small wrinkle to consider about the retrial on\\npossession with intent to distribute. Ordinarily when a jury\\ncannot reach a verdict, the district court will declare a mistrial\\non that particular charge, thus formally releasing the prose-\\ncution to retry the defendant. In this case the district court\\nnever declared a “mistrial” using that particular word. The\\ngovernment argues, and we agree, that it would be error to\\nconclude that there was no mistrial simply because the district\\ncourt failed to use that exact term. See, e.g., United States v.\\nPowers, 978 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (“the trial judge when\\n\\n\\n 5 Morgan makes one feeble argument to demonstrate that mistrial due\\nto a hung jury was not the result of his voluntary choice. He argues that\\nalthough his counsel acquiesced to the judge’s timeline of giving the jury\\nuntil 4:00 p.m. to reach a verdict before accepting the deadlock, he did so\\n“out of respect of the district court and not a desire to conclude the pro-\\nceedings.” Reply Brief at 5. The court and counsel for both sides had an\\nextensive conversation about how long the court should require the dead-\\nlocked jury to deliberate. After the judge suggested that he allow the jury\\nto deliberate until 4:00 p.m., Morgan’s counsel stated on the record, “that’s\\nfine.” R. 127 at 203. A lawyer cannot acquiesce to a court’s suggested\\ncourse of action and then claim later that “I did not mean it and was only\\nsaying it to be polite.” The dangers of accepting such an argument are too\\nobvious to elaborate upon.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2751\\n\\ndeclaring a mistrial did not use the words ‘manifest neces-\\nsity,’ but they are neither magic nor necessary when sufficient\\njustification appears in the record.”). The record was replete\\nwith evidence that the judge and both parties considered the\\nproceedings to have ended in a mistrial. The judge announced\\nthat the jury was deadlocked, dismissed the jury, and gave\\nthe government sixty days to make a decision about retrying\\nMorgan.\\n The next question, then, is whether the court could retry\\nMorgan for the lesser included offense of possession of meth-\\namphetamine for which he was convicted at the first trial. It\\ncould not. This clearly would constitute a second prosecution\\nfor the same offense, and one for which the jury came to a\\nresolution—a clear violation of double jeopardy. Brown, 432\\nU.S. at 165 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause … protects against\\na second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.”).\\nMorgan’s counsel, however, clearly and unequivocally\\nwaived this right to be free from double jeopardy. At the be-\\nginning of the second trial, the district court judge and Mor-\\ngan’s counsel had the following exchange:\\n THE COURT: … we’re all aware of the fact that\\n he’s previously been convicted of that [posses-\\n sion], which would normally raise double jeop-\\n ardy issues. I assume for purposes of this trial\\n you’re waiving any double jeopardy issue?\\n If he were—for example, if he’s convicted only\\n of possession in this trial, obviously he’s not go-\\n ing to be sentenced twice.\\n MR. HOLMAN: Right.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 25\\n\\n THE COURT: I’d only sentence him once. But is\\n that correct? Are you waiving that issue for our\\n purposes here?\\n MR. HOLMAN: Yes, Judge.\\nR. 133 at 5–6.\\n As we explained above, a defendant who explicitly or im-\\nplicitly consents to a second trial of an offense is foreclosed\\nfrom making any complaint about double jeopardy. See Cur-\\nrier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151. Morgan made a voluntary choice to\\nhave the judge in the second trial instruct the jury on the lesser\\nincluded offense of possession. He cannot now use the Dou-\\nble Jeopardy clause to forestall that prosecution. See Id. at\\n2151 (plurality) & 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The end\\nresult is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a\\nsecond prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy\\nClause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple tri-\\nals or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prose-\\ncution.”).\\n And just as Morgan’s lawyer could waive or forfeit the\\nright to a double jeopardy defense against retrial for the\\ngreater charged offense, Morgan’s lawyer could also waive\\nhis double jeopardy rights related to retrial of the lesser in-\\ncluded offense. Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2151; Dintz, 424 U.S. at\\n609 n.11. Morgan’s very situation illustrates why allowing a\\nlawyer to waive double jeopardy defenses as a tactical matter\\nmakes sense. The news has been replete with stories about the\\nravages of the methamphetamine epidemic and the lives ru-\\nined and lost. A jury, given the choice between letting a pos-\\nsible methamphetamine dealer go scot free or convicting him\\nof possession with intent to deliver, might be inclined to do\\n\\f26 No. 18-2751\\n\\nthe latter. But, given the chance to reach a middle ground and\\nfind him guilty of possession alone, a jury faced with a low-\\nlevel dealer trying to make money for his elderly, ailing par-\\nents, might feel more comfortable finding him guilty of pos-\\nsession alone. This was the strategy that Morgan’s counsel\\nchose when he asked for either an instruction that Morgan\\nhad already been found guilty of possession or to present the\\nplace-holding lesser included offense option to the jury. As\\nMorgan’s trial counsel argued to the judge, “we’re going to be\\nstuck in a situation where the only verdict the jury has is pos-\\nsession with intent to deliver, and that basically cuts the trial\\nstrategy in half. … I think the jury needs to know somehow\\nthat this defendant has been convicted in this case before, but\\nthey are seeking to retry him.” R. 128 at 12–13.\\n In sum, Morgan has either forfeited or waived any claims\\nthat he had that his rights under the double jeopardy clause\\nhave been violated.\\nB. Propensity evidence\\n Moving from procedure to substance, Morgan alleges that\\nthe use of the three “other act” witnesses who testified about\\nhis prior drug use and drug dealing violated Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 404(b) and 403, as their testimony was used to\\ndemonstrate his propensity to deal drugs and thus unfairly\\nprejudiced his case. He did not raise this issue below (other\\nthan to contest that the prior acts were too remote in time—\\nan issue he does not contest here) and therefore we once again\\nreview this claim for plain error only. United States v. Thomas,\\n897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 615 (2018),\\nand cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 850 (2019).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 27\\n\\n 1. Rule 404(b) and propensity evidence\\n At issue here is the testimony of government witnesses\\nEmily Philbee, Melissa Hackwith, and Sue McIntire, all of\\nwhom frequently exchanged text messages with Morgan in\\nthe few months prior to his arrest, including on the day of his\\narrest. Each witness testified that she had both used metham-\\nphetamine with, and received it from Morgan. On its face,\\nRule 404(b) prohibits evidence of wrongs or acts that are not\\nthe ones for which a defendant is on trial.\\n The relevant parts of Rule 404(b) are as follows:\\n (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,\\n wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a\\n person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accord-\\n ance with the character.\\n (2) Permitted Uses; … . This evidence may be\\n admissible for another purpose, such as proving\\n motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack\\n of accident. …\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). A more colloquial way to state the rule\\nmight be to say that a court may not allow in evidence of prior\\nacts to show that the defendant is “the kind of person who\\nwould do such a thing.”\\n The problem, as we have frequently acknowledged, is that\\noften evidence can be used for both a permitted use—such as\\nshowing intent—and also an impermissible use, such as pro-\\npensity. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2751\\n\\n2014). For this reason, our court has concluded that “the dis-\\ntrict court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act\\nevidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how ex-\\nactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-\\ncifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference.” Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).\\n The government could have introduced the other-act evi-\\ndence described by the witnesses for impermissible propen-\\nsity purposes. In this case, however, Morgan conceded that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine, but contested that he in-\\ntended to distribute it to others. Evidence of his intent, there-\\nfore, was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose of\\nproving the required intent.\\n 2. Rule 403: balancing probative value and prejudice\\n Our evaluation of non-propensity relevance under Rule\\n404(b) is just the first step. “[E]ven if the other-act evidence is\\nrelevant without relying on a propensity inference, it may be\\nexcluded under Rule 403.” Id. at 856–57. Rule 403 of the Fed-\\neral Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude even relevant\\nevidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed\\nby a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts\\nmust tread carefully before admitting other act evidence be-\\ncause it almost always creates “some risk that the jury will\\ndraw the forbidden propensity inference.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at\\n857. And of all the 404(b) permissible uses, “intent” is perhaps\\nthe one most likely to be tangled up with improper propen-\\nsity uses. Id. at 858.\\n How then must a court attempt to balance this difficult\\nquestion when other act evidence is both relevant for a per-\\nmissible use—for example, to demonstrate intent—but also\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 29\\n\\nmay be used prejudicially by a jury to assume that a defend-\\nant has a certain propensity to commit a crime? The Court in\\nGomez instructed that “the degree to which the non-propen-\\nsity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the proba-\\ntive value of the other-act evidence.” Id. at 857.\\n Intent can become a disputed or contested issue in one of\\ntwo ways. First, intent is almost always an important issue in\\na specific intent crime, but it can also become a hotly contested\\nissue if the defendant makes it so in a case involving a gen-\\neral-intent crime. Id at 858–59. Our Circuit holds that posses-\\nsion with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. United\\nStates v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 1612 (2019); United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 727\\n(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2012). And even if it were not, Morgan placed it plainly\\nat issue both in his opening statement, and his closing argu-\\nment at the second trial. 6\\n In opening arguments in the second trial, his counsel said\\nvery little (a mere 152 words), but what he did say placed in-\\ntent front and center: “[T]he key thing that you need to keep\\nin mind is, what is his intent? Okay? He’s carrying it, yes. He’s\\nstopped at the airport, yes. But did he intend to sell all of those\\ndrugs anywhere?” R. 132 at 13. At closing, he reiterated,\\n [Morgan] did not have the intent to distribute\\n that—all of that at the Peoria County Airport.\\n\\n\\n 6 The government argues that Morgan also placed intent squarely at\\nissue by raising it in his first trial and taking the stand to concede that he\\npossessed the methamphetamine but deny that he intended to distribute\\nit. Appellee’s Brief at 40. We do not think that Morgan placed his intent at\\nissue in the second trial simply because he raised it in the first trial.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2751\\n\\n This case is all about intent, possession with in-\\n tent to deliver. The [government] must prove\\n beyond a reasonable doubt that Kent possessed\\n the ice at the Peoria County Airport, and at that\\n time—not before in Galesburg, not after-\\n wards—but at that time, he intended to deliver.\\nR. 133 at 39.\\n Juxtaposing this case with United States v. Chapman, 765\\nF.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), demonstrates the importance, when\\nbalancing prejudice and probative value, of considering “the\\nextent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actu-\\nally is contested in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. In Chap-\\nman, police officers claimed that they had seen the defendant,\\nChapman, carrying a bag with the butt of a gun sticking out.\\nThey later stopped and arrested Chapman as he was climbing\\nout of a nearby window without the bag. The recovered bag,\\nit turned out, contained a very large quantity of heroin. Chap-\\nman conceded that the bag contained a distribution-level\\nquantity of heroin. His defense was simply that the bag was\\nnot his—that is, he never possessed it. Id. at 724. In that case,\\nwe held that the evidence of Chapman’s prior heroin convic-\\ntions was relevant only through an inference about propen-\\nsity—because he had sold heroin before, he must have in-\\ntended to do so again. Id. at 726. The court concluded that\\n“even if the government had articulated a theory of relevance\\nthat does not rely on an impermissible propensity inference\\n(and it did not), the probative value of the heroin-trafficking\\nconviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair\\nprejudice in the specific context of this case. Chapman’s de-\\nfense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the\\nbag at all.” Id. at 726–27 (emphasis in original).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 31\\n\\n In other words, Chapman disputed possession but con-\\nceded intent (that is, that whoever possessed the heroin in-\\ntended to distribute it). The evidence of his prior heroin sales,\\ntherefore, had almost no probative value free from an imper-\\nmissible propensity inference. In contrast, Morgan disputed\\nintent but conceded possession, therefore the probative value\\nof the evidence of intent was high. The government’s intro-\\nduction of the three 404(b) witnesses in this case was thus a\\nlegitimate response to the sole issue in the case—whether\\nMorgan intended to distribute the methamphetamine that he\\nadmitted to possessing. The high probative value outweighed\\nany risk of unfair prejudice.\\n 3. Jury instructions and prejudice\\n The risk of unfair prejudice can also be reduced by giving\\nthe jury limiting instructions aimed at preventing the use of\\nthe other act evidence for improper purposes. Gomez, 763 F.3d\\nat 860. The judge in this case issued such limiting instructions\\nbefore each of the 404(b) witnesses testified, and again to the\\njury at the close of evidence. The jury instructions varied from\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. We compare\\nthem side by side below with the substantive differences in\\nitalics. We also include the government’s proposed instruc-\\ntion as it will become relevant in our discussion:\\n Government’s Instruction 13 Pattern instruc-\\n proposed instruc- given to jury tion\\n tion 13.\\n You have heard testi- You have heard tes- You have heard [tes-\\n mony that the de- timony that the de- timony/evidence]\\n fendant committed a fendant committed that the defendant\\n wrong other than the a wrong other than committed acts other\\n one charged in the the one charged in than the ones\\n\\f32 No. 18-2751\\n\\n indictment. Before the indictment. Be- charged in the in-\\n using this evidence, fore using this evi- dictment. Before us-\\n you must decide dence, you must de- ing this evidence,\\n whether it is more cide whether it is you must decide\\n likely than not that more likely than not whether it is more\\n the defendant did that the defendant likely than not that\\n the wrongs that are did the wrongs that the defendant took\\n not charged in the are not charged in the actions that are\\n indictment. If you the indictment. If not charged in the\\n decide that he did, you decide that he indictment. If you\\n then you may con- did, then you may decide that he did,\\n sider this evidence to consider this evi- then you may con-\\n help you decide that dence to help you sider that evidence\\n on January 7, 2016, decide if on January to help you decide\\n he possessed metham- 7, 2016, the defendant [describe with par-\\n phetamine with intent intended to distribute ticularity the pur-\\n to distribute. You may some or all of the pose for which other\\n not consider it for methamphetamine he act evidence was ad-\\n any other purpose. is accused of pos- mitted, e.g. the de-\\n Keep in mind that sessing. You may not fendant’s intent to\\n the defendant is on consider it for any distribute narcotics,\\n trial here for pos- other purpose. Keep absence of mistake\\n sessing methamphet- in mind that the de- in dealing with the\\n amine with the in- fendant is on trial alleged victim, etc.].\\n tent to distribute on here for possessing You may not con-\\n January 7, 2016, not methamphetamine sider this evidence\\n for the other wrong. with the intent to for any other pur-\\n R. 74-1 at 15. distribute on Janu- pose. To be more spe-\\n ary 7, 2016, not for cific, you may not as-\\n the other wrong. R. sume that, because the\\n 77 at 11. See also R. defendant committed\\n 128 at 75-76, 116; R. an act in the past, he is\\n 129 at 144; R. 133 at more likely to have\\n 57. committed the crime[s]\\n charged in the indict-\\n ment. The reason is\\n that the defendant is\\n not on trial for these\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 33\\n\\n other acts. Rather, he\\n is on trial for [list\\n charges alleged in\\n the indictment]. The\\n government has the\\n burden to prove be-\\n yond a reasonable\\n doubt the elements of\\n the crime[s] charged in\\n the indictment. This\\n burden cannot be met\\n with an inference that\\n the defendant is a per-\\n son whose past acts\\n suggest bad character\\n or a willingness or ten-\\n dency to commit\\n crimes.\\n Pattern Criminal\\n Jury Instructions of\\n the Seventh Circuit\\n (2012 Ed.) (plus\\n 2015-2017 and 2018\\n changes), §3.11.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Although our court urges district courts to begin with the\\nSeventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions, it is only the start-\\ning point and the court instructs that instructions “should be\\ncustomized to the case rather than boilerplate.” Gomez, 763\\nF.3d at 860.\\n In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the\\ninstructions. The instructions ordered the jury not to consider\\nthe testimony of the 404(b) witnesses “for any other purpose.”\\n\\f34 No. 18-2751\\n\\nBut would a lay person on a jury, who would have no reason\\nto know how or why our judicial system struggles with pro-\\npensity evidence, have any idea what the court means by “for\\nany other purpose?” What it actually means is that the jury\\nshould not use the evidence to infer that the defendant is a\\n“bad guy” or the “type of guy who would sell methampheta-\\nmine or commit crimes in general.” These are the exact expla-\\nnations that were excluded from the pattern instructions.\\nWithout them it almost makes it seem as though the jury may\\nuse the evidence for propensity purposes. In other words,\\nhow was a jury to know that it could not use the other act\\nevidence to show “Morgan has sold methamphetamine in the\\npast therefore he must be guilty of doing it this time.” We\\nthink the omissions from the pattern instructions created an\\nerror.\\n Not only do we think that it was in error, but it seems as\\nthough the district court judge did too. When he first consid-\\nered the proposed jury instruction he stated,\\n I looked at your proposed jury instructions [on\\n propensity evidence] … but it doesn’t accu-\\n rately state the instruction. It does in part. But\\n your jury instruction does not tell them what the\\n specific reason, motive, intent, design or what-\\n ever that its being offered.\\n The way I read your instruction, it just sounds\\n like—almost like a propensity instruction\\n which, of course, is not permitted.\\n I assume you intended to fill in there with\\n whether the defendant intended to distribute\\n methamphetamine; is that right? His intent?\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 35\\n\\nR. 128 at 9. In response, the government agreed to “tighten”\\nthe instruction. Id. But the only change it made was not sub-\\nstantive and certainly did not address the judge’s prior con-\\ncern about propensity. The government changed “you may\\nconsider this evidence to help you decide that on January 7,\\n2016, the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent\\nto distribute,” to “you may consider this evidence to help you\\ndecide if on January 7, 2016, the defendant intended to dis-\\ntribute some or all of the methamphetamine he is accused of\\npossessing.” Compare R. 74-1 at 15 (Government’s proposed\\ninstruction) to R. 77 at 11 (instruction submitted to jury). 7\\n Nevertheless, Morgan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to\\nthis instruction, not just once, but twice. R. 128 at 75–76; R. 133\\nat 4. First, during a pretrial proceeding as the judge and coun-\\nsel were reviewing jury instructions and limiting instructions.\\nThe judge read the instruction and then asked, “Are we all\\nagreed that that would be the proper instruction?” R. 128 at\\n76. Morgan’s counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” Id. And then,\\nagain, when reviewing the instructions just before submitting\\nthem to the jury, the judge suggested that the word “that”\\nshould be changed to “if.” He then stated, “Any objection to\\nthat as amended?” R. 133 at 4. Morgan’s counsel replied “No,\\nJudge.” Id. Thus any objection was unequivocally waived.\\nWhen a defendant negligently fails to object to a jury instruc-\\ntion before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may\\nlater attack that instruction only for plain error. United States\\nv. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013). A defendant who\\nwaives—rather than forfeits—his objection as Morgan did\\n\\n\\n 7 The Judge also changed the word “that” to “if.” See R. 133 at 4 and\\ncompare R. 74-1 at 15 to R. 77 at 11.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2751\\n\\nhere however, “cannot avail himself of even the demanding\\nplain error standard of review. He has no recourse and gen-\\nerally must live with his earlier decision not to press the er-\\nror.” Id.\\n We note for future trials that we think a jury instruction\\nthat does not inform the jury what “other purposes” means is\\nnot sufficient to explain forbidden propensity purposes to ju-\\nrors. Our court has explained the import of including the ra-\\ntionale in the propensity instruction.\\n [W]e see no reason to keep the jury in the dark\\n about the rationale for the rule against propen-\\n sity inferences. Lay people are capable of under-\\n standing the foundational principle in our sys-\\n tem of justice that we try cases, rather than per-\\n sons. The court’s limiting instruction would be\\n more effective if it told the jurors that they must\\n not use the other-act evidence to infer that the\\n defendant has a certain character and acted “in\\n character” in the present case because it does\\n not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he\\n committed the particular crime charged in the\\n case. Finally, the instruction would be im-\\n proved by tying the limiting principle to the\\n prosecution’s burden of proof. The jurors\\n should be reminded that the government’s duty\\n is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every el-\\n ement of the specific crime charged, and it cannot\\n discharge its burden by inviting an inference\\n that the defendant is a person whose past acts\\n suggest a willingness or propensity to commit\\n crimes.\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 37\\n\\nGomez, 763 F.3d at 86. The government’s proposed jury in-\\nstructions and the one used at trial omitted this rationale. Jury\\ninstructions on propensity should include the rationale ex-\\nplained in Gomez and in the pattern instructions. Morgan,\\nhowever, twice waived his right to object to the instructions\\nas submitted.\\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n Finally, Morgan asks us to evaluate his claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel. His brief, in a footnote, recognizes that\\n“in some cases, this Court has suggested that ineffective assis-\\ntance of counsel claims are more appropriately reserved for\\nproceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Appellant’s Brief at 44,\\nn.8. We have done more than suggest; we have warned\\nagainst the near-certain folly that will arise, not just in “some\\ncases” but in nearly every situation in which ineffectiveness\\nof counsel claims are reviewed on direct appeal. We have\\ncounseled that such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\nare “’invariably doomed’ on direct review because they often\\nrequire augmentation of the record with extrinsic evidence,\\nwhich cannot be considered.” Delatorre v. United States, 847\\nF.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gilliam, 255\\nF.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001)). And we have even noted in one\\nopinion that as of that date, this Court had never reversed a\\nconviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance\\nof counsel. See United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 339 (7th\\nCir. 1995). We have documented our concerns and warnings\\nagain and again. See United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2005) (compiling cases with warnings against pursu-\\ning ineffective assistance claims during direct appeal). See\\nalso Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).\\n\\f38 No. 18-2751\\n\\n It is true that in this case there was indeed some factual\\ndevelopment that would be helpful for an ineffective assis-\\ntance claim. After the second trial, Morgan filed a pro se mo-\\ntion for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. After the\\ndistrict court appointed a new attorney, his trial counsel sub-\\nmitted an affidavit and testified at a subsequent hearing on\\nthe motion. R. 101-1; R. 121. Morgan’s brief alleges that this is\\na sufficient record with which to proceed with respect to the\\nineffectiveness of Morgan’s first trial counsel. We disagree.\\nThere is no record at all in the post-trial hearing of counsel’s\\nstrategy regarding double jeopardy. And his strategy regard-\\ning the 404(b) witnesses is only addressed in a limited man-\\nner. Furthermore, Morgan agrees that the record is not suffi-\\nciently developed to assess the effectiveness of his second\\nlawyer, who took over during the post-trial motions, and asks\\nto preserve any claim Morgan raises as to his second lawyer’s\\nperformance for collateral review. We would then be placed\\nin a position of assessing ineffectiveness of counsel in a piece-\\nmeal fashion, which, for judicial economy, we decline to do.\\nSee West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“permitting multiple, piecemeal appeals from a single\\naction in the district court will have a debilitating effect on the\\nefficient administration of justice.”).\\n Moreover, if we were to consider Morgan’s claim here, our\\ndecision will be binding on the district court on post-convic-\\ntion review and Morgan will have lost the opportunity for a\\ntrue full review of the matter. Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. Conse-\\nquently, we decline to review Morgan’s claim of ineffective\\nassistance of counsel in this direct appeal. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Stork, 487 F. App’x 295, 296 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\fNo. 18-2751 39\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all re-\\nspects.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3069,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4635802,"string":"4,635,802"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"George KIEBALA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek BORIS, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"George Kiebala v. Derek Boris"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3233"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Hamilton, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17‐3233\\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDEREK BORIS,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\\n\\f2 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n A. The Dispute\\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\\n\\n\\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 3\\n\\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\\nto come to an end.\\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\\nsage said:\\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\\n However, their excuse for not paying\\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\\n\\f4 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\\n trusted!!2\\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\\n B. The Litigation\\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\\n\\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 5\\n\\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\\nat *7.\\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\\nlimitations period. Id.\\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\\n\\f6 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\\nclaim.\\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\\ntone, and substance.\\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 7\\n\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\\nbars the claim.\\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 9\\n\\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\\nitations defense to his libel claim.\\n B. Statute of Limitations\\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\\n2011).3\\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\\n\\n\\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\\ncourt.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 11\\n\\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\\nplained:\\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\\n of a letter to an editor.\\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 13\\n\\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\\ngeneral public).\\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\\n\\f14 No. 17‐3233\\n\\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\\n\\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 15\\n\\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413055/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635802/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: George KIEBALA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek BORIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3233\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nDEREK BORIS,\n Defendant‐Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\n\f2 No. 17‐3233\n\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\nstatute of limitations.\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\n A. The Dispute\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\n\n\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 3\n\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\nto come to an end.\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\nsage said:\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\n However, their excuse for not paying\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\n\f4 No. 17‐3233\n\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\n trusted!!2\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\n B. The Litigation\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\n\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 5\n\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\nat *7.\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\nlimitations period. Id.\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\n\f6 No. 17‐3233\n\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\nclaim.\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\ntone, and substance.\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\n\fNo. 17‐3233 7\n\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\nII. Analysis\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\nbars the claim.\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\n\f8 No. 17‐3233\n\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\n\fNo. 17‐3233 9\n\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\nitations defense to his libel claim.\n B. Statute of Limitations\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\n\f10 No. 17‐3233\n\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\n2011).3\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\n\n\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\ncourt.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 11\n\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\nstatute of limitations.\n\f12 No. 17‐3233\n\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\nplained:\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\n of a letter to an editor.\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\n\fNo. 17‐3233 13\n\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\ngeneral public).\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\n\f14 No. 17‐3233\n\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\n\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 15\n\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: George KIEBALA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek BORIS, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17‐3233\\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDEREK BORIS,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\\n\\f2 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n A. The Dispute\\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\\n\\n\\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 3\\n\\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\\nto come to an end.\\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\\nsage said:\\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\\n However, their excuse for not paying\\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\\n\\f4 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\\n trusted!!2\\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\\n B. The Litigation\\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\\n\\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 5\\n\\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\\nat *7.\\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\\nlimitations period. Id.\\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\\n\\f6 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\\nclaim.\\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\\ntone, and substance.\\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 7\\n\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\\nbars the claim.\\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 9\\n\\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\\nitations defense to his libel claim.\\n B. Statute of Limitations\\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\\n2011).3\\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\\n\\n\\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\\ncourt.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 11\\n\\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\\nplained:\\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\\n of a letter to an editor.\\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 13\\n\\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\\ngeneral public).\\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\\n\\f14 No. 17‐3233\\n\\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\\n\\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 15\\n\\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3070,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4635810,"string":"4,635,810"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"George Kiebala v. Derek Boris"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3233"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17‐3233\\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDEREK BORIS,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\\n\\f2 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n A. The Dispute\\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\\n\\n\\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 3\\n\\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\\nto come to an end.\\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\\nsage said:\\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\\n However, their excuse for not paying\\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\\n\\f4 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\\n trusted!!2\\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\\n B. The Litigation\\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\\n\\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 5\\n\\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\\nat *7.\\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\\nlimitations period. Id.\\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\\n\\f6 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\\nclaim.\\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\\ntone, and substance.\\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 7\\n\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\\nbars the claim.\\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 9\\n\\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\\nitations defense to his libel claim.\\n B. Statute of Limitations\\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\\n2011).3\\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\\n\\n\\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\\ncourt.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 11\\n\\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\\nplained:\\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\\n of a letter to an editor.\\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 13\\n\\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\\ngeneral public).\\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\\n\\f14 No. 17‐3233\\n\\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\\n\\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 15\\n\\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413063/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635810/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: George Kiebala v. Derek Boris\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3233\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nDEREK BORIS,\n Defendant‐Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\n\f2 No. 17‐3233\n\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\nstatute of limitations.\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\n A. The Dispute\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\n\n\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 3\n\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\nto come to an end.\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\nsage said:\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\n However, their excuse for not paying\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\n\f4 No. 17‐3233\n\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\n trusted!!2\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\n B. The Litigation\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\n\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 5\n\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\nat *7.\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\nlimitations period. Id.\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\n\f6 No. 17‐3233\n\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\nclaim.\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\ntone, and substance.\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\n\fNo. 17‐3233 7\n\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\nII. Analysis\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\nbars the claim.\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\n\f8 No. 17‐3233\n\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\n\fNo. 17‐3233 9\n\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\nitations defense to his libel claim.\n B. Statute of Limitations\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\n\f10 No. 17‐3233\n\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\n2011).3\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\n\n\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\ncourt.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 11\n\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\nstatute of limitations.\n\f12 No. 17‐3233\n\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\nplained:\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\n of a letter to an editor.\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\n\fNo. 17‐3233 13\n\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\ngeneral public).\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\n\f14 No. 17‐3233\n\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\n\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\n\fNo. 17‐3233 15\n\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: George Kiebala v. Derek Boris\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17‐3233\\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDEREK BORIS,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16‐CV‐7478 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant George\\nKiebala appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against\\ndefendant‐appellee Derek Boris. Kiebala contends the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala,\\nwho represented himself in the district court, could amend his\\ncomplaint to avoid dismissal. He also argues that the district\\n\\f2 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncourt erred in holding that his libel claim is barred by the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n We affirm. District judges do not have an affirmative duty\\nto coach or second‐guess the choices that parties, even pro se\\nparties, make about how to litigate their cases. We also agree\\nwith the district court that the applicable Illinois statute of\\nlimitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n A. The Dispute\\n In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we ac‐\\ncept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff without vouching for\\ntheir objective truth. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Kiebala owns a luxury car share service called\\nCurvy Road Holdings, LLC.1 It allows customers to purchase\\ntime‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are\\nowned by “investors.” In September 2009, Derek Boris be‐\\ncame a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the\\nrental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gal‐\\nlardo. All was well for the first few months as Kiebala made\\npayments to Boris in late 2009 and March 2010.\\n In May 2010, however, Boris withdrew his car from the\\nprogram, and Kiebala’s check for his final payment to Boris\\ndid not clear. Kiebala emailed Boris on July 16, 20, 22, and Au‐\\ngust 6, 2010, to explain that various medical and business dif‐\\nficulties were preventing payment. Boris never received his\\n\\n\\n 1Kiebala also owns a second company, Exotic Car Share, LLC, which\\noperates on a different business model. Although the filings mention both\\ncompanies, defendant Boris contracted only with Curvy Road Holdings.\\nFor ease of reference, we limit our discussion to Curvy Road.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 3\\n\\nfinal payment, and communications between the two seemed\\nto come to an end.\\n After a period of quiet, though, Boris posted angry and\\nderogatory statements on various websites about Kiebala and\\nCurvy Road. He did this on at least eight occasions from\\nDecember 2010 through July 2011. Sharing his thoughts on\\ncustomer review sites such as Scamexposure.com, Private‐\\ncomplaints.com, and Ripoffreport.com, Boris allegedly\\nrevealed (we must assume) Curvy Road’s confidential\\nbusiness information and opined that “it is a FRAUD\\ncompany” whose “owner simply cannot be trusted [because]\\n[h]e has lied repeatedly and he will steal your money.”\\n Kiebala’s final posting from this period, central to the stat‐\\nute of limitations issue here, was made to RipoffReport.com\\non July 20, 2011. The subject heading asserted that Kiebala\\nwas a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” The mes‐\\nsage said:\\n The company rents some of its exotic cars from\\n individual owners such as myself, and pays out\\n a commission based off of actual customer use.\\n However, their excuse for not paying\\n THOUSANDS of owed commissions to me is\\n that “my wife took my money”! This from a\\n supposed ‘professional’ company, makes it\\n clear that lying and stealing are part of George\\n Kiebala [and] Curvy Road[’s] … daily manage‐\\n ment! I would advise EVERYONE, customers\\n and potential partners, to STAY AWAY from this\\n thief, or you risk losing everything. This\\n\\f4 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n company, and the owners, simply cannot be\\n trusted!!2\\nAnd with that, the dispute went dormant for several years.\\n In the fall of 2014, Boris again turned his sights on Kiebala.\\nOn October 22, 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to\\ngive him “a chance to make good on our agreement before I\\nput my review of your company on various websites.” The\\nparties did not reach a settlement agreement, and Boris\\nlaunched a new round of internet postings.\\n On July 21, 2015, on a new website called scamorg.com,\\nBoris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport\\npost of July 20, 2011. And on July 22, 2015, Boris returned to\\nRipoffReport.com and “updated” his original July 20, 2011\\npost. According to Kiebala, “No additional information ap‐\\npears to have been provided when the post was updated.”\\nKiebala claims, and we assume for purposes of the appeal,\\nthat by indicating that his 2011 negative review was “up‐\\ndated,” Boris caused the post to reflect a date of 2015, making\\nit more likely to be prioritized in new online search results.\\n B. The Litigation\\n Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris the following\\nyear on July 22, 2016, alleging five Illinois state law claims.\\n(The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)\\nbased on diversity of citizenship.) Boris moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint. The district court granted the motion and\\n\\n 2 Kiebala submitted a print‐out of this post to the district court and\\nidentified its date as July 20, 2011. Kiebala’s submission, however, is a July\\n20, 2011 post that is designated “Updated” as of July 22, 2015. Kiebala says\\nthat the text of the original 2011 post was not changed when it was later\\n“updated” in 2015, and we assume as much for purposes of this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 5\\n\\ndismissed all counts, noting that: (a) the dismissal as to the\\nlibel and intentional inflection of emotional distress claims\\nwas without prejudice, and (b) the dismissal of claims for\\nbreach of a non‐disclosure agreement, breach of contract, and\\ntortious interference with business expectancy was without\\nprejudice because Kiebala sued in his personal capacity and\\nhe was not the real party in interest—his companies were. Kie‐\\nbala v. Boris, No. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 590287 (N.D. Ill. Feb.\\n14, 2017). As for the latter three claims, the court gave Kiebala\\nthirty days to file an amended complaint that either joined or\\nsubstituted his companies as plaintiffs; if he failed to do so,\\nthe latter three claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.\\nat *7.\\n Kiebala’s claims for libel and intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress faced different hurdles. The district court held\\nthat Kiebala’s libel claim was barred by Illinois’s one‐year\\nstatute of limitations for defamation claims because the last\\n“original post” was dated July 21, 2015, i.e., one day outside\\nthe limitations period. Id. at *4. The court concluded that Bo‐\\nris’s “updated” post from July 22, 2015 could not extend the\\nlimitations period. Id.\\n The district court dismissed Kiebala’s claim for intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress on the merits, holding that the\\nposts could not be considered objectively as “so extreme as to\\ngo beyond all possible bounds of decency,” but were better\\ncategorized as “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy‐\\nances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nKolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.\\n1992). Thus, the district court granted Boris’s motion to dis‐\\nmiss because, “even construing his complaint liberally given\\n\\f6 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nhis pro se status,” Kiebala’s complaint failed to state a claim\\nupon which relief could be granted. Id. at *7.\\n Kiebala filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its\\nruling on the claims for tortious interference and intentional\\ninfliction of emotional distress, and to grant him leave to file\\nan amended complaint. Kiebala made clear that he was not\\nasking the district court to reconsider its ruling on his libel\\nclaim or to allow him to amend that claim. His motion, sup‐\\nporting memorandum, and reply memorandum were all con‐\\nsistent on that score. His only references to his libel claim em‐\\nphasized that he was not asking the district court to reconsider\\nits ruling on that claim, nor requesting leave to amend.\\n The district court denied the motion for reconsideration\\nbut made clear that its dismissal was without prejudice and\\nthat Kiebala could file an amended complaint. Kiebala v. Boris,\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 1161177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,\\n2017). Kiebala did so, but Boris again moved to dismiss, this\\ntime seeking sanctions. In opposing the motions, Kiebala\\nagain emphasized that he was not trying to amend his libel\\nclaim.\\n As relevant to Kiebala’s appeal, the new allegations in‐\\ntended to buttress the claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress included several additional instances of alleg‐\\nedly defamatory posts. Most of these posts still dated from\\n2011, but some were undated, and one was arguably posted\\non March 20, 2017, and we accept that date on appeal. The\\nnewly alleged posts largely tracked the other posts in form,\\ntone, and substance.\\n The district court denied Boris’s motion for sanctions but\\ngranted dismissal, this time with prejudice. Kiebala v. Boris,\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 7\\n\\nNo. 1:16 cv 7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,\\n2017). The court held that Kiebala’s attempts to cure the tor‐\\ntious interference claim were insufficient on the merits. Id. at\\n*3–4. The court further held that Kiebala’s amended claim for\\nintentional infliction of emotional distress also failed on the\\npleadings. Id. at *5–6. Even considering the newly alleged\\npost, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the high standard for\\nsuch a claim: “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and\\n“intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at *6, quoting\\nSwearnigen‐El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864\\n(7th Cir. 2010). The district court entered judgment for Boris.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Kiebala presents two questions about only his\\nlibel claim. First, he contends that the district court erred by\\nnot allowing him to amend his libel claim. Second, he argues\\nthat the court erred by finding that the statute of limitations\\nbars the claim.\\n A. Opportunity to Amend Pleadings\\n When a district court denies a party’s request to amend his\\npleadings, we review under an abuse of discretion standard,\\nand there is “a presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at\\nleast one opportunity to amend.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of\\nGreater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 524, 518\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Kiebala, however, never sought to amend his\\nlibel claim. Instead, he faults the district court for failing to\\n“offer” him an opportunity to amend the libel claim. This ap‐\\nproach is not grounded in the text of Federal Rule of Civil Pro‐\\ncedure 15, which assumes some agency on the part of the liti‐\\ngant. Under Rule 15(a)(1), “[a] party may amend its pleading\\nonce as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of the\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3233\\n\\ncomplaint or after a motion to dismiss or other motion requir‐\\ning a responsive pleading has been filed. “In all other cases,”\\nRule 15(a)(2) explains, “a party may amend its pleading only\\nwith the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s\\nleave.” The district judge, of course, “should freely give leave\\nwhen justice so requires,” but the Rule gives no indication\\nthat a judge is required to offer parties legal guidance on\\nwhether and how to amend their pleadings.\\n This rule should be different, Kiebala seems to argue, for\\na pro se plaintiff. To be sure, we have held that “district courts\\nhave a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints lib‐\\nerally and to allow ample opportunity for amending the com‐\\nplaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant\\nwould be able to state a meritorious claim.” Donald v. Cook\\nCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). In addi‐\\ntion to viewing a “pro se complaint with an understanding\\neye,” a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the cor‐\\nrect procedure or “take appropriate measures to permit the\\nadjudication of pro se claims on the merits.” Id.\\n At the same time, we have tried to make clear that a “court\\nis not to become an advocate.” Id. District courts are not\\ncharged with seeking out legal “issues lurking within the con‐\\nfines” of the pro se litigant’s pleadings, and the court’s duties\\ncertainly do “not extend so far as to require the court to bring\\nto the attention of the pro se litigant or to decide the unraised\\nissues.” Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).\\n Kiebala’s effort to impose such a coaching obligation on\\nthe district court is not tenable. According to Kiebala’s argu‐\\nment, the district judge should have: (a) read Kiebala’s filings\\nexpressly disclaiming any interest in reconsideration or\\namendment of his libel claim, (b) observed that Kiebala’s\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 9\\n\\namended complaint added, for his intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress claim, allegations about a recent internet\\nposting that could have been within the one‐year statute of\\nlimitations for the dismissed libel claim; (c) disregarded Kie‐\\nbala’s responses to Boris’s second motion to dismiss, in which\\nhe again emphasized that he had no interest in amending his\\nlibel claim; (d) advised Kiebala that the newly alleged post in‐\\ncluded in his amended claim for intentional infliction of emo‐\\ntional distress might offer a basis to salvage his untimely libel\\nclaim from the statute of limitations, and then (e) suggested\\nto Kiebala that he file a second amended complaint following\\nthe judge’s recommendation as to how to plead his libel claim.\\n Requiring judges to take such affirmative steps to guide\\npro se plaintiffs’ pleadings would force them outside the role\\nof neutral judges. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583 (7th\\nCir. 1996) (courts are not to “fill in all of the blanks in a pro se\\ncomplaint”); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,\\n323 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the “institutional concerns”\\nwith “impos[ing] on the court the obligation to make argu‐\\nments for [a] party that the party has not made for itself”). The\\ndistrict judge did not abuse his discretion either by failing to\\nsuggest to Kiebala that he amend the libel claim he had re‐\\npeatedly said he did not want to amend or by failing to advise\\nKiebala that a new allegation regarding his intentional inflic‐\\ntion of emotional distress claim might avoid the statute of lim‐\\nitations defense to his libel claim.\\n B. Statute of Limitations\\n Kiebala’s libel claim under Illinois law is governed by the\\none‐year statute of limitations on defamation claims. 735 ILCS\\n5/13‐201. The district court dismissed Kiebala’s libel claim—\\nas alleged—as barred by that statute of limitations. We review\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3233\\n\\nthis ruling de novo. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir.\\n2011).3\\n In his original complaint, the most recent new and alleg‐\\nedly defamatory statement was made one year and one day\\nbefore Kiebala filed the complaint. The issue on appeal boils\\ndown to whether Boris, by marking his 2011 Ripoff Report\\npost as “updated” on July 22, 2015—exactly one year before\\nKiebala filed his complaint—started a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for that alleged libel. Our role in deciding this\\nquestion of state law is to predict how we think the Supreme\\nCourt of Illinois would decide the issue. Pippen v. NBCUniver‐\\nsal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The question of republication of alleged libels has arisen\\noften and was the subject of a proposed uniform statute for\\nstates to enact. In relevant part, the Illinois enactment of the\\nUniform Single Publication Act does not permit a person to\\n“have more than one cause of action for damages for libel”\\nbased “upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,\\nsuch as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine\\nor any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast\\nover radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion pic‐\\nture.” 740 ILCS 165/1. We have explained that the Act was in‐\\ntended to protect speakers and writers from “repeated\\n\\n\\n 3Kiebala did not waive his right to press this claim on appeal by fail‐\\ning to re‐argue it in response to Boris’s second motion to dismiss. To pre‐\\nserve appellate rights, a party need not repeat challenges to a definitive\\ninterlocutory ruling. See, e.g., Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 901 F.3d 868,\\n882 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.\\n1999) (en banc). Kiebala is not entitled, however, to argue in this appeal\\ngrounds for sustaining his libel claim that he did not present to the district\\ncourt.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 11\\n\\nlitigation arising from a single, but mass‐produced, defama‐\\ntory publication.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615.\\n The 1959 statute codified a common law rule adopted by\\nthe Illinois courts long before the internet came along. See\\nWheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1962).\\nWe have already predicted that “the Supreme Court of Illinois\\nwould deem the single‐publication rule applicable to the In‐\\nternet.” Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (“Every state court that has\\nconsidered the question applies the single‐publication rule to\\ninformation online … [a]nd those federal courts that have ad‐\\ndressed the topic have concluded that the relevant state su‐\\npreme court would agree.”). We explained that “excluding\\nthe Internet from the single‐publication rule would eviscerate\\nthe statute of limitations and expose online publishers to po‐\\ntentially limitless liability.” Id.\\n Illinois courts have not yet considered whether “updat‐\\ning” a previously published internet post, without changing\\nthe post’s content or placing the content on a new website, is\\nsufficient to escape the single‐publication rule. In predicting\\nhow the state’s highest court would answer a question, we\\nmay consider instructive decisions from other jurisdictions.\\nSee Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615; see also, e.g., Community Bank of\\nTrenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 811–13 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (drawing on cases from other states to make Erie Rail‐\\nroad prediction of state law). Relying on analogous Illinois\\nstate cases and treatment of similar conduct by other courts,\\nwe predict the Supreme Court of Illinois would hold that Bo‐\\nris’s 2015 marking of his 2011 post as “updated,” is, without\\nmore, not sufficient to treat the 2011 post as newly circulated\\nor republished such that his claim could avoid the one‐year\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3233\\n\\n The closest guidance from an Illinois court comes from a\\npre‐internet case similar to this one, Founding Church of Scien‐\\ntology of Washington, D.C. v. American Medical Ass’n, 377\\nN.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. 1978). There the plaintiff alleged that the\\ndefendant had published a libelous article in its monthly mag‐\\nazine and then several years later “caused reprints and copies\\nof the article to be delivered, distributed and published to\\nthree named persons with various newspapers on the east\\ncoast, as well as throughout the United States.” Id. at 159–60.\\n The court rejected the argument that the later distribution\\nextended the statute of limitations, describing the defendant’s\\naction as “nothing more than miscellaneous copies incidental\\nto the general [earlier] publication.” Id. at 161. The court ex‐\\nplained:\\n To conclude otherwise and consider them a “re‐\\n publication,” would cause havoc with the law\\n of libel and expose a publisher or author to a\\n lawsuit years after his article had first been pub‐\\n lished simply because he or someone else chose\\n to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy\\n to a friend or, for example, to a magazine as part\\n of a letter to an editor.\\nId. Such an outcome would make no sense, especially “be‐\\ncause the article in question might well be on file in libraries,\\nand so open to the public anyway.” Id. Kiebala’s original 2011\\npost—still available on the same website—could similarly be\\nconsidered as “on file” and “open to the public anyway,” with\\nthe later updated‐but‐unaltered post serving as the equivalent\\nof including the original statement in a “letter to an editor.”\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 13\\n\\n Illinois law allows some room to argue that a new publi‐\\ncation starts a new clock if the content is changed, at least sig‐\\nnificantly, or if the new publication is addressed to a new au‐\\ndience. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420,\\n437 (7th Cir. 2009) (single publication rule did not apply to\\ncreditors’ repeated reports of inaccurate information to credit\\nreporting agencies where “the information conveyed did not\\nstay the same”); Weber v. Cueto, 624 N.E.2d 442, 452–53 (Ill.\\nApp. 1993) (single publication rule did not apply where orig‐\\ninal publication was privileged report to government author‐\\nities and later publication was not privileged and intended for\\ngeneral public).\\n An Illinois court considered the interplay of these different\\nfactors at some length in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership,\\n859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 2006). Plaintiff Blair had worked for\\nseveral years as an employee of defendant’s steakhouse. Dur‐\\ning that time, his photograph was used for promotional pur‐\\nposes on defendant’s flyers, brochures, signs, billboards, res‐\\ntaurant menus, calendars, postcards, and website. Id. at 1189–\\n90. Blair later sued the defendant for appropriating his like‐\\nness and violating his right to publicity by using his picture.\\nId. at 1190. The court held that the suit was barred by the one‐\\nyear statute of limitations because his “cause of action ac‐\\ncrue[d] at the time [his] interest [wa]s invaded,” i.e., upon the\\nfirst publication of the photograph. Id. at 1193.\\n Borrowing from the single publication rule for defamation\\nclaims, the court found that it did not matter that Blair’s pic‐\\nture “was displayed via several mediums over a period of\\ntime”; his picture “was used for a single purpose” and to “tar‐\\nget[] a single audience.” Id. The court acknowledged that a\\nrepublication could “constitute a new cause of action if the\\n\\f14 No. 17‐3233\\n\\npublication is altered so as to reach a new audience or pro‐\\nmote a different product.” Id. at 1194. But the court repeated\\nthat, given defendant’s use of an “image [that] remained con‐\\nstant and was not significantly altered to reach a new audi‐\\nence” and that was used for the “same … purpose” (e.g., “to\\npromote a single product”), it did not matter that it was pub‐\\nlished multiple times “via several mediums.” Id.\\n These factors have continued to guide Illinois courts when\\nconsidering a later appearance of allegedly defamatory con‐\\ntent on the internet. We have noted that “passive maintenance\\nof a web site” is not considered a republication. Pippen, 734\\nF.3d at 616. Nor have courts been persuaded to start a new\\nstatute of limitations clock when defendants “changed the\\nURL where statements were posted but left the statements un‐\\naltered,” or when “defendants added an unrelated story to [a]\\nweb page hosting the allegedly defamatory statement.” Id.,\\nciting Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (9th\\nCir. 2007), Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012),\\nand Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 463–64 (N.Y. 2002).4\\n We agree with the district court here that a single instance\\nof Boris marking his original 2011 post as “updated,” at least\\n\\n 4Similarly, a federal district court found that publication of new arti‐\\ncles and blogposts providing hyperlinks to already‐published defamatory\\nmaterial did not start a new statute of limitations period, even though the\\narticles and posts containing the hyperlinks were made in venues that\\n“appeal[ed] to a different type of audience.” Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law\\nCenter, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (granting motion to\\ndismiss). The later publication of such a hyperlink is “simply a new means\\nfor accessing the referenced article … [m]aking access to the referenced\\narticle easier,” while lacking “the critical feature of republication”—\\nnamely, “that the original text of the article was changed or the contents\\nof the article presented directly to a new audience.” Id. at 917.\\n\\fNo. 17‐3233 15\\n\\nwithout anything more, did not start a new statute of limita‐\\ntions clock for the alleged defamation. The 2015 “update” was\\nidentical in content to the 2011 publication, and the update\\nwas intended to reach the same audience, plaintiff Kiebala’s\\npotential investors and customers. The single publication rule\\napplies so that the July 22, 2015 post did not revive Kiebala’s\\ntime‐barred claim for defamation.\\n The judgment of the district court is therefore\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3071,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636061,"string":"4,636,061"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Richard A. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. RIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Sierra International MacHinery, LLC, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3034; 18-3141"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Scudder, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n and\\n\\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\\naffirm its judgment.\\n I\\n A\\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\\n\\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\\nit that appears in the record shows:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\\n B\\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\\npose.\\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\\n\\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\\nhim.\\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\\nof leave to amend.\\n II\\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\\n\\n A\\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\\nto protect maintenance workers.\\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\\n\\n B\\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\\n condition.\\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\\nproof. Id.\\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\\n user and to the public at large;\\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\\n same need in a safer way;\\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\\n or driving cost up too high;\\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\\n care;\\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\\n the product, either through general public knowledge\\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\\nof obtaining liability insurance.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\\n\\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\\nants followed naturally.\\n III\\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\\nmary judgment.\\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\\n IV\\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\\n\\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413314/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636061/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Richard A. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. RIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Sierra International MacHinery, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\n v.\n\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\n\n and\n\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\ncuit Judges.\n\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\naffirm its judgment.\n I\n A\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\n\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\nit that appears in the record shows:\n\n\n\n\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\n\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\n B\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\npose.\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\n\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\nhim.\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\n\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\nof leave to amend.\n II\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\n\n A\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\n\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\nto protect maintenance workers.\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\n\n B\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\n condition.\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\nproof. Id.\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\n\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\n user and to the public at large;\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\n same need in a safer way;\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\n or driving cost up too high;\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\n care;\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\n the product, either through general public knowledge\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\nof obtaining liability insurance.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\n\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\nants followed naturally.\n III\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\n\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\nmary judgment.\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\n IV\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\n\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Richard A. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. RIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Sierra International MacHinery, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n and\\n\\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\\naffirm its judgment.\\n I\\n A\\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\\n\\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\\nit that appears in the record shows:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\\n B\\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\\npose.\\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\\n\\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\\nhim.\\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\\nof leave to amend.\\n II\\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\\n\\n A\\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\\nto protect maintenance workers.\\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\\n\\n B\\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\\n condition.\\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\\nproof. Id.\\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\\n user and to the public at large;\\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\\n same need in a safer way;\\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\\n or driving cost up too high;\\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\\n care;\\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\\n the product, either through general public knowledge\\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\\nof obtaining liability insurance.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\\n\\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\\nants followed naturally.\\n III\\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\\nmary judgment.\\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\\n IV\\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\\n\\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3072,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636145,"string":"4,636,145"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3141"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n and\\n\\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\\naffirm its judgment.\\n I\\n A\\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\\n\\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\\nit that appears in the record shows:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\\n B\\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\\npose.\\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\\n\\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\\nhim.\\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\\nof leave to amend.\\n II\\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\\n\\n A\\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\\nto protect maintenance workers.\\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\\n\\n B\\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\\n condition.\\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\\nproof. Id.\\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\\n user and to the public at large;\\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\\n same need in a safer way;\\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\\n or driving cost up too high;\\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\\n care;\\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\\n the product, either through general public knowledge\\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\\nof obtaining liability insurance.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\\n\\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\\nants followed naturally.\\n III\\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\\nmary judgment.\\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\\n IV\\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\\n\\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413398/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636145/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\n v.\n\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\n\n and\n\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\ncuit Judges.\n\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\naffirm its judgment.\n I\n A\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\n\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\nit that appears in the record shows:\n\n\n\n\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\n\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\n B\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\npose.\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\n\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\nhim.\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\n\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\nof leave to amend.\n II\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\n\n A\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\n\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\nto protect maintenance workers.\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\n\n B\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\n condition.\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\nproof. Id.\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\n\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\n user and to the public at large;\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\n same need in a safer way;\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\n or driving cost up too high;\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\n care;\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\n the product, either through general public knowledge\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\nof obtaining liability insurance.\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\n\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\nants followed naturally.\n III\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\n\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\n\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\nmary judgment.\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\n IV\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\n\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\n\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n and\\n\\nSIERRA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-RJD — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Accidents unfortunately happen on\\nbusiness premises with some regularity. The workers’ com-\\npensation system normally governs payments from employ-\\ners to injured workers, but those workers are free to sue other\\nparties, such as suppliers or lessors of machinery that is used\\non the site. That is what happened here: Richard A. Clark was\\nbadly injured as he was getting off a car-crushing machine\\nknown as a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (“the Crusher”),\\nwhich was used by his employer, Thornton Auto Crushing,\\nLLC. He sued both the manufacturer of the Crusher, Sierra\\nInternational Machinery, LLC, and the company that had\\nleased it to Thornton, River Metals Recycling, LLC, asserting\\nthat they were liable to him under Illinois tort law because it\\nwas defectively designed. The district court granted summary\\njudgment in both defendants’ favor after it decided to strike\\nthe testimony from Clark’s expert. Even taking the facts in the\\nlight most favorable to Clark, as we must, we conclude that\\nthe district court was correct to take this action. We therefore\\naffirm its judgment.\\n I\\n A\\n Scrap cars eventually end up with a company such as\\nThornton, which crushes cars and sends what remains to a\\nsalvage company. One of the machines Thornton used to\\nsquash the cars was the Crusher. The Crusher had been as-\\nsembled in Italy and then imported into the United States by\\nSierra. Sierra sold it to a company called Tri-State, which in\\nturn conveyed it to River Metals through an asset-only pur-\\nchase agreement. River Metals leased it to Thornton.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 3\\n\\n The Crusher was a rather large machine, as the picture of\\nit that appears in the record shows:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nEvery other day or so for about 18 months before his accident,\\nClark had worked with this machine. He was responsible for\\ndaily maintenance, including checking the oil, antifreeze, and\\nhydraulic fluids. In order to perform these tasks, he would\\nclamber up the right side of the machine, stepping and grab-\\nbing onto whatever was handy: the hydraulic lines, a hose, or\\na cylinder, for example. This was not a method endorsed by\\nSierra: it recommended instead that workers use either a lad-\\nder or a working platform, such as a manlift or a forklift, to\\nreach the tanks. When the time came to get down, Clark typ-\\nically turned, stepped down from the tank-level platform\\n(about 60 inches above the ground) onto the steel plate on top\\nof the stabilizer (about 45 inches from the ground), and from\\nthere jumped the rest of the way.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n On March 11, 2013, Clark finished his work up on the ma-\\nchine and attempted to dismount as usual. But this time he\\nslipped, fell to the ground, and landed on his outstretched\\narm, shattering his elbow. He was taken to the Emergency De-\\npartment at Carbondale Memorial Hospital; the Hospital rec-\\norded that “[a]s he was getting off the bailer [sic] apparently\\nhe slipped in some hydraulic fluid.” Since the accident,\\nClark’s left arm has been almost completely useless, and he\\nhas been in constant pain. He has not been able to work, de-\\nspite an effort to return to Thornton.\\n B\\n A little less than two years later, Clark filed a products-\\nliability complaint against River Metals and Sierra in the Cir-\\ncuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. In it, he alleged that the\\nCrusher was defective and unreasonably dangerous, because\\nit failed to provide an adequate platform, handrails, or other\\narea for performing routine maintenance. (Sierra named sev-\\neral third-party defendants, but the district court dismissed\\nthem, and they play no part in this appeal.) River Metals and\\nSierra removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the\\nSouthern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). After motion practice not relevant\\nhere, the district court granted summary judgment for both\\ndefendants on the ground that Clark could use only Illinois’s\\nrisk-utility test for his defective-design theory, see Calles v.\\nScripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 255–59 (2007), and that he\\nhad failed to present admissible expert evidence for that pur-\\npose.\\n The problem was not that Clark failed to present an expert:\\nhe did, in the person of Dr. James Blundell. Dr. Blundell has\\nbeen a professor of mechanical engineering at the University\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 5\\n\\nof Missouri for over 30 years, and he has published many\\npeer-reviewed articles in that field. He opined that the\\nCrusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails.\\nIn support of those recommendations, he pointed to a stand-\\nard published by the American National Standards Institute\\n(ANSI) recommending that a ladder be available at the front\\nplatform of the machine for safe ascent and descent. This\\nwould have required an alteration of the front platform, but\\nDr. Blundell thought that this would be straightforward—it\\ncould be done by mimicking the cab end of the machine. He\\ndid not, however, develop this idea any further or provide\\nany sketches as examples. That would have been difficult,\\nClark argues, because the defendants had refused to make\\ntheir drawings or specifications for the machine available to\\nhim.\\n The district court found that Dr. Blundell’s testimony did\\nnot satisfy the threshold criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence\\n702—in particular, the requirement that “the expert … relia-\\nbly appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the\\ncase.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d). It did so for several reasons. First,\\nlooking at Dr. Blundell’s deposition, the court noted that “he\\nrepeatedly demonstrated … that he does not understand how\\nto perform daily maintenance on the machine.” Second, be-\\ncause Dr. Blundell had no alternative design to offer, the court\\nthought that his opinion was “nothing more than a bare con-\\nclusion that adds nothing of value to the judicial process.” See\\nClark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00447-JPG-\\nRJD, 2018 WL 3108891, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (cleaned\\nup) (quoting McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651,\\n658 (7th Cir. 1998)). Third, Dr. Blundell eventually admitted\\nthat the ANSI standard to which he had pointed did not insist\\non a fixed ladder, as opposed to an external ladder. (Indeed,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nthat standard—as quoted in Dr. Blundell’s report—is con-\\ncerned with the need for railings, not ladders.) For all those\\nreasons, the court struck Dr. Blundell’s testimony. It also re-\\njected Clark’s last-ditch effort to rely on the testimony of Si-\\nerra’s Service Tech Manager, Antonio Torres, in support of the\\ndefective-design theory. Taking that testimony in the light\\nmost favorable to Clark, Torres admitted that it would be fea-\\nsible to put a ladder and a handrail somewhere on the front\\nplatform, but critically, Torres also said that there were “other\\nways” to provide a safe way of getting on and off the machine.\\nId. at *7. Those “other ways” were Sierra’s designed and in-\\ntended ways: an external ladder, forklift, or manlift.\\n Without admissible expert testimony, the district court\\nheld, Clark’s suit could not survive. The court accordingly\\ngranted summary judgment for both defendants and dis-\\nmissed all other claims. It also refused to allow Clark to\\namend his complaint to introduce a failure-to-warn theory.\\nSuch an 11th-hour amendment would gravely prejudice the\\ndefendants, the court concluded, and there was no justifica-\\ntion for Clark’s delay in raising the claim. Clark has appealed\\nonly from the summary judgment ruling, not from the denial\\nof leave to amend.\\n II\\n Clark’s principal argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in its treatment of Dr. Blundell, and more broadly\\nin its decision that expert testimony was essential. He first\\ncontends that the court should have held a hearing before ex-\\ncluding Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Second, he argues that ex-\\npert testimony was not necessary to establish the “common-\\nsense” point that a safety feature such as a built-in ladder had\\nto be included in order to make the Crusher safe.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 7\\n\\n A\\n We consider de novo the question whether the district court\\nproperly applied the Rule 702 framework (often called the\\nDaubert framework, after the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), which was largely codified in the Rule). Lapsley v. Xtek,\\nInc., 689 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we bear in\\nmind that the threshold inquiry “is not designed to have the\\ndistrict judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate is-\\nsues of credibility and accuracy.” Id. at 805. If the district court\\nhas properly applied the Rule, our review of the decision to\\nadmit or exclude evidence is deferential. Id.\\n Turning first to the question of basic methodology, we find\\nno error in the district court’s application of Rule 702. The\\ncourt summarized the Rule accurately and then turned to the\\ntask of applying it to Dr. Blundell’s testimony. Our review of\\nthat application is only for abuse of discretion.\\n The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony rep-\\nresented a reasonable assessment of the proposed evidence. It\\nfound Dr. Blundell’s methodology to be unclear and conclu-\\nsory, and we have no trouble following its thinking. We see\\nno deficiency in the district court’s decision about the neces-\\nsity of a hearing, and so it committed no error when it re-\\nsolved this issue without one. The report is just five pages\\nlong, including Dr. Blundell’s discussion of the facts of the\\ncase, his description of the machine, and his recitation of the\\nOperator’s Manual. His analysis covers one page, in which he\\ncited only an ANSI standard. The portion of that standard on\\nwhich he relied states “Every open-sided floor or platform\\nthat is four feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\nshall be guarded by a railing system along all open sides, ex-\\ncept where excluded as specified in 1.2 or where there is en-\\ntrance to a ramp, stairway or fixed ladder.” Because Clark was\\ndescending from a height of approximately five feet (59.75\\ninches), Dr. Blundell concluded that “a railing, a fixed ladder\\nand a toe board should have been provided.”\\n Brevity may be the soul of wit, but there is a difference be-\\ntween a complete but concise treatment of a subject and a fail-\\nure to address the important points. There are several prob-\\nlems with Dr. Blundell’s cursory statement. First, his para-\\nphrase of the ANSI standard is not accurate. Although it does\\nsay that a railing is necessary, it says nothing about requiring\\na fixed ladder or a toeboard. Instead, it says that there should\\nbe an opening in a guard rail for a fixed ladder, and it is silent\\nabout toeboards. Indeed, Dr. Blundell did not even recom-\\nmend, based on his own experience, that a toeboard and a\\nfixed ladder should be added to a guardrail in order properly\\nto protect maintenance workers.\\n The district court also criticized Dr. Blundell for his lack of\\nknowledge of the Crusher machine. It is true that he could not\\nreadily identify where each type of maintenance occurred. On\\nthe other hand, no one contested the fact that Clark had to\\nclimb up and get down from the front area, and Dr. Blundell\\nwas well aware of that. But the lack of dispute over the critical\\narea is at most one point in Dr. Blundell’s favor, and it is not\\none that overrode the other deficiencies the district court\\nnoted. We thus conclude that the district court did not err\\nwhen it excluded Dr. Blundell’s proffered expert testimony.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 9\\n\\n B\\n Clark’s back-up position is that the need for some safe-\\nguards on the Crusher was obvious enough that he should\\nhave been able to reach the jury without expert testimony. Re-\\ncall that under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a strict-liability\\ncase based on a product defect must prove the following:\\n (1) a condition of the product as a result of manufac-\\n turing or design, (2) that made the product unreasona-\\n bly dangerous, (3) and that existed at the time the\\n product left the defendant’s control, and (4) an injury\\n to the plaintiff, (5) that was proximately caused by the\\n condition.\\nMikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 543 (2008), opin-\\nion modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008). The only ele-\\nment at issue in Clark’s case is the second—whether the prod-\\nuct was unreasonably dangerous. He bears the burden of\\nproof. Id.\\n Illinois courts use two different approaches in order to de-\\ncide whether something is unreasonably dangerous—the\\nconsumer-expectations test and the risk-utility test. Id. at 541.\\nBut if the evidence before the court implicates the risk-utility\\ntest, it is the one that the court should use, “because the latter\\n[i.e. the consumer-expectations test] is incorporated into the\\nformer and is but one factor among many for the jury to con-\\nsider.” Id. at 556. The Illinois Supreme Court calls this an in-\\ntegrated test, and it has created a daunting list of at least 11\\nnon-exclusive and non-dispositive factors that a factfinder\\nmight consider when applying it. We list a few of those factors\\nto give the reader a feel for what is relevant:\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product to the\\n user and to the public at large;\\n (2) The likelihood that the product will cause injury, and\\n if so, how serious that injury might be;\\n (3) The availability of substitutes that would meet the\\n same need in a safer way;\\n (4) The feasibility for the manufacturer to eliminate the\\n unsafe characteristics without either impairing utility\\n or driving cost up too high;\\n (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of\\n care;\\n (6) The user’s probable awareness of dangers inherent in\\n the product, either through general public knowledge\\n or suitable warnings or instructions;\\n (7) The manufacturer’s ability to obtain liability insurance.\\nCalles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264–66.\\n Although it may seem obvious that a ladder was all that a\\nmaintenance worker would have needed in order safely to get\\nup to the top of the Crusher and back down again, the ques-\\ntion becomes more complex if we must decide how such a\\nladder might have been built into the machine. Just to say, as\\nSierra seems to concede, that it would be possible to attach a\\nfixed ladder to the machine, does not tell us where the ladder\\nshould have gone, how expensive this design change would\\nhave been, or whether a ladder alone would be enough with-\\nout guardrails and toeholds. We also know nothing about\\npossible substitutes for the Crusher, or about the relative ease\\nof obtaining liability insurance.\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 11\\n\\n Illinois courts have recognized that “[p]roducts liability\\nactions … often involve specialized knowledge or expertise\\noutside the layman’s knowledge” and so may require expert\\ntestimony. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App.\\n3d 821, 834 (1990); Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 585\\n(7th Cir. 2011) (“Several intermediate appellate decisions in\\nIllinois say that expert testimony is vital in design-defect cases\\nwhen aspects of a product’s design or operation are outside\\nthe scope of lay knowledge.”). We understand this to imply\\nthat there might be some products that are so simple that no\\nexpert is needed to tell people how to use them. Thus, for in-\\nstance, in Baltus the Illinois Appellate Court observed that “if\\na chair is designed to be easily collapsible, for portability, but\\nhas the tendency to collapse when someone sits on it, an ex-\\npert in chair design may not be needed to help the jury decide\\nthat the design is unreasonably dangerous; it does not func-\\ntion in the manner expected and is in fact unsafe.” 199 Ill.\\nApp. 3d at 836. But we agree with the district court that the\\ncase before us is not one that can be resolved exclusively on\\nthe basis of common experience. Clark needed expert testi-\\nmony for this critical element of his case (i.e. what design(s)\\nwould have been acceptable), and with Dr. Blundell’s analysis\\nexcluded, he had none. Summary judgment for both defend-\\nants followed naturally.\\n III\\n Before concluding, we add a few words about River Met-\\nals’s cross-appeal. The first point to make is that it was unnec-\\nessary to file a formal cross-appeal. River Metals is simply of-\\nfering an alternate ground to support the district court’s judg-\\nment in its favor; it has no desire to change that judgment. In\\nthe district court, it moved for dismissal on the ground\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\\n\\n(among others) that it was a non-manufacturer defendant for\\npurposes of 735 ILCS 5/2-621. See also id. 5/2-621(b), (c) (re-\\nquiring dismissal of a non-manufacturer defendant once the\\nmanufacturer has “been required to answer or otherwise\\nplead” unless the plaintiff establishes certain exceptions). The\\ndistrict court denied the motion because it thought that River\\nMetals raised this defense too late—more than two years after\\nfiling the answer, and several months after moving for sum-\\nmary judgment.\\n This may have been erroneous. Illinois courts focus only\\non the establishment of the manufacturer’s identity “in a\\ntimely fashion” and the lack of prejudice for a plaintiff. Cherry\\nv. Siemans Med. Sys., Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1061 (1990).\\nBut we do not need to resolve this dispute in light of our de-\\ncision that both defendants were entitled to summary judg-\\nment on the merits. We also have no need to address River\\nMetals’s arguments that, as a lessor of a used product, it was\\nnot a company that could be strictly liable for design defects,\\nand that its liability was precluded by the terms of the agree-\\nment pursuant to which it bought the assets of Tri-State, the\\noriginal purchaser from Sierra.\\n IV\\n It is always regrettable when a person is injured on the job,\\nespecially when it seems from a layperson’s standpoint that a\\nrelatively easy measure might have prevented the injury. But\\nthat does not mean that every possible defendant is always\\nliable. Clark sued the manufacturer and lessor of the machine\\non which he had been working, but under Illinois law, he\\nneeded expert testimony to pin down exactly why the ma-\\nchine was designed in a defective way. The district court did\\n\\fNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141 13\\n\\nnot abuse its discretion in excluding the only expert testimony\\nthat he had, and so its judgment must be AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3073,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636146,"string":"4,636,146"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3392"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3392\\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3392\\n\\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\\nof good faith and fair dealing.\\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\\n\\fNo. 18‐3392 3\\n\\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\\nings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413399/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636146/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3392\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\n\f2 No. 18‐3392\n\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\nof good faith and fair dealing.\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\n\fNo. 18‐3392 3\n\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\nings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3392\\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3392\\n\\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\\nof good faith and fair dealing.\\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\\n\\fNo. 18‐3392 3\\n\\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\\nings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3074,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636268,"string":"4,636,268"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3392"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3392\\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3392\\n\\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\\nof good faith and fair dealing.\\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\\n\\fNo. 18‐3392 3\\n\\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\\nings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413521/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636268/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3392\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\n\f2 No. 18‐3392\n\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\nof good faith and fair dealing.\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\n\fNo. 18‐3392 3\n\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\nings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3392\\nEMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐89 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Emmis Communications Corpora‐\\ntion bought two insurance policies, each from a different pro‐\\nvider. From Chubb Insurance Company, it purchased a direc‐\\ntors‐and‐officers liability policy for the period of October 1,\\n2009, to October 1, 2010. Emmis later bought a second insur‐\\nance policy, this time from Illinois National Insurance Com‐\\npany. This policy covered liability from October 1, 2011, to\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3392\\n\\nOctober 1, 2012. It had an exclusion for any losses in connec‐\\ntion with “Event(s),” which included “[a]ll notices of claim of\\ncircumstances as reported under policy 8181‐0068 issued to\\nEmmis Corporation by Chubb Insurance Companies.”\\n In 2012, Emmis tried to gain control of enough of its shares\\nto go private. Three shareholders filed an action to stop Em‐\\nmis’s effort. Emmis, through its broker, reported this suit to\\nChubb. It also sought coverage under the Illinois National\\npolicy. Illinois National refused coverage, so Emmis sued,\\nseeking damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty\\nof good faith and fair dealing.\\n Both parties sought summary judgment—Emmis arguing\\nthat coverage was appropriate, and Illinois National arguing\\nthat the policy’s complex exclusion provisions prevented cov‐\\nerage. Among the disputes was the meaning of “as reported.”\\nIllinois National argued that this provision excluded all no‐\\ntices that were reported to Chubb at any time—which of\\ncourse would include the notice in dispute. Emmis, on the\\nother hand, claimed that it excluded only those notices that\\nhad been reported at the time that the policy went into effect—\\ntwo years before this notice was reported.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for Emmis\\non its claim for breach of contract. It rejected each of Illinois\\nNational’s theories under the language of the exclusion, in‐\\ncluding its interpretation of the “as reported” language. It\\nconcluded that, while both interpretations were reasonable,\\nEmmis’s was better. The court thought that the past tense of\\n“as reported” must “refer[] to events that had already oc‐\\ncurred at the time of drafting.” It bolstered its holding by in‐\\nvoking the rule favoring coverage when multiple reasonable\\n\\fNo. 18‐3392 3\\n\\nreadings of an insurance policy might apply. See Bradshaw v.\\nChandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009).\\n On appeal, the parties briefed many legal issues arising\\nfrom the Byzantine exclusion language. But we can resolve\\nthis case on a single issue: the meaning of “as reported.” We\\ndisagree with the district court’s opinion; Illinois National’s\\nproposed interpretation is correct. The phrase has no discern‐\\nable temporal limitations. Once Emmis or one of its agents re‐\\nports a claim to Chubb, at any time, then that claim is “re‐\\nported”—and so is excluded. The timing of the report is irrel‐\\nevant. Emmis acknowledged in its brief that it did in fact re‐\\nport its claim to Chubb. That resolves our inquiry.\\n The exclusion applies, so summary judgment should have\\nbeen entered in favor of Illinois National. The judgment of the\\ndistrict court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceed‐\\nings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3075,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636341,"string":"4,636,341"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valerie FLORES, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Valerie Flores"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3249"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nFdatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her\\nstate sentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the pro‐\\nposed conditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\n\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413594/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636341/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valerie FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nVALERIE FLORES,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\n\f2 No. 18‐3249\n\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\ning appellate review.\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\nwaiver, we affirm.\n I\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\n\fNo. 18‐3249 3\n\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\n\f4 No. 18‐3249\n\nFdatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her\nstate sentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the pro‐\nposed conditions of supervised release.\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\nder the sentencing guidelines.\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\nrecord. She emphasized:\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\n life with a positive perception on how things\n should be done rightfully.\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 5\n\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\nance of her state revocation sentence.\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\ncourt then stated:\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\n the defendant.\n …\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\n\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\nThank you.”\n\f6 No. 18‐3249\n\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\npetition the Court for review.”\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\n A\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 7\n\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\ncondition.\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\ncase.\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\n\f8 No. 18‐3249\n\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\nand intelligent.\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\nCir. 2009).\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐3249 9\n\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\n\f10 No. 18‐3249\n\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\nan informed decision:\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\napproval.” Id.\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\n\fNo. 18‐3249 11\n\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\n B\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\n\f12 No. 18‐3249\n\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\npresent here.\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 13\n\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\ndecision not to object.1\n C\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\npart of our plain‐error review.\n\n\n 1\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\n\f14 No. 18‐3249\n\n III\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valerie FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nFdatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her\\nstate sentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the pro‐\\nposed conditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\n\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3076,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636599,"string":"4,636,599"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Valerie Flores"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3249"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413852/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636599/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nVALERIE FLORES,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\n\f2 No. 18‐3249\n\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\ning appellate review.\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\nwaiver, we affirm.\n I\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\n\fNo. 18‐3249 3\n\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\n\f4 No. 18‐3249\n\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\nconditions of supervised release.\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\nder the sentencing guidelines.\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\nrecord. She emphasized:\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\n life with a positive perception on how things\n should be done rightfully.\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\n\fNo. 18‐3249 5\n\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\nance of her state revocation sentence.\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\ncourt then stated:\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\n the defendant.\n …\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\nThank you.”\n\f6 No. 18‐3249\n\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\npetition the Court for review.”\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\n A\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 7\n\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\ncondition.\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\ncase.\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\n\f8 No. 18‐3249\n\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\nand intelligent.\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\nCir. 2009).\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐3249 9\n\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\n\f10 No. 18‐3249\n\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\nan informed decision:\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\napproval.” Id.\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\n\fNo. 18‐3249 11\n\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\n B\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\n\f12 No. 18‐3249\n\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\npresent here.\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 13\n\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\ndecision not to object.1\n C\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\npart of our plain‐error review.\n\n\n 1\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\n\f14 No. 18‐3249\n\n III\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3077,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636628,"string":"4,636,628"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Valerie Flores"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3249"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413881/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636628/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nVALERIE FLORES,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\n\f2 No. 18‐3249\n\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\ning appellate review.\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\nwaiver, we affirm.\n I\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\n\fNo. 18‐3249 3\n\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\n\f4 No. 18‐3249\n\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\nconditions of supervised release.\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\nder the sentencing guidelines.\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\nrecord. She emphasized:\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\n life with a positive perception on how things\n should be done rightfully.\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\n\fNo. 18‐3249 5\n\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\nance of her state revocation sentence.\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\ncourt then stated:\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\n the defendant.\n …\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\nThank you.”\n\f6 No. 18‐3249\n\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\npetition the Court for review.”\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\n A\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 7\n\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\ncondition.\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\ncase.\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\n\f8 No. 18‐3249\n\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\nand intelligent.\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\nCir. 2009).\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐3249 9\n\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\n\f10 No. 18‐3249\n\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\nan informed decision:\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\napproval.” Id.\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\n\fNo. 18‐3249 11\n\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\n B\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\n\f12 No. 18‐3249\n\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\npresent here.\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 13\n\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\ndecision not to object.1\n C\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\npart of our plain‐error review.\n\n\n 1\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\n\f14 No. 18‐3249\n\n III\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3078,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636630,"string":"4,636,630"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2040"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Ripple, Manion, Sykes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2040\\nJOHN DOE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\\n\\f2 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\\nregulatory framework.\\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1291.\\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\\nof “employment-based” visas.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 3\\n\\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\\n\\n\\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2040\\n\\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 5\\n\\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\\n investing, the requisite capital; and\\n\\n\\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\\n\\f6 No. 17-2040\\n\\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\\n in the United States; and\\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 7\\n\\n B.\\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\\nvisa.\\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\\nland.\\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\\n\\n\\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\\n\\f8 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 9\\n\\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\\nappeal.\\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\\n\\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\\n\\f10 No. 17-2040\\n\\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\\nment.\\n C.\\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n10 R.91 at 14.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 11\\n\\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\\nhours.12\\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\\n\\n\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2040\\n\\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\\ntures was not arbitrary.\\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 13\\n\\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\\nour disposition of this appeal.\\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\\n the agency\\n has relied on factors which Congress\\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\\n failed to consider an important aspect of\\n the problem, offered an explanation for\\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\\n a difference in view or the product of\\n agency expertise.\\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\\n\\f14 No. 17-2040\\n\\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\\n review when it provides that agencies must\\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\\n 1980).\\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 15\\n\\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\\n\\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f16 No. 17-2040\\n\\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\\n portant role in determining whether or not the\\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\\n land was sold on the same day for double the\\n price. [16]\\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\\n\\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\\nmate purchase at all.\\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 17\\n\\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\\ncerns.”17\\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\\n\\n17 Id.\\n18 R.91 at 14.\\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\\n20 Id. at 25.\\n\\f18 No. 17-2040\\n\\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\\nmercial enterprise.\\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\\n\\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 19\\n\\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\\n\\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f20 No. 17-2040\\n\\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\\nof evidence.\\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 21\\n\\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\\nrisk.”25\\n Conclusion\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413883/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636630/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2040\nJOHN DOE,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\nActing Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\n\f2 No. 17-2040\n\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\nregulatory framework.\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\n\n\n\n\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1291.\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\nof “employment-based” visas.\n\fNo. 17-2040 3\n\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\n\n\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\n\f4 No. 17-2040\n\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\n\fNo. 17-2040 5\n\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\n investing, the requisite capital; and\n\n\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\n\f6 No. 17-2040\n\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\n in the United States; and\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\n\n\n\n\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\n\fNo. 17-2040 7\n\n B.\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\nvisa.\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\nland.\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\n\n\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\n\f8 No. 17-2040\n\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\n\n\n\n\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\n\fNo. 17-2040 9\n\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\nappeal.\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\n\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\n\f10 No. 17-2040\n\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\nment.\n C.\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\n\n\n10 R.91 at 14.\n\fNo. 17-2040 11\n\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\nhours.12\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\n\n\n11 Id.\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\n\f12 No. 17-2040\n\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\ntures was not arbitrary.\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\n\fNo. 17-2040 13\n\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\nour disposition of this appeal.\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\n the agency\n has relied on factors which Congress\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\n failed to consider an important aspect of\n the problem, offered an explanation for\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\n a difference in view or the product of\n agency expertise.\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\n\f14 No. 17-2040\n\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\n review when it provides that agencies must\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\n 1980).\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\n\fNo. 17-2040 15\n\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\n\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\n\f16 No. 17-2040\n\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\n portant role in determining whether or not the\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\n land was sold on the same day for double the\n price. [16]\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\n\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\nmate purchase at all.\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\n\fNo. 17-2040 17\n\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\ncerns.”17\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\n\n17 Id.\n18 R.91 at 14.\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\n20 Id. at 25.\n\f18 No. 17-2040\n\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\nmercial enterprise.\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\n\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\n\fNo. 17-2040 19\n\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\n\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\n\f20 No. 17-2040\n\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\nof evidence.\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\n\n\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\n\fNo. 17-2040 21\n\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\nrisk.”25\n Conclusion\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2040\\nJOHN DOE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\\n\\f2 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\\nregulatory framework.\\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1291.\\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\\nof “employment-based” visas.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 3\\n\\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\\n\\n\\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2040\\n\\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 5\\n\\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\\n investing, the requisite capital; and\\n\\n\\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\\n\\f6 No. 17-2040\\n\\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\\n in the United States; and\\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 7\\n\\n B.\\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\\nvisa.\\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\\nland.\\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\\n\\n\\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\\n\\f8 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 9\\n\\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\\nappeal.\\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\\n\\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\\n\\f10 No. 17-2040\\n\\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\\nment.\\n C.\\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n10 R.91 at 14.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 11\\n\\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\\nhours.12\\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\\n\\n\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2040\\n\\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\\ntures was not arbitrary.\\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 13\\n\\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\\nour disposition of this appeal.\\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\\n the agency\\n has relied on factors which Congress\\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\\n failed to consider an important aspect of\\n the problem, offered an explanation for\\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\\n a difference in view or the product of\\n agency expertise.\\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\\n\\f14 No. 17-2040\\n\\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\\n review when it provides that agencies must\\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\\n 1980).\\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 15\\n\\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\\n\\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f16 No. 17-2040\\n\\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\\n portant role in determining whether or not the\\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\\n land was sold on the same day for double the\\n price. [16]\\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\\n\\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\\nmate purchase at all.\\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 17\\n\\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\\ncerns.”17\\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\\n\\n17 Id.\\n18 R.91 at 14.\\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\\n20 Id. at 25.\\n\\f18 No. 17-2040\\n\\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\\nmercial enterprise.\\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\\n\\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 19\\n\\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\\n\\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f20 No. 17-2040\\n\\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\\nof evidence.\\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 21\\n\\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\\nrisk.”25\\n Conclusion\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3079,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636631,"string":"4,636,631"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Alberto Romero ARRAZABAL, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2969"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Bauer, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 17-2969\\n\\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\\nARRAZABAL,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States,*\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A045-091-341\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\\n\\f2 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\\nsecond time.\\n I.\\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 3\\n\\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\\n\\n\\n1\\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\\nstill living in El Salvador.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2969\\n\\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\\nin the chest with a gun.\\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 5\\n\\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\\nproof. A.R. 766.\\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\\n\\f6 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 7\\n\\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\\n2015)).\\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\\n\\f8 No. 17-2969\\n\\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 9\\n\\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\\n\\f10 No. 17-2969\\n\\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\\n The IJ summed up as follows:\\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\\n under CAT.\\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\\nA.R. 2–5.\\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 11\\n\\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\\n\\n2\\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2969\\n\\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 13\\n\\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\\nprotection under the CAT.\\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\\nto prevail on his claims.\\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\\n\\f14 No. 17-2969\\n\\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\\nevidence he presented.\\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 15\\n\\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\\ncorroborative aspects.\\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\\n\\f16 No. 17-2969\\n\\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\\n2016, which was in the record.\\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\\n\\n\\n3\\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 17\\n\\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\\n\\f18 No. 17-2969\\n\\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\\nsignificant oversight.\\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 19\\n\\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\\ninterpreter:\\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\\n correct?\\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\\npoint by the government’s counsel:\\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\\n\\f20 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\\n he already has a family. He already has children.\\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\\n children?\\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 21\\n\\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\\n\\f22 No. 17-2969\\n\\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\\naltogether on this basis.\\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\\nevidentiary support).\\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 23\\n\\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\\n\\f24 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\\nCir. 2006).\\n III.\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\\nArrazabal’s behalf.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413884/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636631/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Francisco Alberto Romero ARRAZABAL, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2969\n\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\nARRAZABAL,\n Petitioner,\n\n v.\n\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\nof the United States,*\n Respondent.\n\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A045-091-341\n\n\n\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\nJudges.\n\n\n\n*\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\n\f2 No. 17-2969\n\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\nsecond time.\n I.\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\n\fNo. 17-2969 3\n\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\n\n\n1\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\nstill living in El Salvador.\n\f4 No. 17-2969\n\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\nin the chest with a gun.\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\n\fNo. 17-2969 5\n\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\nproof. A.R. 766.\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\n\f6 No. 17-2969\n\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\n\fNo. 17-2969 7\n\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\n2015)).\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\n\f8 No. 17-2969\n\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\n\fNo. 17-2969 9\n\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\n\f10 No. 17-2969\n\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\n The IJ summed up as follows:\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\n under CAT.\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\nA.R. 2–5.\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\n\fNo. 17-2969 11\n\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\n II.\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\n\n2\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\n\f12 No. 17-2969\n\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\n\fNo. 17-2969 13\n\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\nprotection under the CAT.\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\nto prevail on his claims.\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\n\f14 No. 17-2969\n\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\nevidence he presented.\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\n\fNo. 17-2969 15\n\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\ncorroborative aspects.\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\n\f16 No. 17-2969\n\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\n2016, which was in the record.\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\n\n\n3\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\n\fNo. 17-2969 17\n\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\n\f18 No. 17-2969\n\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\nsignificant oversight.\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\n\fNo. 17-2969 19\n\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\ninterpreter:\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\n correct?\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\npoint by the government’s counsel:\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\n\f20 No. 17-2969\n\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\n he already has a family. He already has children.\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\n children?\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\n\fNo. 17-2969 21\n\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\n\f22 No. 17-2969\n\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\naltogether on this basis.\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\nevidentiary support).\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\n\fNo. 17-2969 23\n\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\n\f24 No. 17-2969\n\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\nCir. 2006).\n III.\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\nArrazabal’s behalf.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Francisco Alberto Romero ARRAZABAL, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 17-2969\\n\\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\\nARRAZABAL,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States,*\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A045-091-341\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\\n\\f2 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\\nsecond time.\\n I.\\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 3\\n\\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\\n\\n\\n1\\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\\nstill living in El Salvador.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2969\\n\\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\\nin the chest with a gun.\\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 5\\n\\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\\nproof. A.R. 766.\\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\\n\\f6 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 7\\n\\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\\n2015)).\\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\\n\\f8 No. 17-2969\\n\\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 9\\n\\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\\n\\f10 No. 17-2969\\n\\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\\n The IJ summed up as follows:\\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\\n under CAT.\\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\\nA.R. 2–5.\\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 11\\n\\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\\n\\n2\\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2969\\n\\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 13\\n\\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\\nprotection under the CAT.\\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\\nto prevail on his claims.\\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\\n\\f14 No. 17-2969\\n\\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\\nevidence he presented.\\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 15\\n\\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\\ncorroborative aspects.\\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\\n\\f16 No. 17-2969\\n\\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\\n2016, which was in the record.\\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\\n\\n\\n3\\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 17\\n\\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\\n\\f18 No. 17-2969\\n\\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\\nsignificant oversight.\\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 19\\n\\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\\ninterpreter:\\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\\n correct?\\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\\npoint by the government’s counsel:\\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\\n\\f20 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\\n he already has a family. He already has children.\\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\\n children?\\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 21\\n\\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\\n\\f22 No. 17-2969\\n\\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\\naltogether on this basis.\\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\\nevidentiary support).\\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 23\\n\\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\\n\\f24 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\\nCir. 2006).\\n III.\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\\nArrazabal’s behalf.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3080,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636632,"string":"4,636,632"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Lopez GAMERO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3198 & 18-1104"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Sykes, Hamilton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A090-289-114\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\\nAppeals affirmed.\\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\\nunlikely to change the outcome.\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\\n I. Background\\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\\n\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\\nhearing on that claim.\\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\\n“shot at.”\\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\\nwealthy given his home ownership.\\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\\n\\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\\nremuneration.\\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\\nlacking objective support.”\\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\\n\\n\\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\\nrejecting the filing.\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\\n II. Discussion\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\\n\\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\\nA. Illicit Trafficking\\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\\ncontrolled substance … .”).\\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\\n\\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\\ninvolves remuneration.\\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\\ndoes not count.”).\\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\\nexplicit in a footnote:\\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\\n\\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\nB. Convention Against Torture\\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\\nthem.”).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\\n\\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\\nC. Motion to Reopen\\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\\n\\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\\ncome.\\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\\npersonally.\\n III. Conclusion\\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413885/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636632/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Francisco Lopez GAMERO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\n Petitioner,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\nAttorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A090-289-114\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\n\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\nAppeals affirmed.\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\nunlikely to change the outcome.\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\n I. Background\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\n\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\nhearing on that claim.\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\n“shot at.”\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\n\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\nwealthy given his home ownership.\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\n\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\nremuneration.\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\nlacking objective support.”\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\n\n\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\nrejecting the filing.\n\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\n II. Discussion\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\n\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\nA. Illicit Trafficking\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\n\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\ncontrolled substance … .”).\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\n\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\ninvolves remuneration.\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\n\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\ndoes not count.”).\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\nexplicit in a footnote:\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\n\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\nB. Convention Against Torture\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\n(7th Cir. 2013).\n\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\nthem.”).\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\n\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\nC. Motion to Reopen\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\n\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\n\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\ncome.\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\n\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\npersonally.\n III. Conclusion\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Francisco Lopez GAMERO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A090-289-114\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\\nAppeals affirmed.\\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\\nunlikely to change the outcome.\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\\n I. Background\\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\\n\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\\nhearing on that claim.\\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\\n“shot at.”\\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\\nwealthy given his home ownership.\\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\\n\\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\\nremuneration.\\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\\nlacking objective support.”\\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\\n\\n\\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\\nrejecting the filing.\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\\n II. Discussion\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\\n\\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\\nA. Illicit Trafficking\\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\\ncontrolled substance … .”).\\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\\n\\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\\ninvolves remuneration.\\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\\ndoes not count.”).\\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\\nexplicit in a footnote:\\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\\n\\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\nB. Convention Against Torture\\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\\nthem.”).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\\n\\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\\nC. Motion to Reopen\\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\\n\\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\\ncome.\\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\\npersonally.\\n III. Conclusion\\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3081,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636710,"string":"4,636,710"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Valerie Flores"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3249"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413963/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636710/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nVALERIE FLORES,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\n\f2 No. 18‐3249\n\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\ning appellate review.\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\nwaiver, we affirm.\n I\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\n\fNo. 18‐3249 3\n\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\n\f4 No. 18‐3249\n\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\nconditions of supervised release.\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\nder the sentencing guidelines.\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\nrecord. She emphasized:\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\n life with a positive perception on how things\n should be done rightfully.\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\n\fNo. 18‐3249 5\n\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\nance of her state revocation sentence.\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\ncourt then stated:\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\n the defendant.\n …\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\nThank you.”\n\f6 No. 18‐3249\n\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\npetition the Court for review.”\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\n A\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 7\n\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\ncondition.\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\ncase.\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\n\f8 No. 18‐3249\n\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\nand intelligent.\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\nCir. 2009).\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐3249 9\n\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\n\f10 No. 18‐3249\n\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\nan informed decision:\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\napproval.” Id.\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\n\fNo. 18‐3249 11\n\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\n B\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\n\f12 No. 18‐3249\n\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\npresent here.\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\n\fNo. 18‐3249 13\n\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\ndecision not to object.1\n C\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\npart of our plain‐error review.\n\n\n 1\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\n\f14 No. 18‐3249\n\n III\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Valerie Flores\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3249\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nVALERIE FLORES,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:18‐cr‐00039‐wmc‐2 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019— DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Valerie Flores chal‐\\nlenges one condition of her supervised release as unconstitu‐\\ntionally vague. She admits that she did not raise the chal‐\\nlenge in the district court, but she asks that we review it for\\nplain error. The first step in plain‐error review, as the Su‐\\npreme Court has repeatedly said, is to ask whether the de‐\\nfendant intentionally relinquished the challenge she now\\npresents. See Rosales‐Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n1904–05 (2018); Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733\\n(1993). This is where Flores’s challenge fails. She had notice\\nand opportunity to make the challenge in the district court,\\nshe submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirma‐\\ntively waived reading of the conditions and their justifica‐\\ntions at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, preclud‐\\ning appellate review.\\n We recognize, and will address, that in some cases we\\nhave overlooked waiver concerns when reviewing super‐\\nvised release conditions for plain error. Those cases either\\npresented compelling reasons for forgiving waiver, which\\nthis case does not present, or simply did not address waiver,\\nusually because the government did not press it. We empha‐\\nsize, as the Supreme Court has, that waiver is a threshold,\\ncontext‐specific inquiry in plain‐error review. Due to Flores’s\\nwaiver, we affirm.\\n I\\n In January 2018, Wisconsin law enforcement learned via\\nconfidential informants that Flores and her co‐defendant had\\ntraveled to California to obtain methamphetamine and\\ntransport it back to Wisconsin to sell. Through her cell\\nphone, the officers tracked Flores and her co‐defendant, who\\nwere driving separate vehicles in tandem. Police conducted\\ntraffic stops after the co‐defendants returned to Wisconsin.\\nSearches of their vehicles revealed more than 300 pounds of\\nmarijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million.\\n A grand jury returned an indictment charging Flores\\nwith possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms\\nor more of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 3\\n\\nFlores had a prior state court conviction for a felony drug\\noffense, and was on supervision for that offense at the time\\nof her arrest, the government filed an information under 21\\nU.S.C. § 851 for enhanced penalties. Flores faced a mandato‐\\nry minimum sentence of ten years and a supervised release\\nterm of eight years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).\\n In July 2018, Flores pleaded guilty. Using the 2016 United\\nStates Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the United States Pro‐\\nbation Office prepared Flores’s Presentence Investigation\\nReport, Revised Presentence Investigation Report, and ad‐\\ndendum to the report (collectively “PSR”).\\n Attached to the PSR was the supervision plan listing the\\nstandard and special conditions of supervised release. At is‐\\nsue on appeal is standard condition #3 (employment condi‐\\ntion), which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful em‐\\nployment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate\\nin a course of study or vocational training that will equip de‐\\nfendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the pro‐\\nbation officer or the Court.” In Flores’s supervision plan, the\\nprobation office noted that “defendant’s employment has\\nbeen sporadic and inconsistent,” and also “[s]he has out‐\\nstanding financial obligations.” The probation office’s justifi‐\\ncation for the employment condition stated, in part,\\n“[e]vidence based practice research indicates that lawful,\\nstable employment and education are pro‐social activities\\nthat reinforce the rehabilitation of defendant.”\\n Flores had the opportunity to object to the PSR and dis‐\\ncuss sentencing issues in writing before sentencing. In Sep‐\\ntember 2018, she filed objections, corrections, and clarifica‐\\ntions to the PSR. She did not, however, object to any of the\\nproposed conditions of supervised release. A couple weeks\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nlater, she filed a sentencing memorandum seeking the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence to run concurrently with her state\\nsentence. Again, Flores did not object to any of the proposed\\nconditions of supervised release.\\n The district court conducted Flores’s sentencing hearing\\nin October 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court\\nasked Flores if she had the opportunity to read and discuss\\nher original PSR, the revised PSR, and the addendum to the\\nreport with her attorney. Flores responded yes. Next, the\\nsentencing court noted that the government had no objec‐\\ntions to the PSR, but that Flores objected to the two‐level in‐\\ncrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on maintaining a\\npremise for manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub‐\\nstance. The court also discussed Flores’s objection to relevant\\nconduct explaining that the amounts were not included in\\nthe drug quantity analysis, and therefore, had no impact un‐\\nder the sentencing guidelines.\\n Before imposing her sentence, the district judge asked\\nFlores if there was anything she would like to add. Flores\\nhad prepared a written allocution, which she read into the\\nrecord. She emphasized:\\n I want to use this time serving my sentence for\\n some major self‐improvement and to acquire skills\\n and a college degree that will serve me well when I\\n get home. Whatever the outcome of today ends up\\n being, I will take every advantage and opportunity\\n possible to help with my sobriety and restart my\\n life with a positive perception on how things\\n should be done rightfully.\\nAfter her allocution, the district court sentenced Flores to the\\nmandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The court\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 5\\n\\nrecommended mental health treatment, drug abuse pro‐\\ngrams, and, consistent with Flores’s allocution, educational\\nand vocational training. Also, the court directed that Flores’s\\n120 month federal sentence run concurrently with the bal‐\\nance of her state revocation sentence.\\n The district court further sentenced Flores to the manda‐\\ntory eight years of supervised release adopting certain con‐\\nditions set forth in the supervision plan, including the em‐\\nployment condition. The court first noted that neither the\\ngovernment nor Flores had objected to these conditions. The\\ncourt then stated:\\n [T]he primary goals of supervised release are to\\n assist the defendant’s transition back into the\\n community after a term of imprisonment and to\\n provide rehabilitation. That will be crucial to this\\n defendant. Supervision in this case will provide the\\n typical needed programming, including rehabilita‐\\n tive programs, assist with community reintegra‐\\n tion, and afford supervision necessary to deter and\\n protect against further criminal acts perpetrated by\\n the defendant.\\n …\\n I’m confident that along with her sporadic em‐\\n ployment and outstanding financial obligations\\n that I have more than amply justified the conditions\\n that are being imposed. But as counsel is aware,\\n there’s some question as to whether I should put\\n each on the record verbatim and justify them indi‐\\n vidually. And I’m happy to do that unless the de‐\\n fense wishes to waive my doing so.\\nDefense counsel responded: “We do waive, Your Honor.\\nThank you.”\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n The court continued “when the defendant is released\\nfrom confinement, understanding that will be ten years from\\nnow or thereabouts, [if] either the defendant or the supervis‐\\ning probation officer should believe that any of the condi‐\\ntions imposed today are no longer appropriate, they should\\npetition the Court for review.”\\n The district court entered judgment on October 9, 2018,\\nand Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II\\n On appeal, Flores argues that the supervised release con‐\\ndition requiring her to “maintain lawful employment, seek\\nlawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of\\nstudy or vocational training that will equip defendant for\\nsuitable employment” is unconstitutionally vague. Flores\\nspecifically takes issue with the word “suitable.”\\n A\\n We begin with the difference between forfeiture and\\nwaiver. Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquish‐\\nes a known right and forfeiture arises when a party inad‐\\nvertently fails to raise an argument in the district court.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733; United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446,\\n450 (7th Cir. 2017). We review forfeited arguments for plain\\nerror, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes ap‐\\npellate review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Waiver and forfeiture\\nare related, but distinct, concepts, although at times we have\\nconfused the terms. Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450; United States v.\\nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Because Flores did not object to the challenged super‐\\nvised release condition in the district court, the parties assert\\nthat we should review her argument for plain error. We dis‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 7\\n\\nagree. For plain‐error review to apply, “there must be an er‐\\nror that has not been intentionally relinquished or aban‐\\ndoned.” Molina‐Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (citing Olano, 507\\nU.S. at 732‐33); see also Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904‐05;\\nUnited States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018). Ap‐\\nplying well‐known principles, the record makes clear that\\nFlores waived her appellate challenge to the employment\\ncondition.\\n In general, criminal defendants must make informed and\\nintentional decisions when waiving their rights. New York v.\\nHill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Even\\n“[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject\\nto waiver[,]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991),\\nbut “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the\\nright at issue.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. “For certain fundamental\\nrights, the defendant must personally make an informed\\nwaiver,” but for other rights, “waiver may be affected by ac‐\\ntion of counsel.” Id.; see also United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d\\n498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007). Our waiver inquiry, therefore, varies\\ndepending on the right at issue and the circumstances of the\\ncase.\\n In the context of a guilty plea, for example, because the\\ndefendant is waiving several fundamental rights, her waiver\\nmust clear a high bar. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748\\n(1970). When accepting a guilty plea, the district judge must\\n“conduct a long, searching colloquy” to ensure that the de‐\\nfendant properly waived her constitutional rights. United\\nStates v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 11(b). Similarly, a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth\\nAmendment right to assistance of counsel must not only be\\nknowing and intelligent, but also unequivocal. Iowa v. Tovar,\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835\\n(1975). There, too, the district court must directly engage\\nwith the defendant to confirm that her waiver was knowing\\nand intelligent.\\n Not every waiver must meet such stringent criteria. A de‐\\nfendant waives her right to challenge jury instructions if she\\napproved of the instructions at the district court. United\\nStates v. Caguana, 884 F.3d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). “We do not\\nrequire the defendant personally to waive objection, nor is\\nthe district court required to address the waiver question di‐\\nrectly to the defendant.” Griffin, 84 F.3d at 924.\\n Waiver of most sentencing issues is similar. See United\\nStates v. St. Clair, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir.\\nJune 7, 2019). We have observed that there is no rigid rule for\\nfinding waiver in this context. United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d\\n382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, we address each omission in\\nlight of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether\\nthe defendant’s decision not to object was knowing and in‐\\ntentional. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th\\nCir. 2009).\\n We often find such intent where the defendant chose—as\\na matter of strategy—not to present a conditions‐related ar‐\\ngument to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Bloch,\\n825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). A strategic decision is, of\\ncourse, an intentional one, and we recognize that defendants\\noften waive sentencing arguments in bargaining with the\\nprosecution or in focusing the district court on other, more\\npressing sentencing issues. We have thus inferred that a de‐\\nfendant’s choice to raise certain objections at sentencing, but\\nnot others, was strategic and intentional. United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 9\\n\\nTjader, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2 (7th Cir. June 12,\\n2019); United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Indeed, a defendant’s “decision to single out and ob‐\\nject to only one condition is the very ‘[t]ouchstone of waiver,’\\nas it indicates ‘a knowing and intentional decision.’” Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted). We have also found waiver\\nwhen the defendant had a targeted sentencing strategy that\\nled him to waive certain other sentencing arguments. See\\nUnited States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 955, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2001). All\\nthis stands for a straightforward proposition: In the context\\nof supervised release conditions, evidence of a strategic rea‐\\nson not to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a\\nnecessary, ground on which to find waiver, because it re‐\\nflects an intentional decision on the defendant’s part.\\n Moreover, in the specific context of supervised release\\nconditions, we have provided guidance to ensure defendants\\nmake intentional and informed decisions—decisions that\\ncould eliminate appellate review based on waiver. See United\\nStates v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 2016). As we\\nexplained in Lewis, “[t]he foundation for these limits on ap‐\\npellate review is that a district judge needs to ensure that\\nparties have a fair and genuine opportunity to raise objec‐\\ntions in the district court.” Id. at 1081.\\n An important factor in giving a defendant the opportuni‐\\nty to make an informed and intentional decision about su‐\\npervised release conditions is advance notice of the condi‐\\ntions. United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.\\n2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–43 (7th Cir.\\n2015). “The goal of providing the parties with advance no‐\\ntice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to pre‐\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nsent an informed response.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843. We re‐\\ncently clarified why advance notice is necessary in making\\nan informed decision:\\n A defendant who receives advance notice of\\n proposed conditions of supervised release has both\\n the benefit of advice of counsel and a full oppor‐\\n tunity to raise objections about arguably vague or\\n unjustified conditions of supervised release. Sen‐\\n tencing in the district court is the time to raise such\\n issues, not on appeal, for the first time.\\nSt. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2.\\n Last, and most obvious, we have concluded that a de‐\\nfendant intentionally waived an appellate challenge to his\\nsupervised release condition when he “affirmatively told the\\ndistrict court that he had no objection” to the challenged\\ncondition. United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.\\n2018); see also United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (affirmative withdrawal of objections to chal‐\\nlenged conditions constitutes waiver). In Smith, when dis‐\\ncussing defendant’s intentional relinquishment, we reasoned\\nthat the “district court expressly invited objections to the\\nproposed visitation condition, and Smith’s attorney, with the\\nbenefit of having seen the condition in advance, responded\\nthat the condition was ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 650. We further\\narticulated that “Smith has not argued that either he or his\\nattorney was confused or that the response did not indicate\\napproval.” Id.\\n Applying these principles to the circumstances of our\\ncase, the record is clear that Flores made a deliberate and in‐\\nformed decision when she did not challenge the employ‐\\nment supervised release condition. She had the opportunity\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 11\\n\\nto review the probation office’s recommendations with her\\nattorney in advance of sentencing, and at her sentencing\\nhearing, the district judge ensured that Flores had reviewed\\nthese conditions with counsel. See St. Clair, 2019 WL 2399597,\\nat *2; Gabriel, 831 F.3d 814. Counsel also filed written objec‐\\ntions to the PSR prior to sentencing, objecting to the relevant\\nconduct calculation and a guideline enhancement, but not\\nthe employment condition. We can reasonably infer from\\nFlores’s choice to raise certain sentencing objections, but not\\nothers, that her decision was strategic and intentional. See\\nGumila, 879 F.3d at 838.\\n Flores’s decision to waive an explanation and reading of\\nthe supervised release conditions further confirms her in‐\\ntent. Tjader, 2019 WL 2441073, at *2; Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872–73.\\nSo, too, does the record as a whole. Flores’s allocution re‐\\nflects her desire to engage in meaningful employment and\\neducational training to restart her life in a positive manner\\nonce she has served her sentence—another indication that\\nher decision not to object to the employment condition was\\nstrategic. See Barnes, 883 F.3d at 958.\\n Due to Flores’s intentional relinquishment of her right to\\nappeal the claimed error, we are precluded from reviewing\\nher appellate argument. See Young, 908 F.3d at 246 (“An ap‐\\npellate court need not consider a claimed error if the issue\\nhas been waived.”). We affirm on this basis.\\n B\\n In so holding, we are aware of the inconsistencies in our\\ncase law and that we have not always applied waiver in this\\ncontext. To start, because we liberally construe waiver in fa‐\\nvor of defendants, see Butler, 777 F.3d at 387, we were willing\\n\\f12 No. 18‐3249\\n\\nto exercise our discretion and overlook a signed appellate\\nwaiver in the rare and limited instance when a condition\\nwas unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it pro‐\\nhibited activities protected by the First Amendment and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is permitted\\nand what is prohibited[,]” in United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d\\n176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014). See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d\\n1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). In other cases, we did not address\\nwaiver in light of intervening changes in supervised release\\nconditions prompted by our decision in United States v.\\nThompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States\\nv. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pou‐\\nlin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is\\npresent here.\\n In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver\\nwhen applying plain‐error review. See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d\\nat 844; United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007);\\nUnited States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nNone of these cases, however, held that waiver did not apply\\nin this context. At most, they assumed that forfeiture gov‐\\nerned. It is well‐established “that the unexamined assump‐\\ntions of prior cases do not control the disposition of a con‐\\ntested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.\\n303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). And our earlier as‐\\nsumptions do not withstand scrutiny, as the Supreme Court,\\nlike us, has made clear that waiver is a threshold considera‐\\ntion when reviewing for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733;\\nYoung, 908 F.3d at 246.\\n We make the point again today. When a defendant does\\nnot address supervised release conditions in the district\\ncourt, this court will assess whether she waived those chal‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐3249 13\\n\\nlenges. We will find waiver, as we do here, when the de‐\\nfendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful\\nopportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or\\ndirectly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions,\\nwaives reading of those conditions and their justifications,\\nchallenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged\\non appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic\\ndecision not to object.1\\n C\\n On a final note, at oral argument, the government articu‐\\nlated that it relied on our prior cases when asserting that\\nplain‐error review applied. See, e.g., Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930–\\n31. Flores’s appellate counsel countered that the government\\nwaived its waiver defense by agreeing to plain‐error review.\\nNormally, we would enforce the government’s waiver, but\\nwe are not obligated to do so. See United States v. Combs, 657\\nF.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v.\\nSchmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n Here, we decline to enforce the government’s waiver due\\nto the inconsistencies in our case law regarding plain‐error\\nreview in the supervised release context, as discussed direct‐\\nly above, and our previous confusion over the terms forfei‐\\nture and waiver. Further, in the face of the recent influx of\\nsupervised release condition challenges before this court\\nwhere such conditions were not challenged before the dis‐\\ntrict court, we are compelled to emphasize that waiver is\\npart of our plain‐error review.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before issuing this opinion, we circulated it to all judges in active\\nservice under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear this case en banc.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐3249\\n\\n III\\n The district court gave Flores every opportunity to make\\nthe challenge she makes now on appeal. Flores expressly de‐\\nclined. That precludes our appellate review, but it does not\\npermanently bind Flores. We have long assumed that proba‐\\ntion officers work with defendants, not against them, to help\\ndefendants transition back into society after prison. They do\\nnot, and must not, nitpick defendants and seek reprimands\\nor revocations over small, unreasonable concerns. There is\\nanother safety valve as well, even for defendants who waive\\nconditions challenges on direct appeal. Should certain condi‐\\ntions prove too onerous or ill‐defined, or should circum‐\\nstances change during incarceration or after release, 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows defendants like Flores to petition\\nthe court for a modification of their supervised release con‐\\nditions, as the district court properly informed Flores here.\\n For today, however, Flores intentionally waived her right\\nto challenge the employment condition, and so we affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3082,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636711,"string":"4,636,711"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Izabela GAWRON, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Izabela Gawron"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2608"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Barrett, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413964/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636711/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Izabela GAWRON, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nIZABELA GAWRON,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\n\f2 No. 18‐2608\n\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\n I\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\n\fNo. 18‐2608 3\n\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\nto be addressed.\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\n\f4 No. 18‐2608\n\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\nher pretrial supervision.\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\nthe district court stated:\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\n Northern District of Illinois.\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\nvised.\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\ncourt asked:\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\n II\n A\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\n\fNo. 18‐2608 5\n\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\nCir. 2016).\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\n\f6 No. 18‐2608\n\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\n\fNo. 18‐2608 7\n\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\n\f8 No. 18‐2608\n\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\nwas procedurally sufficient.\n B\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\n\fNo. 18‐2608 9\n\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\nview for plain error. We agree.\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\nbeen in effect.\n\f10 No. 18‐2608\n\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\n(citations omitted).\n C\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\n\fNo. 18‐2608 11\n\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Izabela GAWRON, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3083,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636713,"string":"4,636,713"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2040"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2040\\nJOHN DOE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\\n\\f2 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\\nregulatory framework.\\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1291.\\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\\nof “employment-based” visas.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 3\\n\\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\\n\\n\\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2040\\n\\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 5\\n\\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\\n investing, the requisite capital; and\\n\\n\\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\\n\\f6 No. 17-2040\\n\\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\\n in the United States; and\\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 7\\n\\n B.\\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\\nvisa.\\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\\nland.\\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\\n\\n\\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\\n\\f8 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 9\\n\\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\\nappeal.\\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\\n\\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\\n\\f10 No. 17-2040\\n\\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\\nment.\\n C.\\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n10 R.91 at 14.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 11\\n\\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\\nhours.12\\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\\n\\n\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2040\\n\\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\\ntures was not arbitrary.\\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 13\\n\\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\\nour disposition of this appeal.\\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\\n the agency\\n has relied on factors which Congress\\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\\n failed to consider an important aspect of\\n the problem, offered an explanation for\\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\\n a difference in view or the product of\\n agency expertise.\\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\\n\\f14 No. 17-2040\\n\\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\\n review when it provides that agencies must\\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\\n 1980).\\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 15\\n\\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\\n\\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f16 No. 17-2040\\n\\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\\n portant role in determining whether or not the\\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\\n land was sold on the same day for double the\\n price. [16]\\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\\n\\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\\nmate purchase at all.\\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 17\\n\\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\\ncerns.”17\\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\\n\\n17 Id.\\n18 R.91 at 14.\\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\\n20 Id. at 25.\\n\\f18 No. 17-2040\\n\\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\\nmercial enterprise.\\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\\n\\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 19\\n\\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\\n\\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f20 No. 17-2040\\n\\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\\nof evidence.\\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 21\\n\\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\\nrisk.”25\\n Conclusion\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413966/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636713/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2040\nJOHN DOE,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\nActing Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\n\f2 No. 17-2040\n\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\nregulatory framework.\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\n\n\n\n\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1291.\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\nof “employment-based” visas.\n\fNo. 17-2040 3\n\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\n\n\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\n\f4 No. 17-2040\n\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\n\fNo. 17-2040 5\n\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\n investing, the requisite capital; and\n\n\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\n\f6 No. 17-2040\n\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\n in the United States; and\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\n\n\n\n\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\n\fNo. 17-2040 7\n\n B.\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\nvisa.\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\nland.\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\n\n\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\n\f8 No. 17-2040\n\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\n\n\n\n\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\n\fNo. 17-2040 9\n\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\nappeal.\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\n\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\n\f10 No. 17-2040\n\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\nment.\n C.\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\n\n\n10 R.91 at 14.\n\fNo. 17-2040 11\n\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\nhours.12\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\n\n\n11 Id.\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\n\f12 No. 17-2040\n\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\ntures was not arbitrary.\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\n\fNo. 17-2040 13\n\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\nour disposition of this appeal.\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\n the agency\n has relied on factors which Congress\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\n failed to consider an important aspect of\n the problem, offered an explanation for\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\n a difference in view or the product of\n agency expertise.\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\n\f14 No. 17-2040\n\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\n review when it provides that agencies must\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\n 1980).\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\n\fNo. 17-2040 15\n\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\n\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\n\f16 No. 17-2040\n\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\n portant role in determining whether or not the\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\n land was sold on the same day for double the\n price. [16]\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\n\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\nmate purchase at all.\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\n\fNo. 17-2040 17\n\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\ncerns.”17\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\n\n17 Id.\n18 R.91 at 14.\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\n20 Id. at 25.\n\f18 No. 17-2040\n\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\nmercial enterprise.\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\n\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\n\fNo. 17-2040 19\n\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\n\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\n\f20 No. 17-2040\n\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\nof evidence.\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\n\n\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\n\fNo. 17-2040 21\n\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\nrisk.”25\n Conclusion\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2040\\nJOHN DOE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. John Doe, a native and citizen of\\nIran, obtained an immigrant visa through an employment-\\nbased visa program for investors, and, in due course, he suc-\\ncessfully applied to adjust his status to that of a conditional\\npermanent resident. At the conclusion of his two-year, condi-\\ntional term, Mr. Doe petitioned to remove the conditions on\\n\\f2 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis residency. The United States Citizenship and Immigra-\\ntion Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition. Mr. Doe chal-\\nlenged the denial in the district court, claiming that the deci-\\nsion was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the relevant\\nstatutory and regulatory authority, and deprived him of his\\ndue process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the\\nreasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Because the factual and procedural background of this\\ncase involves a visa system which is not frequently the sub-\\nject of our cases, we begin by setting forth the statutory and\\nregulatory framework.\\n The EB-52 program, colloquially known as the “investor\\nvisa,” is a program designed by Congress to encourage sig-\\nnificant, job-creating investment in commercial enterprises\\nin the United States, with special incentives related to rural\\nor economically depressed communities where unemploy-\\nment is at least 150% of the national average. The program,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1291.\\n2 The designation “EB-5” denotes that it is the fifth preference category\\nof “employment-based” visas.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 3\\n\\nin its current iteration,3 requires an alien investor to make an\\ninvestment of at least $500,000 for a new commercial enter-\\nprise located in a rural or high-unemployment area and up\\nto $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an\\narea with an unemployment rate significantly below the na-\\ntional average.4 The enterprise can be the creation of a new\\nbusiness, a purchase of an existing business with substantial\\nrestructuring or reorganization, or the substantial expansion\\nof an existing business. The enterprise must create full-time\\nemployment for a minimum of ten qualified employees. See\\ngenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.\\n The process by which an alien obtains status under\\n§ 1153(b)(5) begins with a petition for classification as an al-\\nien entrepreneur. A petition must be accompanied by evi-\\ndence “that the alien has invested or is actively in the pro-\\ncess of investing lawfully obtained capital in a new commer-\\ncial enterprise in the United States which will create\\nfull-time positions for not fewer than 10 qualifying employ-\\nees.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j). Specifically, the petition must con-\\ntain evidence of the existence or formation of the enterprise\\nitself. To demonstrate “that the petitioner has invested or is\\n\\n\\n3 Substantial changes have been proposed to the program, including in-\\ncreases in the minimum investment and a redefinition of targeted areas.\\nSee EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 Fed. Reg. 4738\\n(proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204 and 216).\\n4 The alien need not “create” a “new” business in the literal sense.\\n“New” for purposes of the statute means established after November 29,\\n1990, the date of enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. no.\\n101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Any business formed after\\nthe statute’s effective date is “new” for the purposes of the statute, and\\nan alien need only “invest” in, not create, such business.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2040\\n\\nactively in the process of investing the required amount of\\ncapital, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that\\nthe petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at\\nrisk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital\\nplaced at risk.” Id. § 204.6(j)(2). Financial documents show-\\ning deposits and expenditures must be submitted.\\n Immigrant investors seeking to qualify for an EB-5 visa\\nmay make either direct investments into a business or can\\ninvest through a business designated by USCIS as a “region-\\nal center.” Regional centers are essentially clearinghouses for\\neligible investment opportunities. As the USCIS Policy\\nManual states, “The regional center model can offer an im-\\nmigrant investor already defined investment opportunities,\\nthereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to\\nidentify acceptable investment vehicles.” USCIS Policy\\nManual, Volume 6, Part G, Chapter 3,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6 (current as\\nof June 6, 2019). With respect to the proof of capital at risk,\\ndirect investments and regional center investments have\\nidentical requirements. However, for the purpose of the\\njob-creation requirement, direct investments and regional\\ncenter investments have one important difference. Direct in-\\nvestment can only satisfy the job-creation requirement with\\nthe creation of direct jobs, i.e., new positions within the new\\ncommercial enterprise itself. For a petition filed on the basis\\nof jobs already created, a petitioner submits relevant tax rec-\\nords, for example, documenting direct hires. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(j)(4)(i)(A). By contrast, investments through regional\\ncenters allow EB-5 applicants to satisfy the job-creation re-\\nquirement with either direct or indirect positions. An indirect\\njob is one held outside of the new commercial enterprise but\\ncreated as a result of the new commercial enterprise. An al-\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 5\\n\\nien who chooses to rely on such indirect, econom-\\nic-impact-based employment must use an approved eco-\\nnomic methodology to establish that the requisite number of\\njobs have been or will be created. See id. § 204.6(m)(7)(ii).5\\nFor a petitioner like Mr. Doe, who files on the basis of an en-\\nterprise anticipated to create the required number of jobs, his\\npetition must include “[a] copy of a comprehensive business\\nplan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of\\nthe new commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than\\nten (10) qualifying employees will result, including approx-\\nimate dates, within the next two years, and when such em-\\nployees will be hired.” Id. § 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B).\\n The approval of an EB-5 visa petition results in the issu-\\nance of an immigrant visa and permits the alien to file for\\npermanent resident status on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1255(a), 1186b(a)(1). Conditional residency lasts for two\\nyears. Ninety days before the expiration of the conditional\\nresidency, an alien may apply to have the conditions on res-\\nidence removed and become a lawful permanent resident.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A). At that time, USCIS must reevalu-\\nate the alien’s investment and ensure that the alien:\\n (A) (i) invested, or is actively in the process of\\n investing, the requisite capital; and\\n\\n\\n5 The regulations allow that to demonstrate “indirect job creation,” “rea-\\nsonable methodologies may be used. Such methodologies may include\\nmultiplier tables, feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic\\nmarkets for the goods or services to be exported, and other economically\\nor statistically valid forecasting devices which indicate the likelihood\\nthat the business will result in increased employment.” 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 204.6(m)(7)(ii); see also id. § 204.6(m)(3)(v).\\n\\f6 No. 17-2040\\n\\n (ii) sustained the actions described in clause (i)\\n throughout the period of the alien’s residence\\n in the United States; and\\n (B) is otherwise conforming to the require-\\n ments of section 1153(b)(5) of this title.\\n8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a). The alien\\nbears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies all eligi-\\nbility criteria by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of\\nChawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (BIA 2010).\\n Mr. Doe successfully navigated each of the steps of this\\nprocess until the final one, the petition to remove the condi-\\ntions on his residence. In its consideration of that petition,\\nUSCIS identified two potential issues with respect to his ap-\\nplication: whether his investment was sustained, at risk,\\nthrough the duration of his residency, and whether the pro-\\nject would create the requisite number of jobs within a rea-\\nsonable period of time. USCIS was required to engage in this\\ninquiry and to consider the state of affairs as of the time of\\nthe final petition even though it previously had found the\\nsame requirements satisfied. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1).6 Its\\nresolution of these matters is the subject of Mr. Doe’s appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n6 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the Director of\\nUSCIS must determine whether “[a] commercial enterprise was estab-\\nlished by the alien” and whether “[t]he alien invested or was actively in\\nthe process of investing the requisite capital.” In addition, the Director\\nmust find that “[t]he alien sustained the[se] actions … throughout the\\nperiod of the alien’s residence in the United States.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 7\\n\\n B.\\n In 2011, Mr. Doe became one of twenty-four indirect im-\\nmigrant investors in a proposed project to build Elgin\\nMemory Care, Inc., a 110-unit assisted living facility in Elgin,\\nIllinois. Each individual investor would contribute a mini-\\nmum of $500,000 to be used for the project and, if additional\\nstatutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied, by vir-\\ntue of their investment would become eligible for an EB-5\\nvisa.\\n While Mr. Doe’s initial capital investment was held in es-\\ncrow, he self-petitioned for his EB-5 visa (the “I-526 peti-\\ntion”). His petition included a then-current business plan,\\nwhich represented that, with the $12 million investment as\\nthe total project cost, construction of the facility would begin\\nin 2010 and the facility would be operational by 2011. The\\nplan also claimed that the project would create more than\\n270 full-time jobs. USCIS approved the I-526 petition in June\\n2011. One month later, Mr. Doe’s $500,000 investment was\\ntransferred to Elgin Memory Care, and three days after the\\ntransfer, on August 1, 2011, Elgin Memory Care purchased a\\nparcel of land on which it intended to build the assisted liv-\\ning facility. Elgin Memory Care paid $1.1 million for the\\nland.\\n With an approved immigrant visa in hand, Mr. Doe was\\neligible to apply for adjustment of status.7 His application\\nfor adjustment was approved in 2011, and he was granted\\nconditional resident status for a two-year period. See 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1186b. Approximately one month before the expiration of\\n\\n\\n7 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b(a)(1), 1201–02; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.\\n\\f8 No. 17-2040\\n\\nhis conditional residency in October 2013, Mr. Doe filed a\\npetition to remove the conditions on his residence (the “I-829\\npetition”), as permitted by the statute.8\\n In response to his petition, in August 2014, Mr. Doe re-\\nceived the first indication that USCIS was beginning to have\\nconcerns about the investment that formed the basis of his\\nvisa: USCIS issued a thorough and detailed seven-page Re-\\nquest for Evidence to Mr. Doe. The Request sought further\\nevidence that his investment satisfied two critical grounds of\\nEB-5 eligibility, both significant to the disposition of the pre-\\nsent appeal. First, the agency requested certain information\\nto confirm that Mr. Doe’s capital investment with the EB-5\\nFund had been sustained throughout his two-year condi-\\ntional residency period. In addition to seeking relevant fi-\\nnancial documents and tax records that Mr. Doe had not\\nprovided, the Request specifically noted that, in searching a\\nproperty records database, it had discovered something\\nquestionable about the land transaction that was the sup-\\nposed purpose of Mr. Doe’s capital investment. USCIS had\\nlearned that Elgin Memory Care purchased the parcel of\\nland for $1.1 million from an entity called UIS Development,\\nLLC, on the very same day that UIS itself had purchased the\\nparcel from Nesler & Lake CRE, for nearly half the amount,\\n$630,000. The Request gave examples of potential evidence\\nto overcome deficiencies related to whether Mr. Doe’s in-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8 The period during which an alien may apply to remove conditions is\\nthe ninety-day period prior to the expiration of the conditional residen-\\ncy. 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d)(2)(A).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 9\\n\\nvestment was placed “at risk,” including an explanation of\\nthe prior sale “with supporting evidence.”9\\n In addition to articulating the specific concerns about the\\nland transaction funded with Mr. Doe’s investment, the Re-\\nquest also raised potential issues about the evidence con-\\ncerning job creation. The Request noted that, between the\\ninitial submissions in support of the visa and this most re-\\ncent petition to remove conditions, Mr. Doe had revised his\\nprojected job-creation figures downward by nearly fifty per-\\ncent without any explanation. Beyond the particular defi-\\nciencies identified, the Request reflects plainly a concern\\nfrom the agency that the project had not met any of its pro-\\njected benchmarks and that no updated timelines for com-\\npletion and operation had been submitted. The agency re-\\nquested that, in response to its concerns, Mr. Doe provide\\nfurther information on whether the project remained a going\\nconcern and whether he had sustained his qualifying in-\\nvestment in it. It also sought information on revisions to the\\nanticipated job creation, because the deadlines in the plan\\nsubmitted had not been met by the project. It listed a series\\nof documents that might help satisfy those requests and in-\\nvited Mr. Doe to submit anything else relevant to these con-\\ncerns. Mr. Doe responded to the Request with various addi-\\ntional documents, the sufficiency of which is relevant to this\\nappeal.\\n On January 16, 2015, USCIS denied Mr. Doe’s I-829 peti-\\ntion to remove the conditions on his residence. The\\nnine-page denial letter cited two alternate and independent\\ngrounds for the decision: namely, the “at risk” ground, relat-\\n\\n9 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15 (R.32-1).\\n\\f10 No. 17-2040\\n\\ned to the suspicious land transaction, and the “job-creation”\\nground, related to whether the project met the minimum\\nstatutory requirements for creating new full-time employ-\\nment.\\n C.\\n Mr. Doe brought this action in the district court, princi-\\npally alleging that USCIS’s denial of his application to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence was arbitrary and ca-\\npricious. In 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-\\nmary judgment. The district court granted the Government\\ndefendants’ motion in a lengthy and thoughtful memoran-\\ndum opinion and order. The court determined that the agen-\\ncy’s action was grounded in the evidentiary record. See 5\\nU.S.C. § 706(2).\\n First, with respect to the requirement that the full amount\\nof a capital investment be placed “at risk,” the court noted\\nthat USCIS had reason to be “deeply concerned about the\\nlegitimacy of [the] land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s capital\\nhad, in fact, been used to support job creation activities by\\nthe assisted living facility.”10 The court recounted the docu-\\nmented facts of the transaction: that the investment was\\ntransferred from the regional center to Elgin Memory Care\\nthree days before the land transaction, but on the day of the\\ntransaction, an intermediate buyer was able to purchase the\\nland for roughly half the price Elgin Memory Care would\\npay to that buyer later the same day. The court noted that\\nthe agency had asked Mr. Doe to provide evidence substan-\\ntiating the legitimacy of the land deal in the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n10 R.91 at 14.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 11\\n\\ndence and that he had provided only summary affidavits\\nattesting to the deal’s legitimacy and a lack of relationship\\nbetween the seller, intermediate buyer, and ultimate buyer.\\nAs the court observed, none of these documents explained\\naway the fact that the transaction was questionable on its\\nface. Furthermore, the court held that USCIS was entitled to\\ndiscount the affidavits because they were “self-serving,” and\\n“do little to shed any light on the wide disparity between”\\nthe two same-day purchase prices.11 The court noted that\\nMr. Doe had failed to provide the sale documents from the\\nfirst transaction, the terms of the deal, or an independent\\nappraisal. The court found reasonable USCIS’s rejection of\\nMr. Doe’s contrary assertion—that the intermediate buyer\\nwas able to “flip” the property for a profit in a matter of\\nhours.12\\n The district court then turned to the job-creation re-\\nquirement. In response to Mr. Doe’s objection that the agen-\\ncy’s decision added a requirement that indirect jobs created\\nby the entity must last longer than two years to be counted,\\nthe court concluded that Mr. Doe had misread the decision.\\nIn the court’s view, when read in context, it was clear that\\nthe agency’s reference to the duration of jobs created applied\\nonly to the direct jobs. With respect to the remaining indirect\\njobs, even if they all counted, the district court noted that\\nthey were fewer than the ten required.\\n The court also found no merit to Mr. Doe’s objection that\\nthe agency had improperly rejected his employment impact\\n\\n\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 15 (quoting CAR at 25).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2040\\n\\nreport. It thought that there were numerous reasons to ques-\\ntion the reliability of his expenditures, given that construc-\\ntion had not commenced. The court determined that there\\nwas no error in the agency’s conclusion that Mr. Doe’s im-\\npact report was unreliable in light of the totality of the evi-\\ndence in the record. Finally, the court found no error in the\\nagency’s rejection of Mr. Doe’s job-creation methodology. It\\nconcluded that Mr. Doe essentially disagreed with the agen-\\ncy’s refusal to include certain expenditures in its calcula-\\ntions, but that, in any event, the exclusion of those expendi-\\ntures was not arbitrary.\\n Mr. Doe appealed the district court’s judgment. When his\\nappeal was first before us, we discovered a conflict of inter-\\nest with his attorney. Specifically, the attorney on the brief\\nwas the second member of a two-person law firm, and the\\nprincipal attorney was under investigation for fraud in the\\nEB-5 program. See SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill.).\\nKameli is accused of “defrauding at least 226 immigrant in-\\nvestors who participated in the EB-5 immigrant investor\\nprogram. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli so-\\nlicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new com-\\nmercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate\\nsome of those funds.” Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically\\nidentifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the\\nscheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of mis-\\nappropriation of the immigrant investors’ capital. We or-\\ndered briefing on the subject of a potential conflict between\\nthe Kameli firm’s continued representation of Mr. Doe, and\\nwe subsequently disqualified them from further representa-\\ntion. Id. at 720. We pause to emphasize that our discussion of\\nthe fraud accusations concerned only the qualifications of\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 13\\n\\nprior counsel and his law firm to represent Mr. Doe before\\nus in this proceeding. The allegations are not part of the ad-\\nministrative record in this case, and they have no bearing on\\nour disposition of this appeal.\\n Now represented by new counsel, and supported by new\\nbriefing, the merits of Mr. Doe’s appeal are before us.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Our review of the district court’s decision granting sum-\\nmary judgment is de novo. St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v.\\nMilwaukee Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Mr. Doe claims that USCIS’s denial of the petition to re-\\nmove the conditions on his residence is arbitrary or capri-\\ncious and requests that this court therefore hold it unlawful.\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).\\n When determining whether an agency’s deci-\\n sion is arbitrary or capricious, we ask whether\\n the agency\\n has relied on factors which Congress\\n had not intended it to consider, entirely\\n failed to consider an important aspect of\\n the problem, offered an explanation for\\n its decision that runs counter to the evi-\\n dence before the agency, or is so im-\\n plausible that it could not be ascribed to\\n a difference in view or the product of\\n agency expertise.\\nZero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,\\n668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.\\nDefs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). Furthermore,\\n\\f14 No. 17-2040\\n\\n [t]he Administrative Procedure Act (the\\n “APA”) recognizes the importance of judicial\\n review when it provides that agencies must\\n explain the basis for their decisions, “on all ma-\\n terial issues of fact, law, or discretion ... .” 5\\n U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has\\n instructed us to review agency decisions only\\n on the basis of the reasons given in the agen-\\n cy’s order or opinion. Securities and Exchange\\n Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).\\n “Even if the evidence in the record, combined\\n with the reviewing court’s understanding of\\n the law, is enough to support the order, the\\n court may not uphold the order unless it is sus-\\n tainable on the agency’s findings and for the\\n reasons stated by the agency.” 3 K. Davis, Ad-\\n ministrative Law Treatise § 14.29 at 128 (2d ed.\\n 1980).\\nSaylor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th\\nCir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).\\n In the present case, because USCIS’s determination was\\nbased on two independent and alternative grounds, we\\nwould have to find error in both determinations in order to\\ngrant relief to Mr. Doe. See BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d\\n1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When an agency offers multiple\\ngrounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as\\nany one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated\\nthat the agency would not have acted on that basis if the al-\\nternative grounds were unavailable.”). We therefore consid-\\ner whether the agency’s decision may be sustained under\\neither its at-risk or job-creation rationales.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 15\\n\\n First, Mr. Doe challenges USCIS’s conclusion that he had\\nnot carried the burden to demonstrate that his capital in-\\nvestment was put “at risk” for the purpose of generating a\\nreturn. Specifically, in its Request for Evidence, the agency\\nnoted that there were deficiencies in Mr. Doe’s evidence re-\\ngarding his contribution and its subsequent use. To begin,\\nthe agency faulted him for providing no evidence, in the\\nform of a loan agreement or otherwise, that the funding enti-\\nty released the funds to Elgin Memory Care. Next, although\\nthere was evidence that Elgin Memory Care had purchased a\\nparcel of land for construction of the facility at a price of $1.1\\nmillion, that same property had been purchased earlier the\\nsame day by an intermediate buyer for the cost of only\\n$630,000. The agency also noted the absence of later tax rec-\\nords and of “[u]naltered” financial statements by Elgin\\nMemory Care.13 To satisfy the requirement, USCIS requested\\na series of documents. Among them was “[a]n explanation,\\nwith supporting evidence, to explain the prior sale between”\\nthe first owner of the property and the intermediate buyer,\\nas well as descriptions of any relationships between the par-\\nties to either of the sales.14 Mr. Doe responded to the agen-\\ncy’s Request for Evidence. Although he provided affidavits\\nfrom the intermediate buyer and Mr. Doe’s then-counsel,\\nKameli, on behalf of Elgin Memory Care, none provided an\\nexplanation of the first sale and how the property could have\\nbeen “flipped” on the very same day.\\n\\n13 CAR at 14 (R.32-1). The financial statements Mr. Doe provided had\\nblacked out virtually all information, save the $500,000 contribution from\\nMr. Doe. See, e.g., id. at 460 (R.32-9) (bank statement, with series of blank\\npost-it notes covering all information except the contribution).\\n14 Id. at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f16 No. 17-2040\\n\\n When it ultimately denied the petition, questions regard-\\ning the legitimacy of the land transaction were the principal\\nbasis for the agency’s conclusion that the required amount of\\ncapital had not been shown to be “sustained” and “at risk.”15\\nThe denial letter again noted the dubious details of the land\\ndeal, and then considered the evidence submitted in re-\\nsponse to the Request for Evidence. It concluded that\\n [t]he legitimacy of the transaction plays an im-\\n portant role in determining whether or not the\\n EB-5 capital was truly made available to [Elgin\\n Memory Care], as opposed to simply being\\n used for purposes unrelated to job creation. In\\n this case, the same-day land transaction and\\n the doubling of the price cast doubt on the le-\\n gitimacy of the transaction. Petitioner did not\\n submit sufficient evidence to explain why the\\n land was sold on the same day for double the\\n price. [16]\\nIt also stated that Mr. Doe had failed to submit objective evi-\\ndence, such as an independent appraisal, that supports the\\n\\n15 The agency cited the seminal BIA precedent on “at risk” investments,\\nMatter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169 (BIA 1998), for the proposition that\\nthe full amount of the investment must be made available to the\\njob-creating entity. As Mr. Doe notes, the citation is of limited use;\\nIzummi involved the question whether the investment may be used to\\npay lender fees associated with obtaining additional capital for the\\njob-creating entity. Id. at 178–79. The question here is not whether some\\nparticular expenditure can be credited based on its type, but whether the\\ntransaction was questionable enough to suggest that it was not a legiti-\\nmate purchase at all.\\n16 CAR at 6 (R.32-1).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 17\\n\\nfinding that the price Elgin Memory Care paid approximates\\nmarket price. It discounted the sworn statements that the\\nparties were unrelated under Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec.\\n582, 591–92 (BIA 1988), which required “independent objec-\\ntive evidence” to resolve credibility issues with the alien’s\\nown statement. The affidavit from the intermediate buyer,\\nUSCIS concluded, was insufficient to “assuage USCIS’s con-\\ncerns.”17\\n As the district court noted, “[i]t is clear from the record\\nthat USCIS was deeply concerned about the legitimacy of\\n[Elgin Memory Care]’s land deal and whether [Mr. Doe]’s\\ncapital had, in fact, been used to support job creation activi-\\nties by the assisted living facility.”18 Mr. Doe makes various\\nobjections to this conclusion. He first complains that USCIS\\nexpanded the evidentiary requirements necessary to satisfy\\nthe statute. Next, he asserts that the agency relied on an “en-\\ntirely unsupported[] hunch” to deny his claim.19 He also\\nclaims that the denial failed to address the evidence he sub-\\nmitted. Finally, he contends that the denial improperly re-\\nquired him to “prove a negative,” i.e., that the land deal did\\nnot run afoul of EB-5 policy.20\\n Mr. Doe readily acknowledges, at multiple points in his\\nbrief, that he bears the burden of proving eligibility by a\\npreponderance of the evidence. Although his brief cites nu-\\nmerous specific objections to the USCIS determination, he\\n\\n17 Id.\\n18 R.91 at 14.\\n19 Appellant’s Br. 13.\\n20 Id. at 25.\\n\\f18 No. 17-2040\\n\\nleaves relatively untouched the basic concern of USCIS: two\\nyears after the initial petition was granted, the project had\\nmet none of the benchmarks identified in the most recent\\nplans Mr. Doe had submitted. Indeed, it was so far behind\\nschedule as to raise legitimate questions about whether the\\nproject ever would be completed. In that broader context,21\\nUSCIS reviewed Mr. Doe’s application, in which he claimed\\nthat his capital investment had funded the purchase of prop-\\nerty for the not-yet-built assisted living facility. USCIS’s own\\nreview of the state’s property database revealed unusual cir-\\ncumstances—an intermediate buyer able to own the proper-\\nty for less than one day and turn a tremendous profit by re-\\nselling it to Elgin Memory Care. That large, unexplained\\nprofit led USCIS to question whether the transaction was in-\\nstead a maneuver to skim some of the money off of the in-\\nvestment, an action resulting in less of Mr. Doe’s investment\\nbeing placed “at risk” to create jobs through the new com-\\nmercial enterprise.\\n We think the agency was entitled to conclude that\\nMr. Doe’s response to the agency’s concern failed to address\\nadequately this broader and more fundamental question\\nraised by USCIS. For example, Mr. Doe makes much of the\\nfact that the denial repeatedly uses the term “double” to re-\\nfer to the price paid by Elgin Memory Care relative to the\\nprice paid by the intermediate buyer. He correctly notes that,\\nof the $1.1 million paid by Elgin Memory Care, $120,000 was\\n\\n21The agency is both aware, and communicating to aliens, that fraud is a\\nrecurring problem in this visa category. See USCIS, Investor Alert - In-\\nvestment Scams Exploit Immigrant Investor Program,\\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/archive/investor-alert-investment-scams-exploit-\\nimmigrant-investor-program (last updated 10/2013).\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 19\\n\\nheld in escrow for street-related improvements. As a conse-\\nquence, the profit made by the intermediate buyer was not\\n$470,000, but $350,000, which is not “double” the amount\\npaid. His objection, while technically correct, is immaterial:\\nUSCIS was not concerned with the exact percentage but with\\nthe fact that an ownership of only hours had turned such a\\nsignificant, and therefore questionable, profit.\\n Notably, USCIS did not deny the claim immediately, but\\nrequested evidence to support the legitimacy of the transac-\\ntion. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).22 It requested “[a]n explana-\\ntion, with supporting evidence” of the prior land sale, and a\\ndescription of the relationship between the parties to that\\nsale and the principals of each.23 As the district court noted,\\nMr. Doe’s response gave no narrative explanation of how the\\nintermediate buyer was able to acquire the property and\\nturn a profit of several hundred thousand dollars with such\\nspeed. Similarly, Mr. Doe’s quibbles about USCIS’s treat-\\n\\n22 The regulations provide, in relevant part,\\n If derogatory information is determined regarding any\\n of these issues or it becomes known to the government\\n that the entrepreneur obtained his or her investment\\n funds through other than legal means (such as through\\n the sale of illegal drugs), the director shall offer the alien\\n entrepreneur the opportunity to rebut such information.\\n If the alien entrepreneur fails to overcome such deroga-\\n tory information or evidence the investment funds were\\n obtained through other than legal means, the director\\n may deny the petition, terminate the alien’s permanent\\n resident status, and issue an order to show cause.\\n 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2).\\n23 CAR at 14 (R.32-1).\\n\\f20 No. 17-2040\\n\\nment of the affidavit of the intermediate buyer, which stated\\nsummarily that it had no relationship with any other party,\\nmiss the mark: the ultimate question is not whether USCIS\\nhad to credit that affidavit, but whether Mr. Doe established\\nthat his capital was fully available to Elgin Memory Care\\nand legitimately used for purposes related to job creation.24\\nSimilarly, USCIS did not require a market analysis or the\\noriginal purchase agreement on the property, but simply\\nstated that Mr. Doe had not met his burden to establish that\\nthe transaction was legitimate. The statements of USCIS are\\nbest read as simply communicating that, even if Mr. Doe\\nwere unable to obtain information from the first seller and\\nthe intermediate buyer, he could have procured other kinds\\nof evidence.\\n The Request for Evidence placed Mr. Doe on notice that\\nUSCIS had legitimate suspicions; he was unable to answer\\nadequately those suspicions in the evidence he provided.\\nThe burden remained on Mr. Doe to establish that he met all\\nof the requirements of the program, or, in the words of the\\nregulation, “to overcome [the] derogatory information” that\\nUSCIS had considered. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(2). The denial of\\nMr. Doe’s petition reflects nothing other than a recognition\\nthat his submissions in response to the Request for Evi-\\n\\n\\n24 Indeed, the very case on which Mr. Doe relies, Soltane v. United States\\nDepartment of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), states that “[a]n\\nagency’s rejection of uncontradicted testimony can support a finding of\\nsubstantial evidence” when it provides adequate reasons. Id. (quoting\\nTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, USCIS did\\nprovide a specific reason for why the affidavit did not speak to its central\\nconcern: how the intermediate buyer was able to turn an astonishing\\nprofit in just hours of ownership.\\n\\fNo. 17-2040 21\\n\\ndence—which had been specific both in its concerns and in\\nits list of documents that might address those concerns—had\\nfailed to overcome contrary evidence. USCIS reasonably\\nconcluded, after questioning the single expenditure support-\\ned by Mr. Doe’s investment, that significant questions re-\\nmained unanswered about whether the transaction was le-\\ngitimate and truly placed the full value of the investment “at\\nrisk” for purposes of job creation. Mr. Doe, who carried the\\nburden to establish his eligibility, failed to dispel these con-\\ncerns when given an opportunity. The district court there-\\nfore did not err in its conclusion that USCIS’s decision was\\nnot arbitrary or capricious with respect to the land transac-\\ntion and whether Mr. Doe’s investment was placed “at\\nrisk.”25\\n Conclusion\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n25 Because we have concluded that the first basis relied upon by the dis-\\ntrict court to uphold the agency’s decision was not in error, we need not\\nconsider whether the agency’s alternative basis for denying Mr. Doe’s\\npetition also was a legally sufficient basis for denial. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC,\\n351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3084,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636714,"string":"4,636,714"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2969"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 17-2969\\n\\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\\nARRAZABAL,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States,*\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A045-091-341\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\\n\\f2 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\\nsecond time.\\n I.\\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 3\\n\\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\\n\\n\\n1\\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\\nstill living in El Salvador.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2969\\n\\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\\nin the chest with a gun.\\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 5\\n\\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\\nproof. A.R. 766.\\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\\n\\f6 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 7\\n\\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\\n2015)).\\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\\n\\f8 No. 17-2969\\n\\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 9\\n\\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\\n\\f10 No. 17-2969\\n\\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\\n The IJ summed up as follows:\\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\\n under CAT.\\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\\nA.R. 2–5.\\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 11\\n\\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\\n\\n2\\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2969\\n\\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 13\\n\\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\\nprotection under the CAT.\\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\\nto prevail on his claims.\\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\\n\\f14 No. 17-2969\\n\\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\\nevidence he presented.\\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 15\\n\\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\\ncorroborative aspects.\\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\\n\\f16 No. 17-2969\\n\\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\\n2016, which was in the record.\\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\\n\\n\\n3\\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 17\\n\\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\\n\\f18 No. 17-2969\\n\\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\\nsignificant oversight.\\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 19\\n\\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\\ninterpreter:\\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\\n correct?\\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\\npoint by the government’s counsel:\\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\\n\\f20 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\\n he already has a family. He already has children.\\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\\n children?\\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 21\\n\\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\\n\\f22 No. 17-2969\\n\\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\\naltogether on this basis.\\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\\nevidentiary support).\\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 23\\n\\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\\n\\f24 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\\nCir. 2006).\\n III.\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\\nArrazabal’s behalf.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413967/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636714/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2969\n\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\nARRAZABAL,\n Petitioner,\n\n v.\n\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\nof the United States,*\n Respondent.\n\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A045-091-341\n\n\n\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\nJudges.\n\n\n\n*\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\n\f2 No. 17-2969\n\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\nsecond time.\n I.\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\n\fNo. 17-2969 3\n\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\n\n\n1\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\nstill living in El Salvador.\n\f4 No. 17-2969\n\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\nin the chest with a gun.\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\n\fNo. 17-2969 5\n\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\nproof. A.R. 766.\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\n\f6 No. 17-2969\n\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\n\fNo. 17-2969 7\n\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\n2015)).\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\n\f8 No. 17-2969\n\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\n\fNo. 17-2969 9\n\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\n\f10 No. 17-2969\n\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\n The IJ summed up as follows:\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\n under CAT.\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\nA.R. 2–5.\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\n\fNo. 17-2969 11\n\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\n II.\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\n\n2\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\n\f12 No. 17-2969\n\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\n\fNo. 17-2969 13\n\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\nprotection under the CAT.\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\nto prevail on his claims.\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\n\f14 No. 17-2969\n\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\nevidence he presented.\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\n\fNo. 17-2969 15\n\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\ncorroborative aspects.\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\n\f16 No. 17-2969\n\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\n2016, which was in the record.\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\n\n\n3\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\n\fNo. 17-2969 17\n\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\n\f18 No. 17-2969\n\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\nsignificant oversight.\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\n\fNo. 17-2969 19\n\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\ninterpreter:\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\n correct?\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\npoint by the government’s counsel:\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\n\f20 No. 17-2969\n\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\n he already has a family. He already has children.\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\n children?\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\n\fNo. 17-2969 21\n\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\n\f22 No. 17-2969\n\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\naltogether on this basis.\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\nevidentiary support).\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\n\fNo. 17-2969 23\n\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\n\f24 No. 17-2969\n\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\nCir. 2006).\n III.\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\nArrazabal’s behalf.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 17-2969\\n\\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\\nARRAZABAL,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States,*\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A045-091-341\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n We substitute William P. Barr, the current Attorney General of the United\\nStates, as the Respondent in this action. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).\\n\\f2 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This matter is before this court for a\\nsecond time on Francisco Arrazabal’s pending requests for\\nwithholding of removal and protection under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture (“CAT”). Arrazabal contends that he faces the\\nlikelihood of continued persecution and torture in his native El\\nSalvador as someone who has renounced his membership in\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, more commonly known\\nas MS-13. Two years ago, we remanded the matter to the Board\\nof Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”) for further\\nproceedings after concluding that both the Immigration Judge\\n(“IJ”) and the Board, in rejecting Arrazabal’s claims, had\\noverlooked certain evidence that on its face corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account. Arrazabal v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.\\n2016). The case returns to us now following a second hearing\\nbefore an IJ, to whom additional evidence was presented, and\\nanother round of review before the Board, which again\\nresulted in the denial of Arrazabal’s requests for relief. Because\\nthe IJ and the Board mischaracterized certain evidence and yet\\nagain ignored the corroborative aspects of the evidence, we\\nconclude that we must remand for further proceedings for a\\nsecond time.\\n I.\\n Arrazabal was born in El Salvador and admitted to this\\ncountry as a lawful permanent resident in 1995, at the age of\\n19. His mother and sister live in the United States and are now\\nAmerican citizens. After disagreements caused his mother to\\nevict him from her Los Angeles home in 1996, he became\\nhomeless. Shortly thereafter, he was recruited into the MS-13\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 3\\n\\ngang (which he says offered him shelter and food),1 had a\\nnumber of run-ins with the law, and was eventually convicted\\non firearms and drug charges. While incarcerated, he had\\nhimself tattooed on his chest, fingers, arms, head, and back to\\nsignal his affiliation with MS-13. His criminal record resulted\\nin a revocation of his status as a lawful permanent resident of\\nthis country. His subsequent request for asylum was denied,\\nand he was ordered removed to El Salvador in 2001.\\n Arrazabal alleges that he renounced his gang membership\\nupon his return to El Salvador, repeatedly rebuffed the efforts\\nof local MS-13 gang members to involve him in gang activities,\\nand as a result suffered violence at the hands of MS-13 (which\\nopposes his efforts to leave it), a rival gang (who think he is\\nactive in MS-13), and the police (who likewise believe he is still\\nan active gang member). He represents that he was arrested\\nwithout cause on roughly 30 occasions and was jailed for\\nextended periods in 2008 and 2010 pursuant to arrests for\\nsuspected involvement with gang extortion. While interrogat-\\ning him pursuant to the latter two arrests, police officers\\nallegedly struck him with their hands and batons and burned\\nhim with cigarettes; he also avers that he was beaten by gang\\nmembers during his subsequent incarceration. In both in-\\nstances, he was eventually released from custody after his\\nmother made payments to two different lawyers—$5,000 on\\nthe first occasion, and $2,500 on the second. (Although the\\ndetails of his release are unclear, there are suggestions in the\\n\\n\\n1\\n There are some conflicting statements from Arrazabal in the record\\nsuggesting that he may have joined MS-13 when he was 14 years old and\\nstill living in El Salvador.\\n\\f4 No. 17-2969\\n\\nrecord and the briefing that the money was used to bribe the\\nauthorities.) When he was not in jail, Arrazabal used funds sent\\nby his mother every month to pay MS-13 $10 a week in order\\nto be left alone. The payments of “rent” worked for a time, but\\neventually the threats, harassment, and beatings by gang\\nmembers resumed (and according to Arrazabal’s mother, there\\ncame a time when she no longer was able to send him money\\nfor this purpose when she became ill). He was pistol-whipped\\non one occasion; rocks with threatening messages were thrown\\nthrough the windows of his mother-in-law’s home, where he\\nwas living; and on one occasion in 2012, masked intruders\\nentered the home, threatened his mother-in-law, and struck her\\nin the chest with a gun.\\n Eventually, Arrazabal fled El Salvador and returned to the\\nU.S. illegally. He was arrested in 2012 for unlawful reentry and\\nspent 27 months in federal prison. He applied again for\\nasylum, and in 2014, an asylum officer preliminarily deter-\\nmined that he had a reasonable fear of being tortured if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Because Arrazabal’s 2001 removal\\norder disqualified him from seeking asylum, he instead sought\\nwithholding of removal and CAT protection, alleging based on\\nhis past experiences that he was likely, if returned to El\\nSalvador, to face persecution as a member of a social group\\ncomprising former MS-13 gang members. An IJ conducted a\\nhearing on those claims, at which Arrazabal appeared pro\\nse and testified in his own behalf; but upon consideration of the\\nevidence Arrazabal presented, the IJ denied him relief. The IJ\\nfound, inter alia, that Arrazabal’s testimony regarding his\\nexperiences in El Salvador was not credible to the extent it was\\nuncorroborated by other evidence (A.R. 1078–79, 1080, 1081);\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 5\\n\\nthat he did not qualify as a member of a particular social group\\nbecause he had not adequately proved that he was, in fact, a\\nformer rather than a current gang member (A.R. 1080); that he\\nhad not taken sufficient outward steps (including, for example,\\nthe removal of his tattoos) to disassociate himself from the\\ngang (A.R. 1080); and that, because he had not presented\\ncredible evidence in support of his allegations of past persecu-\\ntion, he had not shown that he would face persecution or\\ntorture if returned to El Salvador (A.R. 1080, 1081–82). The BIA\\ndismissed his appeal, concluding that “[i]n the absence of\\ncredible testimony, [Arrazabal] did not establish his eligibility\\nfor withholding of removal under the Act, as the documentary\\nevidence he submitted did not independently and credibly\\nestablish his claim of persecution on account of a protected\\nground enumerated in the Act in El Salvador,” and that his\\nclaim for CAT protection likewise failed for want of sufficient\\nproof. A.R. 766.\\n This court granted review and returned the case to the\\nBoard. We declined Arrazabal’s invitation to overturn the IJ’s\\ndetermination that he was not a credible witness, reasoning\\nthat it was supported by substantial evidence. 822 F.3d at\\n964–65. Nonetheless, we identified certain problems with the\\nIJ’s decision that warranted a remand. We noted first that the\\nIJ, in stating that Arrazabal’s account of his travails in El\\nSalvador was not corroborated, had overlooked key evidence,\\nincluding an affidavit from Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law\\n(with whom he had lived in El Salvador), who corroborated\\nArrazabal’s account of being arrested and beaten by police on\\naccount of his perceived gang affiliation, and the threats on his\\nlife from MS-13. 822 F.3d at 965. Likewise, the IJ had not\\n\\f6 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmentioned a letter from Arrazabal’s uncle expressing concern\\nthat Arrazabal would be murdered by gang members if\\nreturned to El Salvador. Id. We went on to criticize the IJ’s\\nanalysis as to whether Arrazabal qualified as a member of a\\nparticular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.\\nAs the IJ himself had acknowledged, we had previously held\\nthat a tattooed former gang member could qualify as a member\\nof a particular social group. Id. at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos v.\\nHolder, 589 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2009)). The IJ had none-\\ntheless faulted Arrazabal for not having taken sufficient overt\\nmeasures to disassociate himself from MS-13 and for instead\\ninvoking his own subjective intent to distance himself from the\\ngang. But this was not an accurate recounting of Arrazabal’s\\nevidence on this point. Arrazabal had testified that he had\\nrepeatedly rebuffed the gang’s efforts to involve him in its\\ncriminal activities and had made regular extortion payments\\nto avoid harm by the gang. Id. at 966. “If we accept that\\ntestimony as true (as the immigration judge implicitly did in\\nthis portion of his analysis), there is little more that Arrazabal\\ncould have done to distance himself from the gang without\\nputting himself at even more risk of reprisal.” Id. Third, the\\ncourt expressed concern about how the IJ had handled the\\nCAT claim. The IJ had acknowledged the possibility that\\nArrazabal might be tortured by MS-13 with the acquiescence\\nof the police, yet had nonetheless denied his claim on the\\nground that he had not shown such torture was “more likely\\nthan not” to occur. “But that oft-repeated phrase must be\\nunderstood pragmatically in the immigration context, because\\nthere is no reliable data to show just how great an applicant’s\\nrisk of torture is.” Id. (collecting cases). “All that can be said\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 7\\n\\nresponsibly on the basis of actually obtainable information is\\nthat there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien will\\nbe tortured if removed from the United States.” Id. (quoting\\nRodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir.\\n2015)).\\n When the case returned to the Board, the Board, at the\\ngovernment’s request, remanded the matter to a different IJ in\\norder to conduct another hearing on Arrazabal’s claims.\\nArrazabal again represented himself. He submitted a new\\nstatement to the court in advance of the hearing but did not\\ntestify. Arrazabal’s mother, Anna, and his sister, Karen, both\\ntestified at the hearing. Because they live in the United States,\\ntheir testimony regarding events and conditions in El Salvador\\nwas, to a significant degree, based on their conversations with\\npersons still living in that country, including Arrazabal’s\\nformer (common-law) wife and mother-in-law. Based on such\\nsecond-hand information, for example, Karen generally\\ncorroborated the state of affairs with gangs and police in El\\nSalvador and represented that MS-13 had threatened\\nArrazabal. Anna, likewise relying on information supplied by\\nher son and his former wife and mother-in-law, described the\\nsituation confronting her son in El Salvador, including the 2012\\nincident in which gang members had come to his (former\\nmother-in-law’s) home looking for him; she also confirmed that\\nhe had been arrested and incarcerated twice, and was beaten\\nby gang members during his 2010 incarceration. In addition,\\nAnna testified, inter alia, that she had sent her son $70 per\\nmonth in support, from which he took $10 per week to pay\\nMS-13 in order to be left alone. Arrazabal also submitted three\\nsworn letters from family members and acquaintances in El\\n\\f8 No. 17-2969\\n\\nSalvador corroborating the threats, beatings, and arrests. He\\nalso submitted news articles and other materials about the\\ngeneral situation in El Salvador.\\n After considering the record as supplemented by this new\\nevidence, the IJ again denied Arrazabal’s claims for relief. The\\njudge in the first instance declined to revisit her predecessor’s\\nfinding that the testimony of Arrazabal himself at the first\\nhearing was not credible. A.R. 100. Accordingly, she focused\\non whether the other evidence Arrazabal presented corrobo-\\nrated his allegations that he had been persecuted on account of\\nhis status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.\\n The IJ accorded the two pieces of evidence this court said\\nwere overlooked in the first decision—the letters from his\\nformer mother-in-law and his uncle—“little evidentiary\\nweight.” A.R. 101. Although the letter from Arrazabal’s former\\nmother-in-law indicated that Arrazabal had been beaten at the\\nhands of the police, “it does not describe any specific instances\\nof harm, comment on the frequency of the beatings, or state if\\nshe witnessed any beatings.” A.R. 101. The letter also did not\\nsay anything about the two arrests that led to Arrazabal’s\\nincarceration, was “vague” as to any threats made by MS-13,\\nand said nothing about the alleged incident in 2012 when gang\\nmembers had broken into her home looking for Arrazabal and\\nstruck her with a gun. A.R. 101–02. Finally, given that\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had said they were in regular\\ncontact with his former mother-in-law, it was not clear to the\\njudge why she had not provided the court with a more current\\nand specific account. A.R. 102. As for the letter from\\nArrazabal’s uncle, that letter (like the former mother-in-law’s\\nletter) was now more than two years old, was unsworn, did\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 9\\n\\nnot disclose whether the uncle was living in the United States\\nor El Salvador, and while stating generally that the gang was\\nlooking for Arrazabal, provided neither details nor the basis\\nfor the uncle’s knowledge in this respect. A.R. 102.\\n The IJ also concluded that the additional evidence submit-\\nted in the second hearing did not sufficiently corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story. As a general matter, the testimonies of\\nArrazabal’s mother and sister had limited value to the extent\\nthey were based on second-hand information provided to them\\nby Arrazabal’s former wife and mother-in-law. A.R. 103. The\\nIJ also viewed Anna’s testimony as inconsistent with her son’s\\naccount to the extent she gave different dates than he had for\\nthe two arrests that resulted in lengthy periods of incarcera-\\ntion; and she had testified to only giving him $70 a month, not\\nthe $7,500 Arrazabal had said was used to procure his release\\nfrom jail. A.R. 104. Moreover, the IJ understood Anna to have\\ntestified that Arrazabal was in no way unique in having to pay\\nextortion or “rent” money to MS-13: “In fact, Anna said\\neveryone in El Salvador has to pay rent to avoid harm.” A.R.\\n104. Karen, for her part, had spoken to only one specific threat\\nher brother had received (when a rock was thrown through the\\nwindow of his former mother-in-law’s house), but again, she\\nlacked personal knowledge of this incident. A.R. 104.\\n Finally, as relevant here, the IJ discounted the value of the\\nthree new letters Arrazabal had submitted from persons living\\nin El Salvador. She noted that the letters “use nearly identical\\nphrases, sentence composition, and formatting to each other\\nwhich gives these letters indicia of unreliability.” A.R. 103. The\\nletters had all been translated from Spanish to English by\\nArrazabal’s sister, which the judge noted might account for\\n\\f10 No. 17-2969\\n\\nsome of the similarities. The judge also acknowledged that one\\nof the letters contained a detail regarding an assault on\\nArrazabal that was missing from the other letters. But the IJ\\nnoted that all three letters were similar to the letter from\\nArrazabal’s former mother-in-law which this court had singled\\nout in its decision, and apparently deemed them to be of little\\nweight for the same reasons. A.R. 103.\\n The IJ summed up as follows:\\n Because the letters are unreliable and vague, because\\n the applicant did not provide current corroborative\\n evidence that was reasonably obtainable, and be-\\n cause the remand testimony does not corroborate\\n the applicant’s claims, the Court finds the applicant\\n has not provided sufficient corroboration to carry\\n his burden of proof under the REAL ID Act. Further,\\n because the same incredible and insufficiently\\n corroborated testimony forms the basis of the appli-\\n cant’s request for protection under CAT, the Court\\n also denies the applicant’s request for protection\\n under CAT.\\nA.R. 105. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order\\ntracking and adopting the IJ’s rationale in all material respects.\\nA.R. 2–5.\\n Arrazabal again appealed to this court. We denied his\\nmotion for a stay of removal pending a resolution of the\\nappeal, and Arrazabal was again removed to El Salvador in\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 11\\n\\nFebruary 2018, shortly after the initial merits briefs were filed.2\\nAfter reviewing Arrazabal’s pro se brief, the Attorney General’s\\nbrief, and the appellate record, we appointed counsel to\\nrepresent Arrazabal and had the case re-briefed and argued.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his claim for withholding of removal,\\nArrazabal must establish a clear probability that his life or\\nfreedom will be threatened in El Salvador due to his member-\\nship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);\\nLozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2016). As\\nwe noted in our prior decision, a tattooed, former Salvadoran\\ngang member can qualify as a member of a particular social\\ngroup for this purpose. 822 F.3d at 965 (citing Benitez Ramos,\\n589 F.3d at 428–29). One way for an individual to establish that\\nhis membership in a given social group is likely to result in a\\nthreat to his life or freedom is to show that he has experienced\\npersecution in the past owing to that very status. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(b)(1); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.\\n2009). We have described persecution as “punishment or the\\ninfliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that\\nthis country does not recognize as legitimate.” Toptchev v.\\nI.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Begzatowski v.\\nI.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002)). Persecution entails\\nmore than simple harassment but includes such actions as\\n“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment,\\nillegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings,\\n\\n2\\n His removal, of course, does not render moot his challenge to the removal\\norder. Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Hor v.\\nGonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\f12 No. 17-2969\\n\\nor torture.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d\\n790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that\\nthreatens death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial\\nharm or suffering). Evidence that one’s status as a former gang\\nmember will more likely than not result in a threat to his life or\\nfreedom will suffice to establish the “clear probability” that\\nwithholding of removal requires. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at\\n827 (citing Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016)).\\n In order to claim protection under the CAT, Arrazabal must\\nprove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to\\ntorture as a result of his removal to El Salvador. Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) for purposes of\\nintimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, which\\ntakes place at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a\\npublic official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a); Fuller v.\\nWhitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 516 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019); Lozano-Zuniga,\\n832 F.3d at 830. Proof of “a substantial risk that a given alien\\nwill be tortured if removed from the United States” will suffice\\nto satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. Arrazabal, 822 F.3d\\nat 966 (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, supra, 808 F.3d at\\n1135–36). An alien need not establish that the torture is due to\\nhis membership in a particular social group in order to claim\\nthe protections of the CAT. See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d\\n521, 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d\\n1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006)).\\n Arrazabal has alleged that although he once was a member\\nof the MS-13 gang, he is no longer affiliated with that gang;\\nthat he has rebuffed the gang’s overtures to him in El Salvador;\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 13\\n\\nthat he has been watched, harassed, threatened, and subjected\\nto physical violence by gang members as a result; that a rival\\ngang has attacked him believing that he is still active with MS-\\n13; that the police likewise regard him as a member of MS-13\\nand have arrested, beaten, and jailed him without cause on that\\nbasis; and that the jailings have in turn exposed him to more\\nviolence at the hands of gang members (in which the authori-\\nties have acquiesced). If Arrazabal’s account is true, then he has\\npresented plausible claims for withholding of removal and\\nprotection under the CAT.\\n But of course, the first IJ to hear Arrazabal’s case found that\\nhis testimony was not credible (a finding we determined was\\nsupported by substantial evidence), and the second IJ declined\\nto disturb that assessment. The adverse credibility finding does\\nnot by itself doom Arrazabal’s claims, but it does render\\ncorroboration from other witnesses and documents essential to\\nthe success of his case. See Xiang v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 306, 309 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (citing Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2004)). Only by presenting evidence that persuasively corrobo-\\nrates the material aspects of his testimony can Arrazabal hope\\nto prevail on his claims.\\n That is why in the prior appeal we remanded this case to\\nthe Board: the IJ and the Board had both overlooked certain\\nevidence which on its face supported Arrazabal’s account as to\\nwhat has happened to him and what is likely to happen if he\\nremains in El Salvador. On remand, the IJ and the Board found\\nthe two pieces of evidence we had highlighted in our decision\\ninsufficient to meaningfully corroborate Arrazabal’s account.\\nThey were within their rights to do so: they considered the\\nevidence and articulated logical reasons to discount the\\n\\f14 No. 17-2969\\n\\ncorroborative value of the letters submitted by Arrazabal’s\\nuncle and former mother-in-law. But in recounting and\\nevaluating the additional evidence Arrazabal presented at the\\nsecond hearing, the IJ and the Board committed the very same\\nsorts of errors that led to our prior decision to remand the case.\\nAs Arrazabal points out, the IJ, seconded by the Board,\\noverlooked certain significant corroborative aspects of the\\nevidence he presented.\\n We are satisfied that Arrazabal did not waive these points,\\nas the government contends that he did. Arrazabal, of course,\\nwas pro se before both the IJ and the Board. His brief to the\\nBoard reflects many of the problems that typify pro se plead-\\nings: poor writing, lack of focus, repetition, a reliance on\\nnarrative without citation to the record, distraction with\\nirrelevant matters, and so on. The brief nonetheless does argue\\nthat the IJ made mistakes, that she overlooked evidence\\ncorroborating his account, and that her decision on the whole\\nwas not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. 64, 66, 68, 69,\\n74, 75. (A “motion to reconsider evidence” filed the same day\\nas his brief to the Board makes essentially the same points. A.R.\\n6–8.) Collectively, these assertions amount to the semblance of\\nan argument that the IJ did not fully and fairly consider the\\ncorroborative aspects of the evidence Arrazabal presented and\\nplaced the BIA on notice of the need to examine that evidence.\\nSee Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 990–91 (7th Cir. 2008).\\nOur own decision remanding the matter to the Board had\\nmade clear that it was the Board’s duty to examine carefully\\neach piece of evidence that Arrazabal had submitted to assess\\nits corroborative value; that decision itself established an\\nagenda for the Board in addition to the particular points\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 15\\n\\nArrazabal attempted to make in his (second) appeal to the\\nBoard. Indeed, the Board’s order, to the extent it recounted\\neach of the points the IJ had made in rejecting Arrazabal’s\\nclaims and endorsed the IJ’s findings, indicates that the Board\\nhad undertaken a comprehensive review of the record in\\nresponse to Arrazabal’s appeal. Under these circumstances, we\\ndo not agree that Arrazabal’s failure to point out specific\\ndiscrepancies between the evidence and the IJ’s summary and\\ncharacterization of the evidence resulted in a waiver of the\\nright to raise those discrepancies here. The Board plainly\\nunderstood that our prior decision charged it with the obliga-\\ntion to examine Arrazabal’s evidence conscientiously and to\\nconsider the extent which it did or did not corroborate his\\nfactual account. Having reviewed, recounted, and endorsed\\nthe IJ’s rationale in all material respects, any errors made by\\nthe IJ in recounting and assessing the degree of corroboration\\nthe evidence lent to Arrazabal’s allegations are fair game here.\\n Having now reviewed the record as supplemented by the\\nsecond hearing before the IJ, we find that there are several\\nrespects in which the documents and testimony presented to\\nthe IJ corroborated certain material aspects of Arrazabal’s\\nstory, and yet the IJ and the Board failed to recognize those\\ncorroborative aspects.\\n This is particularly the case with the testimony provided by\\nArrazabal’s mother, Anna. Anna was an important witness\\nbecause, by her account as well as that of her son, it was she\\nwho provided a total of $7,500 for him to get out of jail in El\\nSalvador on two occasions and who also sent him $70 each\\nmonth, which he used in part to make the $10 weekly extortion\\npayments to MS-13. Anna obviously had personal knowledge\\n\\f16 No. 17-2969\\n\\nof these payments and thus was able to corroborate\\nArrazabal’s story in these respects. In the original round of\\nproceedings before the first IJ, Anna submitted a letter dated\\nAugust 19, 2014 to the court in lieu of testifying (A.R. 768)3; in\\nthe proceedings conducted on remand before the second IJ, she\\nsubmitted a second letter dated August 22, 2016 (A.R. 541), and\\nshe also gave testimony over the course of two days, the first\\nin person and the second by video. The second IJ’s decision\\nunderstandably focused on Anna’s in-court testimony. As we\\nhave noted, the IJ discounted that testimony insofar as it\\nconcerned the conditions in El Salvador and what had hap-\\npened to her son there because it was based not on her per-\\nsonal knowledge but rather what she had been told by others,\\nincluding Arrazabal’s former mother-in-law. That is a fair\\npoint, subject to the qualifications we note below. But there\\nwere certain matters as to which Anna had personal knowl-\\nedge, including the money she had sent to (or on behalf of) her\\nson and for what purposes. And as to these matters, the IJ\\nfailed to take into account her new letter, dated August 22,\\n2016, which was in the record.\\n For example, the IJ stated that Anna’s testimony failed to\\ncorroborate her son’s averment that she had made payments\\nof $2,500 and $5,000 to lawyers in order to secure his release\\nfrom prison. A.R. 104. It is true enough that Anna did not\\ntestify about this point: she was never asked. (Arrazabal asked\\nonly two questions of his mother; the bulk of the questioning\\n\\n\\n3\\n In the first round, she also submitted another letter to the court dated\\nJune 17, 2014, but that letter simply urged that her son be released from\\ncustody pending a hearing on the merits of his case. A.R. 1210.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 17\\n\\nwas undertaken by the judge and the government’s counsel.)\\nShe did, in response to questioning by the government, state\\nthat she had submitted multiple letters to the court on her son’s\\nbehalf. A.R. 211–12. But no one questioned her about the\\ncontents of those letters. Anna’s letter dated August 22, 2016\\n(prior to the second hearing) specifically corroborated\\nArrazabal’s representations that he (or rather, his mother) was\\nforced to pay a total of $7,500 to two lawyers in order to get\\nout of jail: the letter represents that she sent payments of $5,000\\nand $2,500 to the two lawyers (whom she identifies by name),\\nand obviously this was a fact that was within her personal\\nknowledge. A.R. 541. This is an important point of corrobora-\\ntion, both as to the fact of Arrazabal’s imprisonment and how\\nhe managed to obtain his release. Recall that some of the\\nphysical abuse Arrazabal alleges he experienced at the hands\\nof gang members and Salvadoran police took place when he\\nwas arrested, interrogated, and then incarcerated on these two\\noccasions, so the fact and circumstances of his arrests and\\nincarceration were material to his claims. Not only did the IJ\\nand the government fail to ask her about the letter—as the IJ\\nacknowledged (A.R. 104 n.6)—but the letter was never\\naddressed in the IJ’s decision. It was the IJ’s apparent failure to\\nreview her letter that led her to state that Anna’s testimony did\\nnot sufficiently corroborate her son as to the payments to the\\nlawyers. A.R. 104.\\n The IJ, of course, was not compelled to credit Anna’s letter\\nor to deem its corroboration (if credited) sufficient, alone or\\ntogether with the other evidence, to carry the day on the merits\\nof Arrazabal’s claims for relief. But the IJ was required to\\nrecognize the corroborative aspects of Anna’s letter as well as\\n\\f18 No. 17-2969\\n\\nher testimony to the court and to take that corroboration into\\naccount in assessing the weight of the evidence. The judge’s\\nfailure to do so was a material omission.\\n Moreover, although Anna’s testimony did conflict in part\\nwith Arrazabal’s own account as to the dates of his incarcera-\\ntion in El Salvador, as the IJ pointed out (A.R. 104), it also\\ncorroborated his testimony in part. Arrazabal represented that\\nhe had been imprisoned in 2008 and 2010. The IJ understood\\nhis mother to have testified he was imprisoned in 2011 and\\n2012. A.R. 96, 104. In fact, Anna, who was questioned repeat-\\nedly on the dates her son was in jail, said he was incarcerated\\nin both 2010 and 2011. A.R. 204, 205, 206, 235, 236, 237, 245. Her\\ndates obviously do not correspond perfectly with Arrazabal’s\\ndates, but they do corroborate his testimony that he was jailed\\nfor a period of time in 2010. (And, again, given that she was\\nsending money to her son to help him get out of jail, she would\\nhave reason to know when he was incarcerated.) Moreover, it\\nwas during the 2010 incarceration, which Anna believed to\\nhave been the first of his two incarcerations, that Anna recalled\\nher son losing a molar and suffering an oral infection as a\\nresult of a beating by gang members. A.R. 237–38, 239. This\\ncorresponds with her son’s statement that he suffered a\\ncracked molar as a result of a jailhouse beating during his first\\nincarceration. A.R. 705. The judge did not acknowledge these\\ncorroborating consistencies in their accounts, and this was a\\nsignificant oversight.\\n Nor, finally, did Anna’s testimony equate the danger that\\nher son faced as a former gang member with the dangers\\nencountered by the general citizenry in El Salvador, as the IJ\\nbelieved. A.R. 96–97, 104. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, supra, 832\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 19\\n\\nF.3d at 828–29 (fears of generalized harms in alien’s home\\ncountry insufficient to support relief) (collecting cases). In\\nexamining Anna, both the IJ and the government’s counsel\\nattempted to elicit from her a concession that any citizen, not\\njust a former gang member, might find himself forced to pay\\n“rent” to MS-13 in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 207–08,\\n242–43. To place her answers in full context and to show why\\nwe think the IJ mischaracterized those answers, we recount the\\nrelevant portions of her testimony here. The following colloquy\\ntook place between the IJ and Anna, who testified through an\\ninterpreter:\\n JUDGE: Now, do people who are not gang members\\n have to pay extortion money for protections?\\n ANNA: Yeah. Yes. The people who have businesses,\\n they have to pay the rent to gang members.\\n JUDGE: So, your son basically had to pay the same\\n extortion money other people had to pay. Is that\\n correct?\\n ANNA: Yes. He had to pay so he wouldn’t be\\n harmed or they wouldn’t harm his children.\\nA.R. 207–08. And here is the follow-up questioning on this\\npoint by the government’s counsel:\\n COUNSEL: And you—I believe you told the\\n judge—because I wrote this down—you said your\\n son is like everyone else. He had to pay like every-\\n one else to avoid being harmed or having his kids\\n harmed. Is that what you said, ma’am?\\n\\f20 No. 17-2969\\n\\n ANNA: Yes. In fact, I did pay this amount because\\n I did not want them to harass him anymore, because\\n he already has a family. He already has children.\\n And with him dead, who’s going to take care of the\\n children?\\n COUNSEL: So, basically, your son is not unique\\n when he was in El Salvador, paying off the gangs or\\n paying off the police. Everyone else there is paying\\n rent to somebody to live safely. Correct?\\n ANNA: Well, as a matter of fact, they would pres-\\n sure more the people who own businesses. But in his\\n case, he did not want to join the gang, and that is\\n why, you know, he was paying the rent. …\\nA.R. 242–43. Looking carefully at Anna’s testimony, the most\\nthat she acknowledged was that some business owners might\\nbe forced to pay money to the gang just as her son had. A.R.\\n208, 243. When the IJ asked her if there were people other than\\n(former) gang members who had to pay rent to the gang, Anna\\nacknowledged that some business owners had to make\\nextortion payments; she did not affirm that any other citizen\\nmight have to make such payments. When the government’s\\ncounsel later suggested that Anna had told the judge that\\n“everyone else” had to pay rent to the gang and asked her if\\nthat was correct, Anna in response said “yes” and immediately\\nexplained that it was necessary for her son to pay extortion\\nmoney in order to avoid harassment. A.R. 243. When counsel\\nfollowed up to again ask if her son was like “everyone else” in\\nthat respect, she told counsel, as she had the judge, that it was\\nbusiness owners who likewise were forced to pay off the gang.\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 21\\n\\nA.R. 243. Only by focusing on her initial “yes” to counsel and\\nignoring what followed (and what she had told the judge\\nearlier) could one read into her testimony a sweeping conces-\\nsion that her son’s plight vis-à-vis the gang was no different\\nfrom that of anyone else in El Salvador. And that is not a fair\\nreading of her testimony. By reading into her testimony a\\nbroad concession that any El Salvadoran might be forced to\\npay monetary tribute to the gang, the IJ was able to downplay\\nthe unique nature of the danger that Arrazabal alleges he has\\nfaced due to his status as a former gang member. The balance\\nof Anna’s testimony is consistent with Arrazabal’s position that\\nit is his membership in a particular social group—former MS-\\n13 gang member—that accounts for the harassment, threats,\\nbeatings, and incarceration he has experienced. Anna repeat-\\nedly emphasized that Arrazabal was forced to pay weekly rent\\nto MS-13 because of his status as a former gang member. A.R.\\n207, 243. Thus, contrary to the IJ’s construction of her testi-\\nmony, Anna did corroborate that her son faces a particular risk\\nof harm. Again, this was a serious error on the IJ’s part.\\n More broadly, the IJ also discounted much of Anna’s\\ntestimony as constituting or deriving from hearsay. Because\\nshe lives in the United States, it is true that in certain respects\\nher testimony was based upon what she has been told by\\nArrazabal and his former wife and mother-in-law. On the other\\nhand, the substantial sums of money she sent Arrazabal to help\\nhim get out of jail and to pay MS-13 protection money to avoid\\nharm when he was out of jail are, as indicated above, within\\nher personal knowledge. Moreover, her testimony still corrob-\\norates Arrazabal’s account to the extent it is consistent with his\\nown version of events and that of other witnesses. Hearsay is,\\n\\f22 No. 17-2969\\n\\nafter all, admissible in immigration proceedings so long as it is\\nreliable. Vidinski v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016);\\nMalave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Duad v.\\nUnited States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Certainly her\\ntestimony may be entitled to reduced weight to the extent it\\nderives from what she has been told rather than what she has\\npersonally witnessed, but her testimony cannot be dismissed\\naltogether on this basis.\\n The IJ signaled that she was disinclined to give significant\\nweight to what corroboration there was to be found in the\\nletters, affidavits, and testimony from Arrazabal’s relatives and\\nfriends because this evidence was supplied by “interested\\nparties.” A.R. 101 (discounting the letters from Arrazabal’s\\nformer mother-in-law and uncle on this basis). It is true that\\nthey are interested, but this will also be true in many asylum\\nand CAT cases, as it is the petitioner’s friends and relatives\\nwho are most likely to know what the petitioner has experi-\\nenced. A particular witness may or may not be credible, and\\nhis or her relationship with the petitioner certainly factors into\\nthat determination, but to summarily discredit his testimony\\nsolely because he or she has a connection with the petitioner\\nwould not be appropriate. Cf. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,\\n771–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that although most affidavits\\nsubmitted in litigation typically are self-serving, their self-\\nserving character alone does not mean they can be disregarded\\nin determining whether a party’s version of the facts has any\\nevidentiary support).\\n We note, finally, that there is one additional piece of\\nevidence—specifically, a sworn letter submitted by Dinora\\nElizabeth Franco—related by marriage to Arrazabal’s former\\n\\fNo. 17-2969 23\\n\\nmother-in-law—that likewise corroborates certain aspects of\\nArrazabal’s story. Franco’s statement was one of three sworn\\nstatements that the IJ discounted because they were all\\nsimilarly worded. A.R. 103. It is true that the bulk of these\\nstatements contain a great deal of identical language, and we\\ndo not fault the IJ for taking that similarity into consideration\\nin assessing the weight to be accorded that evidence. What the\\nIJ at first acknowledged but then proceeded to ignore, how-\\never, is a passage in Franco’s statement that was unique to her\\nstatement and which described an incident in which Arrazabal\\nwas pistol-whipped by gang members and in which she treated\\nhis injuries so that he did not have to travel to a hospital for\\nthat purpose and risk further harassment by the gang while en\\nroute. A.R. 298. Again, taken at face value, this short passage\\non its face corroborates an important piece of Arrazabal’s\\nstory—being physically attacked by MS-13 gang mem-\\nbers—and Franco’s statement is, in contrast to others, both\\nspecific and based on her personal knowledge. Again, the IJ\\nand the Board are not compelled to accept Franco’s statement\\nas true or to give it any particular weight. In contrast with\\nother witnesses, Franco is not related to Arrazabal, although\\nshe evidently is a family friend. But the IJ and the BIA must at\\na minimum acknowledge the corroboration her statement\\ncontains and consider it accordingly.\\n These sorts of oversights and mistakes in the analysis of the\\nIJ and the Board convince us that a second remand is neces-\\nsary. To be clear, it is for the IJ and the Board to weigh the\\nevidence and to decide whether Arrazabal has met his burden\\nwith respect to withholding of removal and relief under the\\nCAT. For that reason, we reject Arrazabal’s suggestion that we\\n\\f24 No. 17-2969\\n\\nmay simply reverse the Board and remand with directions to\\ngrant him relief. But the IJ and the Board must in the first\\ninstance take fair notice of the corroboration found in the\\nevidence Arrazabal has submitted and take that corroboration\\ninto account in evaluating his claims. And they must not only\\ntake each piece of evidence in isolation, but they must consider\\nthe sum total of the evidence in deciding whether Arrazabal\\nhas met his burden. See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th\\nCir. 2006).\\n III.\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we GRANT\\nArrazabal’s petition for review and REMAND this matter to\\nthe BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nWe thank appointed counsel for their vigorous advocacy on\\nArrazabal’s behalf.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3085,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636715,"string":"4,636,715"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1104"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A090-289-114\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\\nAppeals affirmed.\\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\\nunlikely to change the outcome.\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\\n I. Background\\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\\n\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\\nhearing on that claim.\\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\\n“shot at.”\\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\\nwealthy given his home ownership.\\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\\n\\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\\nremuneration.\\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\\nlacking objective support.”\\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\\n\\n\\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\\nrejecting the filing.\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\\n II. Discussion\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\\n\\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\\nA. Illicit Trafficking\\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\\ncontrolled substance … .”).\\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\\n\\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\\ninvolves remuneration.\\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\\ndoes not count.”).\\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\\nexplicit in a footnote:\\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\\n\\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\nB. Convention Against Torture\\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\\nthem.”).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\\n\\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\\nC. Motion to Reopen\\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\\n\\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\\ncome.\\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\\npersonally.\\n III. Conclusion\\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4413968/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636715/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\n Petitioner,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\nAttorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A090-289-114\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\n\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\nAppeals affirmed.\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\nunlikely to change the outcome.\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\n I. Background\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\n\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\nhearing on that claim.\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\n“shot at.”\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\n\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\nwealthy given his home ownership.\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\n\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\nremuneration.\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\nlacking objective support.”\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\n\n\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\nrejecting the filing.\n\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\n II. Discussion\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\n\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\nA. Illicit Trafficking\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\n\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\ncontrolled substance … .”).\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\n\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\ninvolves remuneration.\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\n\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\ndoes not count.”).\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\nexplicit in a footnote:\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\n\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\nB. Convention Against Torture\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\n(7th Cir. 2013).\n\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\nthem.”).\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\n\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\nC. Motion to Reopen\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\n\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\n\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\n\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\ncome.\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\n\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\n\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\npersonally.\n III. Conclusion\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Orders of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A090-289-114\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Francisco Lopez Gamero, a Mexican\\ncitizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States,\\nfaces removal because of two state drug convictions. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in a con-\\ntrolled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought\\ndeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nbut the judge denied that relief because the evidence he\\npresented about the risk of torture from Mexican drug\\ncartels was largely speculative. The Board of Immigration\\nAppeals affirmed.\\n Lopez Gamero later moved to reopen the removal pro-\\nceedings based on new evidence—most notably, evidence\\nthat his brother-in-law and nephew had been kidnapped\\nand held for ransom in Lopez Gamero’s hometown. The\\nBoard denied the motion, ruling that the new evidence was\\nunlikely to change the outcome.\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both decisions. He raises\\nthree arguments: (1) his drug convictions do not qualify as\\n“illicit trafficking” under § 1101(a)(43)(B) because the crimes\\nin question do not require proof of remuneration; (2) the\\nagency’s decision to deny his application under the Conven-\\ntion Against Torture is not supported by substantial evi-\\ndence; and (3) the agency applied the wrong legal standard\\nand abused its discretion when it denied his motion to\\nreopen. We deny the petitions for review.\\n I. Background\\n Lopez Gamero entered the United States in 1973 and be-\\ncame a lawful permanent resident in 1989. Over the next\\ndecade and a half, he was convicted of three crimes in Cook\\nCounty Circuit Court: (1) a domestic-violence offense in\\n1997, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1); (2) possession of\\ncocaine with intent to deliver in 2005, id. § 570/401(c)(2); and\\n(3) possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, id.\\n§ 550/5(f), also in 2005.\\n On April 6, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security\\ninitiated removal proceedings against Lopez Gamero. An\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 3\\n\\nimmigration judge found him removable as an alien convict-\\ned of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, an aggravat-\\ned felony listed in § 1101(a)(43)(B). The judge also\\ndetermined that Lopez Gamero is ineligible for most forms\\nof relief from removal—specifically, asylum, cancellation of\\nremoval, and withholding of removal. That left only one\\npotentially viable path to relief: deferral of removal under\\nthe Convention Against Torture. The judge held a merits\\nhearing on that claim.\\n Lopez Gamero testified that he fears torture at the hands\\nof drug cartels if he is removed to Mexico. He bases this fear\\non a series of incidents that occurred in his hometown of\\nGeneral Carlos Real, Durango, Mexico. In October 2008 his\\ncousin alerted him that suspicious men “were looking for\\nhim.” He later heard warnings from acquaintances and\\nfamily members that unknown individuals had been asking\\nabout him and surveilling his house in General Carlos Real.\\nIn 2009 Lopez Gamero’s father told him that he was ap-\\nproached by suspicious men in a pick-up truck asking about\\nLopez Gamero’s whereabouts. In 2011 Lopez Gamero’s wife\\nand daughter received an anonymous phone call, and the\\ncaller knew they were planning to travel to Mexico. In\\nSeptember 2012 Lopez Gamero’s housekeeper at the home in\\nMexico told him that “several people … dressed up like\\nmilitary” came to the house and forced their way in. Finally,\\nin October 2013 Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter were\\nstaying at a friend’s house in Mexico when the house was\\n“shot at.”\\n Lopez Gamero offered several reasons why cartel mem-\\nbers might be looking for him. He thought they might be\\ninterested in him because of his connections to the United\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nStates and his controlled-substance convictions. He also said\\nhe might be a target because cartel members viewed him as\\nwealthy given his home ownership.\\n Lopez Gamero’s wife and daughter testified about their\\nexperiences with the unknown caller and the shooting.\\nLopez Gamero also submitted certified statements from\\nother residents of General Carlos Real generally asserting\\nthat his safety was at risk if he returned.\\n Dr. Nathan Jones, an expert witness on Mexican drug-\\ncartel violence, testified about how the cartels operate, the\\npervasive cartel violence in General Carlos Real, and the\\nrisks that Lopez Gamero would face in other parts of the\\ncountry. He testified that Lopez Gamero would face a high\\nrisk of harm if he returned to General Carlos Real, a moder-\\nate risk if he lived elsewhere but maintained contact with\\nrelatives, and a low but still significant risk if he lived else-\\nwhere and severed communication with his family.\\n The immigration judge was not persuaded. He found\\nLopez Gamero credible but gave his testimony “little\\nweight” because he had difficulty remembering dates and\\nmuch of his information was secondhand or speculative. He\\nreached the same conclusion for Lopez Gamero’s wife and\\ndaughter. The judge also declined to credit Dr. Jones’s opin-\\nion testimony, reasoning that it was “not supported by facts\\nin the record and was highly speculative.” The judge accord-\\ningly declined to order deferral of removal, explaining that\\nthe evidence was insufficient to establish that Lopez Gamero\\nfaced a substantial risk of torture if removed to Mexico.\\n Lopez Gamero appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, challenging the denial of deferral of removal and\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 5\\n\\nalso the judge’s predicate legal conclusion that his drug\\nconvictions qualify as illicit trafficking under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). On the latter issue, he argued that “illicit\\ntrafficking” offenses are limited to those that involve com-\\nmercial transactions in drugs—i.e., exchanging drugs for\\nremuneration.\\n The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The\\nBoard first held that any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act (or a corresponding state drug felony)\\nqualifies as illicit trafficking under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regard-\\nless of whether it involves remuneration. The Board also\\nconcluded that Lopez Gamero had not met his burden of\\nproof for deferral of removal, agreeing with the immigration\\njudge’s observation that his “entire case is speculative and\\nlacking objective support.”\\n Lopez Gamero moved to reconsider and reopen the pro-\\nceedings. He argued that the Board ignored material evi-\\ndence in the record, but he also submitted new evidence—\\nnamely, that his brother-in-law and nephew were kidnapped\\nand severely beaten by members of a drug cartel and freed\\nonly after family members paid a ransom. 1 The Board\\ndenied the motion, explaining that the immigration judge\\nhad considered the totality of the evidence and that Lopez\\n\\n\\n1 Lopez Gamero later supplemented his motion with an affidavit from a\\nfamily member stating that a suspicious person came to the house and\\nasked for Lopez Gamero. The agency returned the supplemental filing,\\nstating that it was not submitted by “[Lopez Gamero] or [his] attorney\\n(with a EOIR-27 on file).” Lopez Gamero was not notified of this action\\nuntil after the Board denied his motion to reopen. He labels this an\\n“administrative error” but does not challenge the agency’s reason for\\nrejecting the filing.\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nGamero had not demonstrated a “nexus” between his own\\ncircumstances and the kidnapping of his brother-in-law and\\nnephew. The new evidence, the Board concluded, was not\\nlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings.\\n II. Discussion\\n Lopez Gamero seeks review of both the removal order\\nand the order denying his motion to reopen. Where, as here,\\nthe Board issues its own opinion rather than adopting or\\nsupplementing the immigration judge’s opinion, we review\\nonly the Board’s opinion. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 335\\n(7th Cir. 2014). Our standard of review is deferential; we will\\nuphold the agency’s decision as long as it is “supported by\\nreasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the\\nrecord considered as a whole.” Weiping Chen v. Holder,\\n744 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). We decide questions of law\\nindependently, though we will defer to the Board’s interpre-\\ntation of an immigration statute if the statutory language is\\nambiguous. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.\\n2012). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on a motion to\\nreopen for abuse of discretion; relief is appropriate only if\\nthe decision “was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.” Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d\\n705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Lopez Gamero presses three arguments in these consoli-\\ndated petitions. He first argues that his state drug convic-\\ntions do not qualify as “illicit trafficking” under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because the Illinois offenses do not require\\nremuneration—i.e., a commercial transaction in drugs. He\\nalso challenges the Board’s denial of his claim for deferral of\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 7\\n\\nremoval under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, he\\nargues that the agency applied the wrong legal standard and\\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reopen.\\nA. Illicit Trafficking\\n The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an\\nalien who has been “convicted of an aggravated felony at\\nany time after admission” is removable. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act’s definition of “aggravated\\nfelony” lists many crimes. See generally id. § 1101(a)(43). At\\nissue here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as\\ndefined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug traffick-\\ning crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B). Under § 924(c) the term “drug trafficking\\ncrime” includes “any felony punishable under the Con-\\ntrolled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\n The phrase “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is\\nnot further defined, but the Board reads it to include “any\\nstate, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involv-\\ning the unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance as\\ndefined by Federal Law.” In re L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,\\n368 (BIA 2014) (quotation marks omitted). That is, the Board\\nreads the term to require a commercial transaction or an\\nexchange of drugs for remuneration. Id. at 371. In addition,\\nthe Supreme Court has said in dicta that the “commonsense\\nconception” of illicit trafficking includes “some sort of\\ncommercial dealing.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).\\n This creates an interpretive dilemma. The statutory defi-\\nnition says that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”\\nincludes any drug-trafficking crime as defined in § 924(c),\\nand the § 924(c) definition in turn sweeps in “any felony\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\npunishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” (Empha-\\nsis added.) But most felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct do not require a commercial transaction—i.e., an ex-\\nchange of drugs for remuneration. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly\\nor intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or\\npossess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a\\ncontrolled substance … .”).\\n To resolve this tension, the Board has effectively split\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) into two parts: it treats a drug conviction as\\nan aggravated felony if the offense satisfies the “commercial\\ntransaction” understanding of “illicit trafficking” or if the\\noffense qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime as defined in\\n§ 924(c)—that is, if it is a felony under the Controlled Sub-\\nstances Act (or a state analog). See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d\\n297, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2002) (detailing the Board’s adoption of\\nthis approach). As the Board has explained, “the ‘drug\\ntrafficking crime’ clause is not a subset [of the term ‘illicit\\ntrafficking’] in the usual sense[] because that phrase includes\\nsome offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus,\\nthe ‘subset’ is both broader and narrower than ‘illicit traffick-\\ning.’” In re L-G-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 374 n.6.\\n Here the Board ruled that Lopez Gamero’s Illinois con-\\nvictions for possession of controlled substances (cocaine and\\nmarijuana) with intent to deliver mirror the analog felonies\\nin the Controlled Substances Act. Compare 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n570/401(c)(2), 550/5(f). The Board accordingly held that his\\nconvictions qualify as drug-trafficking crimes under § 924(c)\\nand, by extension, are properly classified as aggravated\\nfelonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 9\\n\\n Lopez Gamero concedes that his Illinois convictions\\nmatch the analog drug felonies in the Controlled Substances\\nAct. He argues instead that his drug convictions do not\\nqualify as “illicit trafficking” offenses because they do not\\ninvolve remuneration. His argument proceeds in two steps.\\nFirst, he invokes the “commercial” aspect of the term “illicit\\ntrafficking” mentioned in passing in the Supreme Court’s\\ndicta in Lopez and appearing more formally in the Board’s\\ndecision in In re L-G-H. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53 (citing\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004)); In re L-G-H,\\n26 I. & N. Dec. at 368. Second, he contends that the phrase\\n“drug trafficking crime” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(B) is a\\nsubset of “illicit trafficking.” Putting the two parts of the\\nargument together, he maintains that a felony punishable\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act (or a corresponding\\nstate offense) qualifies as an aggravated felony only if it\\ninvolves remuneration.\\n We’re not persuaded. To begin, the Court’s dicta in Lopez\\ncannot bear the interpretive weight Lopez Gamero assigns to\\nit. As used in federal and state controlled-substances stat-\\nutes, “trafficking” is a broad term casting a wide net and\\ncovering all manner of unlawful distribution of—and pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute—controlled substances,\\nwhether for value or otherwise. Few drug-trafficking felo-\\nnies require proof of remuneration; it’s improbable that\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only these.\\n Moreover, the Lopez dicta must be read in context: the\\nCourt’s reasoning actually forecloses Lopez Gamero’s inter-\\npretation of § 1101(a)(43)(B). The conviction at issue there\\nwas a South Dakota felony for aiding and abetting another’s\\npossession of cocaine, which “state law treated as the equiv-\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nalent of possessing the drug.” 549 U.S. at 53. But “[m]ere\\npossession,” the Court observed, is not a felony under\\nfederal law. Id. The Court explained that any drug felony as\\ndefined in § 924(c)—that is, any felony punishable under the\\nControlled Substances Act—“necessarily counts” as illicit\\ntrafficking. Id. at 55. However, because the South Dakota\\nfelony possession conviction would be a misdemeanor\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act, it did not qualify. Id.\\n(“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony[,] it\\ndoes not count.”).\\n So the Court’s holding rests on the assumption that a\\nconviction for a drug-related crime punishable as a felony\\nunder the Controlled Substances Act counts as an aggravat-\\ned felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) regardless of whether the\\ncrime entails remuneration. The Court made this point\\nexplicit in a footnote:\\n Those state possession crimes that correspond\\n to felony violations of one of the three statutes\\n enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession\\n of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see\\n 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the defini-\\n tions used by Congress in 8 U.S.C.\\n § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), re-\\n gardless of whether these [crimes] constitute “illicit\\n trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug traf-\\n ficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech.\\n549 U.S. at 55 n.6 (emphasis added).\\n Alternatively, if the term “illicit trafficking” is ambigu-\\nous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.\\nSee Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 997 (applying Chevron deference\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 11\\n\\nto the Board’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-\\nality Act). The Board reads § 1101(a)(43)(B) to include both\\n(1) illicit-trafficking crimes that involve remuneration and\\n(2) drug-trafficking crimes as defined in § 924(c)—that is,\\nany felony listed in the Controlled Substances Act (or a\\ncorresponding state offense). This interpretation tracks the\\nCourt’s reasoning in Lopez. See 549 U.S. at 55 n.6. According-\\nly, the Board properly classified Lopez Gamero’s convictions\\nas aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43)(B).\\nB. Convention Against Torture\\n To qualify for deferral of removal under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture, the claimant must establish that it is more\\nlikely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Because the risk of torture is\\ndifficult to quantify, we’ve reframed the claimant’s burden as\\na requirement to establish a “substantial risk” of torture if\\nremoved. Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.\\n2018). The implementing regulations broadly define “tor-\\nture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether\\nphysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person.”\\n8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The agency must consider all evi-\\ndence relevant to the possibility of future torture. Id.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3).\\n Lopez Gamero contends that the Board’s decision is not\\nsupported by substantial evidence. That’s a hard argument\\nto win. The agency’s decision satisfies the substantial-\\nevidence standard unless the record as a whole compels the\\nconclusion that the claimant faces a substantial risk of tor-\\nture if removed. See Abdoulaye v. Holder, 721 F.3d 485, 490\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\n Lopez Gamero’s evidence amounts to a handful of suspi-\\ncious incidents over a five-year span occurring at a home he\\ndidn’t live in. He presented no corroborating evidence that\\nthese incidents occurred, and he and his witnesses could\\nonly speculate that a drug cartel was involved. His claim is\\nsimilar to the one at issue in Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800,\\n806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of “random\\nincidents of violence against [the claimant’s] family members\\n[that] happened years apart and are unrelated and not\\nconnected in any way to the [claimant].” We hold here, as we\\ndid in Gutierrez, that the Board’s decision satisfies the\\nsubstantial-evidence standard.\\n Lopez Gamero raises a handful of more specific chal-\\nlenges to the Board’s decision. The first is an assertion that\\nthe Board failed to consider material evidence. The Board\\nstated that there was “no evidence” of the identity of the\\nharassers. The Board also said that his “entire case is specu-\\nlative and lacking in objective support.” As Lopez Gamero\\nsees it, the Board must have overlooked key pieces of evi-\\ndence or else it would not have made these statements. He\\npoints to the following parts of the record: his testimony\\ndescribing the housekeeper’s account of the break-in, the\\nnature of the anonymous phone call, the evidence docu-\\nmenting cartel activity in the area, and the statements from\\nhis relatives and friends that “cartel members” were looking\\nfor him. But the Board did not overlook this evidence; it\\nsimply found it unpersuasive. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d\\n736, 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Silais’s argument that the agency\\nignored or misconstrued [her expert’s] evidence amounts to\\nnothing more than frustration with the [immigration judge’s]\\nfactual findings. Without more, we see no reason to disturb\\nthem.”).\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 13\\n\\n Lopez Gamero also argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard when it characterized his burden of\\nproof as “high and specific.” That was a rough approxima-\\ntion of his burden. See, e.g., Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d\\n822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the petitioner’s burden as\\na “high bar”). And any arguable confusion is resolved in the\\nvery next sentence of the Board’s decision. There the Board\\nstated that Lopez Gamero must show a substantial risk of\\ntorture. That’s a correct statement of the legal standard.\\n Finally, Lopez Gamero complains about the Board’s anal-\\nysis of three specific items of evidence. He contends that the\\nBoard improperly discounted his expert’s opinion. The\\nBoard declined to credit the expert’s testimony because it\\nwas “too speculative to be given much weight.” We see no\\nbasis to second-guess that conclusion. The Board also stated\\nthat Lopez Gamero’s continued home ownership in General\\nCarlos Real cut against his claim of fear. That’s one permissi-\\nble way to view the evidence. Lastly, Lopez Gamero high-\\nlights a misstep by the immigration judge, who mistakenly\\ncommented that Lopez Gamero forgot certain dates during\\nhis testimony. The Board reasonably characterized this as a\\n“minor misstatement [that] was not material to the\\n[i]mmigration [j]udge’s decision.” In short, we find no reason\\nto disturb the Board’s determination that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot satisfy his burden on his claim for deferral of removal.\\nC. Motion to Reopen\\n The Board has broad discretion over motions to reopen\\nremoval proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).\\nIt may, for example, deny a motion to reopen if: “(1) it is not\\nsupported by previously unavailable and material evidence;\\n(2) it fails to establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nfor the underlying relief sought; or (3) the Board determines\\ndiscretionary relief is not appropriate in the petitioner’s\\ncase.” Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). A\\nprima facie case requires “sufficient evidence to demon-\\nstrate … a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits so\\nas to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a\\nfull evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 742.\\n Lopez Gamero sought to reopen the proceedings based\\non new evidence that his brother-in-law and nephew were\\nkidnapped and beaten by members of a drug cartel. The\\nBoard denied the motion, explaining that Lopez Gamero did\\nnot “satisfy [his] heavy burden to show that if the proceed-\\nings were reopened or remanded, it would likely change the\\noutcome.” More specifically, the Board saw nothing in his\\nmotion to link the kidnapping to his own circumstances.\\n Lopez Gamero first argues that the Board applied the\\nwrong legal standard. He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),\\nwhich provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall\\nstate the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The\\nregulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-\\nings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that\\nevidence sought to be offered is material and was not availa-\\nble and could not have been discovered or presented at the\\nformer hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to\\nmean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new\\nevidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a\\nclear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes\\nnecessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.\\n Relatedly, Lopez Gamero challenges the Board’s reliance\\non In re Coelho, which places the burden on the claimant to\\nshow that “if the proceedings were reopened and remanded,\\n\\fNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104 15\\n\\nit would likely change the outcome.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,\\n472–73 (BIA 1992). Lopez Gamero maintains that this hold-\\ning has been abrogated by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). Not\\nso. Section 1229a(c)(7) provides only that an alien has a right\\nto file a motion to reopen if he meets the statutory require-\\nments. As we’ve discussed, both Supreme Court precedent\\nand the applicable regulations vest the Board with broad\\ndiscretion over motions to reopen. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at\\n323; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).\\n Lopez Gamero next argues that it was wrong as a legal\\nmatter for the Board to require a “nexus” between the\\nkidnapping and his own circumstances. He explains that\\n“nexus” is a term of art in immigration law. For example, in\\nwithholding-of-removal and asylum cases, an alien must\\nshow that his family members were targeted because of their\\nfamilial relationship with the alien, see In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.\\nDec. 40, 43–47 (BIA 2017), but this requirement does not\\napply in applications for relief under the Convention\\nAgainst Torture. This argument misunderstands the Board’s\\nuse of the word “nexus.” It was not a statement of the legal\\nstandard. The Board used the term to explain why the new\\nevidence did not affect its analysis: Lopez Gamero had not\\nshown that the kidnapping was related to the threats against\\nhim, so the new evidence was not likely to change the out-\\ncome.\\n Lopez Gamero argues in the alternative that his new evi-\\ndence “directly refutes the basis” for the Board’s decision to\\ndeny his claim for relief, so it was an abuse of discretion to\\ndecline to reopen the proceedings. We’re not persuaded. The\\nBoard had a reasonable explanation for denying the motion:\\nThe violence against Lopez Gamero’s extended family is not\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\\n\\nsufficiently connected to threats against Lopez Gamero\\npersonally.\\n III. Conclusion\\n In sum, the Board correctly classified Lopez Gamero’s\\ndrug convictions as aggravated felonies under\\n§ 1101(a)(43)(B), and he is therefore removable based on\\nthose convictions. The Board’s denial of his application for\\nrelief under the Convention Against Torture is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence. Finally, the Board applied the proper\\nlegal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nhis motion to reopen. We DENY the petitions for review.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3086,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636748,"string":"4,636,748"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Izabela Gawron"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2608"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414001/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636748/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Izabela Gawron\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nIZABELA GAWRON,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\n\f2 No. 18‐2608\n\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\n I\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\n\fNo. 18‐2608 3\n\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\nto be addressed.\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\n\f4 No. 18‐2608\n\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\nher pretrial supervision.\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\nthe district court stated:\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\n Northern District of Illinois.\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\nvised.\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\ncourt asked:\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\n II\n A\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\n\fNo. 18‐2608 5\n\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\nCir. 2016).\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\n\f6 No. 18‐2608\n\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\n\fNo. 18‐2608 7\n\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\n\f8 No. 18‐2608\n\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\nwas procedurally sufficient.\n B\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\n\fNo. 18‐2608 9\n\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\nview for plain error. We agree.\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\nbeen in effect.\n\f10 No. 18‐2608\n\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\n(citations omitted).\n C\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\n\fNo. 18‐2608 11\n\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Izabela Gawron\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3087,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636758,"string":"4,636,758"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Paul Schlieve"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3391"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"District Judge William M. Conley\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n July 3, 2019\\n Before\\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n No. 18-3391 v.\\n\\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n Originating Case Information:\\n\\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\\n Western District of Wisconsin\\n District Judge William M. Conley\\n\\n\\n The following are before the court:\\n\\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\\n appellant.\\n\\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\\nthe surname \\\"Schlieve\\\" in this appeal.\\n\\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414011/\", \"author_raw\": \"District Judge William M. Conley\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DIANE P WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FRANK H EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"DIANE P WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FRANK H EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636758/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Paul Schlieve\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\n\n\n\n\n ORDER\n July 3, 2019\n Before\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n No. 18-3391 v.\n\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n Originating Case Information:\n\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\n Western District of Wisconsin\n District Judge William M. Conley\n\n\n The following are before the court:\n\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\n appellant.\n\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\n\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\nthe surname \"Schlieve\" in this appeal.\n\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Paul Schlieve\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n July 3, 2019\\n Before\\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n No. 18-3391 v.\\n\\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n Originating Case Information:\\n\\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\\n Western District of Wisconsin\\n District Judge William M. Conley\\n\\n\\n The following are before the court:\\n\\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\\n appellant.\\n\\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\\nthe surname \\\"Schlieve\\\" in this appeal.\\n\\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3088,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636759,"string":"4,636,759"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Izabela Gawron"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2608"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414012/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636759/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Izabela Gawron\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nIZABELA GAWRON,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\n\f2 No. 18‐2608\n\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\n I\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\n\fNo. 18‐2608 3\n\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\nto be addressed.\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\n\f4 No. 18‐2608\n\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\nher pretrial supervision.\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\nthe district court stated:\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\n Northern District of Illinois.\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\nvised.\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\ncourt asked:\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\n II\n A\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\n\fNo. 18‐2608 5\n\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\nCir. 2016).\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\n\f6 No. 18‐2608\n\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\n\fNo. 18‐2608 7\n\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\n\f8 No. 18‐2608\n\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\nwas procedurally sufficient.\n B\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\n\fNo. 18‐2608 9\n\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\nview for plain error. We agree.\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\nbeen in effect.\n\f10 No. 18‐2608\n\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\n(citations omitted).\n C\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\n\fNo. 18‐2608 11\n\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Izabela Gawron\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2608\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nIZABELA GAWRON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 CR 188‐8 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Izabela Gawron is a citizen of Poland,\\nbut she has lived in the United States for the last 17 years. She\\nbecame mixed up in a complex scheme that landed her in fed‐\\neral court facing charges of wire fraud. Once there, she\\npleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 12 months\\nand one day in prison, and two years of supervised release.\\nHer appeal focuses on the latter part of the sentence: she\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2608\\n\\ncontends that the district court erred by imposing any term of\\nsupervised release, because she is likely to be deported after\\nher imprisonment. She also argues that the supervised‐release\\ncondition confining her to the district where she is being su‐\\npervised is flawed because the condition contains no scienter\\nrequirement. Finally, she asserts that the court’s written judg‐\\nment conflicts with its oral pronouncement of this condition.\\n While we find that Gawron’s first two arguments lack\\nmerit, her argument about scienter would have warranted re‐\\nlief if she had properly preserved it. As for the third, we agree\\nwith both parties that the written judgment must be amended\\nto conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.\\n I\\n Gawron and her husband, Kazimierz Motyka, were two\\nmembers of a credit‐card fraud scheme. They provided their\\npersonal information to another person, who then misrepre‐\\nsented their income to obtain credit cards in their names.\\nEquipped with the cards, Gawron and Motyka then made\\npurchases (including two luxury cars) without intending to\\npay the credit‐card bills. They created two new corporations\\nwith a mobile payment processing terminal and swiped other\\nparticipants’ credit cards through the terminal. When they\\ncould not repay their debts, they declared bankruptcy. Both\\nwere indicted, and Gawron eventually pleaded guilty to one\\ncount of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.\\n Using the 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines,\\nwhich was effective from November 1, 2016, to November 1,\\n2018, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga‐\\ntion report. It calculated a Guidelines range of one to three\\nyears of supervised release but added that the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 3\\n\\n“ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant\\nwho would likely be removed from the country after her re‐\\nlease from prison. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5. The PSR also\\nrecommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron\\nfrom leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised\\nwithout permission. Gawron objected to the PSR and to two\\nconditions of supervised release, but she did not single out\\neither the general imposition of supervision or the condition\\nprohibiting her from leaving the jurisdiction. In fact, after stat‐\\ning her two objections to conditions of supervision, she repre‐\\nsented that she “does not object to the remaining conditions.”\\n At the sentencing hearing, Gawron reiterated her two ob‐\\njections. Again, she did not take the position that supervised\\nrelease should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor\\ndid she contest the condition restricting her movement. When\\nasked by the court about the likelihood of deportation,\\nGawron’s counsel responded that immigration proceedings\\nhad started and that her deportation was not a matter of “if,”\\nbut “when.” When the court asked if Gawron had any addi‐\\ntional objections to the term of supervision or to the sentence,\\nGawron’s counsel stated that there were no issues that needed\\nto be addressed.\\n As we noted earlier, the court imposed a prison sentence\\nof 12 months and one day (below the lower limit recom‐\\nmended by the Guidelines), along with a two‐year term of su‐\\npervision. It explained that it chose to include supervision be‐\\ncause of Gawron’s need to reintegrate into society upon re‐\\nlease if she was not deported after her incarceration. The court\\nadded that the conditions of supervision would require\\nGawron to secure employment, regain financial stability, and\\npay restitution. It acknowledged that Gawron’s children\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nwould face significant difficulties if both parents were incar‐\\ncerated at the same time, and so the court granted Gawron’s\\nrequest to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release. In\\nthe meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of\\nher pretrial supervision.\\n When reading aloud the supervised‐release conditions,\\nthe district court stated:\\n Defendant shall remain within the jurisdiction\\n where defendant is being supervised, unless granted\\n permission to leave by the Court or the probation of‐\\n ficer. By jurisdiction I mean the federal judicial district\\n in which defendant is being supervised, such as the\\n Northern District of Illinois.\\nThe written judgment, however, omitted the critical last sen‐\\ntence, and thus does not clarify that “jurisdiction” refers to the\\nfederal judicial district in which the defendant is being super‐\\nvised.\\n After listing Gawron’s supervised‐release conditions, the\\ncourt asked:\\n Do you have any legal objection to the sentence I\\n propose or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\n sons under Section 3553(a) as to the term of imprison‐\\n ment or the condition[s] of supervised release?\\nGawron’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”\\n II\\n A\\n Gawron now argues that the district court did not ade‐\\nquately support its decision to impose a term of supervised\\nrelease. But on this record, that argument comes too late. She\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 5\\n\\nnever suggested to the district court that supervised release\\nwas categorically inappropriate for someone facing likely re‐\\nmoval; worse, she specifically declined the court’s invitation\\nto expand upon its reasoning for the supervised‐release com‐\\nponent of the judgment. This is the stuff of waiver.\\nUnited States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (find‐\\ning waiver established when “the judge asked specifically\\nabout the extent of her explanations of the sentence in general\\nand supervised release in particular” and counsel raised no\\nobjections); see also United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–\\n74 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\n Gawron had both notice of the conditions and an oppor‐\\ntunity to object. At the sentencing hearing, the district court\\nconfirmed with Gawron that she had reviewed the PSR,\\nwhich recommended imposing supervised release. Gawron’s\\nposition paper on her conditions of supervised release men‐\\ntioned that the court “ordinarily” should not impose a term\\nof supervision, but it made no argument on that point. In‐\\nstead, Gawron challenged only the imposition of specific rec‐\\nommended conditions. At sentencing, when the court asked\\ncounsel if he wished to request a more detailed explanation of\\neach of the supervised‐release conditions, counsel said he\\nwould “waive” that right. Before pronouncing the sentence,\\nthe court again asked if counsel had any objection to the pro‐\\nposed sentence or if he wanted further elaboration of the\\ncourt’s weighing of the factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Gawron’s counsel answered with a flat “no.” Those\\nactions add up to waiver. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083; Bloch,\\n825 F.3d at 873–74; Gabriel, 831 F.3d at 814.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n The only thing that complicates our analysis is the fact\\nthat, despite this record, the government never mentioned\\nwaiver in its briefs on appeal. Indeed, the government does\\nnot even contend that the issue was forfeited; it states only\\nthat we should review de novo whether the district court com‐\\nmitted procedural error at sentencing. United States v. Griffith,\\n913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, we would con‐\\nclude that the government has waived the waiver defense.\\nUnited States v. Tyson, 863 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Despite the fact that both parties believe that the govern‐\\nment’s failure to raise waiver or forfeiture means that we are\\nlooking at a procedural point that should be reviewed de novo,\\nsee United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016), we\\nare not so sure. We can notice a forfeiture even if the govern‐\\nment has let it slip, and we choose to do so in this case. A pro‐\\ncedural error may require remand unless the government can\\nestablish that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano,\\n507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300–01 (7th Cir. 2018); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 930. But when\\nthe argument has been forfeited, the rules are different. United\\nStates v. Wagner, 872 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2017). And the for‐\\nfeiture here is unmistakable: Gawron never argued that the\\ncourt should not impose any supervised release. Her single,\\nundeveloped reference in her sentencing memorandum to the\\npresumption that “ordinarily” supervised release is not im‐\\nposed when the defendant is deportable falls far short of an\\nargument that supervised release would be erroneous for her.\\nImmigration proceedings do not always proceed like clock‐\\nwork (to say the least), and so the district court’s reluctance to\\ntreat removal as a done deal was prudent.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 7\\n\\n Even if supervised release is generally permissible, there\\nis more that must be done. The district court must adequately\\njustify both the length of supervised release and the condi‐\\ntions it imposes. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (citations omitted). Gawron argues that the district\\ncourt fell short in both those respects.\\n Her argument has some heft: she is correct that the Guide‐\\nlines recommend against imposing supervised release in this\\nsituation. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5 (2016). The Sentenc‐\\ning Commission notes that if a deported defendant returns to\\nthe United States legally, supervised release is unnecessary,\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016); if a deported defendant re‐\\nturns illegally, then a new prosecution would be preferable,\\nid.; and if the defendant never returns, the case would likely\\nbe inactivated, and so supervised release would be unneces‐\\nsary in the first place. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO\\nSUPERVISED RELEASE, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION\\n64–65 (2010). We too have noted that the Sentencing Commis‐\\nsion takes the position that imposing supervised release on a\\ndeportable defendant is both “unnecessary and undesirable.”\\nUnited States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n Yet the Guidelines do not advise that supervised release is\\nnever a good idea. The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)\\n(2016) instructs courts to consider imposing supervised re‐\\nlease on a removable defendant “if the court determines that\\nit would provide an added measure of deterrence and protec‐\\ntion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016) (emphasis added).\\n Noting that supervised release is not statutorily required\\nfor her crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Gawron complains that the\\ndistrict court did not explain why it would provide an “added\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2608\\n\\nmeasure of deterrence and protection” for her. U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5 (2016). But once again, whatever deficien‐\\ncies exist in the record are the result of her own actions. The\\ndistrict court asked her if she had had an opportunity to re‐\\nview the PSR with her attorney, and it methodically reviewed\\nthe PSR section‐by‐section with both parties, stopping to in‐\\nvite objection. The PSR explicitly states that the supervised‐\\nrelease conditions are recommended in part to “afford[] ade‐\\nquate deterrence to criminal conduct” and to “protect[] the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant.” Under Peterson,\\nadopting the PSR’s reasoning satisfies the procedural require‐\\nment to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing supervised\\nrelease. 891 F.3d at 301. But that was not all the court did at\\nsentencing. It expressly noted the possibility that Gawron\\nwould not be deported immediately after her release from\\nprison. Given this possibility, the court stated that it was im‐\\nposing a two‐year term based on “all factors discussed as well\\nas the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “in\\nlight of the need for the defendants to reintegrate into society\\nonce they are released from custody.” “Where the parties pre‐\\nsent no objection after being provided an opportunity … the\\nprocedural requirement can be satisfied with a more general\\nand less detailed explanation of reasoning.” Id. at 302; see also\\nBickart, 825 F.3d at 839. We are satisfied that this explanation\\nwas procedurally sufficient.\\n B\\n Gawron next argues that the supervised‐release condition\\nforbidding her from leaving the jurisdiction without permis‐\\nsion (Discretionary Condition #14) is inconsistent with\\nU.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) because it omits a scienter component.\\nHere, too, Gawron did not raise this argument in the district\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 9\\n\\ncourt. On appeal, both parties recognize that this argument\\nwas not raised and argue that the forfeiture should lead to re‐\\nview for plain error. We agree.\\n The government correctly notes that we have said more\\nthan once that Discretionary Condition #14 does not have to\\ninclude a scienter component. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931; see\\nalso United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017).\\nWe clarified in Poulin that including a scienter component,\\nwhile recommended, is not mandatory. 809 F.3d at 931. Poulin\\nand Givens, however, are not the end of the story.\\n The decision in Poulin was based upon the 2012 edition of\\nthe Guidelines, which did not include a scienter component\\nin the travel restriction. 809 F.3d at 930; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1)\\n(2012). The decision in Givens was based upon the 2015 edition\\nof the Guidelines, which also did not include a scienter com‐\\nponent in the travel restriction. 875 F.3d at 387; U.S.S.G.\\n§ 5D1.3(c)(1) (2015). But then the Guidelines changed. The\\ndistrict court in Gawron’s case used the 2016 Guidelines,\\nwhich added the word “knowingly” to the travel restriction.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016). The pertinent statute re‐\\nquires that a supervised‐release condition be consistent with\\nthe Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(d)(3). Since 2016, the policy statement has included the\\nterm “knowingly.” The Guidelines must be interpreted using\\n“the plain meaning of the words in the text.” United States v.\\nHill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011). There is no plainer\\nway to read “knowingly” than as a scienter component. It is\\nnot clear, therefore, that the results in our earlier decisions\\nwould have been the same had the 2016 policy statements\\nbeen in effect.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2608\\n\\n We have not squarely confronted this change in the Guide‐\\nlines language in the past. We did, however, applaud the use\\nof the word “knowingly” in United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d\\n849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2018). Now that Gawron has raised the\\npoint, however, more needs to be said and done. Going for‐\\nward, the district courts and Probation Offices would be well\\nadvised to ensure that any forms they use reflect the 2016\\namendment. For the present case, we assume for the sake of\\nargument that Gawron has pointed to an error. But Gawron\\ncan prevail only if she can show that this assumed error affects\\nher substantial rights. That, we conclude, she cannot do. (We\\ntake no position on the question whether the district court\\nmight wish to modify the conditions of her release to include\\nthis scienter requirement, should her case go that far.)\\nGawron argues only that the absence of a scienter require‐\\nment will make it easier to find a violation of this condition of\\nsupervised release; that in turn, she says, will affect her “sub‐\\nstantial right to remain free.” Especially in her case, however,\\nthe possibility of being charged with a violation for unwit‐\\ntingly leaving the judicial district is speculative at best. See\\nUnited States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). It falls\\nshort of the specific showing of prejudice that the plain‐error\\nstandard demands. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735; United States v.\\nBurns, 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain‐error review re‐\\nquires a “specific showing of prejudice, not just speculation”)\\n(citations omitted).\\n C\\n Gawron’s final point is uncontroversial: she asks that the\\ncondition in the written judgment be corrected to include the\\ndefinition of “jurisdiction” as “federal judicial district,” thus\\nconforming to the court’s oral pronouncement from the\\n\\fNo. 18‐2608 11\\n\\nbench. The government agrees that the condition as stated\\norally is proper and so it must be given effect.\\n We therefore modify the judgment to conform to the\\ncourt’s oral pronouncement defining the term “jurisdiction”\\nas “judicial district,” see United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645,\\n651 (7th Cir. 2018), and AFFIRM it as modified.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3089,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4636820,"string":"4,636,820"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Paul Schlieve"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3391"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"District Judge William M. Conley\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n July 3, 2019\\n Before\\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n No. 18-3391 v.\\n\\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n Originating Case Information:\\n\\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\\n Western District of Wisconsin\\n District Judge William M. Conley\\n\\n\\n The following are before the court:\\n\\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\\n appellant.\\n\\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\\nthe surname \\\"Schlieve\\\" in this appeal.\\n\\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414073/\", \"author_raw\": \"District Judge William M. Conley\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DIANE P WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FRANK H EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"DIANE P WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FRANK H EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636820/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Paul Schlieve\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\n\n\n\n\n ORDER\n July 3, 2019\n Before\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n No. 18-3391 v.\n\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n Originating Case Information:\n\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\n Western District of Wisconsin\n District Judge William M. Conley\n\n\n The following are before the court:\n\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\n appellant.\n\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\n\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\nthe surname \"Schlieve\" in this appeal.\n\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Paul Schlieve\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nEverett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Office of the Clerk\\n Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Phone: (312) 435-5850\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 www.ca7.uscourts.gov\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n July 3, 2019\\n Before\\n DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n No. 18-3391 v.\\n\\n PAUL SCHLIEVE,\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n Originating Case Information:\\n\\n District Court No: 3:18-cr-00053-wmc-1\\n Western District of Wisconsin\\n District Judge William M. Conley\\n\\n\\n The following are before the court:\\n\\n 1. MOTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 13, 2019, by the pro se\\n appellant.\\n\\n 2. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SCHLIEVE’S MOTION FOR\\n CONFIDENTIAL NAME, filed on June 28, 2019, by counsel for the appellee.\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the appellant may use\\nthe surname \\\"Schlieve\\\" in this appeal.\\n\\n IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's order and judgment of June 6, 2019, are\\nAMENDED to reflect that the appellant's name for purposes of the appeal is Paul Schlieve. The\\nclerk of this court shall modify the docket accordingly.\\n form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3090,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637453,"string":"4,637,453"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE, LLC, Agent of Wellspring of Milwaukee, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Milwaukee Ctr. for Independence, Inc. v. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3205"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Manion, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3205\\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\\n\\f2 No. 18-3205\\n\\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\\ncourt, we affirm.\\n I.\\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\\n\\n\\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\\nexceeds $75,000.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 3\\n\\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\\n\\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\\nSecond Amended Complaint.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3205\\n\\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\\nDaily Rate”). 3\\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\\ntaining substantially similar terms.\\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\\ncash.”\\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\\n\\n\\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\\nto bill in its own name.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 5\\n\\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\\nlion.\\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\\nCollections.\\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\\nat 23.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3205\\n\\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\\nclaim for breach of contract.\\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\\n II.\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\\nWellspring facility.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 7\\n\\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\\nA. Waiver & Concession\\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\\n\\f8 No. 18-3205\\n\\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\\n\\n\\n\\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\\nMHC.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 9\\n\\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections. We disagree. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\\n\\f10 No. 18-3205\\n\\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\\nN.W.2d at 410.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 11\\n\\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\\nis enough here.\\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\\n\\f12 No. 18-3205\\n\\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\\n27.\\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\\nmoney was Py’s).\\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections.\\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 13\\n\\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\\n\\f14 No. 18-3205\\n\\n 2. Contract and Tort\\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 15\\n\\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\\ntion.”).\\n III.\\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\\nAFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414706/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637453/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE, LLC, Agent of Wellspring of Milwaukee, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3205\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\nMilwaukee, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\n\f2 No. 18-3205\n\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\ncourt, we affirm.\n I.\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\n\n\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\nexceeds $75,000.\n\fNo. 18-3205 3\n\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\n\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\nSecond Amended Complaint.\n\f4 No. 18-3205\n\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\nDaily Rate”). 3\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\ntaining substantially similar terms.\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\ncash.”\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\n\n\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\nto bill in its own name.\n\fNo. 18-3205 5\n\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\nlion.\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\nCollections.\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\n\n\n\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\nat 23.\n\f6 No. 18-3205\n\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\nclaim for breach of contract.\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\n II.\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\n\n\n\n\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\nWellspring facility.\n\fNo. 18-3205 7\n\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\nA. Waiver & Concession\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\n\n\n\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\n\f8 No. 18-3205\n\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\n\n\n\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\nMHC.\n\fNo. 18-3205 9\n\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\nCollections. We disagree. 7\n\n\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\n\f10 No. 18-3205\n\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\n\n\n\n\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\nN.W.2d at 410.\n\fNo. 18-3205 11\n\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\nis enough here.\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\n\f12 No. 18-3205\n\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\n27.\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\nmoney was Py’s).\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\nthe BIRC Collections.\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\n\fNo. 18-3205 13\n\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\n\f14 No. 18-3205\n\n 2. Contract and Tort\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\n\fNo. 18-3205 15\n\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\ntion.”).\n III.\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\nAFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE, LLC, Agent of Wellspring of Milwaukee, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3205\\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\\n\\f2 No. 18-3205\\n\\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\\ncourt, we affirm.\\n I.\\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\\n\\n\\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\\nexceeds $75,000.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 3\\n\\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\\n\\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\\nSecond Amended Complaint.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3205\\n\\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\\nDaily Rate”). 3\\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\\ntaining substantially similar terms.\\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\\ncash.”\\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\\n\\n\\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\\nto bill in its own name.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 5\\n\\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\\nlion.\\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\\nCollections.\\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\\nat 23.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3205\\n\\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\\nclaim for breach of contract.\\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\\n II.\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\\nWellspring facility.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 7\\n\\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\\nA. Waiver & Concession\\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\\n\\f8 No. 18-3205\\n\\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\\n\\n\\n\\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\\nMHC.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 9\\n\\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections. We disagree. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\\n\\f10 No. 18-3205\\n\\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\\nN.W.2d at 410.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 11\\n\\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\\nis enough here.\\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\\n\\f12 No. 18-3205\\n\\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\\n27.\\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\\nmoney was Py’s).\\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections.\\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 13\\n\\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\\n\\f14 No. 18-3205\\n\\n 2. Contract and Tort\\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 15\\n\\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\\ntion.”).\\n III.\\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\\nAFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3091,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637478,"string":"4,637,478"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Milwaukee Center for Independe v. Milwaukee Health Care"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3205"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3205\\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\\n\\f2 No. 18-3205\\n\\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\\ncourt, we affirm.\\n I.\\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\\n\\n\\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\\nexceeds $75,000.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 3\\n\\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\\n\\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\\nSecond Amended Complaint.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3205\\n\\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\\nDaily Rate”). 3\\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\\ntaining substantially similar terms.\\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\\ncash.”\\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\\n\\n\\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\\nto bill in its own name.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 5\\n\\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\\nlion.\\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\\nCollections.\\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\\nat 23.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3205\\n\\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\\nclaim for breach of contract.\\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\\n II.\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\\nWellspring facility.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 7\\n\\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\\nA. Waiver & Concession\\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\\n\\f8 No. 18-3205\\n\\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\\n\\n\\n\\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\\nMHC.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 9\\n\\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections. We disagree. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\\n\\f10 No. 18-3205\\n\\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\\nN.W.2d at 410.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 11\\n\\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\\nis enough here.\\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\\n\\f12 No. 18-3205\\n\\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\\n27.\\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\\nmoney was Py’s).\\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections.\\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 13\\n\\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\\n\\f14 No. 18-3205\\n\\n 2. Contract and Tort\\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 15\\n\\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\\ntion.”).\\n III.\\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\\nAFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4414731/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637478/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Milwaukee Center for Independe v. Milwaukee Health Care\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3205\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\nMilwaukee, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\n\f2 No. 18-3205\n\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\ncourt, we affirm.\n I.\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\n\n\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\nexceeds $75,000.\n\fNo. 18-3205 3\n\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\n\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\nSecond Amended Complaint.\n\f4 No. 18-3205\n\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\nDaily Rate”). 3\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\ntaining substantially similar terms.\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\ncash.”\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\n\n\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\nto bill in its own name.\n\fNo. 18-3205 5\n\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\nlion.\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\nCollections.\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\n\n\n\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\nat 23.\n\f6 No. 18-3205\n\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\nclaim for breach of contract.\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\n II.\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\n\n\n\n\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\nWellspring facility.\n\fNo. 18-3205 7\n\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\nA. Waiver & Concession\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\n\n\n\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\n\f8 No. 18-3205\n\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\n\n\n\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\nMHC.\n\fNo. 18-3205 9\n\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\nCollections. We disagree. 7\n\n\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\n\f10 No. 18-3205\n\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\n\n\n\n\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\nN.W.2d at 410.\n\fNo. 18-3205 11\n\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\nis enough here.\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\n\f12 No. 18-3205\n\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\n27.\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\nmoney was Py’s).\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\nthe BIRC Collections.\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\n\fNo. 18-3205 13\n\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\n\f14 No. 18-3205\n\n 2. Contract and Tort\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\n\fNo. 18-3205 15\n\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\ntion.”).\n III.\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\nAFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Milwaukee Center for Independe v. Milwaukee Health Care\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3205\\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE,\\nLLC, agent of Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 15-CV-1479 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC\\n(MHC) and Milwaukee Center for Independence, Inc. (MCFI)\\nentered into an agreement in 2014. Per that agreement, MCFI,\\na non-profit organization dedicated to providing medical care\\n\\f2 No. 18-3205\\n\\nfor individuals with brain injuries, would operate a brain-in-\\njury center in MHC’s nursing facility. MHC would handle all\\nbilling and collections for the services MCFI provided and,\\nthrough a process outlined in the agreement, remit the funds\\ncollected to MCFI (after taking a cut for itself).\\n But MHC failed to follow through on its obligations under\\nthe contract, redirecting MCFI’s funds to pay its employees\\nand other creditors instead. MCFI sued MHC for breaching\\nthe contract and brought claims against MHC’s principal,\\nWilliam Nicholson. The district court, exercising diversity ju-\\nrisdiction, 1 entered summary judgment against MHC for\\nbreach of contract and against Nicholson for conversion and\\ncivil theft. The district court awarded MCFI over $2 million\\nin damages, interest, and costs against MHC and Nicholson,\\njointly and severally. It also awarded MCFI over $200,000 in\\nattorney’s fees and costs against Nicholson alone.\\n MHC and Nicholson appeal the judgments against Ni-\\ncholson. Because we agree with the conclusions of the district\\ncourt, we affirm.\\n I.\\n William Nicholson was the CEO of “the Congress Compa-\\nnies,” a collection of businesses involved in the construction\\nof medical facilities. In 2013, Nicholson and another investor,\\n\\n\\n 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MCFI is a Wisconsin corporation with its prin-\\ncipal place of business in Wisconsin. MHC is a Delaware LLC whose\\nmembers, William Koski and William Nicholson, are both citizens of\\nNew Jersey. See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion is the citizenship of its members.”). The amount in controversy well\\nexceeds $75,000.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 3\\n\\nWilliam Koski, 2 formed MHC to operate the Wellspring of\\nMilwaukee nursing home, with Nicholson serving as the\\nmanaging member. The Wellspring facility was in a building\\nowned by Milwaukee Healthcare Properties I, LLC (Milwau-\\nkee Properties), another of Nicholson’s companies. The prop-\\nerty was subject to a mortgage from Oppenheimer Multifam-\\nily Housing and Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Oppenheimer).\\nThe United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-\\nopment (HUD) insured the mortgage.\\n In 2014, MCFI and MHC entered into an agreement\\nwhereby MCFI would operate an 18-bed brain-injury clinic\\nwithin the Wellspring facility, the Nexday Brain Injury Rehab\\nCenter (BIRC). The agreement outlined a specific process for\\nMCFI to obtain compensation for services performed at the\\nBIRC. MHC would bill and collect from third parties (e.g.,\\nMedicaid and private insurance companies) for MCFI’s ser-\\nvices in MHC’s own name and on MHC’s own behalf. MHC\\nwould then place any funds collected for MCFI’s services\\n(BIRC Collections) into a general account, which was subject\\nto a control agreement with Branch Banking & Trust Com-\\npany. The agreement then required MHC to maintain a spe-\\ncial checking account with a Milwaukee-area bank (the BIRC\\nDepository Account) and transfer all BIRC Collections into\\nthat account. On the third business day of every month, MCFI\\nwould submit an invoice to MHC. On the 20th of each month,\\nMHC would remit to MCFI either the amount of the invoice\\nor the amount in the BIRC Depository Account, whichever\\n\\n 2 Koski was originally a party to this suit along with Nicholson, but\\nafter the district court dismissed the claims against them in MCFI’s First\\nAmended Complaint, MCFI did not name Koski as a defendant in its\\nSecond Amended Complaint.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3205\\n\\nwas less, after taking a cut for itself (the “Wellspring Interim\\nDaily Rate”). 3\\n In addition to these terms, the agreement called for MHC\\nto approach Oppenheimer and HUD about approval for\\nMCFI to acquire a security interest in the receivables of which\\nthe BIRC Collections would be proceeds. The agreement\\nnotes any such interest would be subordinate to any security\\ninterest held by Oppenheimer, HUD, or an accounts-receiva-\\nble lender. The parties do not indicate what Oppenheimer\\nand HUD thought about MCFI acquiring a security interest in\\nthose receivables, but it is clear MCFI never got one.\\n In 2015, the parties entered into a renewal agreement con-\\ntaining substantially similar terms.\\n While the parties operated under these agreements, MHC\\nsuffered significant cash-flow problems. MHC’s financial\\nwoes prompted Nicholson to invest his personal funds multi-\\nple times, totaling over $4 million. In an effort to manage\\nthese problems, Nicholson directed the CFO of the Congress\\nCompanies, Ed Tabor, to get involved to “help manage the\\ncash.”\\n Under Tabor’s direction, MHC began redirecting BIRC\\nCollections to make its payroll and pay other creditors, pri-\\nmarily Milwaukee Properties. In 2015, MHC entered into a\\nline-of-credit arrangement with SCM Specialty Finance Op-\\nportunities Fund, L.P. (SCM), an accounts-receivable lender.\\nUnder that agreement, MHC placed all the money it collected\\n\\n\\n 3 This round-about way for MCFI to receive its compensation was\\napparently a consequence of Wisconsin law, which did not allow MCFI\\nto bill in its own name.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 5\\n\\n(including BIRC Collections) into one of two lock-box ac-\\ncounts (one for government payors, the other for private\\npayors). Every day, SCM would sweep out all the funds in\\nthose accounts and apply them toward MHC’s outstanding\\ndebt to SCM. MHC would then request a new draw on the\\nline of credit to obtain operating capital.\\n MCFI received its last full payment from MHC in March\\n2015. By the end of that year, MHC owed MCFI over $1 mil-\\nlion.\\n MCFI sued MHC in December 2015 and ceased operating\\nthe BIRC in February 2016. In its operative complaint, MCFI\\nclaimed MHC breached the contract and sought to hold Ni-\\ncholson liable under theories of veil-piercing (to hold him per-\\nsonally liable for MHC’s breach), conversion, and civil theft.\\nMCFI maintained Tabor was Nicholson’s agent, so Nicholson\\nwas personally responsible for Tabor’s redirection of the BIRC\\nCollections.\\n MHC acknowledged it breached the contract, but Nichol-\\nson contested his personal liability. The parties filed cross-\\nmotions for summary judgment. In his briefs to the district\\ncourt, Nicholson argued (1) MCFI could not pierce the LLC’s\\nveil, (2) MCFI’s claims for conversion and civil theft\\namounted to an impermissible claim for tortious breach of\\ncontract, and (3) MCFI was just another vendor with no par-\\nticular interest in the BIRC Collections. However, concerning\\nhis relationship with Tabor, Nicholson “concede[d] that Ni-\\ncholson was principal, and Tabor was Nicholson’s agent.” 4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Defendants’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 73,\\nat 23.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3205\\n\\nYet, he maintained nothing either he or Tabor did amounted\\nto a conversion of the BIRC Collections.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for MCFI on\\nits claims for breach of contract, conversion, and civil theft.\\nAfter noting Nicholson’s concession of his agency relation-\\nship with Tabor, the district court observed Nicholson’s only\\ndefense against MCFI’s tort claims was his argument MCFI\\nhad no interest in the BIRC Collections. The district court con-\\ncluded MCFI had such an interest, and therefore held Nichol-\\nson liable for conversion and civil theft. The district court also\\nheld MCFI’s tort claims were not improperly conflated with a\\nclaim for breach of contract.\\n The parties submitted additional briefing on damages. In\\nhis damages brief, Nicholson tried to walk back his earlier\\nconcession concerning his relationship with Tabor, arguing\\nhe meant to say he was Tabor’s principal inasmuch as he was\\nTabor’s superior within MHC, not that Tabor was his personal\\nagent. The district court rejected that argument outright and\\nheld Nicholson to his concession. The court awarded MCFI\\n$1,903,452.47, plus interest and costs, against Nicholson and\\nMHC jointly and severally. It also awarded $198,669.50 in at-\\ntorney’s fees, plus costs, against Nicholson alone. 5\\n II.\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nSpierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). “When\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The district court also awarded MCFI $33,362.66, plus interest,\\nagainst MHC for unreimbursed improvements MCFI had made to the\\nWellspring facility.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 7\\n\\nreviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘we con-\\nstrue all inferences in favor of the party against whom the mo-\\ntion under consideration is made,’” that is, the party appeal-\\ning the judgment. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Am. Int’l\\nSpecialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (quot-\\ning Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir.\\n2018)). “Summary judgment is appropriate … if, on the evi-\\ndence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in\\nfavor of” that party. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Because this is a diversity case, “we apply state sub-\\nstantive law.” Med. Protective Co., 911 F.3d at 445. Specifically,\\nwe apply Wisconsin law because this case comes to us from\\nthe Eastern District of Wisconsin and neither party disputes\\nthat Wisconsin law applies. See id.\\nA. Waiver & Concession\\n Before getting to the merits of this case, we note Nicholson\\nmakes a number of arguments in his briefs to this court that,\\nas MCFI points out, were not raised to the district court.\\nThose arguments are waived, and we will not address them.\\nSee Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that\\nyou waive that argument on appeal.”).\\n In addition, Nicholson spends a significant portion of his\\nbrief arguing about his relationship with Tabor. Nicholson\\ntells us Tabor and he were co-agents, going so far as to argue\\nhe was not Tabor’s principal at all. 6 But all of that is moot\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 “In a relationship of coagency, neither agent is the other’s agent.\\nThus, neither is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by the other.\\nEach coagent owes duties to the common principal.” Restatement (Third)\\n\\f8 No. 18-3205\\n\\ngiven Nicholson’s express concession in his briefing to the\\ndistrict court “that Nicholson was principal, and Tabor was\\nNicholson’s agent.” Nicholson is bound to his admission,\\nhowever much he regrets it now. Cf. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St.\\nLouis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udicial\\nefficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert\\nwhat it has already unequivocally told a court by the most\\nformal and considered means possible.”). The manner of Ni-\\ncholson’s concession bolsters that conclusion. Nicholson did\\nnot just concede his relationship with Tabor in some throw-\\naway line buried in the brief. He expressly stated, at the end\\nof the section of his brief discussing conversion, that though\\nhe was Tabor’s principal and Tabor was his agent, it did not\\nmatter because MCFI had no interest in the BIRC Collections.\\nNowhere in the three briefs Nicholson filed with the district\\ncourt before the damages phase does Nicholson argue he is\\nnot personally liable because he had an insufficient relation-\\nship with Tabor. Thus, Nicholson cannot argue this is just “a\\nnew twist” on an earlier argument. Cf. United States v. Billups,\\n536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding the appellant’s\\nreliance on different authority on appeal was not a new argu-\\nment). This is a blatant attempt to contradict what he already\\nadmitted, and we will not allow it.\\nB. Nicholson’s Remaining Arguments\\n Setting aside the arguments Nicholson conceded or did\\nnot develop before the district court, we are left with two: (1)\\nMCFI cannot pursue its claims for conversion and civil theft\\n\\n\\n\\nof Agency § 1.04 cmt a. Nicholson argues the “common principal” was\\nMHC.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 9\\n\\nbecause it did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC Col-\\nlections, and (2) MCFI’s tort claims are simply repackaged\\nclaims for breach of contract. We take each in turn.\\n 1. MCFI’s Ownership Interest\\n Under Wisconsin law, both conversion and civil theft re-\\nquire the victim to have an ownership interest in the property\\nconverted or stolen. WIS. STAT. § 895.446(1) (creating a civil\\ncause of action for victims of theft); WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b)\\n(defining theft to include the intentional use, transfer, con-\\ncealment, or retention of possession of money “without the\\nowner’s consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with in-\\ntent to convert … to the use of any other person except the\\nowner”); H.A. Friend & Co. v. Prof’l Stationery, Inc., 720 N.W.2d\\n96, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (listing “intentional control or tak-\\ning of property belonging to another” as the first element of\\nconversion). Nicholson argues MCFI did not have such an\\ninterest in the BIRC Collections; it merely had a right to pay-\\nment. See generally Kentuckiana Healthcare, Inc. v. Fourth St. So-\\nlutions, LLC, 517 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If you simply\\nowe someone money and fail to pay it, you have broken a\\ncontract but you have not taken your creditor’s property.”).\\nHe notes MHC billed and collected in its own name and on\\nits own behalf, the BIRC Collections were held in MHC’s bank\\naccounts, and MCFI acknowledged other entities could claim\\nsecurity interests in the BIRC Collections. All of this, he says,\\nshows MCFI did not have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections. We disagree. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 In a related argument, Nicholson contends the BIRC Collections\\ncannot be subject to a claim for conversion because they were commin-\\ngled with other funds in MHC’s accounts. In his briefing to the district\\n\\f10 No. 18-3205\\n\\n Our analysis on this point begins, and just about ends,\\nwith Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 647 N.W.2d\\n409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Evelyn Martin was a\\nresident at a Methodist Manor nursing home. Id. at 410. 8 Her\\nson, Frederick Martin, was a joint holder on her bank account\\nand would receive “on his mother’s behalf her monthly in-\\ncome from Social Security and other unknown sources.” Id.\\nat 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin law and\\nEvelyn’s contract with Methodist Manor required Evelyn to\\npay all but $40 of her monthly Social Security income to Meth-\\nodist Manor on the 15th of each month. Id. at 411 & n.1; see\\nalso WIS. STAT. § 49.45(7)(a) (1999–2000). Nevertheless, Fred-\\nerick did not forward his mother’s Social Security income to\\nMethodist Manor, instead using the funds “for himself or oth-\\ners.” Martin, 647 N.W.2d at 411.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncourt, Nicholson’s only argument about commingling in relation to the\\ntort claims was one sentence in a paragraph asserting MHC was not\\nMCFI’s “fiduciary or trustee” for the purposes of MCFI’s civil-theft\\nclaim. Whether that was sufficient to avoid waiver of the argument he\\nmakes here is immaterial because the argument fails in any event. Just\\nbecause money was “mingled” with other money does not defeat a claim\\nfor conversion. See Regas v. Helios, 186 N.W. 165, 166 (Wis. 1922) (allow-\\ning a claim for conversion where the defendant “proceeded to treat the\\nmoney as his own by mingling it with his own funds”); Cotton v. Sharp-\\nstein, 14 Wis. 226, 234 (1861) (“[W]hen [the defendant] so mingles\\n[money] without authority and then refuses to pay, I am unable to see\\nwhy such refusal should not be just as much evidence of a conversion as\\nthough the money were still in a separate parcel.”).\\n 8 Martin was an appeal from a motion to dismiss, so the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals treated the facts alleged in the complaint as true. 647\\nN.W.2d at 410.\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 11\\n\\n Methodist Manor sued Frederick for conversion. Id. The\\ntrial court dismissed the complaint, but the Wisconsin Court\\nof Appeals reversed. The court concluded Methodist Manor,\\npursuant to the law and its contract with Evelyn, was “the one\\nrightfully entitled” to the Social Security income. Id. at 412\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Frederick was\\n“under a duty to remit [the Social Security income] to Meth-\\nodist Manor,” and his failure to do so amounted to a conver-\\nsion of Methodist Manor’s property. Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n Drawing out the similarities between the case before us\\nand Martin defeats most of Nicholson’s arguments. Nichol-\\nson says MCFI cannot have an ownership interest in the BIRC\\nCollections because MHC acquired them in its own name and\\non its own behalf. But that was just as true of Evelyn Martin\\nreceiving her Social Security income in her own name and on\\nher own behalf. Nicholson says MHC owned the BIRC De-\\npository Account where the BIRC Collections were stored be-\\nfore being remitted to MCFI, but the Social Security income in\\nMartin presumably was also held in the Martins’ bank ac-\\ncount until it was turned over to Methodist Manor. At bot-\\ntom, the cases are materially indistinguishable. Both in Mar-\\ntin and here, one party received funds from an outside source\\nand was required to remit those funds to the other party. If\\nthat was enough to create an ownership interest in Martin, it\\nis enough here.\\n Despite the evident similarities between this case and Mar-\\ntin, Nicholson fights the analogy, pointing instead to Method-\\nist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py, 746 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). Ruth Ann Py was another resident at a Methodist\\nManor nursing home. Id. at 826. According to the terms of\\n\\f12 No. 18-3205\\n\\nher contract, Py was to pay Methodist Manor $2,450 each\\nmonth. Id. Py’s granddaughter, Nadine Ray, had control of\\nPy’s checkbook and handled her accounts. Id. at 827. At Py’s\\nrequest, Ray would deliver large amounts of cash to her\\ngrandmother ranging from $500 to $5,000. Id. Meanwhile, Py\\nallegedly became deficient in her payments to Methodist\\nManor, accruing an outstanding balance of $32,700. Id. at 826–\\n27.\\n The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Methodist Manor\\ndid not have a claim for conversion against Ray. The court\\nconsidered Martin “inapposite” because “there [was] no evi-\\ndence … that Ray received funds that were to be applied to\\nthe cost of Py’s care.” Id. at 828. Unlike the situation in Mar-\\ntin, there was no evidence Methodist Manor was entitled to\\nany specific money in Py’s accounts; it merely had a right to\\npayment. See id. at 830 (citing approvingly the trial court’s\\nconclusion “Ruth Ann Py owed money to Methodist Manor\\nfor what Methodist Manor provided [her] with” but the\\nmoney was Py’s).\\n The facts of this case are much closer to Martin than they\\nare to Py. Here, MCFI had more than a generic right to pay-\\nment; the agreements entitled MCFI to specific funds MHC\\ncollected for services at the BIRC. Indeed, the parties point to\\nno provision in the agreements under which MCFI could re-\\nceive any funds MHC collected unrelated to the BIRC. Under\\nthe reasoning of Martin, MCFI had an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections.\\n We address one other argument Nicholson makes relating\\nto MCFI’s ownership interest: MCFI could not have a prop-\\nerty interest in the BIRC Collections because it acknowledged\\nthe receivables from the BIRC, of which the BIRC Collections\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 13\\n\\nwould be proceeds, could be subject to security interests held\\nby MHC’s creditors, including MCFI itself. See generally WIS.\\nSTAT. § 409.203(6) (“The attachment of a security interest in\\ncollateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-\\nvided by s. 409.315 … .”); WIS. STAT. § 409.315(1)(b) (“A secu-\\nrity interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collat-\\neral.”). Nicholson points to Wisconsin law that an enforceable\\nsecurity interest requires the party granting the interest to\\nhave “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in\\nthe collateral.” WIS. STAT. § 409.203(2)(b). He argues if the\\nBIRC Collections were MCFI’s property, MHC would not\\nhave been able to grant security interests in the receivables.\\n We are unconvinced. Just because MCFI gave the impres-\\nsion MHC could grant security interests in the receivables\\ndoes not mean MCFI did not have an ownership interest in\\nthe BIRC Collections. If the true owner of property gives the\\nimpression that another is the owner, the true owner cannot\\nlater contest a security interest the other granted in the prop-\\nerty. See Kloety v. Delles, 45 Wis. 484, 488–89 (Wis. 1878); 68\\nAm. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 203. However, nothing in\\nthat rule serves to negate the true owner’s rights in the prop-\\nerty—he is just “estopped from showing that a security inter-\\nest is not valid.” 68 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. Therefore, at most\\nMCFI’s acknowledgement of the security interests of MHC’s\\ncreditors only estops MCFI from contesting the interests of\\nthose creditors. It does not prevent MCFI from asserting its\\nownership of the property against MHC. See Kloety, 45 Wis.\\nat 489 (“Under these circumstances, we think the plaintiff is\\nestopped to deny as against [the secured party] that his wife is\\nthe owner of the property.” (emphasis added)).\\n\\f14 No. 18-3205\\n\\n 2. Contract and Tort\\n This leaves only Nicholson’s argument that he is not sub-\\nject to the tort claims because they conflate tort and contract.\\nIn that regard, “Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to\\nmaintain the distinction between contract and tort claims.”\\nButler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760, 773\\n(Wis. 2006) (Roggensack, J., concurring). But maintaining that\\ndistinction does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim\\nevery time there is a contract between the victim and the tort-\\nfeasor. See Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226, 228 (1861). Wis-\\nconsin courts only require “a duty existing independently of\\nthe performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to\\nexist.” Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147,\\n151 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329\\nN.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983)); accord Cotton, 14 Wis. at 229\\n(“[A] party, by entering into a contract with the owner in re-\\nspect to property, does not thereby incapacitate himself from\\nwrongfully invading the rights of the owner which exist inde-\\npendent of the contract.”). To proceed on a tort claim when\\nthere is a contract, “a contract may create the state of things which\\nfurnishes the occasion of a tort”; it just cannot create “the un-\\nderlying duty for the tort.” Landwehr, 329 N.W.2d at 414\\n(quoting Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Wis. 1951)).\\n As the district court concluded, the contract between the\\nparties here “created the state of things” which allowed the\\ntort to occur; it did not create the duty Nicholson breached.\\nBy the terms of the parties’ agreement, MCFI obtained an\\nownership interest in the BIRC Collections. The duty to re-\\nfrain from converting or stealing the BIRC Collections was en-\\ntirely independent of the contract. It arose from the common\\nlaw and Wisconsin statutes, not the contract between MCFI\\n\\fNo. 18-3205 15\\n\\nand MHC. See Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 299, 301–\\n02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]ort obligations are in general ob-\\nligations [that are] imposed by law … to avoid injury to oth-\\ners.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON\\nON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984))). Accordingly, the\\npresence of a contract between MCFI and MHC does not bar\\nholding Nicholson liable for the torts. Cf. H.A. Friend & Co.,\\n720 N.W.2d at 102 (“Van Der Puy had a duty, regardless of\\nthe existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that\\nbelonged to Friend without Friend’s consent or authoriza-\\ntion.”).\\n III.\\n MCFI had an ownership interest in the BIRC Collections\\nand was entitled to proceed on its tort claims against Nichol-\\nson, who was personally involved in the wrongful redirection\\nof those funds through the actions of his agent, Tabor. The\\ndistrict court’s grant of summary judgment to MCFI is\\nAFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3092,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637755,"string":"4,637,755"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Devontay SAWYER, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Devontay Sawyer"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2923"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415008/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637755/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Devontay SAWYER, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\n\f2 No. 18-2156\n\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\nfirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\nthe officers on the porch.\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\nsaid no.\n\fNo. 17-3221 3\n\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\nto suppress.\n II. Discussion\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\nitself.\n\f4 No. 18-2156\n\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\n\fNo. 17-3221 5\n\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\n\f6 No. 18-2156\n\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\ndisturbed).\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Devontay SAWYER, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3093,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637782,"string":"4,637,782"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Devontay Sawyer"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2923"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415035/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637782/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\n\f2 No. 18-2156\n\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\nfirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\nthe officers on the porch.\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\nsaid no.\n\fNo. 17-3221 3\n\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\nto suppress.\n II. Discussion\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\nitself.\n\f4 No. 18-2156\n\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\n\fNo. 17-3221 5\n\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\n\f6 No. 18-2156\n\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\ndisturbed).\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3094,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637783,"string":"4,637,783"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claudius L. FINCHER, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Claudius Fincher"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2520"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Manion, Sykes, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2520\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\\n I. Background\\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\\nundercover police officers.\\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 3\\n\\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\\n\\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\\nvalve eligibility.\\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\\nonment. He appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 5\\n\\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\\nconnection with his offense.\\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\\nCir. 2014).\\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 7\\n\\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2520\\n\\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 9\\n\\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\\nance of the evidence burden.\\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\\neration.\\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\\nlevel firearm enhancement.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\\nthe district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415036/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637783/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claudius L. FINCHER, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2520\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\n\f2 No. 18‐2520\n\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\n I. Background\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\nundercover police officers.\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\n\fNo. 18‐2520 3\n\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\n\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\n\f4 No. 18‐2520\n\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\nvalve eligibility.\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\nonment. He appeals.\n II. Discussion\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\n\fNo. 18‐2520 5\n\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\nconnection with his offense.\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\n\f6 No. 18‐2520\n\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\nCir. 2014).\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\n\fNo. 18‐2520 7\n\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\n\f8 No. 18‐2520\n\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\n\fNo. 18‐2520 9\n\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\nance of the evidence burden.\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\n\f10 No. 18‐2520\n\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\neration.\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\nlevel firearm enhancement.\n III. Conclusion\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\nthe district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claudius L. FINCHER, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2520\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\\n I. Background\\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\\nundercover police officers.\\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 3\\n\\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\\n\\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\\nvalve eligibility.\\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\\nonment. He appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 5\\n\\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\\nconnection with his offense.\\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\\nCir. 2014).\\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 7\\n\\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2520\\n\\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 9\\n\\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\\nance of the evidence burden.\\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\\neration.\\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\\nlevel firearm enhancement.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\\nthe district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3095,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637867,"string":"4,637,867"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Devontay Sawyer"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2923"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415120/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637867/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\n\f2 No. 18-2156\n\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\nfirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\nthe officers on the porch.\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\nsaid no.\n\fNo. 17-3221 3\n\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\nto suppress.\n II. Discussion\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\nitself.\n\f4 No. 18-2156\n\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\n\fNo. 17-3221 5\n\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\n\f6 No. 18-2156\n\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\ndisturbed).\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2156\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2156\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 17-3221 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2156\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3096,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4637868,"string":"4,637,868"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Claudius Fincher"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2520"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2520\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\\n I. Background\\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\\nundercover police officers.\\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 3\\n\\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\\n\\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\\nvalve eligibility.\\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\\nonment. He appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 5\\n\\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\\nconnection with his offense.\\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\\nCir. 2014).\\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 7\\n\\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2520\\n\\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 9\\n\\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\\nance of the evidence burden.\\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\\neration.\\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\\nlevel firearm enhancement.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\\nthe district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415121/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637868/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Claudius Fincher\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2520\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\n\f2 No. 18‐2520\n\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\n I. Background\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\nundercover police officers.\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\n\fNo. 18‐2520 3\n\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\n\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\n\f4 No. 18‐2520\n\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\nvalve eligibility.\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\nonment. He appeals.\n II. Discussion\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\n\fNo. 18‐2520 5\n\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\nconnection with his offense.\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\n\f6 No. 18‐2520\n\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\nCir. 2014).\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\n\fNo. 18‐2520 7\n\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\n\f8 No. 18‐2520\n\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\n\fNo. 18‐2520 9\n\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\nance of the evidence burden.\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\n\f10 No. 18‐2520\n\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\neration.\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\nlevel firearm enhancement.\n III. Conclusion\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\nthe district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Claudius Fincher\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2520\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCLAUDIUS L. FINCHER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17‐cr‐00096 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Claudius Fincher possessed a fire‐\\narm; that much is certain. The questions raised in this appeal\\nare whether the district court clearly erred by finding\\nFincher’s possession of the firearm was “in connection with”\\nhis drug offense, and whether resolving that factual question\\nat sentencing without a jury determination violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. Due to finding Fincher possessed the gun in\\nconnection with his drug offense, the court held Fincher was\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nineligible for safety‐valve relief and sentenced him to the\\nmandatory minimum sentence of five years. For the reasons\\nstated below, we affirm the district court’s sentence.\\n I. Background\\n Fincher was raised in Chicago. After attending a few years\\nof college, he moved to the Madison, Wisconsin, area to spend\\ntime with his grandmother. Although he initially intended to\\nspend only a few weeks there, he ended up staying for about\\na year before his arrest in this case. For much of this time he\\nlived in his girlfriend’s mother’s home, but at the time of his\\narrest, he was residing in a small one‐bedroom apartment\\nwith his uncle, Darnell Brunt, a drug dealer.\\n At some point after moving to Wisconsin, Fincher became\\ninvolved in a drug‐selling operation with Brunt. Law enforce‐\\nment spotted them departing from and returning to an apart‐\\nment complex in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, before and after drug\\nsales. Fincher was seen on the balcony of an apartment unit\\nthere. Law enforcement learned the legal renter of the apart‐\\nment was a woman who resided in Chicago. In September\\n2017, Fincher and Brunt were arrested after selling heroin to\\nundercover police officers.\\n On the day Fincher and Brunt were arrested, the police\\nsearched the apartment. The apartment was sparsely fur‐\\nnished, but it was apparent from the clothing and toiletries\\nfound there that at least two men were living there regularly.\\nThe officers found more than 100 grams of heroin in a bed‐\\nroom closet. They also found a large amount of cash and three\\nunfired .40 caliber bullets in the closet. A loaded .40 caliber\\nhandgun was found in a kitchen drawer. Prior to his arrest in\\nthis case, Fincher’s criminal record was clean.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 3\\n\\n Fincher was indicted on October 4, 2017, with one count of\\nconspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent\\nto distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of\\ndistribution of and intent to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy\\ncharge on February 20, 2018.\\n Fincher’s offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence\\nof five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), however, provides the potential\\nfor relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for certain of‐\\nfenses, including Fincher’s offense. Under this provision, a\\ncourt is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if\\nit finds the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant has a\\nminimal criminal history; (2) the defendant did not use or\\nthreaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the\\noffense; (3) the offense did not result in death or injury to any\\nperson; (4) the defendant was not an organizer or leader in the\\noffense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all infor‐\\nmation and evidence related to the offense to the government\\nbefore the sentencing hearing. Id.\\n During the early stages of this case, it appeared Fincher\\nmight qualify for safety‐valve relief because he had no crimi‐\\nnal history. In fact, during Fincher’s plea colloquy, the district\\njudge discussed with him the “possibility that what we call\\nthe safety valve may apply to you.”1 Throughout the discus‐\\nsion, however, the judge emphasized that Fincher would have\\nto meet the statutory criteria to qualify for safety‐valve relief.\\n The initial presentence report did not recommend the fire‐\\narm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). After a\\n\\n 1 Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nforensic report revealed Fincher’s DNA on the firearm recov‐\\nered from the apartment, however, the government asserted\\nFincher was subject to the firearm enhancement. At that time,\\nthe government also informed defense counsel of its belief\\nthat Fincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief because he\\npossessed a firearm in connection with the offense.\\n Fincher requested a presentence determination of his eli‐\\ngibility for safety‐valve relief and objected to the application\\nof the sentencing enhancement. The district court issued a\\npresentence opinion and order finding Fincher possessed the\\nfirearm in connection with his offense, and therefore was in‐\\neligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level en‐\\nhancement. In doing so, the court rejected Fincher’s argument\\nthat under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Al‐\\nleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the district court was\\nprecluded from making factual findings regarding his safety‐\\nvalve eligibility.\\n At sentencing, the district court concluded Fincher’s\\nGuidelines range was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Due to\\nthe large quantity of heroin involved, however, a five‐year\\nmandatory minimum sentence applied. 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i). Fincher was sentenced to five years’ impris‐\\nonment. He appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n Fincher raises two challenges to the district court’s sen‐\\ntence. One is constitutional, asserting the district court’s find‐\\ning precluding safety‐valve eligibility violated the Sixth\\nAmendment. The other is factual, asserting the district court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 5\\n\\nclearly erred in finding Fincher’s possession of the gun was in\\nconnection with his offense.\\n A. Alleyne and Safety‐Valve Eligibility Factors\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the handgun was in connection with his offense as\\na violation of the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi and Al‐\\nleyne. We review such challenges de novo. United States v.\\nWolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the Sixth\\nAmendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend‐\\nment, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defend‐\\nant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element\\nof the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt.’” 530 U.S. at 476–77; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.\\nThe Court concluded that any fact (other than a prior convic‐\\ntion) that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre‐\\nscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and\\nproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.\\n In Alleyne, the Court reasoned any fact other than a prior\\nconviction that alters the prescribed sentencing range in a\\nway that aggravates the penalty is an element of the crime to\\nwhich Apprendi applies. Such a fact “necessarily forms a con‐\\nstituent part of a new offense.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. The\\nCourt held facts that increase the mandatory minimum aggra‐\\nvate the crime’s penalty. Id. at 103. “[T]he core crime and the\\nfact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together\\nconstitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which\\nmust be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.\\n Fincher seeks to extend the reasoning of Alleyne to pre‐\\nclude judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility factors. As\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nFincher’s argument goes, the safety‐valve provision controls\\nthe application of the mandatory minimum: if the defendant\\nis found to be ineligible for safety‐valve relief, he is subject to\\na mandatory minimum from which he would otherwise be\\nfree. In Fincher’s case, the application of a five‐year manda‐\\ntory minimum hinged on the finding that he possessed the\\ngun in connection with his offense. Thus, he argues that find‐\\ning increased his mandatory minimum sentence.\\n This court has not yet considered the question of whether\\nAlleyne bars judicial factfinding of safety‐valve eligibility.\\nEach of the other circuits that have considered the question,\\nhowever, has concluded it does not. Four circuits have issued\\npublished opinions to this effect. United States v. Leanos, 827\\nF.3d 1167, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. King, 773\\nF.3d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lizarraga‐Carrizales,\\n757 F.3d 995, 997–99 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,\\n734 F.3d 88, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2013). Three others have issued un‐\\npublished opinions or orders to the same effect. United States\\nv. Caballero, 672 Fed. App’x 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Juarez‐Sanchez, 558 Fed. App’x 840, 843 (10th Cir.\\n2014); United States v. Silva, 566 Fed. App’x 804, 807–08 (11th\\nCir. 2014).\\n Underlying these decisions is the recognition that a man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is not increased by the defendant’s\\nineligibility for safety‐valve relief. Rather, it is already trig‐\\ngered by the offense; the safety‐valve provision merely pro‐\\nvides lenity. Since “Alleyne, by its terms, applies to facts that\\n‘increase[] the mandatory minimum,’” it does not apply to ju‐\\ndicial factfinding that precludes safety‐valve relief because\\nsuch factfinding “does not increase [the] baseline minimum\\nsentence.” See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 97–99. “A fact that\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 7\\n\\nprecludes safety‐valve relief does not trigger or increase the\\nmandatory minimum, but instead prohibits imposition of a\\nsentence below a mandatory minimum already imposed as a\\nresult of the guilty plea or jury verdict.” Id. at 98.\\n We find this reasoning sound. In Fincher’s case, the man‐\\ndatory minimum sentence is triggered by the statutes defin‐\\ning his offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B), 846. The safety‐valve pro‐\\nvision potentially allows for relief from that mandatory mini‐\\nmum, but it does not increase or trigger it.\\n Fincher argues this reasoning is improperly formalistic.\\nHe contends it draws a distinction based only on the differ‐\\nence between stating something in positive versus negative\\nlanguage. He informs us “a condition that causes something\\nto not not happen, makes it happen.” We disagree. The dis‐\\ntinction is more than merely positive versus negative phras‐\\ning. It goes to the heart of Alleyne’s purpose, which is to de‐\\ntermine what constitutes an “element” of a crime. Alleyne, 570\\nU.S. at 114 (“[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is\\nwhether a fact is an element of the crime.”). Under Alleyne, a\\nfact that combines with the base offense to create a new, ag‐\\ngravated offense is an element of the crime. Id. at 113. Safety‐\\nvalve eligibility factors do not combine with the base offense\\nto create a new, aggravated crime. Instead, the base offense\\ntriggers the mandatory minimum on its own. Safety‐valve el‐\\nigibility mitigates the offense’s penalty; it does not aggravate\\nit. See King, 773 F.3d at 55.\\n Therefore, we hold that judicial factfinding precluding\\nsafety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2520\\n\\ndistrict court did not err under Alleyne by finding Fincher pos‐\\nsessed the gun in connection with his offense.\\n B. Possession in Connection with the Offense\\n Fincher challenges the district court’s finding that his pos‐\\nsession of the firearm was connected to his offense of conspir‐\\nacy to distribute heroin. Based on this finding, the court held\\nFincher was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a\\ntwo‐level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We\\nreview the district court’s factual findings underlying safety‐\\nvalve eligibility and the sentencing enhancement for clear er‐\\nror. United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(standard of review for safety‐valve eligibility findings);\\nUnited States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (stand‐\\nard of review for Guidelines enhancement findings).\\n Because whether Fincher possessed the gun in connection\\nwith the crime is central to both his safety‐valve eligibility and\\nthe application of the Guidelines enhancement, Fincher’s ar‐\\nguments against both are the same. The burden of proof, how‐\\never, is different for each. For safety‐valve eligibility, Fincher\\nhad to prove to the district court by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that he did not possess the gun in connection with\\nhis offense. United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Concerning the firearm enhancement, once the govern‐\\nment proved through DNA evidence that Fincher possessed\\nthe gun, the burden shifted to Fincher to show it was “clearly\\nimprobable” his possession was in connection with his of‐\\nfense. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nFincher cannot meet the “clearly improbable” standard if he\\nfails to meet the lower preponderance of the evidence stand‐\\nard. Cf. United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017)\\n(discussing the interplay between these burdens of proof). We\\n\\fNo. 18‐2520 9\\n\\ntherefore focus our discussion on whether the district court\\nclearly erred by finding Fincher had not met the preponder‐\\nance of the evidence burden.\\n Fincher argues there was a lack of “specific” evidence of\\nconnection to the crime. By this, he means there was no evi‐\\ndence drugs were sold in the apartment where the gun was\\nlocated, no evidence he possessed or mentioned the gun while\\nselling drugs, and no evidence his DNA was transferred to\\nthe gun during the conspiracy period rather than at some\\npoint before. He argues that, in the absence of specific evi‐\\ndence connecting a gun to the crime, a district court should\\nnot be able to make such a finding. Otherwise, he asserts, de‐\\nfendants who lawfully possess a weapon must undertake the\\nvirtually impossible task of proving a negative to show it was\\nnot possessed in connection with the crime.\\n But the danger of which Fincher warns—a district court’s\\npresumption of a connection based merely on evidence of\\npossession—is not present here. The evidence the district\\ncourt relied on is not as scant as Fincher makes it out to be.\\n The court recited several facts beyond Fincher’s mere pos‐\\nsession to support the conclusion the gun was possessed in\\nconnection with the offense. The court noted the handgun\\nwas not a hunting gun, so the type of firearm did not suggest\\nit had a purpose unrelated to the offense. Some ammunition\\nwas stored in the closet where the drugs were stored, and the\\ngun was kept loaded and in a readily accessible place. The\\nsmall size of the apartment and consequent proximity be‐\\ntween the loaded gun and the drug stash also supported the\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2520\\n\\nconclusion that the gun’s purpose was to protect the drug op‐\\neration.\\n Perhaps most relevant was the court’s finding that the\\napartment where the handgun was located appeared to be\\nspecifically used as a base of operations for the drug conspir‐\\nacy. Neither Fincher nor Brunt was the legal renter of the\\nproperty. The evidence suggested Fincher had only resided\\nthere temporarily during the conspiracy and for the purpose\\nof furthering the conspiracy. Furthermore, Fincher presented\\nno evidence the gun was used for any purpose other than pro‐\\ntecting the drug operation. Given the deference owed to the\\ndistrict court’s findings, we see no justification for overturn‐\\ning the court’s finding that the gun was possessed in connec‐\\ntion with the drug conspiracy.\\n We hold the district court did not err in finding Fincher\\nfailed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his posses‐\\nsion of the handgun was not in connection with his offense.\\nThus, the district court properly denied safety‐valve relief.\\nFurthermore, since Fincher consequently could not show it\\nwas “clearly improbable” that he possessed the gun in con‐\\nnection with his offense, the court properly applied the two‐\\nlevel firearm enhancement.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence of\\nthe district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3097,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4638183,"string":"4,638,183"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Devontay Sawyer"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2923"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2923\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 18-2923 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2923\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 18-2923 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2923\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415436/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638183/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\n\f2 No. 18-2923\n\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\nfirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\nthe officers on the porch.\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\nsaid no.\n\fNo. 18-2923 3\n\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\nto suppress.\n II. Discussion\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\nitself.\n\f4 No. 18-2923\n\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\n\fNo. 18-2923 5\n\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\n\f6 No. 18-2923\n\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\ndisturbed).\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Devontay Sawyer\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2923\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDEVONTAY SAWYER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a condi-\\ntional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the\\ndenial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests\\nthe search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that\\nhe had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the\\nbackpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2923\\n\\nconcluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate ex-\\npectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the\\nunattended backpack. We agree with the district court and af-\\nfirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a\\nreport of a residential burglary in progress. After they ap-\\nproached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry,\\nsomeone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he\\nand his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a\\nrental property with no current tenants and that no one\\nshould be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front\\nwindows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a fig-\\nure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding\\nthat any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on\\nthe front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside.\\nUltimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with\\nthe officers on the porch.\\n M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my\\nhouse.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they\\nopened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The\\nsearching officers used the radio to inform the officers out-\\nside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The\\nofficers who had searched the backpack brought it outside.\\nOfficer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened\\nthe backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warn-\\nings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone.\\nSawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood\\nlater asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he\\nsaid no.\\n\\fNo. 18-2923 3\\n\\n After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the con-\\ntents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued\\nthat the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it.\\nThe government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to\\ncontest the search because he failed to provide evidence that\\nhe had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack,\\nand that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legit-\\nimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recog-\\nnize. The government also argued that the officers obtained\\nconsent from the owner to search the home. The district court\\ndenied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer\\nlacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was un-\\nlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable ex-\\npectation of privacy there. The court further determined that\\nthe officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of\\ntheir ongoing investigation of a burglary.\\n Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly\\npossessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He ex-\\npressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion\\nto suppress.\\n II. Discussion\\n This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress\\nde novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th\\nCir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legiti-\\nmate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was\\nundisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that\\nit was his. He also contends that the district court character-\\nized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expec-\\ntation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack\\nitself.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2923\\n\\n Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy\\nrequires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights\\nwere personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34\\n(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determina-\\ntion is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the\\nmerits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–\\n39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive\\nFourth Amendment question of whether the person challeng-\\ning the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the\\npremises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amend-\\nment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d\\n750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a\\nlegitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1)\\nwhether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual,\\nsubjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expecta-\\ntion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as\\nreasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the\\nburden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy in the backpack. See id. at 758.\\n Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s ar-\\ngument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded,\\nnonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable\\nexpectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he\\nunlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment re-\\nquires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,”\\nsee United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in\\nthis case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in\\na home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not rea-\\nsonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas,\\n439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers re-\\nsponded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from\\nM.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer\\n\\fNo. 18-2923 5\\n\\nand three others then emerged from the home. M.G. re-\\nquested a search of the home during which the officers dis-\\ncovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert\\nthat his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful\\nor offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus,\\nlike “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during\\nthe off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of pri-\\nvacy to contest the search within the home because any ex-\\npectation he had was not one that society is prepared to rec-\\nognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States\\nv. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n This determination aligns with the decisions of other cir-\\ncuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful pres-\\nence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United\\nStates v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who\\noverstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally suf-\\nficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amend-\\nment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747\\n(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the\\nFourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297,\\n303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection\\nwith otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of\\nprivacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown\\na legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack\\nwas found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that\\nhe left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d\\n792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d\\n192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying\\napartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest\\nsearch of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v.\\nJackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who\\n\\f6 No. 18-2923\\n\\nplaced bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legiti-\\nmate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain un-\\ndisturbed).\\n Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not vi-\\nolate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the\\nsearch of his home, which included the backpack. An other-\\nwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party\\nwith common control over the searched premises consents, or\\nwhen someone with apparent authority to consent does so.\\nUnited States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A\\ngeneral consent to search the premises can include consent to\\nsearch containers within it if those containers would reasona-\\nbly hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500\\nU.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he co-\\nowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current\\ntenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal prop-\\nerty—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the\\nhouse, he commanded that any occupants come outside and\\nasked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did\\nnot limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable,\\nthen, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent\\nto search the house included consent to search a container,\\nsuch as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to\\nthe break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.\\n Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy\\nin the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3098,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4638182,"string":"4,638,182"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In RE: CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC., Debtor. Horace Fox, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Chicago Management Consulting Group, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julia Hathaway, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Fox v. Hathaway (In Re Chi. Mgmt. Consulting Grp., Inc.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2354"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Ripple, Sykes, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2354\\nIN RE:\\n CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,\\n Debtor.\\nHORACE FOX, as Chapter 7 Trustee for\\nthe Estate of Chicago Management\\nConsulting Group, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJULIA HATHAWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 8917 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Frank Novak tragically took his own\\nlife in February 2012. He left his company, Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 17-2354\\n\\nManagement Consulting Group, Inc., to his close friend\\nDebra Comess. She was not in a position to manage the\\nstruggling firm, so she initiated bankruptcy proceedings\\nalmost immediately after Novak’s death.\\n The Chapter 7 Trustee discovered numerous transfers\\nfrom Chicago Management Consulting Group’s coffers to\\nComess and Julia Hathaway—another Novak companion\\nwho ran a small yoga studio. Believing the transfers to be\\nfraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee sought\\nto reclaim their value for the Estate. After a bench trial, the\\nbankruptcy judge ruled that the transfers to Comess and\\nHathaway were voidable on grounds of actual and\\nconstructive fraud and imposed sanctions on Hathaway for\\ndiscovery lapses. The district court affirmed.\\n Comess settled her case; this appeal concerns the trans-\\nfers to Hathaway. She launches several arguments. First, she\\ncontends that the bankruptcy judge committed clear error by\\nignoring one of the Trustee’s trial exhibits when evaluating\\nthe company’s financial health. Second, she challenges the\\nbankruptcy judge’s finding that the company did not receive\\nreasonably equivalent value in return for its transfers. Third,\\nshe argues that the company did not have “creditors” under\\nthe Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“IUFTA” or\\n“the Act”) at the time of the transfers. Finally, Hathaway\\nvigorously disputes the sanctions ruling.\\n We affirm. As a preliminary matter, Hathaway failed to\\ncomply with multiple rules of appellate procedure. On the\\nmerits, our review of a bankruptcy court’s factual findings is\\nconstrained; we reverse only for clear error. Not one of\\nHathaway’s arguments meets this high bar. The bankruptcy\\njudge was amply justified when he concluded that the\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 3\\n\\ncompany was insolvent, the transfers to Hathaway were\\ngratuitous, and the company had creditors under the Act.\\nAnd we see no reason to disturb the imposition of discovery\\nsanctions.\\n I. Background\\n Novak was the sole shareholder of Chicago Management\\nConsulting Group, an information-technology consulting\\nfirm he started in 1997. His primary client was BP America.\\nBy 2008 the company’s solvency was questionable. In\\nFebruary 2012 Novak committed suicide, leaving his com-\\npany to his good friend Debra Comess. She was not\\nequipped to run the firm, so she initiated bankruptcy pro-\\nceedings, filing a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the North-\\nern District of Illinois on May 2, 2012.\\n For four years prior to the bankruptcy filing, Comess and\\nJulia Hathaway, another close friend of Novak’s, had re-\\nceived significant payments from the company, though they\\nwere not employees. Hathaway alone received $45,400.81\\nbetween 2008 and 2012. Hathaway runs a small yoga studio,\\nand her email correspondence with Novak during this\\nperiod suggests that the payments were personal, not pro-\\nfessional. The emails document Hathaway’s repeated re-\\nquests for gifts and payments and Novak’s expressions of\\naffection for her and willing acquiescence in her requests.\\n Trustee Horace Fox brought an avoidance action target-\\ning the transfers to Comess and Hathaway. He later moved\\nfor sanctions against Hathaway alleging dilatory behavior\\nduring discovery.\\n The bankruptcy judge determined that the women had\\nindeed received money from Chicago Management Consult-\\n\\f4 No. 17-2354\\n\\ning Group and that Novak typically failed to record the\\ntransactions. The judge also found that the company was\\ninsolvent at the time of the transfers, relying on an account-\\ning expert’s report introduced by the Trustee. The judge\\nrejected Hathaway’s argument that a list of gross receivables\\nproffered by the Trustee refuted the expert’s conclusion.\\n Moving on, the judge ruled that the company did not re-\\nceive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for its trans-\\nfers to Hathaway. He based this finding on evidence of\\nNovak’s close personal relationship with her, his habit of\\npaying for her personal expenses on demand, the lack of\\nevidence that Hathaway performed any work for the com-\\npany, the irregularity and vagueness of her apparently\\nhastily prepared invoices, and the inconsistency of those\\ninvoices with the company’s bank records.\\n The judge concluded that the transfers were voidable as\\nactually and constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548\\nand the IUFTA. The latter applied via § 544(b)(1) of the Code\\nbecause the Trustee had established that the consulting firm\\nhad “at least one [unsecured] creditor” at the time of the\\nconveyances—the Internal Revenue Service—and that an\\nunpaid credit-card company counted as another.\\n The judge took a cautious approach to the Trustee’s mo-\\ntion for discovery sanctions. He declined to impose sanc-\\ntions for Hathaway’s failure to respond to interrogatories\\nand produce tax returns. And although Hathaway was slow\\nto turn over certain emails despite multiple discovery or-\\nders, the judge was satisfied that she had generally complied\\nand that much of the delay was caused by her email service\\nprovider. Finally, the judge considered a set of emails that\\nHathaway unquestionably possessed but failed to produce.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 5\\n\\nHe found that those emails were improperly omitted but\\nthat they contained no relevant information. In the end, the\\njudge determined that sanctions were appropriate only to\\nthe extent that Hathaway’s delay and failure to comply with\\ncourt orders caused the Trustee to expend additional time\\nand resources litigating the recurring discovery disputes. He\\nordered “payment of the [T]rustee’s attorney fees and\\nexpenses reasonably incurred in pursuing the discovery\\nmatters.” The judge later entered judgment against\\nHathaway for the fraudulent conveyances in the amount of\\n$45,400.81 and imposed $11,187.25 in discovery sanctions.\\n Hathaway appealed to the district court under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(a)(1). The district judge affirmed across the board. He\\ndiscerned no clear error in the bankruptcy judge’s finding\\nthat Chicago Management Consulting Group was insolvent.\\nHe was unimpressed by Hathaway’s attempts to contradict\\nthe finding that the company had not received value for its\\ntransfers. Nor did he see fit to question the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s identification of unsecured creditors for § 544(b)\\npurposes. On the issue of discovery sanctions, he deferred to\\nthe bankruptcy judge’s broad discretion and found no\\nreason to set aside the award.\\n II. Discussion\\n Hathaway’s appeal repeats the arguments she raised in\\ndistrict court. We note at the outset that she did not ap-\\nproach this appeal with the seriousness our rules demand.\\nShe failed to provide an adequate record to facilitate our\\nreview. Because she claims that several of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s factual findings were unsupported by the evidence, it\\nwas her responsibility to “include in the record a transcript\\nof all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” FED.\\n\\f6 No. 17-2354\\n\\nR. APP. P. 10(b)(2); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8009(b)(5).\\nRelevant evidence “generally … include[s] a complete\\ntranscript of the trial along with the exhibits properly admit-\\nted into evidence.” LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540, 544 (7th\\nCir. 1995).\\n The most glaring omission is the expert report upon\\nwhich the bankruptcy court based its insolvency ruling. That\\nreport, compiled by Trustee’s expert Lois West, was not\\ndelivered to us until after oral argument.1 Frustratingly,\\nHathaway has been on notice of this deficiency since the\\ndistrict judge noted the absence of the West report from the\\nrecord. Comess v. Fox (In re Chi. Mgmt. Consulting Grp., Inc.),\\n569 B.R. 722, 728 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2017). So we’re left to interpret\\na portion of the West report’s raw data reproduced in\\nHathaway’s appellate brief. Finally, Hathaway’s appendix is\\nincomplete under our circuit rules. It includes only the\\ndistrict judge’s opinion, not the bankruptcy judge’s opinion.\\nSee 7TH CIR. R. 30(b)(2).\\n These serious errors could justify dismissal. See Tapley v.\\nChambers, 840 F.3d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that\\nwe may dismiss an appeal when the appellant has “ample\\nopportunity to correct” a deficiency in the record and fails to\\ndo so); see also Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (“[We] decline[] to entertain [an] appeal[] when the\\nappellant does not file a required appendix.”). We neverthe-\\nless choose to reach the merits, where Hathaway fares no\\nbetter.\\n\\n\\n\\n1Following oral argument, Hathaway moved to supplement the record\\nwith a copy of the West report. We denied that motion.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 7\\n\\nA. Insolvency Analysis\\n We apply “de novo review for the bankruptcy court’s con-\\nclusions of law and clear error review for its findings of\\nfact.” First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 776 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Demonstrating clear error is no mean feat. “When\\nthere are two permissible views of the evidence, the …\\nchoice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Dexia\\nCrédit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 628 (7th Cir. 2010). We\\nwill not reverse the court’s factual findings without a “defi-\\nnite and firm conviction” that it erred. Unsecured Creditors\\nComm. of Sparrer Sausage Co. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 826 F.3d\\n388, 393 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n The Trustee’s fraudulent-transfer claims rest on 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 548 and the IUFTA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 (2010). Each\\nstatute has actual- and constructive-fraud provisions. Actual\\nfraud under § 548 can be proven by circumstantial evidence,\\nincluding the size of the transfer in relation to the debtor’s\\nassets. Frierdich v. Mottaz (In re Frierdich), 294 F.3d 864, 869–\\n70 (7th Cir. 2002). The IUFTA considers insolvency to be a\\n“badge” of actual fraud. § 160/5(b)(9). Under the construc-\\ntive-fraud component of § 548, a trustee can avoid any\\ntransfer for which the debtor “received less than a reasona-\\nbly equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obliga-\\ntion[] and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was\\nmade or such obligation was incurred.” § 548(a)(1)(B); accord\\n§ 160/5. Thus, whether Chicago Management Consulting\\nGroup was insolvent when Novak transferred funds to\\nHathaway was a crucial issue for the bankruptcy court.\\n Under federal and state fraudulent-transfer law, a debtor\\nis insolvent if it has “a balance sheet on which liabilities\\nexceed assets.” See Baldi v. Samuel Son & Co., Ltd., 548 F.3d\\n\\f8 No. 17-2354\\n\\n579, 581 (7th Cir. 2008); Grochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler),\\n320 B.R. 362, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 101(32)(A) (defining “insolvent”); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n160/3(a) (same). If a willing buyer would not purchase the\\ndebtor’s combined assets and liabilities, the debtor is insol-\\nvent. Covey v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657,\\n660 (7th Cir. 1992). A trustee doesn’t need to show insolven-\\ncy on the precise day of the transfer. If he can demonstrate\\nthat the debtor was insolvent at points before and after the\\ntransfer, it’s up to the transferee to rebut the presumption of\\ninsolvency in between. Baldi, 548 F.3d at 581.\\n Relying on the West report, the bankruptcy judge found\\nthat the company was insolvent during the relevant period.\\nLois West, a trained accountant, analyzed records kept by\\nNovak using QuickBooks accounting software. According to\\nthe judge, the data clearly showed that the company’s\\nliabilities exceeded its assets when the transfers were made.\\nAs we’ve noted, Hathaway included only a partial reproduc-\\ntion of the report in her appellate submission. Even based on\\nher version of events, West calculated a negative valuation\\nfor the company at every six-month interval between\\nJune 30, 2008, and December 31, 2011. Thus, so long as the\\nbankruptcy judge accepted the veracity of the QuickBooks\\ndata and the reliability of West’s methods, a finding of\\ninsolvency was inevitable.\\n Hathaway argues that the judge committed clear error\\nwhen he chose to credit the West report rather than Trustee\\nExhibit 32. That document is simply a list of dollar figures\\nlabeled “Receivables from BP According to deposits and\\nwire transfers to Acct xx 7854.” Its attractiveness to\\nHathaway is obvious: Exhibit 32 shows over $2.6 million in\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 9\\n\\naccounts receivable over the crucial 2008–2012 period.\\nSeizing the chance to cast doubt on the West report,\\nHathaway adds the receivables from Exhibit 32, subtracts\\nliabilities, and proclaims that the company was in the black.\\n Exhibit 32 is not the panacea Hathaway makes it out to\\nbe. As the judge explained, its figures don’t rebut West’s\\ntopline finding of insolvency. Indeed, the receivables listed\\nin Exhibit 32 are wholly consistent with West’s conclusion.\\nWhen the company’s contractors performed work for BP,\\nthey generated accounts payable to themselves in addition to\\naccounts receivable for the company. So a significant portion\\nof the incoming cash from BP was offset by the company’s\\nobligations to its contractors. Because the West report con-\\nsidered “all three accounting categories—accounts receiva-\\nble, cash, and accounts payable,” it offered the most\\ncomplete picture of the company’s solvency. Even account-\\ning for outstanding receivables generated by company\\ncontractors, the firm’s liabilities exceeded its net asset value.\\n Hathaway asks us to add gross receivables to the West\\nreport’s asset figures to generate a new valuation for the\\ncompany. But only net receivables are relevant. Hathaway\\nadvanced these same arguments in the bankruptcy and\\ndistrict courts, to no avail. She offers nothing new to support\\nher position. In sum, she hasn’t come close to showing clear\\nerror.\\nB. Reasonably Equivalent Value\\n Hathaway also challenges the bankruptcy judge’s finding\\nthat the company did not receive reasonably equivalent\\nvalue for its transfers. Under both § 548 and the IUFTA, a\\ndebtor’s failure to receive value is a necessary element of\\n\\f10 No. 17-2354\\n\\nconstructive fraud. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. (In re\\nImage Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1998)\\n(explaining that cases applying the no-value requirement of\\n§ 548 can be used to evaluate the same question under the\\nAct). Courts consider “the fair market value of what was\\ntransferred and received, whether the transaction took place\\nat arm’s length, and the good faith of the transferee.” Smith\\nv. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 240 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nWhether value was given is a question of fact reviewed only\\nfor clear error. In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576.\\n Hathaway argues that she provided labor value com-\\nmensurate with the money she received from the firm. She\\ncites her education, work experience, and one line of the trial\\ntranscript in which she mentions consulting work she did for\\nthe company. She also directs our attention to a set of self-\\nprepared invoices, which she claims provide the requisite\\ndocumentation of her work. But as the courts below ob-\\nserved, her invoices are strikingly brief and inconsistent.\\nAnd they conflict with Hathaway’s own testimony, in which\\nshe stated that she billed the company by recording out-of-\\npocket expenses, hours worked, and her hourly rate. The\\ninvoices offer vague descriptors like “Workshop Prepara-\\ntion” and “Management Consulting” but make no attempt at\\nitemization. Nor do they match the company’s bank records.\\nThe invoices are simply not compelling. It’s clear why the\\nbankruptcy court placed so little stock in them.\\n The bankruptcy judge cited plenty of evidence beyond\\nthe invoices to support his conclusion that the transfers were\\ngratuitous. Novak evidently had no qualms about spending\\nconsiderable sums on Hathaway with no obvious connection\\nto professional services. To illustrate: On October 13, 2009,\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 11\\n\\nHathaway demanded reimbursement for $119.10 in personal\\ncosmetic expenses. “I adore you,” Novak replied. About\\nthree weeks later, a check for that precise amount was paid\\nby the company to Hathaway. This exchange was no outlier;\\nNovak satisfied repeated requests for personal gifts from\\nflowers to perfume. He even outfitted her yoga studio with\\nmats and other equipment.\\n Hathaway acknowledges the pattern of gratuitous\\nspending but argues that she always viewed those expendi-\\ntures as gifts from Novak personally, not from the company.\\nBut Hathaway’s description of her state of mind, while not\\nentirely irrelevant, doesn’t impeach the judge’s conclusion\\nnearly enough to show clear error.\\n Hathaway invites us to reinterpret the evidence present-\\ned at trial, crediting her version of events over the judge’s.\\nBut even if Hathaway’s story is one of “two permissible\\nviews of the evidence”—which we doubt—that is insuffi-\\ncient to show clear error. Dexia Crédit Local, 629 F.3d at 628.\\nC. Creditors under the IUFTA\\n Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), trustees can utilize state\\nfraudulent-conveyance statutes in bankruptcy proceedings.\\nSection 544(b) enables a trustee to step into the shoes of an\\nunsecured creditor who existed at the time of the transfer\\nand vindicate that creditor’s state-law rights. The trustee can\\n“avoid any transaction of the debtor that would be voidable\\nby any actual unsecured creditor under state law. The\\ntrustee need not identify the creditor, so long as the unse-\\ncured creditor exists.” In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576–\\n77 (citation omitted). The bankruptcy judge found that\\nChicago Management Consulting Group owed money to the\\n\\f12 No. 17-2354\\n\\nIRS and was carrying credit-card debt at the time of the\\ntransfers.\\n Hathaway points to no evidence contradicting those find-\\nings. She doesn’t even challenge the existence of the compa-\\nny’s tax obligation or credit-card debt, arguing instead that\\nthose obligations were “nominal” and not “due and paya-\\nble.” And if Hathaway wished to challenge the judge’s legal\\nconclusion that these creditors and their claims qualified\\nunder § 544(b) and triggered the IUFTA, she waived that\\nargument by failing to develop it. LINC Fin. Corp. v.\\nOnwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to cite\\nauthorities in support of a particular argument constitutes a\\nwaiver of the issue.”).\\nD. Discovery Sanctions\\n We review a bankruptcy court’s imposition of discovery\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Golant v. Levy (In re Golant),\\n239 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2001). We cannot substitute our\\nown judgment, nor do we require the judge to choose the\\nleast severe sanction. Id. Instead, we ask whether a “reason-\\nable jurist, apprised of all the circumstances, would have\\nchosen [the sanction] as proportionate to the infraction.”\\nSalgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n Hathaway devotes most of her brief to an attack on the\\njudge’s sanctions order. She claims the Trustee was unable to\\nshow prejudice stemming from her actions and that oppos-\\ning counsel inflated the hours they allegedly spent handling\\ndiscovery disputes. She says she ultimately complied with\\nall discovery orders and blames Google for email production\\ndelays. And she even intimates that the Trustee should be\\nsanctioned for his attorneys’ conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 13\\n\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. The fees that were\\nawarded are reasonably related to the Trustee’s efforts to\\nlitigate discovery. Although the judge was eventually con-\\nvinced that the gaps and delays in Hathaway’s email pro-\\nduction hadn’t obscured crucial information, the time spent\\nlitigating those matters burdened both the Trustee and the\\ncourt. Acting within his broad discretion, the judge conclud-\\ned that Hathaway should pay the legal bills incurred by the\\nTrustee while fighting those discovery battles. And he\\nattached an itemized breakdown of the fees he awarded—\\nand did not award. He even cut in half the fees claimed by\\none of the Trustee’s attorneys, citing “unnecessary time.”\\nDiscovery sanctions are upheld “so long as [they] could be\\nconsidered reasonable.” Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696\\n(7th Cir. 2009). These were reasonable sanctions.\\nE. Rule 38 Sanctions\\n The Trustee argues that Hathaway should be sanctioned\\nunder Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure\\nfor filing a frivolous appeal. But a request for Rule 38 sanc-\\ntions must be made by separate motion. Berkson v. Gulevsky\\n(In re Gulevsky), 362 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 2004). The Trustee\\nmerely requests sanctions in a section of his appellate brief.\\nAs we’ve explained before, a “brief-borne request is not a\\nseparately filed motion.” McDonough v. Royal Caribbean\\nCruises, Ltd., 48 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995). We therefore\\ndecline to address the issue.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415435/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638182/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In RE: CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC., Debtor. Horace Fox, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Chicago Management Consulting Group, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julia Hathaway, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2354\nIN RE:\n CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,\n Debtor.\nHORACE FOX, as Chapter 7 Trustee for\nthe Estate of Chicago Management\nConsulting Group, Inc.,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nJULIA HATHAWAY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 8917 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 10, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Frank Novak tragically took his own\nlife in February 2012. He left his company, Chicago\n\f2 No. 17-2354\n\nManagement Consulting Group, Inc., to his close friend\nDebra Comess. She was not in a position to manage the\nstruggling firm, so she initiated bankruptcy proceedings\nalmost immediately after Novak’s death.\n The Chapter 7 Trustee discovered numerous transfers\nfrom Chicago Management Consulting Group’s coffers to\nComess and Julia Hathaway—another Novak companion\nwho ran a small yoga studio. Believing the transfers to be\nfraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee sought\nto reclaim their value for the Estate. After a bench trial, the\nbankruptcy judge ruled that the transfers to Comess and\nHathaway were voidable on grounds of actual and\nconstructive fraud and imposed sanctions on Hathaway for\ndiscovery lapses. The district court affirmed.\n Comess settled her case; this appeal concerns the trans-\nfers to Hathaway. She launches several arguments. First, she\ncontends that the bankruptcy judge committed clear error by\nignoring one of the Trustee’s trial exhibits when evaluating\nthe company’s financial health. Second, she challenges the\nbankruptcy judge’s finding that the company did not receive\nreasonably equivalent value in return for its transfers. Third,\nshe argues that the company did not have “creditors” under\nthe Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“IUFTA” or\n“the Act”) at the time of the transfers. Finally, Hathaway\nvigorously disputes the sanctions ruling.\n We affirm. As a preliminary matter, Hathaway failed to\ncomply with multiple rules of appellate procedure. On the\nmerits, our review of a bankruptcy court’s factual findings is\nconstrained; we reverse only for clear error. Not one of\nHathaway’s arguments meets this high bar. The bankruptcy\njudge was amply justified when he concluded that the\n\fNo. 17-2354 3\n\ncompany was insolvent, the transfers to Hathaway were\ngratuitous, and the company had creditors under the Act.\nAnd we see no reason to disturb the imposition of discovery\nsanctions.\n I. Background\n Novak was the sole shareholder of Chicago Management\nConsulting Group, an information-technology consulting\nfirm he started in 1997. His primary client was BP America.\nBy 2008 the company’s solvency was questionable. In\nFebruary 2012 Novak committed suicide, leaving his com-\npany to his good friend Debra Comess. She was not\nequipped to run the firm, so she initiated bankruptcy pro-\nceedings, filing a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the North-\nern District of Illinois on May 2, 2012.\n For four years prior to the bankruptcy filing, Comess and\nJulia Hathaway, another close friend of Novak’s, had re-\nceived significant payments from the company, though they\nwere not employees. Hathaway alone received $45,400.81\nbetween 2008 and 2012. Hathaway runs a small yoga studio,\nand her email correspondence with Novak during this\nperiod suggests that the payments were personal, not pro-\nfessional. The emails document Hathaway’s repeated re-\nquests for gifts and payments and Novak’s expressions of\naffection for her and willing acquiescence in her requests.\n Trustee Horace Fox brought an avoidance action target-\ning the transfers to Comess and Hathaway. He later moved\nfor sanctions against Hathaway alleging dilatory behavior\nduring discovery.\n The bankruptcy judge determined that the women had\nindeed received money from Chicago Management Consult-\n\f4 No. 17-2354\n\ning Group and that Novak typically failed to record the\ntransactions. The judge also found that the company was\ninsolvent at the time of the transfers, relying on an account-\ning expert’s report introduced by the Trustee. The judge\nrejected Hathaway’s argument that a list of gross receivables\nproffered by the Trustee refuted the expert’s conclusion.\n Moving on, the judge ruled that the company did not re-\nceive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for its trans-\nfers to Hathaway. He based this finding on evidence of\nNovak’s close personal relationship with her, his habit of\npaying for her personal expenses on demand, the lack of\nevidence that Hathaway performed any work for the com-\npany, the irregularity and vagueness of her apparently\nhastily prepared invoices, and the inconsistency of those\ninvoices with the company’s bank records.\n The judge concluded that the transfers were voidable as\nactually and constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548\nand the IUFTA. The latter applied via § 544(b)(1) of the Code\nbecause the Trustee had established that the consulting firm\nhad “at least one [unsecured] creditor” at the time of the\nconveyances—the Internal Revenue Service—and that an\nunpaid credit-card company counted as another.\n The judge took a cautious approach to the Trustee’s mo-\ntion for discovery sanctions. He declined to impose sanc-\ntions for Hathaway’s failure to respond to interrogatories\nand produce tax returns. And although Hathaway was slow\nto turn over certain emails despite multiple discovery or-\nders, the judge was satisfied that she had generally complied\nand that much of the delay was caused by her email service\nprovider. Finally, the judge considered a set of emails that\nHathaway unquestionably possessed but failed to produce.\n\fNo. 17-2354 5\n\nHe found that those emails were improperly omitted but\nthat they contained no relevant information. In the end, the\njudge determined that sanctions were appropriate only to\nthe extent that Hathaway’s delay and failure to comply with\ncourt orders caused the Trustee to expend additional time\nand resources litigating the recurring discovery disputes. He\nordered “payment of the [T]rustee’s attorney fees and\nexpenses reasonably incurred in pursuing the discovery\nmatters.” The judge later entered judgment against\nHathaway for the fraudulent conveyances in the amount of\n$45,400.81 and imposed $11,187.25 in discovery sanctions.\n Hathaway appealed to the district court under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 158(a)(1). The district judge affirmed across the board. He\ndiscerned no clear error in the bankruptcy judge’s finding\nthat Chicago Management Consulting Group was insolvent.\nHe was unimpressed by Hathaway’s attempts to contradict\nthe finding that the company had not received value for its\ntransfers. Nor did he see fit to question the bankruptcy\ncourt’s identification of unsecured creditors for § 544(b)\npurposes. On the issue of discovery sanctions, he deferred to\nthe bankruptcy judge’s broad discretion and found no\nreason to set aside the award.\n II. Discussion\n Hathaway’s appeal repeats the arguments she raised in\ndistrict court. We note at the outset that she did not ap-\nproach this appeal with the seriousness our rules demand.\nShe failed to provide an adequate record to facilitate our\nreview. Because she claims that several of the bankruptcy\ncourt’s factual findings were unsupported by the evidence, it\nwas her responsibility to “include in the record a transcript\nof all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” FED.\n\f6 No. 17-2354\n\nR. APP. P. 10(b)(2); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8009(b)(5).\nRelevant evidence “generally … include[s] a complete\ntranscript of the trial along with the exhibits properly admit-\nted into evidence.” LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540, 544 (7th\nCir. 1995).\n The most glaring omission is the expert report upon\nwhich the bankruptcy court based its insolvency ruling. That\nreport, compiled by Trustee’s expert Lois West, was not\ndelivered to us until after oral argument.1 Frustratingly,\nHathaway has been on notice of this deficiency since the\ndistrict judge noted the absence of the West report from the\nrecord. Comess v. Fox (In re Chi. Mgmt. Consulting Grp., Inc.),\n569 B.R. 722, 728 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2017). So we’re left to interpret\na portion of the West report’s raw data reproduced in\nHathaway’s appellate brief. Finally, Hathaway’s appendix is\nincomplete under our circuit rules. It includes only the\ndistrict judge’s opinion, not the bankruptcy judge’s opinion.\nSee 7TH CIR. R. 30(b)(2).\n These serious errors could justify dismissal. See Tapley v.\nChambers, 840 F.3d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that\nwe may dismiss an appeal when the appellant has “ample\nopportunity to correct” a deficiency in the record and fails to\ndo so); see also Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61 (7th Cir.\n1995) (“[We] decline[] to entertain [an] appeal[] when the\nappellant does not file a required appendix.”). We neverthe-\nless choose to reach the merits, where Hathaway fares no\nbetter.\n\n\n\n1Following oral argument, Hathaway moved to supplement the record\nwith a copy of the West report. We denied that motion.\n\fNo. 17-2354 7\n\nA. Insolvency Analysis\n We apply “de novo review for the bankruptcy court’s con-\nclusions of law and clear error review for its findings of\nfact.” First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 776 (7th\nCir. 2013). Demonstrating clear error is no mean feat. “When\nthere are two permissible views of the evidence, the …\nchoice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Dexia\nCrédit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 628 (7th Cir. 2010). We\nwill not reverse the court’s factual findings without a “defi-\nnite and firm conviction” that it erred. Unsecured Creditors\nComm. of Sparrer Sausage Co. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 826 F.3d\n388, 393 (7th Cir. 2016).\n The Trustee’s fraudulent-transfer claims rest on 11 U.S.C.\n§ 548 and the IUFTA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 (2010). Each\nstatute has actual- and constructive-fraud provisions. Actual\nfraud under § 548 can be proven by circumstantial evidence,\nincluding the size of the transfer in relation to the debtor’s\nassets. Frierdich v. Mottaz (In re Frierdich), 294 F.3d 864, 869–\n70 (7th Cir. 2002). The IUFTA considers insolvency to be a\n“badge” of actual fraud. § 160/5(b)(9). Under the construc-\ntive-fraud component of § 548, a trustee can avoid any\ntransfer for which the debtor “received less than a reasona-\nbly equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obliga-\ntion[] and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was\nmade or such obligation was incurred.” § 548(a)(1)(B); accord\n§ 160/5. Thus, whether Chicago Management Consulting\nGroup was insolvent when Novak transferred funds to\nHathaway was a crucial issue for the bankruptcy court.\n Under federal and state fraudulent-transfer law, a debtor\nis insolvent if it has “a balance sheet on which liabilities\nexceed assets.” See Baldi v. Samuel Son & Co., Ltd., 548 F.3d\n\f8 No. 17-2354\n\n579, 581 (7th Cir. 2008); Grochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler),\n320 B.R. 362, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); see also 11 U.S.C.\n§ 101(32)(A) (defining “insolvent”); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n160/3(a) (same). If a willing buyer would not purchase the\ndebtor’s combined assets and liabilities, the debtor is insol-\nvent. Covey v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657,\n660 (7th Cir. 1992). A trustee doesn’t need to show insolven-\ncy on the precise day of the transfer. If he can demonstrate\nthat the debtor was insolvent at points before and after the\ntransfer, it’s up to the transferee to rebut the presumption of\ninsolvency in between. Baldi, 548 F.3d at 581.\n Relying on the West report, the bankruptcy judge found\nthat the company was insolvent during the relevant period.\nLois West, a trained accountant, analyzed records kept by\nNovak using QuickBooks accounting software. According to\nthe judge, the data clearly showed that the company’s\nliabilities exceeded its assets when the transfers were made.\nAs we’ve noted, Hathaway included only a partial reproduc-\ntion of the report in her appellate submission. Even based on\nher version of events, West calculated a negative valuation\nfor the company at every six-month interval between\nJune 30, 2008, and December 31, 2011. Thus, so long as the\nbankruptcy judge accepted the veracity of the QuickBooks\ndata and the reliability of West’s methods, a finding of\ninsolvency was inevitable.\n Hathaway argues that the judge committed clear error\nwhen he chose to credit the West report rather than Trustee\nExhibit 32. That document is simply a list of dollar figures\nlabeled “Receivables from BP According to deposits and\nwire transfers to Acct xx 7854.” Its attractiveness to\nHathaway is obvious: Exhibit 32 shows over $2.6 million in\n\fNo. 17-2354 9\n\naccounts receivable over the crucial 2008–2012 period.\nSeizing the chance to cast doubt on the West report,\nHathaway adds the receivables from Exhibit 32, subtracts\nliabilities, and proclaims that the company was in the black.\n Exhibit 32 is not the panacea Hathaway makes it out to\nbe. As the judge explained, its figures don’t rebut West’s\ntopline finding of insolvency. Indeed, the receivables listed\nin Exhibit 32 are wholly consistent with West’s conclusion.\nWhen the company’s contractors performed work for BP,\nthey generated accounts payable to themselves in addition to\naccounts receivable for the company. So a significant portion\nof the incoming cash from BP was offset by the company’s\nobligations to its contractors. Because the West report con-\nsidered “all three accounting categories—accounts receiva-\nble, cash, and accounts payable,” it offered the most\ncomplete picture of the company’s solvency. Even account-\ning for outstanding receivables generated by company\ncontractors, the firm’s liabilities exceeded its net asset value.\n Hathaway asks us to add gross receivables to the West\nreport’s asset figures to generate a new valuation for the\ncompany. But only net receivables are relevant. Hathaway\nadvanced these same arguments in the bankruptcy and\ndistrict courts, to no avail. She offers nothing new to support\nher position. In sum, she hasn’t come close to showing clear\nerror.\nB. Reasonably Equivalent Value\n Hathaway also challenges the bankruptcy judge’s finding\nthat the company did not receive reasonably equivalent\nvalue for its transfers. Under both § 548 and the IUFTA, a\ndebtor’s failure to receive value is a necessary element of\n\f10 No. 17-2354\n\nconstructive fraud. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. (In re\nImage Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1998)\n(explaining that cases applying the no-value requirement of\n§ 548 can be used to evaluate the same question under the\nAct). Courts consider “the fair market value of what was\ntransferred and received, whether the transaction took place\nat arm’s length, and the good faith of the transferee.” Smith\nv. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 240 (7th Cir. 2016).\nWhether value was given is a question of fact reviewed only\nfor clear error. In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576.\n Hathaway argues that she provided labor value com-\nmensurate with the money she received from the firm. She\ncites her education, work experience, and one line of the trial\ntranscript in which she mentions consulting work she did for\nthe company. She also directs our attention to a set of self-\nprepared invoices, which she claims provide the requisite\ndocumentation of her work. But as the courts below ob-\nserved, her invoices are strikingly brief and inconsistent.\nAnd they conflict with Hathaway’s own testimony, in which\nshe stated that she billed the company by recording out-of-\npocket expenses, hours worked, and her hourly rate. The\ninvoices offer vague descriptors like “Workshop Prepara-\ntion” and “Management Consulting” but make no attempt at\nitemization. Nor do they match the company’s bank records.\nThe invoices are simply not compelling. It’s clear why the\nbankruptcy court placed so little stock in them.\n The bankruptcy judge cited plenty of evidence beyond\nthe invoices to support his conclusion that the transfers were\ngratuitous. Novak evidently had no qualms about spending\nconsiderable sums on Hathaway with no obvious connection\nto professional services. To illustrate: On October 13, 2009,\n\fNo. 17-2354 11\n\nHathaway demanded reimbursement for $119.10 in personal\ncosmetic expenses. “I adore you,” Novak replied. About\nthree weeks later, a check for that precise amount was paid\nby the company to Hathaway. This exchange was no outlier;\nNovak satisfied repeated requests for personal gifts from\nflowers to perfume. He even outfitted her yoga studio with\nmats and other equipment.\n Hathaway acknowledges the pattern of gratuitous\nspending but argues that she always viewed those expendi-\ntures as gifts from Novak personally, not from the company.\nBut Hathaway’s description of her state of mind, while not\nentirely irrelevant, doesn’t impeach the judge’s conclusion\nnearly enough to show clear error.\n Hathaway invites us to reinterpret the evidence present-\ned at trial, crediting her version of events over the judge’s.\nBut even if Hathaway’s story is one of “two permissible\nviews of the evidence”—which we doubt—that is insuffi-\ncient to show clear error. Dexia Crédit Local, 629 F.3d at 628.\nC. Creditors under the IUFTA\n Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), trustees can utilize state\nfraudulent-conveyance statutes in bankruptcy proceedings.\nSection 544(b) enables a trustee to step into the shoes of an\nunsecured creditor who existed at the time of the transfer\nand vindicate that creditor’s state-law rights. The trustee can\n“avoid any transaction of the debtor that would be voidable\nby any actual unsecured creditor under state law. The\ntrustee need not identify the creditor, so long as the unse-\ncured creditor exists.” In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576–\n77 (citation omitted). The bankruptcy judge found that\nChicago Management Consulting Group owed money to the\n\f12 No. 17-2354\n\nIRS and was carrying credit-card debt at the time of the\ntransfers.\n Hathaway points to no evidence contradicting those find-\nings. She doesn’t even challenge the existence of the compa-\nny’s tax obligation or credit-card debt, arguing instead that\nthose obligations were “nominal” and not “due and paya-\nble.” And if Hathaway wished to challenge the judge’s legal\nconclusion that these creditors and their claims qualified\nunder § 544(b) and triggered the IUFTA, she waived that\nargument by failing to develop it. LINC Fin. Corp. v.\nOnwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to cite\nauthorities in support of a particular argument constitutes a\nwaiver of the issue.”).\nD. Discovery Sanctions\n We review a bankruptcy court’s imposition of discovery\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Golant v. Levy (In re Golant),\n239 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2001). We cannot substitute our\nown judgment, nor do we require the judge to choose the\nleast severe sanction. Id. Instead, we ask whether a “reason-\nable jurist, apprised of all the circumstances, would have\nchosen [the sanction] as proportionate to the infraction.”\nSalgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).\n Hathaway devotes most of her brief to an attack on the\njudge’s sanctions order. She claims the Trustee was unable to\nshow prejudice stemming from her actions and that oppos-\ning counsel inflated the hours they allegedly spent handling\ndiscovery disputes. She says she ultimately complied with\nall discovery orders and blames Google for email production\ndelays. And she even intimates that the Trustee should be\nsanctioned for his attorneys’ conduct.\n\fNo. 17-2354 13\n\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. The fees that were\nawarded are reasonably related to the Trustee’s efforts to\nlitigate discovery. Although the judge was eventually con-\nvinced that the gaps and delays in Hathaway’s email pro-\nduction hadn’t obscured crucial information, the time spent\nlitigating those matters burdened both the Trustee and the\ncourt. Acting within his broad discretion, the judge conclud-\ned that Hathaway should pay the legal bills incurred by the\nTrustee while fighting those discovery battles. And he\nattached an itemized breakdown of the fees he awarded—\nand did not award. He even cut in half the fees claimed by\none of the Trustee’s attorneys, citing “unnecessary time.”\nDiscovery sanctions are upheld “so long as [they] could be\nconsidered reasonable.” Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696\n(7th Cir. 2009). These were reasonable sanctions.\nE. Rule 38 Sanctions\n The Trustee argues that Hathaway should be sanctioned\nunder Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure\nfor filing a frivolous appeal. But a request for Rule 38 sanc-\ntions must be made by separate motion. Berkson v. Gulevsky\n(In re Gulevsky), 362 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 2004). The Trustee\nmerely requests sanctions in a section of his appellate brief.\nAs we’ve explained before, a “brief-borne request is not a\nseparately filed motion.” McDonough v. Royal Caribbean\nCruises, Ltd., 48 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995). We therefore\ndecline to address the issue.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In RE: CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC., Debtor. Horace Fox, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Chicago Management Consulting Group, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julia Hathaway, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2354\\nIN RE:\\n CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,\\n Debtor.\\nHORACE FOX, as Chapter 7 Trustee for\\nthe Estate of Chicago Management\\nConsulting Group, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJULIA HATHAWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 8917 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Frank Novak tragically took his own\\nlife in February 2012. He left his company, Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 17-2354\\n\\nManagement Consulting Group, Inc., to his close friend\\nDebra Comess. She was not in a position to manage the\\nstruggling firm, so she initiated bankruptcy proceedings\\nalmost immediately after Novak’s death.\\n The Chapter 7 Trustee discovered numerous transfers\\nfrom Chicago Management Consulting Group’s coffers to\\nComess and Julia Hathaway—another Novak companion\\nwho ran a small yoga studio. Believing the transfers to be\\nfraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee sought\\nto reclaim their value for the Estate. After a bench trial, the\\nbankruptcy judge ruled that the transfers to Comess and\\nHathaway were voidable on grounds of actual and\\nconstructive fraud and imposed sanctions on Hathaway for\\ndiscovery lapses. The district court affirmed.\\n Comess settled her case; this appeal concerns the trans-\\nfers to Hathaway. She launches several arguments. First, she\\ncontends that the bankruptcy judge committed clear error by\\nignoring one of the Trustee’s trial exhibits when evaluating\\nthe company’s financial health. Second, she challenges the\\nbankruptcy judge’s finding that the company did not receive\\nreasonably equivalent value in return for its transfers. Third,\\nshe argues that the company did not have “creditors” under\\nthe Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“IUFTA” or\\n“the Act”) at the time of the transfers. Finally, Hathaway\\nvigorously disputes the sanctions ruling.\\n We affirm. As a preliminary matter, Hathaway failed to\\ncomply with multiple rules of appellate procedure. On the\\nmerits, our review of a bankruptcy court’s factual findings is\\nconstrained; we reverse only for clear error. Not one of\\nHathaway’s arguments meets this high bar. The bankruptcy\\njudge was amply justified when he concluded that the\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 3\\n\\ncompany was insolvent, the transfers to Hathaway were\\ngratuitous, and the company had creditors under the Act.\\nAnd we see no reason to disturb the imposition of discovery\\nsanctions.\\n I. Background\\n Novak was the sole shareholder of Chicago Management\\nConsulting Group, an information-technology consulting\\nfirm he started in 1997. His primary client was BP America.\\nBy 2008 the company’s solvency was questionable. In\\nFebruary 2012 Novak committed suicide, leaving his com-\\npany to his good friend Debra Comess. She was not\\nequipped to run the firm, so she initiated bankruptcy pro-\\nceedings, filing a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the North-\\nern District of Illinois on May 2, 2012.\\n For four years prior to the bankruptcy filing, Comess and\\nJulia Hathaway, another close friend of Novak’s, had re-\\nceived significant payments from the company, though they\\nwere not employees. Hathaway alone received $45,400.81\\nbetween 2008 and 2012. Hathaway runs a small yoga studio,\\nand her email correspondence with Novak during this\\nperiod suggests that the payments were personal, not pro-\\nfessional. The emails document Hathaway’s repeated re-\\nquests for gifts and payments and Novak’s expressions of\\naffection for her and willing acquiescence in her requests.\\n Trustee Horace Fox brought an avoidance action target-\\ning the transfers to Comess and Hathaway. He later moved\\nfor sanctions against Hathaway alleging dilatory behavior\\nduring discovery.\\n The bankruptcy judge determined that the women had\\nindeed received money from Chicago Management Consult-\\n\\f4 No. 17-2354\\n\\ning Group and that Novak typically failed to record the\\ntransactions. The judge also found that the company was\\ninsolvent at the time of the transfers, relying on an account-\\ning expert’s report introduced by the Trustee. The judge\\nrejected Hathaway’s argument that a list of gross receivables\\nproffered by the Trustee refuted the expert’s conclusion.\\n Moving on, the judge ruled that the company did not re-\\nceive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for its trans-\\nfers to Hathaway. He based this finding on evidence of\\nNovak’s close personal relationship with her, his habit of\\npaying for her personal expenses on demand, the lack of\\nevidence that Hathaway performed any work for the com-\\npany, the irregularity and vagueness of her apparently\\nhastily prepared invoices, and the inconsistency of those\\ninvoices with the company’s bank records.\\n The judge concluded that the transfers were voidable as\\nactually and constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548\\nand the IUFTA. The latter applied via § 544(b)(1) of the Code\\nbecause the Trustee had established that the consulting firm\\nhad “at least one [unsecured] creditor” at the time of the\\nconveyances—the Internal Revenue Service—and that an\\nunpaid credit-card company counted as another.\\n The judge took a cautious approach to the Trustee’s mo-\\ntion for discovery sanctions. He declined to impose sanc-\\ntions for Hathaway’s failure to respond to interrogatories\\nand produce tax returns. And although Hathaway was slow\\nto turn over certain emails despite multiple discovery or-\\nders, the judge was satisfied that she had generally complied\\nand that much of the delay was caused by her email service\\nprovider. Finally, the judge considered a set of emails that\\nHathaway unquestionably possessed but failed to produce.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 5\\n\\nHe found that those emails were improperly omitted but\\nthat they contained no relevant information. In the end, the\\njudge determined that sanctions were appropriate only to\\nthe extent that Hathaway’s delay and failure to comply with\\ncourt orders caused the Trustee to expend additional time\\nand resources litigating the recurring discovery disputes. He\\nordered “payment of the [T]rustee’s attorney fees and\\nexpenses reasonably incurred in pursuing the discovery\\nmatters.” The judge later entered judgment against\\nHathaway for the fraudulent conveyances in the amount of\\n$45,400.81 and imposed $11,187.25 in discovery sanctions.\\n Hathaway appealed to the district court under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(a)(1). The district judge affirmed across the board. He\\ndiscerned no clear error in the bankruptcy judge’s finding\\nthat Chicago Management Consulting Group was insolvent.\\nHe was unimpressed by Hathaway’s attempts to contradict\\nthe finding that the company had not received value for its\\ntransfers. Nor did he see fit to question the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s identification of unsecured creditors for § 544(b)\\npurposes. On the issue of discovery sanctions, he deferred to\\nthe bankruptcy judge’s broad discretion and found no\\nreason to set aside the award.\\n II. Discussion\\n Hathaway’s appeal repeats the arguments she raised in\\ndistrict court. We note at the outset that she did not ap-\\nproach this appeal with the seriousness our rules demand.\\nShe failed to provide an adequate record to facilitate our\\nreview. Because she claims that several of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s factual findings were unsupported by the evidence, it\\nwas her responsibility to “include in the record a transcript\\nof all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” FED.\\n\\f6 No. 17-2354\\n\\nR. APP. P. 10(b)(2); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8009(b)(5).\\nRelevant evidence “generally … include[s] a complete\\ntranscript of the trial along with the exhibits properly admit-\\nted into evidence.” LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540, 544 (7th\\nCir. 1995).\\n The most glaring omission is the expert report upon\\nwhich the bankruptcy court based its insolvency ruling. That\\nreport, compiled by Trustee’s expert Lois West, was not\\ndelivered to us until after oral argument.1 Frustratingly,\\nHathaway has been on notice of this deficiency since the\\ndistrict judge noted the absence of the West report from the\\nrecord. Comess v. Fox (In re Chi. Mgmt. Consulting Grp., Inc.),\\n569 B.R. 722, 728 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2017). So we’re left to interpret\\na portion of the West report’s raw data reproduced in\\nHathaway’s appellate brief. Finally, Hathaway’s appendix is\\nincomplete under our circuit rules. It includes only the\\ndistrict judge’s opinion, not the bankruptcy judge’s opinion.\\nSee 7TH CIR. R. 30(b)(2).\\n These serious errors could justify dismissal. See Tapley v.\\nChambers, 840 F.3d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that\\nwe may dismiss an appeal when the appellant has “ample\\nopportunity to correct” a deficiency in the record and fails to\\ndo so); see also Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (“[We] decline[] to entertain [an] appeal[] when the\\nappellant does not file a required appendix.”). We neverthe-\\nless choose to reach the merits, where Hathaway fares no\\nbetter.\\n\\n\\n\\n1Following oral argument, Hathaway moved to supplement the record\\nwith a copy of the West report. We denied that motion.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 7\\n\\nA. Insolvency Analysis\\n We apply “de novo review for the bankruptcy court’s con-\\nclusions of law and clear error review for its findings of\\nfact.” First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 776 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Demonstrating clear error is no mean feat. “When\\nthere are two permissible views of the evidence, the …\\nchoice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Dexia\\nCrédit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 628 (7th Cir. 2010). We\\nwill not reverse the court’s factual findings without a “defi-\\nnite and firm conviction” that it erred. Unsecured Creditors\\nComm. of Sparrer Sausage Co. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 826 F.3d\\n388, 393 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n The Trustee’s fraudulent-transfer claims rest on 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 548 and the IUFTA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 (2010). Each\\nstatute has actual- and constructive-fraud provisions. Actual\\nfraud under § 548 can be proven by circumstantial evidence,\\nincluding the size of the transfer in relation to the debtor’s\\nassets. Frierdich v. Mottaz (In re Frierdich), 294 F.3d 864, 869–\\n70 (7th Cir. 2002). The IUFTA considers insolvency to be a\\n“badge” of actual fraud. § 160/5(b)(9). Under the construc-\\ntive-fraud component of § 548, a trustee can avoid any\\ntransfer for which the debtor “received less than a reasona-\\nbly equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obliga-\\ntion[] and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was\\nmade or such obligation was incurred.” § 548(a)(1)(B); accord\\n§ 160/5. Thus, whether Chicago Management Consulting\\nGroup was insolvent when Novak transferred funds to\\nHathaway was a crucial issue for the bankruptcy court.\\n Under federal and state fraudulent-transfer law, a debtor\\nis insolvent if it has “a balance sheet on which liabilities\\nexceed assets.” See Baldi v. Samuel Son & Co., Ltd., 548 F.3d\\n\\f8 No. 17-2354\\n\\n579, 581 (7th Cir. 2008); Grochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler),\\n320 B.R. 362, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 101(32)(A) (defining “insolvent”); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n160/3(a) (same). If a willing buyer would not purchase the\\ndebtor’s combined assets and liabilities, the debtor is insol-\\nvent. Covey v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657,\\n660 (7th Cir. 1992). A trustee doesn’t need to show insolven-\\ncy on the precise day of the transfer. If he can demonstrate\\nthat the debtor was insolvent at points before and after the\\ntransfer, it’s up to the transferee to rebut the presumption of\\ninsolvency in between. Baldi, 548 F.3d at 581.\\n Relying on the West report, the bankruptcy judge found\\nthat the company was insolvent during the relevant period.\\nLois West, a trained accountant, analyzed records kept by\\nNovak using QuickBooks accounting software. According to\\nthe judge, the data clearly showed that the company’s\\nliabilities exceeded its assets when the transfers were made.\\nAs we’ve noted, Hathaway included only a partial reproduc-\\ntion of the report in her appellate submission. Even based on\\nher version of events, West calculated a negative valuation\\nfor the company at every six-month interval between\\nJune 30, 2008, and December 31, 2011. Thus, so long as the\\nbankruptcy judge accepted the veracity of the QuickBooks\\ndata and the reliability of West’s methods, a finding of\\ninsolvency was inevitable.\\n Hathaway argues that the judge committed clear error\\nwhen he chose to credit the West report rather than Trustee\\nExhibit 32. That document is simply a list of dollar figures\\nlabeled “Receivables from BP According to deposits and\\nwire transfers to Acct xx 7854.” Its attractiveness to\\nHathaway is obvious: Exhibit 32 shows over $2.6 million in\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 9\\n\\naccounts receivable over the crucial 2008–2012 period.\\nSeizing the chance to cast doubt on the West report,\\nHathaway adds the receivables from Exhibit 32, subtracts\\nliabilities, and proclaims that the company was in the black.\\n Exhibit 32 is not the panacea Hathaway makes it out to\\nbe. As the judge explained, its figures don’t rebut West’s\\ntopline finding of insolvency. Indeed, the receivables listed\\nin Exhibit 32 are wholly consistent with West’s conclusion.\\nWhen the company’s contractors performed work for BP,\\nthey generated accounts payable to themselves in addition to\\naccounts receivable for the company. So a significant portion\\nof the incoming cash from BP was offset by the company’s\\nobligations to its contractors. Because the West report con-\\nsidered “all three accounting categories—accounts receiva-\\nble, cash, and accounts payable,” it offered the most\\ncomplete picture of the company’s solvency. Even account-\\ning for outstanding receivables generated by company\\ncontractors, the firm’s liabilities exceeded its net asset value.\\n Hathaway asks us to add gross receivables to the West\\nreport’s asset figures to generate a new valuation for the\\ncompany. But only net receivables are relevant. Hathaway\\nadvanced these same arguments in the bankruptcy and\\ndistrict courts, to no avail. She offers nothing new to support\\nher position. In sum, she hasn’t come close to showing clear\\nerror.\\nB. Reasonably Equivalent Value\\n Hathaway also challenges the bankruptcy judge’s finding\\nthat the company did not receive reasonably equivalent\\nvalue for its transfers. Under both § 548 and the IUFTA, a\\ndebtor’s failure to receive value is a necessary element of\\n\\f10 No. 17-2354\\n\\nconstructive fraud. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. (In re\\nImage Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1998)\\n(explaining that cases applying the no-value requirement of\\n§ 548 can be used to evaluate the same question under the\\nAct). Courts consider “the fair market value of what was\\ntransferred and received, whether the transaction took place\\nat arm’s length, and the good faith of the transferee.” Smith\\nv. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 240 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nWhether value was given is a question of fact reviewed only\\nfor clear error. In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576.\\n Hathaway argues that she provided labor value com-\\nmensurate with the money she received from the firm. She\\ncites her education, work experience, and one line of the trial\\ntranscript in which she mentions consulting work she did for\\nthe company. She also directs our attention to a set of self-\\nprepared invoices, which she claims provide the requisite\\ndocumentation of her work. But as the courts below ob-\\nserved, her invoices are strikingly brief and inconsistent.\\nAnd they conflict with Hathaway’s own testimony, in which\\nshe stated that she billed the company by recording out-of-\\npocket expenses, hours worked, and her hourly rate. The\\ninvoices offer vague descriptors like “Workshop Prepara-\\ntion” and “Management Consulting” but make no attempt at\\nitemization. Nor do they match the company’s bank records.\\nThe invoices are simply not compelling. It’s clear why the\\nbankruptcy court placed so little stock in them.\\n The bankruptcy judge cited plenty of evidence beyond\\nthe invoices to support his conclusion that the transfers were\\ngratuitous. Novak evidently had no qualms about spending\\nconsiderable sums on Hathaway with no obvious connection\\nto professional services. To illustrate: On October 13, 2009,\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 11\\n\\nHathaway demanded reimbursement for $119.10 in personal\\ncosmetic expenses. “I adore you,” Novak replied. About\\nthree weeks later, a check for that precise amount was paid\\nby the company to Hathaway. This exchange was no outlier;\\nNovak satisfied repeated requests for personal gifts from\\nflowers to perfume. He even outfitted her yoga studio with\\nmats and other equipment.\\n Hathaway acknowledges the pattern of gratuitous\\nspending but argues that she always viewed those expendi-\\ntures as gifts from Novak personally, not from the company.\\nBut Hathaway’s description of her state of mind, while not\\nentirely irrelevant, doesn’t impeach the judge’s conclusion\\nnearly enough to show clear error.\\n Hathaway invites us to reinterpret the evidence present-\\ned at trial, crediting her version of events over the judge’s.\\nBut even if Hathaway’s story is one of “two permissible\\nviews of the evidence”—which we doubt—that is insuffi-\\ncient to show clear error. Dexia Crédit Local, 629 F.3d at 628.\\nC. Creditors under the IUFTA\\n Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), trustees can utilize state\\nfraudulent-conveyance statutes in bankruptcy proceedings.\\nSection 544(b) enables a trustee to step into the shoes of an\\nunsecured creditor who existed at the time of the transfer\\nand vindicate that creditor’s state-law rights. The trustee can\\n“avoid any transaction of the debtor that would be voidable\\nby any actual unsecured creditor under state law. The\\ntrustee need not identify the creditor, so long as the unse-\\ncured creditor exists.” In re Image Worldwide, 139 F.3d at 576–\\n77 (citation omitted). The bankruptcy judge found that\\nChicago Management Consulting Group owed money to the\\n\\f12 No. 17-2354\\n\\nIRS and was carrying credit-card debt at the time of the\\ntransfers.\\n Hathaway points to no evidence contradicting those find-\\nings. She doesn’t even challenge the existence of the compa-\\nny’s tax obligation or credit-card debt, arguing instead that\\nthose obligations were “nominal” and not “due and paya-\\nble.” And if Hathaway wished to challenge the judge’s legal\\nconclusion that these creditors and their claims qualified\\nunder § 544(b) and triggered the IUFTA, she waived that\\nargument by failing to develop it. LINC Fin. Corp. v.\\nOnwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to cite\\nauthorities in support of a particular argument constitutes a\\nwaiver of the issue.”).\\nD. Discovery Sanctions\\n We review a bankruptcy court’s imposition of discovery\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Golant v. Levy (In re Golant),\\n239 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2001). We cannot substitute our\\nown judgment, nor do we require the judge to choose the\\nleast severe sanction. Id. Instead, we ask whether a “reason-\\nable jurist, apprised of all the circumstances, would have\\nchosen [the sanction] as proportionate to the infraction.”\\nSalgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n Hathaway devotes most of her brief to an attack on the\\njudge’s sanctions order. She claims the Trustee was unable to\\nshow prejudice stemming from her actions and that oppos-\\ning counsel inflated the hours they allegedly spent handling\\ndiscovery disputes. She says she ultimately complied with\\nall discovery orders and blames Google for email production\\ndelays. And she even intimates that the Trustee should be\\nsanctioned for his attorneys’ conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-2354 13\\n\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. The fees that were\\nawarded are reasonably related to the Trustee’s efforts to\\nlitigate discovery. Although the judge was eventually con-\\nvinced that the gaps and delays in Hathaway’s email pro-\\nduction hadn’t obscured crucial information, the time spent\\nlitigating those matters burdened both the Trustee and the\\ncourt. Acting within his broad discretion, the judge conclud-\\ned that Hathaway should pay the legal bills incurred by the\\nTrustee while fighting those discovery battles. And he\\nattached an itemized breakdown of the fees he awarded—\\nand did not award. He even cut in half the fees claimed by\\none of the Trustee’s attorneys, citing “unnecessary time.”\\nDiscovery sanctions are upheld “so long as [they] could be\\nconsidered reasonable.” Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696\\n(7th Cir. 2009). These were reasonable sanctions.\\nE. Rule 38 Sanctions\\n The Trustee argues that Hathaway should be sanctioned\\nunder Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure\\nfor filing a frivolous appeal. But a request for Rule 38 sanc-\\ntions must be made by separate motion. Berkson v. Gulevsky\\n(In re Gulevsky), 362 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 2004). The Trustee\\nmerely requests sanctions in a section of his appellate brief.\\nAs we’ve explained before, a “brief-borne request is not a\\nseparately filed motion.” McDonough v. Royal Caribbean\\nCruises, Ltd., 48 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995). We therefore\\ndecline to address the issue.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3099,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4638231,"string":"4,638,231"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2040"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Acting Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n July 10, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 17-2040\\n\\nJOHN DOE, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of\\n Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 1:15-cv-11168\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge.\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n On consideration of the letter of the Government requesting correction of the\\nopinion in this appeal issued on July 3, 2019, the opinion is amended on page 3 by\\nreplacing “and up to $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an area with\\nan unemployment rate significantly below the national average” with “and $1,000,000 for\\na new commercial enterprise located in any other area.”\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415484/\", \"author_raw\": \"Acting Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KENNETH F RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DANIEL A MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIANE S SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KENNETH F RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"DANIEL A MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"DIANE S SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638231/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n July 10, 2019\n\n Before\n\n KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge\n\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge\n\n DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 17-2040\n\nJOHN DOE, Appeal from the United States District\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of\n Illinois, Eastern Division.\n v.\n No. 1:15-cv-11168\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\nActing Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge.\nSecurity, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n ORDER\n\n On consideration of the letter of the Government requesting correction of the\nopinion in this appeal issued on July 3, 2019, the opinion is amended on page 3 by\nreplacing “and up to $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an area with\nan unemployment rate significantly below the national average” with “and $1,000,000 for\na new commercial enterprise located in any other area.”\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n July 10, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 17-2040\\n\\nJOHN DOE, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of\\n Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 1:15-cv-11168\\nKEVIN K. MCALEENAN,\\nActing Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge.\\nSecurity, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n On consideration of the letter of the Government requesting correction of the\\nopinion in this appeal issued on July 3, 2019, the opinion is amended on page 3 by\\nreplacing “and up to $3,000,000 for a new commercial enterprise located in an area with\\nan unemployment rate significantly below the national average” with “and $1,000,000 for\\na new commercial enterprise located in any other area.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":30,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":3000,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NjQ1NDEwNSwianRpIjoiYmIyZTJlOGMtYWQyNS00MTZkLTkwYzAtOTU3MjMyZjk2MmY5Iiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3ODY0NTc3MDUsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.HVHensEBAuZm22eRfm8sBGGTAV6LWgof7JyXbqf-qv62ILlUFVTmaOzENmn3FkXRW9Zh_tLQ0i7tZbyEWULlDQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,640,493 | Brenda MASON, Individually & on Behalf of Quamaine Dwayne Mason; Billy C. Mason, Individually & on Behalf of Quamaine Dwayne Mason, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Martin FAUL, Individually & in His Official Capacity, Defendant - Appellee | Brenda Mason v. City of Lafayette | 2019-07-17 | 18-30362 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30362 Document: 00515038500 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/17/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Un... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640493/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,749 | Southern Hens, Incorporated v. OSHC | 2019-07-18 | 18-60436 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60436 Document: 00515039801 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"HIGGINBOTHAM": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640749/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,993 | Lamon K. GRIGGS, Plaintiff - Appellee v. CHICKASAW COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant - Appellant | Lamon Griggs v. Chickasaw County, Mississippi | 2019-07-18 | 18-60401 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Graves, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60401 Document: 00515040380 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUI... | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640993/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,994 | Jordany PIERRE-PAUL, Also Known as Yves Pierre, Also Known as Yves Paul, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. | Jordany Pierre-Paul v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Ge | 2019-07-18 | 18-60275 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wiener, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60275 Document: 00515040417 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT U... | SMITH | WIENER | ELROD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640994/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,037 | SOUTHERN HENS, INCORPORATED v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, Department of Labor | S. Hens, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n | 2019-07-18 | No. 18-60436 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Higginson, Smith", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415474/", "author_raw": ""}]} | HIGGINBOTHAM | HIGGINSON | SMITH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444037/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,379 | Billy Jack CRUTSINGER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. | Billy Crutsinger v. Lorie Davis, Director | 2019-07-19 | 18-70027 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Owen, Graves", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-70027 Document: 00515041587 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/19/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | OWEN | GRAVES | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641379/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,755 | Wood Group Production Services v. DOWCP | 2019-07-22 | 18-60542 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, DUNCAN, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60542 Document: 00515043289 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | CLEMENT | DUNCAN | OLDHAM | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641755/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,758 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory Alan MCKOWN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Gregory McKown | 2019-07-22 | 18-20467 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wiener, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20467 Document: 00515043228 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | WIENER | ELROD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641758/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,760 | Antonio Jubis ZACARIAS; Roberto Barbar, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LIMITED, Defendant Barry L. Rupert; Carol Rupert; Michael Rishmague; Lionel Alessio; Dan Auli Panos, Et Al, Movants - Appellants v. Official Stanford Investors' Committee; Manuel Canabal; Willis, Limited; Willis of Colorado,... | Zacarias v. Official Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd. | 2019-07-22 | 17-11073 CONSOLIDATED WITH 17-11114, 17-11122, 17-11127, 17-11128, 17-11129 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Graves, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888975/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest... | HIGGINBOTHAM | GRAVES | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641760/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,762 | Brandon L. TATUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. | Tatum v. Southern Company Services, Incorporated | 2019-07-22 | 18-40775 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wiener, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40775 Document: 00515042733 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | WIENER | ELROD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641762/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,765 | 20/20 COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Lennox CRAWFORD, Defendant - Appellee 20/20 Communications, Incorporated, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Randall Blevins ; Kathy Digruilles; James Cobble; Brina Healy; Julia Mucheke-Barrett; Peter Saldoriga; Loren Simpson; Charles Smith; Benjamin Stanczik; Freddie ... | 20/20 Communications, Inc. v. Randall Blevins, et | 2019-07-22 | 18-10260; C/w 19-10050 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "James, Smith, Barksdale", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10260 Document: 00515042973 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | JAMES | SMITH | BARKSDALE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641765/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,038 | WOOD GROUP PRODUCTION SERVICES v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, United States Department of Labor Luigi A. Malta | Wood Grp. Prod. Servs. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Compensation Programs | 2019-07-22 | No. 18-60542 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Duncan, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415475/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CLEMENT | DUNCAN | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444038/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,967 | Eleanor KELLER, Individually and on Behalf of All Heirs-At-Law and/or Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Gerald Simpson, Deceased; The Estate of Gerald Simpson, by and Through Glen Simpson, Administrator of Estate, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Darrin FLEMING, Defendant - Appellant | Eleanor Keller v. Attala County | 2019-07-23 | 18-60081 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, Dennis, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60081 Document: 00515045032 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/23/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Uni... | STEWART | DENNIS | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641967/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,139 | Melida Teresa LUNA-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. | Melida Luna-Garcia v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Gen | 2019-07-23 | 16-60847 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 16-60847 Document: 00515046395 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/23/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\... | JOLLY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642139/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,384 | Mary F. EDMISTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. LOUISIANA SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER, Defendant - Appellee. | Mary Edmiston v. LA Small Business Devel Ctrl | 2019-07-24 | 18-31277 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Elrod, Duncan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-31277 Document: 00515047184 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/24/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFT... | HIGGINBOTHAM | ELROD | DUNCAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642384/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,905 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Agustine SANCHEZ-HERNANDEZ, Also Known as Augustin Sanchez, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Agustine Sanchez-Hernandez | 2019-07-25 | 18-40211 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40211 Document: 00515049108 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FO... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,046 | Michael FACIANE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, Defendant - Appellee | Michael Faciane v. Sun Life Asuc Co. of Canada | 2019-07-25 | 18-30918 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Owen, Southwick, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30918 Document: 00515049788 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCU... | OWEN | SOUTHWICK | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643046/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,047 | Lamon Griggs v. Chickasaw County, Mississippi | 2019-07-25 | 18-60401 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, GRAVES, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60401 Document: 00515049917 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED July 25, 2019\n\n ... | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643047/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,048 | In the MATTER OF Kenneth Wayne BENJAMIN, Debtor Kenneth Wayne Benjamin, Appellant v. United States of America, Social Security Administration, Appellee | Benjamin v. United States (In Re Benjamin) | 2019-07-25 | 18-20185 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Graves, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20185 Document: 00515050196 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n... | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643048/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,381 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Walter GLENN, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Walter Glenn | 2019-07-26 | 18-30741 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Barksdale, Southwick, Haynes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30741 Document: 00515050882 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH C... | BARKSDALE | SOUTHWICK | HAYNES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643381/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,385 | In the MATTER OF: WHISTLER ENERGY II, L.L.C., Debtor Nabors Offshore Corporation, Appellant v. Whistler Energy II, L.L.C. ; Apollo Franklin Partnership, L.P. ; Apollo Centre Street Partnership, L.P. ; Apollo Special Opportunities Managed Account, L.P.; Apollo Credit Opportunity Fund III AIV I LP ; ANS Holdings We, Limi... | Nabors Offshore Corp. v. Whistler Energy II (In Re Whistler Energy II, L. L.C.) | 2019-07-26 | 18-30940 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Owen, Southwick, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30940 Document: 00515050813 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | OWEN | SOUTHWICK | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643385/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,386 | Lillian SMITH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee | Lillian Smith v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. | 2019-07-26 | 18-20465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Owen, Southwick, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20465 Document: 00515050911 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH C... | OWEN | SOUTHWICK | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643386/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,446 | United States v. Jonathan Nelson | 2019-07-26 | 18-10007 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, GRAVES, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "REVISED June 27, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643446/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,619,569 | United States v. John DOE | United States v. Doe | 2019-07-26 | No. 18-10007 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Graves, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8598819/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8619569/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,776 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roberto Trinidad DEL CARPIO FRESCAS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Roberto Trinidad Del Carpio Frescas | 2019-07-29 | 17-50245; CONSOLIDATED WITH 17-50686 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Duncan, Oldham, Per Curiam", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-50245 Document: 00515053776 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | CLEMENT | DUNCAN | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643776/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,778 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Cory Dale FIELDS, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Cory Fields | 2019-07-29 | 18-10928 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10928 Document: 00515053711 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR T... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643778/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,990 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Justice DANIEL ; Letrishia A. Andrews, Also Known as Letrishia Ann Andrews, Also Known as Letrishia Andrews Daniel, Defendants-Appellants. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Folarin H. Alabi, Also Known as Folarin Henry Alabi, Also Known as Henry, Defendant... | United States v. Justice Daniel | 2019-07-30 | 17-20541; 17-20543 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20541 Document: 00515055128 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUI... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643990/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,133 | In the MATTER OF: Vera Frances THOMAS Debtor Vera Frances Thomas, Appellant v. Department of Education, Appellee | Thomas v. Dep't of Educ. (In Re Thomas) | 2019-07-30 | 18-11091 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-11091 Document: 00515055252 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR TH... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644133/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,134 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Nygul ANDERSON; Albert Gonzalez, Defendants - Appellants | United States v. Nygul Anderson | 2019-07-30 | 18-11001 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-11001 Document: 00515055300 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FI... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644134/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,616 | LaBrittany K. HASSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUSTON LOUISIANA HOSPITAL COMPANY, L.L.C., Doing Business as Northern Louisiana Medical Center, Defendant-Appellee. | LaBrittany Hassen v. Ruston Louisiana Hospital Co. | 2019-07-31 | 18-30856 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Smith, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889038/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/res... | KING | SMITH | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644616/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,617 | Carlos Manuel AYESTAS, Also Known as Dennis Zelaya Corea, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee | Carlos Ayestas v. William Stephens, Director | 2019-07-31 | 15-70015 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, SOUTHWICK, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 15-70015 Document: 00515057941 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/31/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | SMITH | SOUTHWICK | HO | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644617/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,040 | FIRSTENERGY GENERATION, LLC, a Wholly Owned Subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corporation, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. | Firstenergy Generation, LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. | 2019-07-02 | 18-1654/1782 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Suhrheinrich, Bush, Readler", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0140p.06\n\n... | SUHRHEINRICH | BUSH | READLER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636040/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,626 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott W. SULIK, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Scott Sulik | 2019-07-03 | 18-5978 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Boggs, Moore, Stranch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0141p.06\n\n ... | BOGGS | MOORE | STRANCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636626/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,627 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert B. LEDBETTER (17-3299 & 17-3309); Christopher A. Harris (17-3304 & 17-3306); Rashad A. Liston (17-3302 & 17-3308); Deounte Ussury (17-3289 & 17-3297); Clifford L. Robinson (17-3290), Defendants-Appellants. | United States v. Robert Ledbetter | 2019-07-03 | 17-3309 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Merritt, Clay, Rogers", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0142p.06\n\n ... | MERRITT | CLAY | ROGERS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636627/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,115 | Charles Brian FOX and Megan Fox, Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Hailey Fox; Matthew Fox; Rebecca Fox ; Sarah Fox, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Charles Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc. | 2019-07-05 | 18-5661 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Stranch, Pearson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 3:16-cv-03013-William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | CLAY | STRANCH | PEARSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637115/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,452 | BEVAN & ASSOCIATES, LP A, INC.; Thomas W. Bevan; Patrick M. Walsh, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dave YOST, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Ohio; Thomas H. Bainbridge ; Jodie M. Taylor; Karen L. Gillmor; Stephanie McCloud, Defendants-Appellees. | Bevan & Assocs., LPA v. Dave Yost | 2019-07-08 | 18-3262 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Siler, Cook, Bush", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0144p.06\n\n ... | SILER | COOK | BUSH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637452/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,688 | United States v. Anton Fuller-Ragland | 2019-07-09 | 18-1773 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and BUSH, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Paul L. Nelson, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BOGGS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUB... | BOGGS | BATCHELDER | BUSH | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637688/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,637,689 | Gilberto Pablo LORENZO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. | Gilberto Pablo Lorenzo v. William Barr | 2019-07-09 | 18-3606 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Kethledge", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888888/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9... | CLAY | KETHLEDGE | CLAY | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637689/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,223 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Diego Gonzalez LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellee. | United States v. Diego Lopez | 2019-07-10 | 18-5042 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Boggs, Kethledge, Stranch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0152p.06\n\n ... | BOGGS | KETHLEDGE | STRANCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638223/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,224 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Courtney Shea GILLISPIE, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Courtney Gillispie | 2019-07-10 | 18-5894 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Rogers, Griffin, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0150p.06\n\n ... | ROGERS | GRIFFIN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638224/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,225 | Richard BAATZ, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | Richard Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission | 2019-07-10 | 18-3233 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Thapar, Bush, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0147p.06\n\n ... | THAPAR | BUSH | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638225/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,227 | Marcus Magnum REIGN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lori GIDLEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. | Marcus Magnum Reign v. Lori Gidley | 2019-07-10 | 18-1086 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Rogers, Donald, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0151p.06\n\n ... | ROGERS | DONALD | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638227/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,228 | ERICKSON TRUCKING SERVICE, INC., Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. | Erickson Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. | 2019-07-10 | 18-2283/2380 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Sutton, Bush, Larsen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0149p.06\n\n ... | SUTTON | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638228/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,230 | Dan H. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFELITE GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Dan Wilson v. Safelite Group, Inc. | 2019-07-10 | 18-3408 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: ROGERS, STRANCH, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fi... | ROGERS | STRANCH | THAPAR | 1 | {"ROGERS": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638230/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,725 | Brian David BRUMBACH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brian David Brumbach, Respondent-Appellee. | United States v. Brian Brumbach | 2019-07-11 | 18-5703/5705 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Siler, Batchelder, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0154p.0... | SILER | BATCHELDER | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638725/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,726 | PRIME RATE PREMIUM FINANCE CORPORATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karen E. LARSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Keith A. Larson, Defendant-Appellant. | Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp., Inc. v. Karen Larson | 2019-07-11 | 18-2071 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "McKeague, Thapar, Murphy", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURPHY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0153p.06\n\n ... | MCKEAGUE | THAPAR | MURPHY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638726/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,727 | K.B., BY AND THROUGH Her Natural Parent, Jennifer QASSIS; Lillian Knox-Bender, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. METHODIST HEALTHCARE - MEMPHIS HOSPITALS, Dba Methodist Hospital and Le Bonheur Children's Hospital, Defendant-Appellee. | K.B., by and through her natural parent, Jennifer Qassis v. Methodist Healthcare | 2019-07-11 | 18-6128 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "McKeague, Thapar, Murphy", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0155p.06\n\n ... | MCKEAGUE | THAPAR | MURPHY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638727/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,182 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Anderson RANKIN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. John Rankin | 2019-07-12 | 18-3345 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Sutton, Murphy", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0157p.06\n\n ... | MOORE | SUTTON | MURPHY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639182/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,183 | United States v. Jeffery Havis | 2019-07-12 | 17-5772 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | COLE | DAUGHTREY | MOORE | 2 | CLAY; GIBBONS; SUTTON; GRIFFIN; KETHLEDGE; WHITE; STRANCH; DONALD; THAPAR; BUSH; LARSEN; NALBANDIAN; READLER; MURPHY | {"COLE": ", Chief", "DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "MOORE": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"... | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639183/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,534 | Lamont Bernard HEARD, William M. Johnson, Jamero T. Moses, Anthony Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tom FINCO, Defendant, and Brad Purves, Dietician and Food Service Manager, Defendant-Appellee. | Lamont Heard v. Tom Finco | 2019-07-15 | 18-2371 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Guy, Thapar, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0158p.06\n\n ... | GUY | THAPAR | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639534/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,964 | KNIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HENKEL AG & COMPANY, KGAA, Defendant-Appellee. | Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co. | 2019-07-16 | 18-2189 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Rogers, Donald, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0159p.06\n\n ... | ROGERS | DONALD | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639964/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,397 | Carlo M. CROCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY; James Glanz; Agustin Armendariz; Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr.; Dean Baquet, Defendants-Appellees. | Carlo Croce v. New York Times Co. | 2019-07-17 | 18-4158 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Cook, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0160p.06\n\n ... | MOORE | COOK | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640397/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,731 | Tara L. KEEN, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. Robert C. HELSON, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., Formerly Known as the Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A., as Successor to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee... | Tara Keen v. Robert Helson | 2019-07-18 | 18-6035 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Guy, Thapar, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0161p.06\n\n ... | GUY | THAPAR | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,061 | James WALKER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Walker, Defendant-Appellee. | United States v. James Walker | 2019-07-23 | 17-5782; 17-5783 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: ROGERS, STRANCH, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge Donald recused herself from participation in this decision", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n... | ROGERS | STRANCH | THAPAR | 1 | {"ROGERS": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642061/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,062 | Chris HARTMAN ; Sonja DeVries; Carla Wallace, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jeremy THOMPSON; Jason Drane; Brian Hill, Defendants-Appellees. | Chris Hartman v. Jeremy Thompson | 2019-07-23 | 18-5220 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SUHRHEINRICH, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n F... | SUHRHEINRICH | MOORE | BUSH | 1 | {"SUHRHEINRICH": ", Circuit", "MOORE": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642062/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,363 | STATE of Tennessee, BY AND THROUGH the TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | State of Tenn. v. United States Dep't of State | 2019-07-24 | 18-5478 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Boggs", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 1:17-cv-01040-S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name... | COLE | BOGGS | COLE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642363/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,043 | Edison Alberto CARVAJAL VASQUEZ v. Paola Andrea GAMBA ACEVEDO | Vasquez v. Acevedo | 2019-07-24 | No. 18-5537 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, McKeague, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415481/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BATCHELDER | MCKEAGUE | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444043/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,774 | PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTHWEST OHIO REGION; Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio; Preterm ; Timothy Kress, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Mike DEWINE (17-3866) ; Joseph Deters (17-3867), Defendants-Appellants. | Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. Mike DeWine | 2019-07-25 | 17-3866/3867 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Merritt, Daughtrey, Stranch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0166p.... | MERRITT | DAUGHTREY | STRANCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642774/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,776 | Jamie Lee PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David HEYMES, Et Al., Defendants, David Israel and County of Kalkaska (17-2270); Greg Somers and Mark Uribe (17-2281), Defendants-Appellants. | Jamie Peterson v. David Heymes | 2019-07-25 | 17-2270/2281 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Siler, Kethledge, Oliver", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 1:15-cv-00969-Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | SILER | KETHLEDGE | OLIVER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642776/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,361 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joey D. WISEMAN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Joey Wiseman, Jr. | 2019-07-26 | 18-3904 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Cook, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0169p.06\n\n ... | MOORE | COOK | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643361/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,362 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Davi Sarah BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Davi Bailey | 2019-07-26 | 18-2388 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Larsen, Readler", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LARSEN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0168p.06\n\n ... | CLAY | LARSEN | READLER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643362/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,674 | Anthony NOVAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF PARMA; Kevin Riley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio ; Thomas Connor, Individually and as an Employee of the City of Parma, Ohio, Defendants-Appellants. | Anthony Novak v. City of Parma | 2019-07-29 | 18-3373 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Merritt, Thapar, Readler", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0170p.06\n\n ... | MERRITT | THAPAR | READLER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643674/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,972 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee. | United States v. James Hennessee | 2019-07-30 | 18-5786 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Gibbons", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889020/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/988... | COLE | GIBBONS | COLE | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643972/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,974 | Lonnie Lee OWENS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mike PARRIS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. | Lonnie Owens v. Mike Parris | 2019-07-30 | 17-5488 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "McKeague, Kethledge, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0171p.06\n\n ... | MCKEAGUE | KETHLEDGE | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643974/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,294 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reynaldo PINEDA-DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte | 2019-07-31 | 18-6118 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Cook, Readler", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0175p.06\n\n ... | MOORE | COOK | READLER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644294/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,295 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kitroy Brian BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Kitroy Buchanan | 2019-07-31 | 18-3667 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Sutton, Bush, Larsen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0173p.06\n\n ... | SUTTON | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644295/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,298 | Jorge MORENO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. | Jorge Moreno-Martinez v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-31 | 18-3798 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Griffin, Bush", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0174p.06\n\n ... | COLE | GRIFFIN | BUSH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644298/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,670 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kent MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Kent Morgan | 2019-07-01 | 18-2751 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2751\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635670/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,799 | United States v. Kent Morgan | 2019-07-01 | 18-2751 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2751\nUNITED STATE... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635799/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,802 | George KIEBALA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek BORIS, Defendant-Appellee. | George Kiebala v. Derek Boris | 2019-07-01 | 17-3233 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3233\nGEORGE KIEBALA,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635802/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,810 | George Kiebala v. Derek Boris | 2019-07-01 | 17-3233 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3233\nGEORGE K... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635810/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,061 | Richard A. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. RIVER METALS RECYCLING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Sierra International MacHinery, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC | 2019-07-02 | 18-3034; 18-3141 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Scudder, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3034 & 18-3141\nRICHARD A. CLARK,\n ... | WOOD | SCUDDER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636061/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,145 | Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC | 2019-07-02 | 18-3141 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3034 & 1... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636145/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,146 | EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. | Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co | 2019-07-02 | 18-3392 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3392\nEMMIS COMMUNIC... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636146/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,268 | Emmis Communications Corporati v. Illinois National Insurance Co | 2019-07-02 | 18-3392 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3392\nEMMIS COMMUNIC... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636268/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,341 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valerie FLORES, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Valerie Flores | 2019-07-03 | 18-3249 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636341/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,599 | United States v. Valerie Flores | 2019-07-03 | 18-3249 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636599/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,628 | United States v. Valerie Flores | 2019-07-03 | 18-3249 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636628/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,630 | John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan | 2019-07-03 | 17-2040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2040\nJOHN DOE,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636630/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,631 | Francisco Alberto Romero ARRAZABAL, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-03 | 17-2969 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2969\n\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\nARRAZABAL,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,632 | Francisco Lopez GAMERO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-03 | 17-3198 & 18-1104 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Sykes, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ GAMERO,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636632/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,710 | United States v. Valerie Flores | 2019-07-03 | 18-3249 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3249\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636710/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,711 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Izabela GAWRON, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Izabela Gawron | 2019-07-03 | 18-2608 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Barrett, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BARRETT | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636711/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,713 | John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan | 2019-07-03 | 17-2040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2040\nJOHN DOE,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636713/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,714 | Francisco Romero Arrazabal v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-03 | 17-2969 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2969\n\nFRANCISCO ALBERTO ROMERO\nARRAZABAL,... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636714/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,715 | Francisco Lopez Gamero v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-03 | 18-1104 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-3198 & 18-1104\nFRANCISCO LOPEZ... | FLAUM | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636715/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,748 | United States v. Izabela Gawron | 2019-07-03 | 18-2608 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNI... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636748/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,758 | United States v. Paul Schlieve | 2019-07-03 | 18-3391 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "District Judge William M. Conley", "type": "010combined", "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEV... | DIANE P WOOD | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER | 1 | {"DIANE P WOOD": ", Chief", "FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636758/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,759 | United States v. Izabela Gawron | 2019-07-03 | 18-2608 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2608\nUNI... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636759/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,636,820 | United States v. Paul Schlieve | 2019-07-03 | 18-3391 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "District Judge William M. Conley", "type": "010combined", "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEV... | DIANE P WOOD | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER | 1 | {"DIANE P WOOD": ", Chief", "FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636820/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,637,453 | MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE, LLC, Agent of Wellspring of Milwaukee, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants. | Milwaukee Ctr. for Independence, Inc. v. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC | 2019-07-08 | 18-3205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3205\nMILWAUKEE CENTER FOR\nINDEPENDENCE, INC.,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637453/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,478 | Milwaukee Center for Independe v. Milwaukee Health Care | 2019-07-08 | 18-3205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3205\nMILWAUKEE CENTER F... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,637,755 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Devontay SAWYER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Devontay Sawyer | 2019-07-09 | 18-2923 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637755/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,782 | United States v. Devontay Sawyer | 2019-07-09 | 18-2923 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637782/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,637,783 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claudius L. FINCHER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Claudius Fincher | 2019-07-09 | 18-2520 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Manion, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2520\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637783/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,867 | United States v. Devontay Sawyer | 2019-07-09 | 18-2923 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637867/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,637,868 | United States v. Claudius Fincher | 2019-07-09 | 18-2520 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2520\nUNITED STATES O... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637868/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,638,183 | United States v. Devontay Sawyer | 2019-07-09 | 18-2923 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2923... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638183/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,638,182 | In RE: CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, INC., Debtor. Horace Fox, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Chicago Management Consulting Group, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julia Hathaway, Defendant-Appellant. | Fox v. Hathaway (In Re Chi. Mgmt. Consulting Grp., Inc.) | 2019-07-10 | 17-2354 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Sykes, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2354\nIN RE:\n CHICAGO MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP, ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638182/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,231 | John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan | 2019-07-10 | 17-2040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Acting Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n ... | KENNETH F RIPPLE | DANIEL A MANION | DIANE S SYKES | 1 | {"KENNETH F RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "DANIEL A MANION": ", Circuit", "DIANE S SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638231/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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